From c4962abc9b5940cdd3bed920b19334fd269df31b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike DePaulo Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 19:59:47 -0400 Subject: Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1j Conflicts: openssl/Makefile openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h --- openssl/ssl/Makefile | 86 +++++++++-------- openssl/ssl/d1_both.c | 3 + openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c | 10 ++ openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c | 93 ++++++------------ openssl/ssl/dtls1.h | 3 +- openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c | 12 ++- openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c | 21 ++-- openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c | 4 +- openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c | 65 +++---------- openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c | 2 +- openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c | 40 +++++++- openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | 19 +++- openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 113 ++++++++++++---------- openssl/ssl/srtp.h | 4 + openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com | 21 ++-- openssl/ssl/ssl.h | 9 ++ openssl/ssl/ssl3.h | 7 +- openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c | 2 + openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 75 +++++++++++---- openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c | 1 + openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 12 ++- openssl/ssl/tls1.h | 15 +-- 23 files changed, 546 insertions(+), 321 deletions(-) (limited to 'openssl/ssl') diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile index bffd928f5..8dd390e67 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -547,26 +547,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h -s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h -s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h +s3_cbc.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h +s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c +s3_cbc.o: ssl_locl.h s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h @@ -671,28 +672,29 @@ s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h -s3_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h -s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h +s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h +s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h +s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 89cdca806..2e4250fcf 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1492,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Read type and payload length first */ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard */ + if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + hbtype = *p++; n2s(p, payload); if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 6bde16fa2..82ca65392 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -266,6 +266,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN: ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg); break; + case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: + /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol + * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, + * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */ +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION +# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION. +#endif + /* Just one protocol version is supported so far; + * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */ + return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION; default: ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c index ab9c41922..535539ba3 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c @@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name, return 1; } -static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num, - SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr) - { - SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p; - - p=srtp_known_profiles; - while(p->name) - { - if(p->id == profile_num) - { - *pptr=p; - return 0; - } - p++; - } - - return 1; - } - static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles; @@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p, col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) { + if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); + return 1; + } + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE); + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); return 1; } @@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al) { - SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof; - STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr; + SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof; + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; int ct; int mki_len; - int i,j; - int id; - int ret; + int i, srtp_pref; + unsigned int id; /* Length value + the MKI length */ if(len < 3) @@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al return 1; } + srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + s->srtp_profile = NULL; + /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ + srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); - clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null(); - while(ct) { n2s(d,id); ct-=2; len-=2; - if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof)) + /* + * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than + * current match. + * If no profiles have been have been configured then this + * does nothing. + */ + for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof); - } - else - { - ; /* Ignore */ + sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); + if (sprof->id == id) + { + s->srtp_profile = sprof; + srtp_pref = i; + break; + } } } @@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al return 1; } - srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); - - /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been - configured then the outer loop doesn't run - (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1) - and so we just return without doing anything */ - for(i=0;iid==sprof->id) - { - s->srtp_profile=sprof; - *al=0; - ret=0; - goto done; - } - } - } - - ret=0; - -done: - if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt); - - return ret; + return 0; } int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h index e65d50119..192c5deff 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h @@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF +#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION + #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100 #if 0 @@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st } #endif #endif - diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c index 2b93c639d..86ab3de1c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver) if (ver == SSL2_VERSION) return(SSLv2_client_method()); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_client_method()); - else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) +#endif + if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) return(TLSv1_client_method()); else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION) return(TLSv1_1_client_method()); @@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { @@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) s->version=SSL3_VERSION; s->method=SSLv3_client_method(); } - else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) && + else +#endif + if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { s->version=TLS1_VERSION; @@ -736,6 +741,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s) goto err; } + /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ + OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); + if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING) { /* fatal alert */ diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c index 2901a6bd0..93ca7d53c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c @@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver) if (ver == SSL2_VERSION) return(SSLv2_server_method()); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_server_method()); - else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) +#endif + if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) return(TLSv1_server_method()); else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION) return(TLSv1_1_server_method()); @@ -421,6 +423,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } } + /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ + OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { @@ -597,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) if ((type == 2) || (type == 3)) { /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */ + s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version); + if (s->method == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + goto err; + } if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err; @@ -624,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) s->s3->rbuf.left=0; s->s3->rbuf.offset=0; } - if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) - s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method(); - else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) - s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method(); - else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) - s->method = TLSv1_server_method(); - else - s->method = SSLv3_server_method(); #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */ s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1]; #endif diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c index c0bdae549..c63be3052 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c @@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED: ret=s->hit; break; + case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: + return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg); default: break; } @@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p) if (p != NULL) { l=c->id; - if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0); + if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0); p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF; p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF; p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 443a31e74..11f13adbf 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ * */ +#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include "ssl_locl.h" #include @@ -67,37 +68,6 @@ * supported by TLS.) */ #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 -/* Some utility functions are needed: - * - * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other - * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. - * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace - * them with something else on odd CPUs. */ -#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) ) -#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) - -/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ -static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b) - { - a -= b; - return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a); - } - -/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ -static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b) - { - unsigned c = a ^ b; - c--; - return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); - } - /* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. * @@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); rec->length -= padding_length; rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ - return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); -} + return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + } /* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and @@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { - unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i); + unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i]; /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ @@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, } /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, - * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We - * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the - * bits. */ - good &= good >> 4; - good &= good >> 2; - good &= good >> 1; - good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; - good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); - + * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. + */ + good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); rec->length -= padding_length; rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ - return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); + return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); } /* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in @@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) { - unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); - unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); + unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start); + unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size); @@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( b = data[k-header_length]; k++; - is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c); - is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1); + is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c); + is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1); /* If this is the block containing the end of the * application data, and we are at the offset for the * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */ - b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c); + b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b); /* If this the the block containing the end of the * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then * just write zero. */ @@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) { /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ - b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]); + b = constant_time_select_8( + is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b); } block[j] = b; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index ea0c82de4..263e6348c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -326,9 +326,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) break; } #endif - /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ + /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */ /* or PSK */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); @@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) #endif EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned char *param,*p; - int al,i,j,param_len,ok; - long n,alg_k,alg_a; + int al,j,ok; + long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA @@ -1354,36 +1354,48 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); } + /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */ param_len=0; + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + param_len = 2; + if (param_len > n) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; + /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } - if (param_len > n) + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL * characters, the hint is truncated from the first * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a @@ -1395,6 +1407,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } @@ -1407,14 +1420,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; + param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p,i); + + if (i > n - param_len) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1422,14 +1443,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1437,15 +1468,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + + if (1 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 1; + i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); p++; - param_len+=i+1; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1453,14 +1494,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + if (2 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1498,14 +1548,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; + + param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p,i); + + if (i > n - param_len) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1513,14 +1572,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + if (2 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1552,14 +1620,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; + + param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p,i); + + if (i > n - param_len) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1567,14 +1644,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + if (2 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1582,14 +1668,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) } p+=i; + if (2 > n - param_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) + + if (i > n - param_len) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + param_len += i; + if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1641,12 +1736,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) */ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves - * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. + * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We + * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point */ - param_len=3; - if ((param_len > n) || - (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || - ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) + param_len=4; + if (param_len > n) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || + ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); @@ -1688,15 +1790,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ p+=1; - param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); - if ((param_len > n) || + + if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } + param_len += encoded_pt_len; n-=param_len; p+=encoded_pt_len; @@ -1739,7 +1841,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) { if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); + int sigalg; + if (2 > n) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + + sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); /* Should never happen */ if (sigalg == -1) { @@ -1757,7 +1867,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (md == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG @@ -1768,15 +1877,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); } else md = EVP_sha1(); - + + if (2 > n) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } n2s(p,i); n-=2; j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + /* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { /* wrong packet length */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } @@ -1785,6 +1900,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { int num; + unsigned int size; j=0; q=md_buf; @@ -1797,9 +1913,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i); - q+=i; - j+=i; + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size); + q+=size; + j+=size; } i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); @@ -1835,8 +1951,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); } else { - if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */ + /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */ + if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -1844,7 +1960,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); /* still data left over */ if (n != 0) { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } @@ -2846,7 +2961,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; + /* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes + * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte + * is for us for simulating strnlen. */ + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2]; + size_t identity_len; unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; @@ -2860,8 +2979,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, - identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, + identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { @@ -2875,7 +2995,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto psk_err; } - + identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0'; + identity_len = strlen(identity); + if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; @@ -2909,14 +3036,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, - psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); - n = strlen(identity); - s2n(n, p); - memcpy(p, identity, n); - n+=2; + psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); + s2n(identity_len, p); + memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); + n = 2 + identity_len; psk_err = 0; psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c index 996267725..9db45af7e 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code) case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); + case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); default: return(-1); } } - diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c index 4835bef1a..3f1745336 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -3355,6 +3355,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) #endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + + case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: + /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol + * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, + * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */ + if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) + return 1; + /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD + * (not at its highest protocol version). */ + if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version) + { +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION +# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. +#endif + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) + return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) + return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) + return s->version == TLS1_VERSION; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) + return s->version == SSL3_VERSION; + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) + return s->version == SSL2_VERSION; + } + return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ + default: break; } @@ -3714,6 +3741,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) break; #endif #endif + default: return(0); } @@ -3822,10 +3850,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, emask_k = cert->export_mask_k; emask_a = cert->export_mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; - emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; + if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) + { + mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; + emask_k |= SSL_kSRP; + mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; + emask_a |= SSL_aSRP; + } #endif - + #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG /* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/ #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ @@ -4291,4 +4324,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; return alg2; } - diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c index eff7356a3..4c9285f35 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) return(n); } +/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will + * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker + * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause + * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ +#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 + /* Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. @@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) short version; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; + unsigned empty_record_count = 0; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); sess=s->session; @@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n"); s->packet_length=0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) goto again; + if (rr->length == 0) + { + empty_record_count++; + if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + goto again; + } #if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 286750128..c23d98708 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include @@ -410,9 +411,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || + /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) /* With normal PSK Certificates and * Certificate Requests are omitted */ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) @@ -1846,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) n+=2+nr[i]; } - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) @@ -2166,6 +2168,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + int decrypt_len; + unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; + /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { @@ -2213,54 +2219,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n=i; } - i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - - al = -1; - - if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ - } - - if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) - { - /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the - * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the - * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). - * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol - * version instead if the server does not support the requested - * protocol version. - * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ - if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && - (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ + /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because + * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see + * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of + * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the + * case that the decrypt fails. See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack - * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version - * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would - * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext - * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except - * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, - * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ - } + /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + goto err; + decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. + * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ + decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); + + /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct + * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. + * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version + * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks + * are done in constant time and are treated like any other + * decryption error. */ + version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); + version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); + + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as + * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks + * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for + * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the + * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not + * support the requested protocol version. If + * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) + { + unsigned char workaround_good; + workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); + workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); + version_good |= workaround_good; + } + + /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good + * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ + decrypt_good &= version_good; + + /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using + * decrypt_good_mask. */ + for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) + { + p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], + rand_premaster_secret[i]); } - if (al != -1) - { - /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure - * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding - * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ - ERR_clear_error(); - i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; - p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ - goto err; - } - s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, diff --git a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h index c0cf33ef2..24f23309d 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ extern "C" { #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80 0x0005 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 0x0006 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP + int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles); int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles); SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s); @@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s); STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl); SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s); +#endif + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com index 05bda755b..7303bc4dd 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com @@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ $ ENDIF $! $! Define The Different SSL "library" Files. $! -$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ - - "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,s3_cbc,"+ - - "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ - - "t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ - - "d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ - +$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth, s2_srvr, s2_clnt, s2_lib, s2_enc, s2_pkt,"+ - + "s3_meth, s3_srvr, s3_clnt, s3_lib, s3_enc, s3_pkt, s3_both, s3_cbc,"+ - + "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib, s23_pkt,"+ - + "t1_meth, t1_srvr, t1_clnt, t1_lib, t1_enc,"+ - + "d1_meth, d1_srvr, d1_clnt, d1_lib, d1_pkt,"+ - "d1_both,d1_enc,d1_srtp,"+ - "ssl_lib,ssl_err2,ssl_cert,ssl_sess,"+ - "ssl_ciph,ssl_stat,ssl_rsa,"+ - "ssl_asn1,ssl_txt,ssl_algs,"+ - - "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg" + "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg,ssl_utst" $! $ COMPILEWITH_CC5 = "" $! @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $ NEXT_FILE: $! $! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List. $! -$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL) +$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL),"COLLAPSE") $! $! Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List. $! @@ -858,8 +858,11 @@ $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS $ CCEXTRAFLAGS = "" $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS $ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR" -$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN - - CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS +$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" +$ THEN +$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," +$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS +$ ENDIF $! $! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option. $! diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index b73da5ee1..b78a1cce4 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -653,6 +653,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st */ #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L +/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. + * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol + * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */ +#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, * they cannot be used to clear bits. */ @@ -1511,6 +1515,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ +#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 @@ -1621,6 +1626,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83 +#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 + #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ @@ -2379,6 +2386,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 +#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 @@ -2525,6 +2533,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h index 37f19e3ab..85f150409 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -128,9 +128,14 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */ +/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746 + * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */ #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF +/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 + * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */ +#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600 + #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index d2f0dec71..1b7eb47e1 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"}, @@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"}, diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 82a2c8012..3f66fc061 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1387,6 +1387,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; + if (put_cb == NULL) + put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; for (i=0; isrp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ - j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); + j = put_cb(c,p); p+=j; } - /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise - * add SCSV if not renegotiating. - */ - if (p != q && !s->renegotiate) + /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. + * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */ + if (p != q) { - static SSL_CIPHER scsv = + if (!s->renegotiate) { - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 - }; - j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p); - p+=j; + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = + { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = put_cb(&scsv,p); + p+=j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif - } + } + + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) + { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = + { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = put_cb(&scsv,p); + p+=j; + } + } return(p-q); } @@ -1439,11 +1453,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i,n; + if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); - if ((num%n) != 0) + if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return(NULL); @@ -1458,7 +1473,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, for (i=0; is3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) @@ -1478,6 +1493,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, continue; } + /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && + (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && + (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) + { + /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version. + * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */ + if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + if (s->s3) + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + goto err; + } + continue; + } + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); p+=n; if (c != NULL) @@ -2944,15 +2976,26 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) { + CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; #endif - if (ssl->cert != NULL) - ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + if (ocert != NULL) + { + int i; + /* Copy negotiated digests from original */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i; + CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i; + rpk->digest = cpk->digest; + } + ssl_cert_free(ocert); + } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 1427484a3..1923cf3e9 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code) case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); + case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 022a4fb28..d6aff4b68 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) + if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { int el; @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if(s->srtp_profile) + if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; @@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in /* session ticket processed earlier */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) + && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) @@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) @@ -2347,7 +2348,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) + { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 2; + } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h index c992091e3..6ae887646 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h @@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" { #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0 +#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 +#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303 -#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 -#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03 +#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION + +#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 +#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01 -#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02 -#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 -#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 -#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01 +#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 +#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03 #define TLS1_get_version(s) \ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0) @@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" { #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */ #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */ #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */ +#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90 #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */ -- cgit v1.2.3