Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1j

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile
	openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h

23 files changed, 546 insertions, 321 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
index bffd928f5..8dd390e67 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -547,26 +547,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c
+s3_cbc.o: ssl_locl.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -671,28 +672,29 @@ s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
+s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
 ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 89cdca806..2e4250fcf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1492,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	/* Read type and payload length first */
 	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
 		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
 	hbtype = *p++;
 	n2s(p, payload);
 	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 6bde16fa2..82ca65392 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -266,6 +266,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 	case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
 		ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
 		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
+#  error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
+#endif
+		/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
+		 * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
+		return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
 
 	default:
 		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index ab9c41922..535539ba3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
-			       SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
-	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
-	p=srtp_known_profiles;
-	while(p->name)
-		{
-		if(p->id == profile_num)
-			{
-			*pptr=p;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		p++;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
 static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
 		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
 					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
 			{
+			if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+				sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+				return 1;
+				}
+
 			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
 			return 1;
 			}
 
@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
 
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
 	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
         int ct;
         int mki_len;
-	int i,j;
-	int id;
-	int ret;
+	int i, srtp_pref;
+	unsigned int id;
 
          /* Length value + the MKI length */
         if(len < 3)
@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}
 
+	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+	/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+	srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
         
-	clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
-
 	while(ct)
 		{
 		n2s(d,id);
 		ct-=2;
                 len-=2;
 
-		if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+		/*
+		 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+		 * current match.
+		 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+		 * does nothing.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
 			{
-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			; /* Ignore */
+			sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+			if (sprof->id == id)
+				{
+				s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+				srtp_pref = i;
+				break;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}
 
-	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
-	/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
-	 configured then the outer loop doesn't run 
-	 (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
-	 and so we just return without doing anything */
-	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
-		{
-		sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
-
-		for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
-			{
-			cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
-            
-			if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
-				{
-				s->srtp_profile=sprof;
-				*al=0;
-				ret=0;
-				goto done;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	ret=0;
-    
-done:
-	if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
-
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index e65d50119..192c5deff 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 #define DTLS1_VERSION			0xFEFF
+#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION		DTLS1_VERSION
+
 #define DTLS1_BAD_VER			0x0100
 
 #if 0
@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
 }
 #endif
 #endif
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 2b93c639d..86ab3de1c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_client_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_client_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		{
 		/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 		if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
 			{
@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
 			s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
 			}
-		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+		else
+#endif
+		if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
 			{
 			s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
@@ -736,6 +741,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			goto err;
 			}
 
+		/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+		OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
 		if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
 			{
 			/* fatal alert */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 2901a6bd0..93ca7d53c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_server_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_server_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
@@ -421,6 +423,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}
 
+	/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
 		{
@@ -597,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		if (s->method == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
 
@@ -624,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
 			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
 			}
-		if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
-		else
-			s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
 #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
 		s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index c0bdae549..c63be3052 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
 		ret=s->hit;
 		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
 	default:
 		break;
 		}
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
 	if (p != NULL)
 		{
 		l=c->id;
-		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
 		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
 		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
 		p[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 443a31e74..11f13adbf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -67,37 +68,6 @@
  * supported by TLS.) */
 #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
 
-/* Some utility functions are needed:
- *
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
-
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	unsigned c = a ^ b;
-	c--;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
-	}
-
 /* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
  * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
  *
@@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
-}
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+	}
 
 /* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
  * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
@@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
 		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
 		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
@@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 		}
 
 	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
-	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
-	 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
-	 * bits. */
-	good &= good >> 4;
-	good &= good >> 2;
-	good &= good >> 1;
-	good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
-	good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
-
+	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+	 */
+	good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
 
-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
 	}
 
 /* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
@@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
 	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
 	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
-		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
 		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
 		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
@@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 				b = data[k-header_length];
 			k++;
 
-			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
-			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
 			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
 			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
-			b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+                        b =  constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
 			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
 			 * just write zero. */
@@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
 				{
 				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
-				b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+				b = constant_time_select_8(
+					is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
 				}
 			block[j] = b;
 			}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index ea0c82de4..263e6348c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -326,9 +326,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				break;
 				}
 #endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
 			/* or PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
 			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 	unsigned char *param,*p;
-	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
-	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+	int al,j,ok;
+	long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1354,36 +1354,48 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
 		}
 
+	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
 	param_len=0;
+
 	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 
+	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 		{
 		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
 
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		param_len = 2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
 		/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
 		 * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the
 		 * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
 		 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
 		if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
 			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
-		if (param_len > n)
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
 		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
 		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
@@ -1395,6 +1407,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
 		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
 			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}	   
@@ -1407,14 +1420,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
 		{
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1422,14 +1443,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1437,15 +1468,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+
+		if (1 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 1;
+
 		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
 		p++;
-		param_len+=i+1;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1453,14 +1494,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1498,14 +1548,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1513,14 +1572,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1552,14 +1620,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1567,14 +1644,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1582,14 +1668,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1641,12 +1736,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		 */
 
 		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
-		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
+		 * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
 		 */
-		param_len=3;
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
-		    (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
-		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) 
+		param_len=4;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
+		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1688,15 +1790,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
 		p+=1;
-		param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
+
+		if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
 		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
 			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += encoded_pt_len;
 
 		n-=param_len;
 		p+=encoded_pt_len;
@@ -1739,7 +1841,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		{
 		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
-			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			int sigalg;
+			if (2 > n)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
 			/* Should never happen */
 			if (sigalg == -1)
 				{
@@ -1757,7 +1867,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			if (md == NULL)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				goto f_err;
 				}
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
@@ -1768,15 +1877,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 			}
 		else
 			md = EVP_sha1();
-			
+
+		if (2 > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
 		n-=2;
 		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
 
+		/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
 		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
 			{
 			/* wrong packet length */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -1785,6 +1900,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			int num;
+			unsigned int size;
 
 			j=0;
 			q=md_buf;
@@ -1797,9 +1913,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
-				q+=i;
-				j+=i;
+				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
+				q+=size;
+				j+=size;
 				}
 			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
 								pkey->pkey.rsa);
@@ -1835,8 +1951,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-			/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
+		/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
@@ -1844,7 +1960,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		/* still data left over */
 		if (n != 0)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -2846,7 +2961,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 			{
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+			/* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
+			 * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
+			 * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
+			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+			size_t identity_len;
 			unsigned char *t = NULL;
 			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
 			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
@@ -2860,8 +2979,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				goto err;
 				}
 
+			memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
 			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+				identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
 				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
 			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
 				{
@@ -2875,7 +2995,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
 				goto psk_err;
 				}
-
+			identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+			identity_len = strlen(identity);
+			if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
 			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
 			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
 			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
@@ -2909,14 +3036,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			s->session->master_key_length =
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 					s->session->master_key,
-					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
-			n = strlen(identity);
-			s2n(n, p);
-			memcpy(p, identity, n);
-			n+=2;
+					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+			s2n(identity_len, p);
+			memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+			n = 2 + identity_len;
 			psk_err = 0;
 		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
 			if (psk_err != 0)
 				{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 996267725..9db45af7e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 	default:			return(-1);
 		}
 	}
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 4835bef1a..3f1745336 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3355,6 +3355,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 #endif
 
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+		if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+			return 1;
+		/* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
+		 * (not at its highest protocol version). */
+		if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
+			{
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+#  error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+				return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+				return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+				return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+				return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
+			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+				return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
+			}
+		return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+
 	default:
 		break;
 		}
@@ -3714,6 +3741,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
 		break;
 #endif
 #endif
+
 	default:
 		return(0);
 		}
@@ -3822,10 +3850,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
 		emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-		emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+		if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			}
 #endif
-			
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 /*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -4291,4 +4324,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
 		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
 	return alg2;
 	}
-		
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index eff7356a3..4c9285f35 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	return(n);
 	}
 
+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
 /* Call this to get a new input record.
  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
  * or non-blocking IO.
@@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	short version;
 	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 	size_t extra;
+	unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n");
 	s->packet_length=0;
 
 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
-	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+	if (rr->length == 0)
+		{
+		empty_record_count++;
+		if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		goto again;
+		}
 
 #if 0
 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 286750128..c23d98708 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -410,9 +411,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
 			/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
 				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
 				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+				/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
 				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
 				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
 				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -1846,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			n+=2+nr[i];
 			}
 
-		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
 			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
 			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
@@ -2166,6 +2168,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+		int decrypt_len;
+		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+
 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
 			{
@@ -2213,54 +2219,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				n=i;
 			}
 
-		i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
-		al = -1;
-		
-		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
-			}
-
-		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
-			{
-			/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
-			 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
-			 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
-			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
-			 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
-			 * protocol version.
-			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
-			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+		 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+		 * case that the decrypt fails. See
+		 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
 
-				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
-				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
-				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
-				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
-				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
-				}
+		/* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+				      sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+		ERR_clear_error();
+
+		/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+		 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
+		decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+		/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+		 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
+		 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+		 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+		 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+		 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+		 * decryption error. */
+		version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
+		version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
+
+		/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+		 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+		 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+		 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+		 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+		 * support the requested protocol version. If
+		 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
+			{
+			unsigned char workaround_good;
+			workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
+			workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
+			version_good |= workaround_good;
+			}
+
+		/* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
+		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
+		decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
+		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+			{
+			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
 			}
 
-		if (al != -1)
-			{
-			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
-			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
-			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
-			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
-			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-				goto err;
-			}
-	
 		s->session->master_key_length=
 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 				s->session->master_key,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index c0cf33ef2..24f23309d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
 int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
 
+#endif
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
index 05bda755b..7303bc4dd 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
@@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ $ ENDIF
 $!
 $! Define The Different SSL "library" Files.
 $!
-$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ -
-           "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,s3_cbc,"+ -
-	    "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ -
-	    "t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ -
-	    "d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ -
+$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth, s2_srvr, s2_clnt, s2_lib, s2_enc, s2_pkt,"+ -
+	    "s3_meth, s3_srvr, s3_clnt, s3_lib, s3_enc, s3_pkt, s3_both, s3_cbc,"+ -
+	    "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,        s23_pkt,"+ -
+	    "t1_meth, t1_srvr, t1_clnt, t1_lib, t1_enc,"+ -
+	    "d1_meth, d1_srvr, d1_clnt, d1_lib, d1_pkt,"+ -
 	    "d1_both,d1_enc,d1_srtp,"+ -
 	    "ssl_lib,ssl_err2,ssl_cert,ssl_sess,"+ -
 	    "ssl_ciph,ssl_stat,ssl_rsa,"+ -
 	    "ssl_asn1,ssl_txt,ssl_algs,"+ -
-	    "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg"
+	    "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg,ssl_utst"
 $!
 $ COMPILEWITH_CC5 = ""
 $!
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $ NEXT_FILE:
 $!
 $! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
 $!
-$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL)
+$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL),"COLLAPSE")
 $!
 $! Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List.
 $!
@@ -858,8 +858,11 @@ $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
 $ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
 $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
 $ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
-$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
-	CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
+$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
+$ THEN
+$     IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
+$     CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
+$ ENDIF
 $!
 $! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
 $!
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index b73da5ee1..b78a1cce4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -653,6 +653,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
  */
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
 
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
  * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -1511,6 +1515,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
 #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
 #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY     TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
 
 #define SSL_ERROR_NONE			0
 #define SSL_ERROR_SSL			1
@@ -1621,6 +1626,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS		82
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83
 
+#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION		119
+
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
 #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -2379,6 +2386,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK			 373
 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
@@ -2525,6 +2533,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED		 1021
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR			 1051
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION		 1060
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	 1086
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY		 1071
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR		 1080
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION		 1100
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index 37f19e3ab..85f150409 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
 #define SSL3_CK_SCSV				0x030000FF
 
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
+#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV			0x03005600
+
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5			0x03000001
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA			0x03000002
 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 			0x03000003
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index d2f0dec71..1b7eb47e1 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 82a2c8012..3f66fc061 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1387,6 +1387,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 
 	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
 	q=p;
+	if (put_cb == NULL)
+		put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
 
 	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
 		{
@@ -1411,24 +1413,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
 		    continue;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+		j = put_cb(c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
-	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
-	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
-	 */
-	if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
+	/* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
+	 * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
+	if (p != q)
 		{
-		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+		if (!s->renegotiate)
 			{
-			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-			};
-		j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
-		p+=j;
+			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+				{
+				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+				};
+			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+			p+=j;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-		fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+			fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
 #endif
-		}
+			}
+
+		if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+			{
+			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+				{
+				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+				};
+			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+			p+=j;
+			}
+ 		}
 
 	return(p-q);
 	}
@@ -1439,11 +1453,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	int i,n;
+
 	if (s->s3)
 		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 
 	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
-	if ((num%n) != 0)
+	if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
 		return(NULL);
@@ -1458,7 +1473,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 
 	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
 		{
-		/* Check for SCSV */
+		/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
 		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
 			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
 			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
@@ -1478,6 +1493,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 			continue;
 			}
 
+		/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+		if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+			{
+			/* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
+			 * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
+			if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+				if (s->s3)
+					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			continue;
+			}
+
 		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
 		p+=n;
 		if (c != NULL)
@@ -2944,15 +2976,26 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
 
 SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
 	{
+	CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
 	if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
 		return ssl->ctx;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
 #endif
-	if (ssl->cert != NULL)
-		ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
 	ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+	if (ocert != NULL)
+		{
+		int i;
+		/* Copy negotiated digests from original */
+		for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+			{
+			CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
+			CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
+			rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
+			}
+		ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1427484a3..1923cf3e9 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
 	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
 	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
 					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 022a4fb28..d6aff4b68 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
 
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(s->srtp_profile)
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
                 {
                 int el;
 
@@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+			 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
 			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
                         if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -2347,7 +2348,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 		return 2;
+		}
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
index c992091e3..6ae887646 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {
 
 #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES	0
 
+#define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION			0x0302
 #define TLS1_2_VERSION			0x0303
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03
+#define TLS_MAX_VERSION			TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
 
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION			0x0302
 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
 #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR		0x02
 
-#define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03
 
 #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
 		((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION	70	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	71	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR		80	/* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	86	/* fatal */
 #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED		90
 #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION	100
 /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */