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authorMike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com>2015-03-28 09:50:31 -0400
committerMike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com>2015-03-28 13:13:13 -0400
commit91e3957fb0e38a5d5649f82e5d9f89dd0e85666f (patch)
treefe0992fb4cf6f3c2a5d597557552ae69caccbe70 /openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
parent9073d97eff3f6d3b33450ef3532a826674c7e1e8 (diff)
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Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1m
Conflicts: openssl/Makefile openssl/Makefile.bak openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c410
1 files changed, 208 insertions, 202 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index c2da56f6c..efa1fd3e9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,205 +65,211 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with 0xff data */
- j=tlen-3-flen;
- memset(p,0xff,j);
- p+=j;
- *(p++)='\0';
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with 0xff data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+ memset(p, 0xff, j);
+ p += j;
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i,j;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- p=from;
- if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 01))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- /* scan over padding data */
- j=flen-1; /* one for type. */
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (*p != 0xff) /* should decrypt to 0xff */
- {
- if (*p == 0)
- { p++; break; }
- else {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
- return(-1);
- }
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- if (i == j)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- if (i < 8)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
- return(-1);
- }
- i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
- j-=i;
- if (j > tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return(-1);
- }
- memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j);
-
- return(j);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = from;
+ if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */
+ if (*p == 0) {
+ p++;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ if (i == j) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (i < 8) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
+ j -= i;
+ if (j > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+ return (j);
+}
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int i,j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen-11))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with non-zero random data */
- j=tlen-3-flen;
-
- if (RAND_bytes(p,j) <= 0)
- return(0);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (*p == '\0')
- do {
- if (RAND_bytes(p,1) <= 0)
- return(0);
- } while (*p == '\0');
- p++;
- }
-
- *(p++)='\0';
-
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ do {
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ } while (*p == '\0');
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i;
- /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
-
- if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography
- * Standard", section 7.2.2. */
-
- if (flen > num)
- goto err;
-
- if (num < 11)
- goto err;
-
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (em == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- memset(em, 0, num);
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
-
- found_zero_byte = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < num; i++)
- {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index);
- found_zero_byte |= equals0;
- }
-
- /*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
- * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
- * also fails.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
-
- /* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
- * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */
- msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = num - msg_index;
-
- /* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
- * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
-
- /*
- * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
- * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
- * information at the API boundary.
- * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
- * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
- */
- if (!good)
- {
- mlen = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
-
-err:
- if (em != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(em);
- if (mlen == -1)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
- return mlen;
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i;
+ /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+
+ if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
+ * section 7.2.2.
+ */
+
+ if (flen > num)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (num < 11)
+ goto err;
+
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset(em, 0, num);
+ /*
+ * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+ * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+ * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+ * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+ *
+ * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+ */
+ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
+ for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+ zero_index =
+ constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
+ zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+ * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+ * also fails.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+ */
+ msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+ /*
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
+ * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+
+ /*
+ * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
+ * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
+ * information at the API boundary.
+ * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
+ * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
+ */
+ if (!good) {
+ mlen = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+
+ err:
+ if (em != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(em);
+ if (mlen == -1)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ return mlen;
+}