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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2014-04-14 23:15:59 +0200
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2014-04-14 23:15:59 +0200
commit242d48135a12fc9167430f391ba0d27d9ad44c6b (patch)
tree95c65b0c4b195842adfd8dcf4c10c8f46b24e044 /openssl
parentd2ad10d03be8e6d4b150bbdf2a28ea3d5a18a2ed (diff)
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Updated openssl to version 1.0.1g
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl')
-rw-r--r--openssl/CHANGES29
-rw-r--r--openssl/Configure2
-rw-r--r--openssl/FAQ3
-rw-r--r--openssl/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--openssl/Makefile.org4
-rw-r--r--openssl/NEWS7
-rw-r--r--openssl/README2
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/apps.c6
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/crl.c18
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/dgst.c4
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/ecparam.c4
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/req.c13
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h11
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c52
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c27
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c1
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c88
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/symhacks.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c5
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/config.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod5
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod9
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/req.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod16
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod4
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod7
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod4
-rw-r--r--openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod2
-rw-r--r--openssl/e_os.h7
-rw-r--r--openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c19
-rw-r--r--openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat2
-rw-r--r--openssl/openssl.spec2
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_both.c26
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/kssl.h9
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c4
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com4
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl.h2
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c46
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/tls1.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/util/libeay.num1
-rw-r--r--openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl8
-rw-r--r--openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl7
65 files changed, 425 insertions, 113 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES
index 9302f586a..4fcfd1d4b 100644
--- a/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,35 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure
index daff8e679..de78469b9 100644
--- a/openssl/Configure
+++ b/openssl/Configure
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ my %table=(
# 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
"VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
# Unified CE target
-"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
"VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
# Borland C++ 4.5
diff --git a/openssl/FAQ b/openssl/FAQ
index 35780f807..59d135396 100644
--- a/openssl/FAQ
+++ b/openssl/FAQ
@@ -768,6 +768,9 @@ openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
more active team members (e.g. Steve).
+Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
+considered to be security issues.
+
[PROG] ========================================================================
* Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile b/openssl/Makefile
index 0709da035..4a40b701d 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.1f
+VERSION=1.0.1g
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -304,8 +304,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
- touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile.org b/openssl/Makefile.org
index a9e27273d..c92806f92 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile.org
+++ b/openssl/Makefile.org
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
- touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \
diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS
index 909fea96c..ed486d146 100644
--- a/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,8 +5,15 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
+ o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+ o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README
index 05b670c5d..10b74d19d 100644
--- a/openssl/README
+++ b/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c
index 1096eee4c..b76db10a5 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/apps.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c
@@ -586,12 +586,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify,
if (ok >= 0)
ok = UI_add_input_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buf,
- PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1);
+ PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1);
if (ok >= 0 && verify)
{
buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buff,
- PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1, buf);
+ PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1, buf);
}
if (ok >= 0)
do
@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ double app_tminterval(int stop,int usertime)
if (proc==NULL)
{
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+ if (check_winnt())
proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,FALSE,
GetCurrentProcessId());
if (proc==NULL) proc = (HANDLE)-1;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/crl.c b/openssl/apps/crl.c
index c395b2afd..8797d300c 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/crl.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/crl.c
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static const char *crl_usage[]={
" -in arg - input file - default stdin\n",
" -out arg - output file - default stdout\n",
" -hash - print hash value\n",
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+" -hash_old - print old-style (MD5) hash value\n",
+#endif
" -fingerprint - print the crl fingerprint\n",
" -issuer - print issuer DN\n",
" -lastupdate - lastUpdate field\n",
@@ -108,6 +111,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int informat,outformat;
char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL;
int hash=0,issuer=0,lastupdate=0,nextupdate=0,noout=0,text=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ int hash_old=0;
+#endif
int fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0;
const char **pp;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
@@ -192,6 +198,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
text = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash") == 0)
hash= ++num;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash_old") == 0)
+ hash_old= ++num;
+#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nameopt") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -304,6 +314,14 @@ bad:
BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
X509_NAME_hash(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ if (hash_old == i)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
+ X509_NAME_hash_old(
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
+ }
+#endif
if (lastupdate == i)
{
BIO_printf(bio_out,"lastUpdate=");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/dgst.c b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
index 81bd870f9..f4aec779c 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/dgst.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
@@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (do_verify)
- r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+ r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
else
- r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+ r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
if (!r)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ecparam.c b/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
index 465480bed..976ebef12 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
* in the asn1 der encoding
* possible values: named_curve (default)
* explicit
- * -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are choosen do not use the seed
+ * -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
* -genkey - generate ec key
* -rand file - files to use for random number input
* -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ bad:
BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
" explicit\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed if 'explicit'"
- " parameters are choosen do not"
+ " parameters are chosen do not"
" use the seed\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey generate ec"
" key\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/req.c b/openssl/apps/req.c
index 85526581c..5e034a85e 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/req.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/req.c
@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ bad:
if (inrand)
app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
+ if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
+ {
+ newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+
if (keyalg)
{
genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey,
@@ -652,12 +657,6 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
- if (newkey <= 0)
- {
- if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
- newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
- }
-
if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"private key length is too short,\n");
@@ -1649,6 +1648,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type,
keylen = atol(p + 1);
*pkeylen = keylen;
}
+ else
+ keylen = *pkeylen;
}
else if (p)
paramfile = p + 1;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
index 41f2e46f6..bd7f45b85 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ _vpaes_consts:
.Lk_dsbo: # decryption sbox final output
.quad 0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
.quad 0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
-.asciz "Vector Permutaion AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.asciz "Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
.align 64
.size _vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
___
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index 1a30bf119..aa60203ba 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),"unknown signature algorithm"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG) ,"unknown tag"},
-{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unkown format"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unknown format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
index b7dce5c1a..2227b2b52 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
static void xopenlog(BIO* bp, char* name, int level)
{
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+ if (check_winnt())
bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL,name);
else
bp->ptr = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
index f34248ec4..21a1a3fe3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
/* Deprecated versions */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+ do { \
+ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+ assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+ } while(0)
+
#else /* !BN_DEBUG */
#define bn_pollute(a)
#define bn_check_top(a)
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 7a5676de6..5461e6ee7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
}
return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
}
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+ {
+ BN_ULONG t;
+ int i;
+
+ bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+ bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+ assert(a != b);
+ assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+ assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+ condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+ t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+ a->top ^= t;
+ b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+ do { \
+ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+ a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ } while (0)
+
+
+ switch (nwords) {
+ default:
+ for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++)
+ BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+ }
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
index b62d1bfac..ba08279a0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -465,8 +465,6 @@ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
if (!pcerts)
return 0;
- if (!pcerts)
- return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++)
{
cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 304c6b706..0b77d8b7d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal (const char *fmta,...)
#if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
/* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
{ HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0,_T("OPENSSL"));
const TCHAR *pmsg=buf;
ReportEvent(h,EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE,0,0,0,1,0,&pmsg,0);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
index 26f4a783f..1c575dc47 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
@@ -208,11 +208,15 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG
return ret;
}
+
/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
* point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
* Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
* GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
*/
static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -246,6 +250,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
x2 = &r->X;
z2 = &r->Y;
+ bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -270,16 +279,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
word = scalar->d[i];
while (mask)
{
- if (word & mask)
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- }
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+ if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
mask >>= 1;
}
mask = BN_TBIT;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
index 27846edb1..95c858960 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
load_dir, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
goto notfound;
return iterator;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 72a2a6727..ac6d441aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
}
/* we fell off the end without starting */
- if (j == i)
+ if ((j == i) && (num == 0))
{
/* Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on
* reading until a new line. */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 250063de8..e1dc2b0f4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -810,7 +810,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
GCM_MUL(ctx,Yi);
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
}
@@ -818,7 +822,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EK0.c,ctx->key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -913,7 +921,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -947,7 +959,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -969,7 +985,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -988,7 +1008,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1004,7 +1028,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1022,7 +1050,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -1066,7 +1098,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1103,7 +1139,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1123,7 +1163,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1141,7 +1185,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
@@ -1159,7 +1207,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1180,7 +1232,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -1225,7 +1281,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1247,7 +1307,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
GHASH(ctx,out,GHASH_CHUNK);
@@ -1262,7 +1326,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += (unsigned int)j;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
in += i;
@@ -1282,7 +1350,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1324,7 +1396,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1349,7 +1425,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
out += GHASH_CHUNK;
@@ -1375,7 +1455,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += (unsigned int)j;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
out += i;
@@ -1386,7 +1470,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index b27a5bb8c..ebe718072 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000106fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000107fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g-fips 7 Apr 2014"
#else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index dd2916372..aee1c30b0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
+ if (!num)
+ return;
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index 5d134e186..34ffcd23f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static void readscreen(void)
int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
return;
/* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
index 07a412f84..bd2f000d5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
#undef SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
+#undef ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported
+#define ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported ssl3_cbc_record_digest_support
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_late
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_early
/* Hack some long ENGINE names */
#undef ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 27ca5150c..c6602dae4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
s=dir;
p=s;
- for (;;p++)
+ do
{
if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0'))
{
@@ -264,9 +264,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
return 0;
}
}
- if (*p == '\0')
- break;
- }
+ } while (*p++ != '\0');
return 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5195ffef2..920066aeb 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1462,10 +1462,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
index b7943e813..01bf09254 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
int ret = 1;
/*
- * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+ * On OpenSSL 1.0.0+ only:
* for streaming set CMS_STREAM
*/
int flags = CMS_STREAM;
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
index 7ddf65326..9fee0a3eb 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
goto err;
/* Decrypt S/MIME message */
- if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, out, NULL, 0))
+ if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, NULL, out, 0))
goto err;
ret = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
index 42f762034..6823c34a0 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
int ret = 1;
/* For simple S/MIME signing use CMS_DETACHED.
- * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+ * On OpenSSL 1.0.0 only:
* for streaming detached set CMS_DETACHED|CMS_STREAM
* for streaming non-detached set CMS_STREAM
*/
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
index ace34b62b..25c5381b9 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ variable points to a section containing further ENGINE configuration
information.
The section pointed to by B<engines> is a table of engine names (though see
-B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration informations
+B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration information
specific to each ENGINE.
Each ENGINE specific section is used to set default algorithms, load
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
index a40c873b9..1ad76a5f8 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ don't output the encoded version of the CRL.
output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in
a directory by issuer name.
+=item B<-hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the CRL issuer name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
=item B<-issuer>
output the issuer name.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
index ba6dc4689..5c7b45d4e 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ PKCS#8 private key format use the B<pkcs8> command.
This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses
an ASN.1 DER encoded SEC1 private key. When used with a public key it
-uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structur as specified in RFC 3280.
+uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as specified in RFC 3280.
The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64
encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key
PKCS#8 format is also accepted.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
index f69a5c5a4..8e0d91798 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ by default.
The filename to write certificates and private keys to, standard output by
default. They are all written in PEM format.
-=item B<-pass arg>, B<-passin arg>
+=item B<-passin arg>
the PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about
the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in
@@ -75,10 +75,15 @@ L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
=item B<-passout arg>
-pass phrase source to encrypt any outputed private keys with. For more
+pass phrase source to encrypt any outputted private keys with. For more
information about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section
in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+=item B<-password arg>
+
+With -export, -password is equivalent to -passout.
+Otherwise, -password is equivalent to -passin.
+
=item B<-noout>
this option inhibits output of the keys and certificates to the output file
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
index ff48bbdf2..0730d117b 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Reverses effect of B<-asn1-kludge>
=item B<-newhdr>
-Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputed
+Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted
request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.
=item B<-batch>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index 4ebf7b585..3215b2e8c 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ s_client - SSL/TLS client program
B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-connect host:port>]
[B<-verify depth>]
+[B<-verify_return_error>]
[B<-cert filename>]
[B<-certform DER|PEM>]
[B<-key filename>]
@@ -90,6 +91,11 @@ Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
+=item B<-verify_return_error>
+
+Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
+abort the handshake with a fatal error.
+
=item B<-CApath directory>
The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
@@ -286,6 +292,13 @@ Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions
these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the
B<-no_sslv2> option.
+The B<s_client> utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the
+handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will
+accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test
+applications should B<not> do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM
+attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error>
+option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake.
+
=head1 BUGS
Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of
@@ -293,9 +306,6 @@ the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather
hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical
SSL client program would be much simpler.
-The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification
-fails.
-
The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report
information whenever a session is renegotiated.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
index 3e503e17e..6758ba308 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ by using an appropriate certificate.
=item B<-dcertform format>, B<-dkeyform format>, B<-dpass arg>
-addtional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively.
+additional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively.
=item B<-nocert>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
index 7fb6caa96..d6aa47d31 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ switch always overrides the settings in the config file.
This is the main section and it specifies the name of another section
that contains all the options for the B<-reply> command. This default
-section can be overriden with the B<-section> command line switch. (Optional)
+section can be overridden with the B<-section> command line switch. (Optional)
=item B<oid_file>
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ included. Default is no. (Optional)
=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
B<OPENSSL_CONF> contains the path of the configuration file and can be
-overriden by the B<-config> command line option.
+overridden by the B<-config> command line option.
=head1 EXAMPLES
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
index b05957bee..56db985c4 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ The name of an EGD socket to get random data from. (Optional)
=item [request]...
List of files containing B<RFC 3161> DER-encoded time stamp requests. If no
-requests are specifed only one request will be sent to the server and it will be
+requests are specified only one request will be sent to the server and it will be
read from the standard input. (Optional)
=back
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
index 5f51fdb47..da06e4446 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ necessary parameters are set, by re-creating the blinding parameters.
BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the blinding factor B<A>.
If B<r> is not NULL a copy the inverse blinding factor B<Ai> will be
-returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared amoung
+returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared among
several threads). BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the
inverse blinding factor B<Ai>. If B<r> is not NULL it will be used as
the inverse blinding.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
index 34443045f..828ecf529 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
@@ -52,8 +52,11 @@ ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and
ERR_get_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags
associated with the error code in *B<data>
and *B<flags>, unless these are B<NULL>. *B<data> contains a string
-if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING>. If it has been allocated by OPENSSL_malloc(),
-*B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_MALLOCED> is true.
+if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING> is true.
+
+An application B<MUST NOT> free the *B<data> pointer (or any other pointers
+returned by these functions) with OPENSSL_free() as freeing is handled
+automatically by the error library.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
index d375c46e0..0ea7d55c0 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine
EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. B<type> is
the cipher to derive the key and IV for. B<md> is the message digest to use.
-The B<salt> paramter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to
+The B<salt> parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to
an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. B<data> is a buffer containing
B<datal> bytes which is used to derive the keying data. B<count> is the
iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to B<key>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 8271d3dfc..1c4bf184a 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ does not remain in memory.
EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a
similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex and
-EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> paramter does not need to be
+EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> parameter does not need to be
initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation.
EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() behave in a
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index b68eece03..46cac2bea 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
log it for debugging purposes.
-By default some addtional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
+By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set
they are enabled.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
index d5b189611..54414a3f6 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ handle PKCS#8 format encrypted and unencrypted keys too.
PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey()
write a private key in an EVP_PKEY structure in PKCS#8
EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format using PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption
-algorithms. The B<cipher> argument specifies the encryption algoritm to
+algorithms. The B<cipher> argument specifies the encryption algorithm to
use: unlike all other PEM routines the encryption is applied at the
PKCS#8 level and not in the PEM headers. If B<cipher> is NULL then no
encryption is used and a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo structure is used instead.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
index 81566839d..6fd6c0321 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification
failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
more informational output.
-All verification errors are printed, informations about the certificate chain
-are printed on request.
+All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
+is printed on request.
The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
certificates.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
index 011a022a1..fe013085d 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of:
=over 4
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
No shutdown setting, yet.
diff --git a/openssl/e_os.h b/openssl/e_os.h
index 79c139257..6a0aad1de 100644
--- a/openssl/e_os.h
+++ b/openssl/e_os.h
@@ -368,6 +368,13 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
# define DEFAULT_HOME "C:"
# endif
+/* Avoid Windows 8 SDK GetVersion deprecated problems */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1800
+# define check_winnt() (1)
+#else
+# define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#endif
+
#else /* The non-microsoft world */
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
index 8c278aa64..91b2ce882 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
@@ -180,8 +180,6 @@ int start_hash(gost_hash_ctx *ctx)
*/
int hash_block(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,const byte *block, size_t length)
{
- const byte *curptr=block;
- const byte *barrier=block+(length-32);/* Last byte we can safely hash*/
if (ctx->left)
{
/*There are some bytes from previous step*/
@@ -196,24 +194,25 @@ int hash_block(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,const byte *block, size_t length)
{
return 1;
}
- curptr=block+add_bytes;
+ block+=add_bytes;
+ length-=add_bytes;
hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,ctx->remainder);
add_blocks(32,ctx->S,ctx->remainder);
ctx->len+=32;
ctx->left=0;
}
- while (curptr<=barrier)
+ while (length>=32)
{
- hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,curptr);
+ hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,block);
- add_blocks(32,ctx->S,curptr);
+ add_blocks(32,ctx->S,block);
ctx->len+=32;
- curptr+=32;
+ block+=32;
+ length-=32;
}
- if (curptr!=block+length)
+ if (length)
{
- ctx->left=block+length-curptr;
- memcpy(ctx->remainder,curptr,ctx->left);
+ memcpy(ctx->remainder,block,ctx->left=length);
}
return 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat b/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
index ff8b19ccf..8768dc61b 100644
--- a/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
+++ b/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
perl util\mkfiles.pl >MINFO
-cmd /c "nasm -f win64 -v" >NUL: 2>&1
+cmd /c "nasm -f win64 -v" >NUL 2>&1
if %errorlevel% neq 0 goto ml64
perl ms\uplink-x86_64.pl nasm > ms\uptable.asm
diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec
index 9436e9984..44147ce64 100644
--- a/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1f
+Version: 1.0.1g
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 7a5596a6b..2e8cf681e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
int r;
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
* message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
* payload, plus padding
*/
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ buffer, write_length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
index 8242fd5ee..e4df84307 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <krb5.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+/* These can sometimes get redefined indirectly by krb5 header files
+ * after they get undefed in ossl_typ.h
+ */
+#undef X509_NAME
+#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
+#undef OCSP_REQUEST
+#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
+#endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 84670b6c1..2b93c639d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
if (send_time)
{
- unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
unsigned char *p = result;
l2n(Time, p);
return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 52efed328..9ac19c05f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
- for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
index a77f7707f..c7bc6fbd7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ $!
$! Define The Different SSL "library" Files.
$!
$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ -
- "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,"+ -
+ "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,s3_cbc,"+ -
"s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ -
"t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ -
"d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ -
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ $ CCDEFS = "TCPIP_TYPE_''P4'"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
-$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
+$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$!
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index dece04de0..7219a0e64 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
*/
unsigned int max_send_fragment;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* Engine to pass requests for client certs to
*/
ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 56db83430..0c4cddedf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -986,7 +986,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
}
else
{
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
+ return -1;
mac_ctx = &hmac;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 33afdeba3..bddffd92c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -662,6 +662,36 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+ /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ *
+ * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+ * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+ */
+ {
+ int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+ * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+ * not. */
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ hlen -= 5;
+ if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+ {
+ hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 0;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+ s2n(hlen, ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+ ret += hlen;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
return p;
@@ -1261,7 +1291,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
if (size < 5)
@@ -2558,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
index c39c267f0..c992091e3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ extern "C" {
/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat 15
+/* ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21
+
/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
diff --git a/openssl/util/libeay.num b/openssl/util/libeay.num
index 6debdb60a..aa86b2b8b 100644
--- a/openssl/util/libeay.num
+++ b/openssl/util/libeay.num
@@ -3511,6 +3511,7 @@ BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION:
d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
CRYPTO_memcmp 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_consttime_swap 3907 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
index 1f1e13fb4..b41bb45e8 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ $out_def="out32";
$tmp_def="tmp32";
$inc_def="inc32";
#enable max error messages, disable most common warnings
-$cflags="-DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp ";
+$cflags="-DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -D_timeb=timeb -D_ftime=ftime ";
if ($debug)
{
$cflags.="-Od -y -v -vi- -D_DEBUG";
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ $efile="";
$exep='.exe';
if ($no_sock)
{ $ex_libs=""; }
-else { $ex_libs="cw32mt.lib import32.lib"; }
+else { $ex_libs="cw32mt.lib import32.lib crypt32.lib ws2_32.lib"; }
# static library stuff
$mklib='tlib /P64';
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ $lfile='';
$shlib_ex_obj="";
$app_ex_obj="c0x32.obj";
-$asm='nasmw -f obj -d__omf__';
-$asm.=" /Zi" if $debug;
+$asm=(`nasm -v 2>NUL` ge `nasmw -v 2>NUL`?"nasm":"nasmw")." -f obj -d__omf__";
+$asm.=" -g" if $debug;
$afile='-o';
$bn_mulw_obj='';
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index 6c550f54a..3705fc73b 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ $zlib_lib="zlib1.lib";
$l_flags =~ s/-L("\[^"]+")/\/libpath:$1/g;
$l_flags =~ s/-L(\S+)/\/libpath:$1/g;
+my $ff = "";
+
# C compiler stuff
$cc='cl';
if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/)
@@ -126,6 +128,7 @@ else # Win32
$base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
$lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
+ $ff = "/fixed";
$opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox /O2 /Ob2';
$dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
$lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
@@ -318,7 +321,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
+ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $ff /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
$ret.="$name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs \$(EX_LIBS) ";
$ret.="\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $ex\n<<\n";
}
@@ -355,7 +358,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) /map $efile$target @<<\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) $ff /map $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files \$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $libs\n<<\n";
}
else