Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/released'

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile

54 files changed, 656 insertions, 212 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES
index a0de5abb6..67ff293f3 100644
--- a/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,73 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+     [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+     [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+     [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
 
   *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
@@ -906,8 +973,67 @@
 
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
   
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+ 
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
 
   *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
      for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure
index f07c31455..eb8744d6b 100644
--- a/openssl/Configure
+++ b/openssl/Configure
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ my %table=(
 "cc",		"cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
 
 ####VOS Configurations
-"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
-"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
 
 #### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups
 # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ my %table=(
 "darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 
 ##### A/UX
diff --git a/openssl/FAQ b/openssl/FAQ
index fe54856a6..2a271ed67 100644
--- a/openssl/FAQ
+++ b/openssl/FAQ
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0e was released on Sep 6th, 2011.
+OpenSSL 1.0.0g was released on Jan 18th, 2012.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS
index 672810dcc..1264201ef 100644
--- a/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,18 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
 
       o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README
index 898437989..6144ddf01 100644
--- a/openssl/README
+++ b/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com b/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com
index 794e1de62..b0d1fdaac 100644
--- a/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com
+++ b/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ $! P2: Zlib object library path (optional).
 $!
 $! Input:	[.UTIL]LIBEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO[32].OLB
 $!		[.UTIL]SSLEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL[32].OLB
+$!		[.CRYPTO.xxx]OPENSSLCONF.H
 $! Output:	[.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO_SHR[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE
 $!		[.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL_SRH[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE
 $!
@@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ $     endif
 $   endif
 $ endif
 $!
+$! ----- Prepare info for processing: disabled algorithms info
+$ gosub read_disabled_algorithms_info
+$!
 $ ZLIB = p2
 $ zlib_lib = ""
 $ if (ZLIB .nes. "")
@@ -384,8 +388,7 @@ $	alg_i = alg_i + 1
 $       if alg_entry .eqs. "" then goto loop2
 $       if alg_entry .nes. ","
 $       then
-$         if alg_entry .eqs. "KRB5" then goto loop ! Special for now
-$	  if alg_entry .eqs. "STATIC_ENGINE" then goto loop ! Special for now
+$	  if disabled_algorithms - ("," + alg_entry + ",") .nes disabled_algorithms then goto loop
 $         if f$trnlnm("OPENSSL_NO_"+alg_entry) .nes. "" then goto loop
 $	  goto loop2
 $       endif
@@ -452,3 +455,22 @@ $     endif
 $   endloop_rvi:
 $   close vf
 $   return
+$
+$! The disabled algorithms reader
+$ read_disabled_algorithms_info:
+$   disabled_algorithms = ","
+$   open /read cf [.CRYPTO.'ARCH']OPENSSLCONF.H
+$   loop_rci:
+$     read/err=endloop_rci/end=endloop_rci cf rci_line
+$     rci_line = f$edit(rci_line,"TRIM,COMPRESS")
+$     rci_ei = 0
+$     if f$extract(0,9,rci_line) .eqs. "# define " then rci_ei = 2
+$     if f$extract(0,8,rci_line) .eqs. "#define " then rci_ei = 1
+$     if rci_ei .eq. 0 then goto loop_rci
+$     rci_e = f$element(rci_ei," ",rci_line)
+$     if f$extract(0,11,rci_e) .nes. "OPENSSL_NO_" then goto loop_rci
+$     disabled_algorithms = disabled_algorithms + f$extract(11,999,rci_e) + ","
+$     goto loop_rci
+$   endloop_rci:
+$   close cf
+$   return
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c
index 6b8b0ef8f..5d11948bb 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ca.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c
@@ -2536,7 +2536,7 @@ static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db)
 			
 	/* Make it Upper Case */
 	for (i=0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++)
-		row[DB_serial][i] = toupper(row[DB_serial][i]);
+		row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]);
 	
 
 	ok=1;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c
index d29a88490..d15925a59 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/cms.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-skeyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf b/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
index 20ed61bc3..45e46a0fb 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
+++ b/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=
 
-commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max			= 64
 
 emailAddress			= Email Address
diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf b/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf
index 9d2cd5bfa..18760c6e6 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ b/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=
 
-commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max			= 64
 
 emailAddress			= Email Address
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
index 34ad2cec7..53be0f8f8 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			psk_key=*(++argv);
 			for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++)
                                 {
-                                if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[j]))
+                                if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j]))
                                         continue;
                                 BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
                                 goto bad;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
index 8a0c34cf0..a3a04d473 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			psk_key=*(++argv);
 			for (i=0; i<strlen(psk_key); i++)
 				{
-				if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[i]))
+				if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i]))
 					continue;
 				BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
 				goto bad;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/x509.c b/openssl/apps/x509.c
index ed1e8c69a..9f5eaeb6b 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/x509.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/x509.c
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ bad:
 				else
 					{
 					pk=load_key(bio_err,
-						keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0,
+						keyfile, keyformat, 0,
 						passin, e, "request key");
 					if (pk == NULL) goto end;
 					}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
index c57b3a2d6..403c4d129 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
@@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ ___
 # As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have
 # undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of
 # percent in performance...
-$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gem;
+$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm;
 
 print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# ensure flush
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 3348b8762..ad0d2506f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
 	
 	if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
 		{
-		/* hmm... a bit ugly */
-		return(0xffffffffL);
+		/* hmm... a bit ugly, return all ones */
+		return -1;
 		}
 	if (a->data == NULL)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index c1d1b1229..bbc495291 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
 	if(name) {
 		if(!(tmpname = BUF_strdup(name))) return NULL;
 		for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
 	if(value) {
 		if(!(tmpval = BUF_strdup(value))) return NULL;
 		for(p = tmpval ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 		tmpname = BUF_strdup(name);
 		if(!tmpname) return 0;
 		for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
index e061f2ffa..89e7a7f54 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag)
 		if (bs->length <= 4)
 			{
 			l=ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
-			if (l < 0)
+			if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
 				{
 				l= -l;
 				neg="-";
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
index c1fd75aaa..4b5a132d8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
 	/* add to buffer and return */
 	if (i >= inl)
 		{
-		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
 		ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
 		return(num+inl);
 		}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
 		{
 		if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
 			{
-			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
 			in+=i;
 			inl-=i;
 			num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
 		ret=0;
 		p1=ctx->ibuf;
-		for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+		for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
 			{
-			if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+			if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
 			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		for (;;)
 			{
 			BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-			if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+			if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
 				{
 				r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
 					&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-					ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+					ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
 				BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
 				if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
 				ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+				ctx->obuf_len-=r;
 				}
 			else
 				{
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 152802fbd..ab47abcf1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
 	{
+	/* Buffers are setup like this:
+	 *
+	 * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+	 */
+
 	/* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
 	int ibuf_size;	/* how big is the input buffer */
 	int obuf_size;	/* how big is the output buffer */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
index 37c65d351..f4093177e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
 	addze	r11,r0
 					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
 	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
-	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
 	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
 	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
 	addc	r12,r8,r12
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
index 5cd3cd2ed..e8f6b0508 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ $sbit=$num;
 	&jle	(&label("sqradd"));
 
 	&mov	($carry,"edx");
-	&lea	("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2));
+	&add	("edx","edx");
 	&shr	($carry,31);
+	&add	("edx",$sbit);
+	&adc	($carry,0);
 &set_label("sqrlast");
 	&mov	($word,$_n0);
 	&mov	($inp,$_np);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index e060592fd..9ed8bc2b4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
 				  * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
 #endif
 	CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
-	unsigned int  counter;
+	int counter;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
 	if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
 		BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-	ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	/* Set the counter to the special value -1
+	 * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+	 * that does not need updating before first use. */
+	ret->counter = -1;
 	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid);
 	return(ret);
 err:
@@ -190,7 +193,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		b->counter = 0;
+
+	if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
 		!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
 		{
 		/* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -205,8 +211,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
 	ret=1;
 err:
-	if (b->counter == 0)
-		b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+		b->counter = 0;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
@@ -227,6 +233,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		return(0);
 		}
 
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		/* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+		b->counter = 0;
+	else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		return(0);
+
 	if (r != NULL)
 		{
 		if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -247,22 +259,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
 	int ret;
 
 	bn_check_top(n);
-	if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-		{
-		BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-		return(0);
-		}
 
 	if (r != NULL)
 		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
 	else
-		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-	if (ret >= 0)
 		{
-		if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		if (b->Ai == NULL)
+			{
+			BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
 			return(0);
+			}
+		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
 		}
+
 	bn_check_top(n);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index af94458ca..03deae667 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
 	field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;	
 
 	/* only support affine coordinates */
-	if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+	if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		{
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index 26a4a9ee7..c3c20c38b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -286,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	size_t		crv_len = 0, n = 0;
 	EC_KEY		*eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
 	EC_GROUP	*group;
+	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
-	unsigned char	*signature = NULL; 
-	unsigned int	sig_len;
+	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
+	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
+	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
 	
 	/* fill digest values with some random data */
@@ -338,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 		if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
 			goto builtin_err;
 		EC_GROUP_free(group);
-		if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160)
+		degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+		if (degree < 160)
 			/* drop the curve */ 
 			{
 			EC_KEY_free(eckey);
@@ -414,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
-		/* modify a single byte of the signature */
-		offset = signature[10] % sig_len;
-		dirt   = signature[11];
-		signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; 
+		/* wrong length */
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1,
+			eckey) == 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		BIO_printf(out, ".");
+		(void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+		 * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+		 * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */
+		sig_ptr = signature;
+		if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+
+		/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+		r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+		s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+		bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+		if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+		if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+			goto builtin_err;
+		/* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
+		memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+		offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+		dirt   = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
 			goto builtin_err;
 			}
+		/* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
 		
 		BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
 		/* cleanup */
+		/* clean bogus errors */
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
 		signature = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 		eckey = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
 		wrong_eckey = NULL;
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+		ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+		raw_buf = NULL;
 		}
 
 	ret = 1;	
@@ -442,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err:
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 	if (wrong_eckey)
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+	if (ecdsa_sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
 	if (signature)
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
+	if (raw_buf)
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
 	if (curves)
 		OPENSSL_free(curves);
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 310a3387b..a368f6fc7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000005fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000007fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g-fips 18 Jan 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index e9ead3a52..e3a65571c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -133,47 +133,87 @@
 # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef __VOS__
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock
+   (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm
+   relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors
+   such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and
+   upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the
+   clock and the rate at which it can be read.
+
+   If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is
+   more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+   clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the
+   results would be far more predictable.
+
+   As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of
+   seed data.  */
+
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-	unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+	short int code;
+	gid_t curr_gid;
 	pid_t curr_pid;
 	uid_t curr_uid;
-	static int first=1;
-	int i;
-	long rnd = 0;
+	int i, k;
 	struct timespec ts;
-	unsigned seed;
-
-/* The VOS random() function starts from a static seed so its
-   initial value is predictable.  If random() returns the
-   initial value, reseed it with dynamic data.  The VOS
-   real-time clock has a granularity of 1 nsec so it should be
-   reasonably difficult to predict its exact value.  Do not
-   gratuitously reseed the PRNG because other code in this
-   process or thread may be using it.  */
-
-	if (first) {
-		first = 0;
-		rnd = random ();
-		if (rnd == 1804289383) {
-			clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-			curr_pid = getpid();
-			curr_uid = getuid();
-			seed = ts.tv_sec ^ ts.tv_nsec ^ curr_pid ^ curr_uid;
-			srandom (seed);
-		}
-	}
+	unsigned char v;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = random();
-		buf[i] = rnd;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
-	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+	long duration;
+	extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+	long long duration;
+	extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#error "Unsupported Platform."
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+	/* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some*
+	   variation between different processes.  */
+
+	curr_gid = getgid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+	curr_gid = 0;
+
+	curr_pid = getpid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+	curr_pid = 0;
+
+	curr_uid = getuid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+	curr_uid = 0;
 
+	for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++)
+	{
+		/* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache
+		   collisions, bus interference, etc.  */
+		for (k=0; k<99; k++)
+			ts.tv_nsec = random ();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+		/* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
+		duration = 1;
+		s$sleep (&duration, &code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+		/* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
+		duration = 1;
+		s$sleep2 (&duration, &code);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+		/* get wall clock time.  */
+		clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+		/* take 8 bits */
+		v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+		RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1);
+		v = 0;
+	}
 	return 1;
 }
 #elif defined __OpenBSD__
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index bc7d9c580..030e07f41 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
 	in=fopen(file,"rb");
 #endif
 	if (in == NULL) goto err;
-#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
 	if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
 	  /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number
 	   * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7c941885f..2e1ddd48d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	if (unblind == NULL)
+		/* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * in BN_BLINDING. */
 		return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
 	else
 		{
-		int ret;
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		return ret;
-		}
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
-		return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-	else
-		{
+		/* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
 		int ret;
 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
 		return ret;
 		}
-}
+	}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	/* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+	 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+	 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+	 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+	 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+	 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+	 */
+	return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+	}
 
 /* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
+		}
 
 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
 		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
 
 	if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret;
 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+			goto err;
+		}
 
 	/* do the decrypt */
 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
 
 	p=buf;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5a0b0249b..701ec565e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+	if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 0d70e8696..df46a4983 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
  * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
  * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
  */
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
 			const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
 			const int length,
 			const unsigned char fill)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+  if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+    return 0;
   if (bs->length > 0) {
     memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
     if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
     }
   }
   memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+  return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
     return 0;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    if (bs->length > 4)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
     BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    if (bs->length > 16)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
     for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
       ;
     for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 /*
  * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
  * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
  */
 static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 				const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 
   switch (a->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = length * 8;
     break;
   }
 
   switch (b->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = length * 8;
     break;
   }
@@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
   unsigned char mask;
   int i, j;
 
+  OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
   for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
     ;
   for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -601,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
     return NULL;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   }
   f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
@@ -656,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
 /*
  * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
  */
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
 			    unsigned char *min,
 			    unsigned char *max,
 			    int length)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+    return 0;
   switch (aor->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
   }
+  return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -687,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
   if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
       afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
       (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
-       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+      !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
     return 0;
-  extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
   return afi_length;
 }
 
@@ -771,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
       IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
 
-      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-      extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	  !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+	return 0;
 
       /*
        * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -800,14 +813,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
     }
 
     /*
-     * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+     * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+     * prefix.
      */
     j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
     {
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
-      if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
-	extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-	if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+      if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+	if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+	  return 0;
+	if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	    range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
 	  return 0;
       }
     }
@@ -841,8 +857,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
     unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
 
-    extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-    extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	!extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+      return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+      return 0;
 
     /*
      * Punt overlaps.
@@ -860,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
       IPAddressOrRange *merged;
       if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
 	return 0;
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
       --i;
@@ -869,6 +893,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted final range.
+   */
+  j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+  {
+    IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+      unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+      if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+	return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -885,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
 				    v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
       return 0;
   }
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
   OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
   return 1;
@@ -1017,6 +1055,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
 	X509V3_conf_err(val);
 	goto err;
       }
+      if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	X509V3_conf_err(val);
+	goto err;
+      }
       if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
@@ -1102,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
 
   p = 0;
   for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
-    extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
-		    c_min, c_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+			 c_min, c_max, length))
+      return -1;
     for (;; p++) {
       if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
 	return 0;
-      extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
-		      p_min, p_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+			   p_min, p_max, length))
+	return 0;
       if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
 	continue;
       if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -1130,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
     return 1;
   if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b))
     return 0;
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
     IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
     int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
@@ -1195,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   }
   if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
     validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
     X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     ret = 0;
@@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
       }
       continue;
     }
-    sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
     for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
       IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
       int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
index 49b10f224..20edff97f 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ using the public key B<eckey>.
 
 ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error.
 
-ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or -1
+ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0
 on error.
 
 ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
index 8e077e31c..d4df1bfac 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
@@ -39,10 +39,16 @@ for a description of the method's properties.
 SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The
 reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions
 (some of these settings were made automatically during the last
-handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing
-an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings.
-SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence
-L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; .
+handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact
+same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer
+changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence
+L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>;
+L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>;
+L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>
+instead to avoid such failures
+(or simply L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>
+if session reuse is not desired).
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
diff --git a/openssl/e_os2.h b/openssl/e_os2.h
index 4c785c62c..d30724d30 100644
--- a/openssl/e_os2.h
+++ b/openssl/e_os2.h
@@ -193,8 +193,14 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 /* --------------------------------- VOS ----------------------------------- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS
+#if defined(__VOS__) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS)
 # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS
+#ifdef __HPPA__
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+#endif
+#ifdef __IA32__
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /* ------------------------------- VxWorks --------------------------------- */
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
index 00759bcab..c74810285 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_l
 		}
 		
 	param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
+    if(!param){
+        goto err;
+    }
+
 	gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock);	
 	OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
 	memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8);
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
index 624be586a..0d7d3ffe6 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len
 		}
 
 	param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
+    if(!param){
+        goto err;
+    }
+	
 	gost_init(&cctx,param->sblock);	
 	OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
 	memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8);
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
index caaea99d3..4a05853e5 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 			}
 		if (strlen(value) == 1)
 			{
-			switch(toupper(value[0]))
+			switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0]))
 				{
 				case 'A':
 					param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet;
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 					break;
 				}
 			}
-		else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X'))
+		else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X'))
 			{
-			switch (toupper(value[1]))
+			switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1]))
 				{
 				case 'A':
 					param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet;
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 			}
 		if (strlen(value) == 1)
 			{
-			switch(toupper(value[0]))
+			switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0]))
 				{
 				case 'A':
 					param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet;
@@ -217,9 +217,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 					break;
 				}
 			}
-		else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X'))
+		else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X'))
 			{
-			switch (toupper(value[1]))
+			switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1]))
 				{
 				case 'A':
 					param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet;
diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec
index e4db87553..d4f31f7b6 100644
--- a/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 %define libmaj 1
 %define libmin 0
 %define librel 0
-%define librev e
+%define librev g
 Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2180c6d4d..9f898d699 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
@@ -264,11 +263,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			return ret;
 		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
 		}
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0);  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
 #endif
 
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
+
 	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
 			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
@@ -795,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 		*ok = 0;
 		return i;
 		}
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	/* parse the message fragment header */
 	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -867,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
 	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
 	 * handshake to fail */
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+	if (i != (int)frag_len)
+		{
+		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	*ok = 1;
 
@@ -1367,7 +1376,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return p;
 	}
 
-static unsigned int 
+unsigned int 
 dtls1_min_mtu(void)
 	{
 	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 48e8b6ffb..c3b77c889 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
     pqueue buffered_messages;
 	pqueue sent_messages;
 	pqueue buffered_app_data;
-	
+	unsigned int mtu;
+
 	if (s->d1)
 		{
 		unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q;
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
 		sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
 		buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
+		mtu = s->d1->mtu;
 
 		dtls1_clear_queues(s);
 
@@ -222,6 +224,11 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 			s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
 			}
 
+		if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
+			{
+			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+			}
+
 		s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
 		s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
 		s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 39aac73e1..de30a505a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -375,6 +375,8 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 	unsigned int mac_size;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -409,13 +411,10 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 	if (enc_err <= 0)
 		{
-		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-		if (enc_err < 0)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			}
-		goto err;
+		/* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
+		 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
+		 */
+		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -445,28 +444,32 @@ printf("\n");
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto f_err;
 #else
-			goto err;
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif			
 			}
 		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length < mac_size)
+		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			goto err;
-#endif
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
-		rr->length-=mac_size;
+		else
+			rr->length = 0;
 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
 			{
-			goto err;
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+		{
+		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	/* r->length is now just compressed */
 	if (s->expand != NULL)
 		{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index a6a4c87ea..149983be3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
 				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
 					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
 					{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 50bd415b5..53223bd38 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		/* wrong packet length */
 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-		goto err;
+		goto f_err;
 		}
 
 	return(1);
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	if (n < 6)
 		{
 		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-		al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
 	if (ticklen + 6 != n)
 		{
-		al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 58386e1ba..b14597076 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 			/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
 			l+=i;
+			/* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
+			 * with the padding length. */
+			memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
 			rec->length+=i;
 			rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
 			}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 62c791cb7..1130244ae 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2177,6 +2177,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned char *rp,*wp;
 	size_t rlen, wlen;
+	int init_extra;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
@@ -2215,6 +2216,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 	wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
 	rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
  	wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+	init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
 	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
 		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
 		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
@@ -2227,6 +2229,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
 	s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
  	s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+	s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
 
 	ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c3b5ff33f..d734c359f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -755,6 +756,14 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	int ok;
 	long n;
 
+	/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+	 * negotiation. */
+	if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
 	 * so permit appropriate message length */
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -783,6 +792,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
 			}
 #endif
+		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 		return 2;
 		}
 	return 1;
@@ -2130,6 +2140,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		if (i <= 0)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+			BN_clear_free(pub);
 			goto err;
 			}
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index e4c3f6501..8f922eea7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1882,6 +1882,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL			 233
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE			 129
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM		 130
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO			 304
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO				 131
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT				 132
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL					 213
@@ -2139,6 +2140,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY			 172
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY			 173
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE			 174
+#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS			 346
 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET			 175
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED			 176
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED			 177
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index baaa89e71..9c2c41287 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -379,6 +379,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER			0x0004
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
+ 
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE		0x0040
 
 typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index a8ce186b7..54ba7ef5b 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
 						sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
 						}
 					}
+					sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
 				}
 			MemCheck_on();
 			}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 0eed46474..e9be77109 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL),	"SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),	"SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),	"SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT),	"SSL3_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL),	"SSL3_CTRL"},
@@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY)   ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY)  ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 46732791f..6688f19a6 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1054,6 +1054,11 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+			return 0;
+#endif
+
 		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
@@ -3042,4 +3047,3 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
 				    ssl_cipher_id);
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 4c78393f3..cea622a2a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 85371c87b..26cbae449 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -971,6 +971,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				sdata = data;
 				if (dsize > 0)
 					{
+					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+						{
+						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
+						}
+
 					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
 						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
 							&sdata, dsize);
diff --git a/openssl/test/testssl b/openssl/test/testssl
index f9d7c5d65..b55364ae8 100644
--- a/openssl/test/testssl
+++ b/openssl/test/testssl
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
 $ssltest $extra || exit 1
 
 if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
-  echo test sslv2/sslv3 w/o DHE via BIO pair
-  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
+  $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
 fi
 
 echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ fi
 if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then
   echo skipping RSA tests
 else
-  echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no DHE, multiple handshakes
-  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+  echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'
+  ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
 
   if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
     echo skipping RSA+DHE tests
diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
index 2c99467d3..aec401c77 100644
--- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ EOF
 	undef %err_reason_strings;
 }
 
-if($debug && defined(%notrans)) {
+if($debug && %notrans) {
 	print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n";
 	foreach(sort keys %notrans)
 	{