path: root/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c

/* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */
/*
 * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
 * project.
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 */

#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "cms_lcl.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"

DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)

/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */

int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
{
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
        return 0;
    }
    if (palg)
        *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
    if (pukm)
        *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
    return 1;
}

/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */

STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
        return NULL;
    }
    return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
}

int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
                                        X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
                                        ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
{
    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
        return 0;
    }
    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
    if (issuer)
        *issuer = NULL;
    if (sno)
        *sno = NULL;
    if (keyid)
        *keyid = NULL;
    if (pubalg)
        *pubalg = NULL;
    if (pubkey)
        *pubkey = NULL;
    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
        if (issuer)
            *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
        if (sno)
            *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
        if (keyid)
            *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
        if (pubalg)
            *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
        if (pubkey)
            *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
    } else
        return 0;
    return 1;
}

int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
{
    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
        return -2;
    }
    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
    else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
    return -1;
}

int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
                                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
                                      ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
                                      CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
                                      X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
{
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
        if (issuer)
            *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
        if (sno)
            *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
        if (keyid)
            *keyid = NULL;
        if (tm)
            *tm = NULL;
        if (other)
            *other = NULL;
    } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
        if (keyid)
            *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
        if (tm)
            *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
        if (other)
            *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
        if (issuer)
            *issuer = NULL;
        if (sno)
            *sno = NULL;
    } else
        return 0;
    return 1;
}

int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
                                       X509 *cert)
{
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
    else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
    else
        return -1;
}

int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
    if (kari->pctx) {
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
        kari->pctx = NULL;
    }
    if (!pk)
        return 1;
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
    if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
        goto err;
    kari->pctx = pctx;
    return 1;
 err:
    if (pctx)
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    return 0;
}

EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
        return &ri->d.kari->ctx;
    return NULL;
}

/*
 * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
 * or the encrypted CEK.
 */

static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
                          CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
{
    /* Key encryption key */
    unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
    size_t keklen;
    int rv = 0;
    unsigned char *out = NULL;
    int outlen;
    keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx);
    if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
        return 0;
    /* Derive KEK */
    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
        goto err;
    /* Set KEK in context */
    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
        goto err;
    /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
        goto err;
    out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
    if (!out)
        goto err;
    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
        goto err;
    *pout = out;
    *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
    rv = 1;

 err:
    OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
    if (!rv && out)
        OPENSSL_free(out);
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
    kari->pctx = NULL;
    return rv;
}

int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
                                   CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
{
    int rv = 0;
    unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
    size_t enckeylen;
    size_t ceklen;
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
    enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
    enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
    /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
        goto err;
    /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
    if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
        goto err;
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
    if (ec->key) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
        OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
    }
    ec->key = cek;
    ec->keylen = ceklen;
    cek = NULL;
    rv = 1;
 err:
    if (cek)
        OPENSSL_free(cek);
    return rv;
}

/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
                                         EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
    EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
    int rv = 0;
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
    if (!pctx)
        goto err;
    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
        goto err;
    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
        goto err;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
    if (!pctx)
        goto err;
    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
        goto err;
    kari->pctx = pctx;
    rv = 1;
 err:
    if (!rv && pctx)
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    if (ekey)
        EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
    return rv;
}

/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */

int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
                                EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
{
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;

    ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
    if (!ri->d.kari)
        return 0;
    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;

    kari = ri->d.kari;
    kari->version = 3;

    rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
        M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
        return 0;
    }

    if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
        if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
            return 0;
    } else {
        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
        if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
            return 0;
    }

    /* Create ephemeral key */
    if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
        return 0;

    CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
    rek->pkey = pk;
    return 1;
}

static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
    int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
    /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);

    if (kekcipher) {
        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
            return 0;
        return 1;
    }
    /*
     * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
     * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
     */
    if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
        kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
    else if (keylen <= 16)
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
    else if (keylen <= 24)
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
    else
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
    return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}

/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */

int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
    int i;

    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
        return 0;
    }
    kari = ri->d.kari;
    reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
    /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
    if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
        return 0;
    /*
     * If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
     * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
     */
    if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
        CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
        oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
        oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
        if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
            return 0;
    }
    /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
        return 0;
    /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
        unsigned char *enckey;
        size_t enckeylen;
        rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
            return 0;
        if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
                            kari, 1))
            return 0;
        ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
    }

    return 1;

}