From fef0b61e18b9c7475e4d6e67ddfc55db46573f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: marha Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 16:17:11 +0000 Subject: Switched to openssl-1.0.0a --- openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c') diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c index c9757e1d6..a5439d544 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); + + /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ + memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return(1); } @@ -414,7 +417,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) goto err; /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */ - goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; + goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG @@ -444,7 +447,7 @@ printf("\n"); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; #else - goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; + goto err; #endif } /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ @@ -455,14 +458,14 @@ printf("\n"); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; #else - goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; + goto err; #endif } rr->length-=mac_size; i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) { - goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; + goto err; } } @@ -504,14 +507,6 @@ printf("\n"); dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */ return(1); -decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac: - /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, - * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption - * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, - * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this - * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */ - al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: @@ -544,8 +539,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */ - if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) - return 0; + dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) @@ -667,21 +661,25 @@ again: if (rr->length == 0) goto again; /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), - * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records - * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they - * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource - * DoS attack */ + * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it + * cannot be processed at this time. */ if (is_next_epoch) { - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); - dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num); + if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) + { + dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num); + } rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } - if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s)) - return(0); + if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) + { + rr->length = 0; + s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ + goto again; /* get another record */ + } dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */ return(1); @@ -809,7 +807,7 @@ start: * buffer the application data for later processing rather * than dropping the connection. */ - dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0); + dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num); rr->length = 0; goto start; } -- cgit v1.2.3