diff options
133 files changed, 2551 insertions, 3563 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES index b5b3dd20f..3044aa7dd 100644 --- a/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,46 +2,170 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] + Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] + + *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix + + If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an + invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will + occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. + + This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford + University. + (CVE-2015-0291) + [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] + + *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix + + OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This + feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES + NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause + OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when + using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a + socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. + However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation + fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. + (CVE-2015-0290) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix + + The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the + initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop + over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with + an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means + that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next + that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial + ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be + that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only + server. - *) SRTP Memory Leak. + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. + (CVE-2015-0207) + [Matt Caswell] - A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who - sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail - to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be - exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL - 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of - whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that - have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. + *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix - The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. - (CVE-2014-3513) - [OpenSSL team] + The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is + made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check + certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any + certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any + application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including + OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. + (CVE-2015-0286) + [Stephen Henson] - *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. + *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix - When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the - integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session - ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory - causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session - tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service - attack. - (CVE-2014-3567) - [Steve Henson] + The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer + dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS + algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify + certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any + certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any + application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including + OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. - *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. + This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. + (CVE-2015-0208) + [Stephen Henson] - When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers - could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be - configured to send them. - (CVE-2014-3568) - [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] + *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix - *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. - Client applications doing fallback retries should call - SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). - (CVE-2014-3566) - [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause + memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been + strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. + + Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY + components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related + functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are + not affected. + (CVE-2015-0287) + [Stephen Henson] + + *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix + + The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo + correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with + missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. + + Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or + otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are + affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). + (CVE-2015-0289) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix + + A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in + servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending + a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. + + This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper + (OpenSSL development team). + (CVE-2015-0293) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix + + If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE + ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message + being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. + (CVE-2015-1787) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix + + Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake + with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: + - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded + automatically, and the user has not seeded manually + - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not + SSL_client_methodv23) + - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from + the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). + + If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will + have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the + output may be predictable. + + For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will + succeed on an unpatched platform: + + openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA + (CVE-2015-0285) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix + + A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function + could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double + free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey + or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption + for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted + sources. This scenario is considered rare. + + This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their + commit 517073cd4b. + (CVE-2015-0209) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix + + The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if + the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. + + This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. + (CVE-2015-0288) + [Stephen Henson] + + *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers + [Kurt Roeckx] + + Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. @@ -378,6 +502,29 @@ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] + *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS + message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer + dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to + Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3571) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the + dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this + could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same + sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited + by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. + Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2015-0206) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is + built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl + method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer + dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3569) + [Kurt Roeckx] + *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. @@ -395,6 +542,17 @@ (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] + *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. + An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication + without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to + authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers + which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates + containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. + Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting + this issue. + (CVE-2015-0205) + [Steve Henson] + *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. @@ -439,6 +597,17 @@ (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] + *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect + results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random + with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any + way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter + Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial + fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and + Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of + the OpenSSL core team. + (CVE-2014-3570) + [Andy Polyakov] + *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable @@ -598,18 +767,6 @@ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] - Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [xx XXX xxxx] - - *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. - - Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when - verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded - DigestInfo structures. - - Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. - - [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted @@ -1107,63 +1264,6 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013] - - *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. - - This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by - Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found - at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ - - Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information - Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London - (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and - Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. - (CVE-2013-0169) - [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] - - *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. - This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) - [Steve Henson] - - *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so - the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() - so it returns the certificate actually sent. - See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. - (This is a backport) - [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>] - - *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012] - - [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after - OpenSSL 1.0.1.] - - *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS - to fix DoS attack. - - Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic - fuzzing as a service testing platform. - (CVE-2012-2333) - [Steve Henson] - - *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. - Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012] - - *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio - BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer - in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. - - Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this - issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. - (CVE-2012-2110) - [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] - Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness @@ -2154,228 +2254,6 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] - Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] - - *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. - - This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by - Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found - at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ - - Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information - Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London - (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and - Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. - (CVE-2013-0169) - [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] - - *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. - This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) - [Steve Henson] - - *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so - the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() - so it returns the certificate actually sent. - See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. - (This is a backport) - [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>] - - *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] - - *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS - to fix DoS attack. - - Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic - fuzzing as a service testing platform. - (CVE-2012-2333) - [Steve Henson] - - *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. - Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] - - *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the - 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an - int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by - rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) - [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>] - - Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] - - *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio - BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer - in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. - - Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this - issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. - (CVE-2012-2110) - [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] - - Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] - - *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness - in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for - content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack - needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The - old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the - CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where - an MMA defence is not necessary. - Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering - this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) - [Steve Henson] - - *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a - client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to - Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] - - *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. - Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and - Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and - preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) - [Antonio Martin] - - Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] - - *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension - of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption - which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against - the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing - differences arising during decryption processing. A research - paper describing this attack can be found at: - http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf - Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information - Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London - (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann - <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de> - for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) - [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] - - *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) - [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>] - - *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. - (CVE-2011-4576) - [Adam Langley (Google)] - - *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George - Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and - Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) - [Adam Langley (Google)] - - *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. - Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw - and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) - [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>] - - *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. - [Adam Langley (Google)] - - *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. - [Emilia Käsper (Google)] - - *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different - interpretations of the '..._len' fields). - [Adam Langley (Google)] - - *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than - BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent - threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. - - This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING - lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of - BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, - the last update always remained unused). - [Emilia Käsper (Google)] - - *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular - for multi-threaded use of ECDH. - [Adam Langley (Google)] - - *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. - [Bodo Moeller] - - *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper - by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: - - http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf - - [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] - - Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011] - - *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 - [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] - - *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must - escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is - ambiguous. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010] - - *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers - and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. - Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 - [Steve Henson] - - *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by - Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan - Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 - [Ben Laurie] - - Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010] - - *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer - overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can - be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 - [Steve Henson] - - *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939 - [Steve Henson] - - *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use - the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of - some broken encodings work correctly. - [Steve Henson] - - *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT - is also one of the inputs. - [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)] - - *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist. - Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only - after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add - etc are non-op. - [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010] - - [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after - OpenSSL 1.0.0.] - - *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory - access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742) - [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>] - - *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more - common in certificates and some applications which only call - SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail. - [Steve Henson] - - *) VMS fixes: - Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com - Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com - Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com - [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>] - Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure index 3cf4a7a26..f776e2335 100644 --- a/openssl/Configure +++ b/openssl/Configure @@ -188,18 +188,18 @@ my %table=( "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", -"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", -"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", +"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", +"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::", # Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box @@ -259,16 +259,16 @@ my %table=( #### IRIX 5.x configs # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate. -"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### IRIX 6.x configs # Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke # './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually. -"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", -"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", +"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", +"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", # N64 ABI builds. -"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs. # Special notes: @@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ my %table=( #### # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... -"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ####################################################################### # Note that -march is not among compiler options in below linux-armv4 @@ -378,30 +378,30 @@ my %table=( # # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8 # -"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-armv4", "gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support, # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness. -"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", -"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", +"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### IA-32 targets... -"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", +"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", #### -"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::", +"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::", "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32", -"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32", +"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of @@ -415,16 +415,16 @@ my %table=( # ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it # doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1... -"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs", +"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs", #### SPARC Linux setups # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently # assisted with debugging of following two configs. -"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but # -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what. -"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # GCC 3.1 is a requirement -"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups # Special notes: # - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you @@ -438,31 +438,31 @@ my %table=( # # <appro@fy.chalmers.se> # -"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", -"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", +"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", +"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", -# Android: linux-* but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs. +# Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs. "android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!] -"BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it # simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3, # triggered by RIPEMD160 code. -"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", @@ -474,8 +474,8 @@ my %table=( # QNX "qnx4", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:", -"QNX6", "gcc:-DTERMIOS::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"QNX6", "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # BeOS "beos-x86-r5", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so", @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ my %table=( "SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::", # SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe -"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::", +"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::", # OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe # You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ my %table=( "netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::", # DJGPP -"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:", +"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:", # Ultrix from Bernhard Simon <simon@zid.tuwien.ac.at> "ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::", @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ my %table=( "newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::", ##### GNU Hurd -"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC", +"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC", ##### OS/2 EMX "OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::", diff --git a/openssl/Makefile b/openssl/Makefile index f814f529c..c6b9e9d5c 100644 --- a/openssl/Makefile +++ b/openssl/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.2 +VERSION=1.0.2a MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.2 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS index 35f3e3f71..682c583da 100644 --- a/openssl/NEWS +++ b/openssl/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,22 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] + + o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291) + o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290) + o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207) + o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) + o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208) + o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287) + o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289) + o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293) + o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787) + o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285) + o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209) + o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288) + o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]: o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 @@ -54,6 +70,7 @@ o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 + o Fix for CVE-2014-0198 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 @@ -113,19 +130,6 @@ o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module. o SRP support. - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]: - - o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 - o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]: - - o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]: - - o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 @@ -198,62 +202,6 @@ o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support. o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations. - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]: - - o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 - o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]: - - o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]: - - o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110) - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]: - - o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]: - - o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 - o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 - o Various DTLS fixes. - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]: - - o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]: - - o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 - o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109 - o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 - o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 - o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]: - - o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]: - - o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 - o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]: - - o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. - - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]: - - o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742. - o Various DTLS fixes. - o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added. - o Fix for no-rc4 compilation. - o Chil ENGINE unload workaround. - Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README index 7878f38e6..8ce093dd4 100644 --- a/openssl/README +++ b/openssl/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.2 22 Jan 2015 + OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c index e6bb48f08..b0acbc7c1 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/apps.c +++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c @@ -574,6 +574,11 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) char *prompt = NULL; prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info); + if(!prompt) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + UI_free(ui); + return 0; + } ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD; UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0); @@ -583,6 +588,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) { buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz); + if(!buff) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + UI_free(ui); + OPENSSL_free(prompt); + return 0; + } ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff, PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf); } @@ -2775,7 +2786,7 @@ void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x, return; if (checkhost) { BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n", - checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) + checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1 ? "" : " NOT"); } diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c index f0a19cf11..d64ec4f14 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/ca.c +++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c @@ -563,10 +563,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE); tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(!tofree) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + goto err; + } strcpy(tofree, s); #else len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1; tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(!tofree) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + goto err; + } BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len); BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len); #endif @@ -2813,6 +2821,11 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; tmp = BUF_strdup(str); + if(!tmp) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); + goto err; + } + p = strchr(tmp, ','); rtime_str = tmp; @@ -2830,6 +2843,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, if (prevtm) { *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); + if(!*prevtm) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); + goto err; + } if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str); goto err; @@ -2870,6 +2887,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, goto err; } comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); + if(!comp_time) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); + goto err; + } if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str); goto err; diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c index 2c8ada60b..2c922537c 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/cms.c +++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c @@ -463,6 +463,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) { cms_key_param *nparam; nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param)); + if(!nparam) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + goto argerr; + } nparam->idx = keyidx; nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); nparam->next = NULL; diff --git a/openssl/apps/dgst.c b/openssl/apps/dgst.c index adb7a060a..95e5fa3fc 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/dgst.c +++ b/openssl/apps/dgst.c @@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } + if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback); /* needed for windows 3.1 */ @@ -304,11 +309,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) goto end; } - if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) { - ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - goto end; - } - if (out_bin == -1) { if (keyfile) out_bin = 1; @@ -460,6 +460,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } + if (!sigbuf) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen); BIO_free(sigbio); if (siglen <= 0) { diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl.c b/openssl/apps/openssl.c index 112ed7e60..687314522 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/openssl.c +++ b/openssl/apps/openssl.c @@ -428,10 +428,6 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[]) if (arg.data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(arg.data); - if (bio_err != NULL) { - BIO_free(bio_err); - bio_err = NULL; - } #if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64) /* Free any duplicate Argv[] storage. */ if (free_Argv) { @@ -440,6 +436,10 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[]) #endif apps_shutdown(); CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err); + if (bio_err != NULL) { + BIO_free(bio_err); + bio_err = NULL; + } OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } diff --git a/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c b/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c index 4d80f8249..643507f21 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c +++ b/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c @@ -189,11 +189,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (infile == NULL) BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else { - if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) - if (in == NULL) { - perror(infile); - goto end; - } + if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load input file\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } } if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) diff --git a/openssl/apps/rsautl.c b/openssl/apps/rsautl.c index 0030aca12..d642f9ad9 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/rsautl.c +++ b/openssl/apps/rsautl.c @@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) rsa_in = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2); rsa_out = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize); + if (!rsa_in || !rsa_out) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } /* Read the input data */ rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2); diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c index d5756c0ff..f6e6bcd76 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c @@ -456,8 +456,13 @@ int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared) if (ncurves <= 0) return 1; curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int)); + if(!curves) { + BIO_puts(out, "Malloc error getting supported curves\n"); + return 0; + } SSL_get1_curves(s, curves); + BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: "); for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { if (i) diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c index b1152aa36..8fa2b737a 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c @@ -560,6 +560,11 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; + if(!pass) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); + return NULL; + } + cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin; cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user"; if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) { @@ -1295,12 +1300,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #endif if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); - /* - * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting - * read ahead solves this problem. - */ - if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) - SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c index baa2455e0..a8491acfd 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n", - identity ? (int)strlen(identity) : 0, identity); + (int)strlen(identity), identity); /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */ if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) { @@ -696,6 +696,8 @@ static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi) EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024); + if (!wbuf) + return 0; wbuf->alloced = 1024; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; @@ -750,9 +752,11 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) num = num + num; /* double the size */ if (num < inl) num = inl; - OPENSSL_free(wbuf); wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num); + if(!wbuf) + return 0; + OPENSSL_free(b->ptr); wbuf->alloced = num; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; @@ -1736,12 +1740,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); - /* - * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting - * read ahead solves this problem. - */ - if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) - SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); @@ -1821,12 +1819,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc); - /* - * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( - * Setting read ahead solves this problem. - */ - if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) - SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx2, 1); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback); @@ -2877,7 +2869,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) /* else we have data */ if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) || - ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 10) == 0))) { + ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) { char *p; X509 *peer; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -3331,6 +3323,10 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) unsigned char *p; sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session)); + if(!sess) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n"); + return 0; + } SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen); sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL); @@ -3338,6 +3334,16 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen); sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen); + if(!sess->id || !sess->der) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n"); + + if(sess->id) + OPENSSL_free(sess->id); + if(sess->der) + OPENSSL_free(sess->der); + OPENSSL_free(sess); + return 0; + } p = sess->der; i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p); diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_time.c b/openssl/apps/s_time.c index 5846f3ae1..a40997a22 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_time.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_time.c @@ -302,6 +302,10 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; maxTime = atoi(*(++argv)); + if(maxTime <= 0) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n"); + badop = 1; + } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badop = 1; @@ -550,7 +554,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read); printf ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n", - nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime, bytes_read / nConn); + nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime, + bytes_read / (nConn?nConn:1)); ret = 0; end: diff --git a/openssl/apps/speed.c b/openssl/apps/speed.c index 7dcd354e0..7b1acc189 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/speed.c +++ b/openssl/apps/speed.c @@ -2775,6 +2775,11 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher) inp = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1]); out = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024); + if(!inp || !out) { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"Out of memory\n"); + goto end; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, no_key, no_iv); @@ -2859,7 +2864,10 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } - OPENSSL_free(inp); - OPENSSL_free(out); +end: + if(inp) + OPENSSL_free(inp); + if(out) + OPENSSL_free(out); } #endif diff --git a/openssl/apps/srp.c b/openssl/apps/srp.c index 47b45fbf9..c679448ee 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/srp.c +++ b/openssl/apps/srp.c @@ -435,10 +435,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE); tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(!tofree) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + goto err; + } strcpy(tofree, s); # else len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1; tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(!tofree) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + goto err; + } BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len); BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len); # endif diff --git a/openssl/apps/x509.c b/openssl/apps/x509.c index d005c82bb..864a60dda 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/x509.c +++ b/openssl/apps/x509.c @@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) z = i2d_X509(x, NULL); m = OPENSSL_malloc(z); + if (!m) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } d = (unsigned char *)m; z = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x), &d); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile index 709b1af39..b94ca72a4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ aesni-mb-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl aes-sparcv9.s: asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(PERL) asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ -aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl +aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl $(PERL) asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ aes-ppc.s: asm/aes-ppc.pl diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c index ff0d1643f..2ddb0860d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c @@ -1130,31 +1130,31 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = - (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ - (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(out , s0); s1 = - (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ - (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(out + 4, s1); s2 = - (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ - (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(out + 8, s2); s3 = - (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ - (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(out + 12, s3); } @@ -1233,10 +1233,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; @@ -1253,10 +1253,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; @@ -1275,10 +1275,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; @@ -1288,10 +1288,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff]); + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff]); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c index 132b09a21..c869ed719 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c @@ -499,10 +499,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; @@ -519,10 +519,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; @@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, while (1) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; @@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ - (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] ) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24); + ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] ) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; @@ -676,22 +676,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS) prefetch256(Te4); - t[0] = Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[1] = Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[2] = Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[3] = Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { int i; @@ -742,22 +742,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, */ for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) { #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS) - t[0] = Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[1] = Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[2] = Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[3] = Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { @@ -812,28 +812,28 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, prefetch256(Te4); *(u32*)(out+0) = - Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[0]; *(u32*)(out+4) = - Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[1]; *(u32*)(out+8) = - Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[2]; *(u32*)(out+12) = - Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ - Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[3]; #else *(u32*)(out+0) = @@ -890,22 +890,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS) prefetch256(Td4); - t[0] = Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[1] = Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[2] = Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[3] = Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { @@ -967,22 +967,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, */ for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) { #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS) - t[0] = Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[1] = Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[2] = Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; - t[3] = Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ - Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ - Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ - Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; + t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ + (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { @@ -1046,27 +1046,27 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, prefetch256(Td4); *(u32*)(out+0) = - (Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff]) ^ - (Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[0]; *(u32*)(out+4) = - (Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff]) ^ - (Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[1]; *(u32*)(out+8) = - (Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff]) ^ - (Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[2]; *(u32*)(out+12) = - (Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff]) ^ - (Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ - (Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ - (Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff]) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[3]; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c index 4a36aff6a..af795306b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b) case V_ASN1_OBJECT: result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); break; + case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: + result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; + break; case V_ASN1_NULL: result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ break; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c index 0578c8887..724a10be4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t) if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm)) return -2; - if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &stm, &ttm)) + if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &ttm, &stm)) return -2; if (day > 0) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h index bb6ac95bd..68e791fcd 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h @@ -795,6 +795,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void); void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); +void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a); int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c index 132a9ef46..11b582dd3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c @@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) int tmp_tag, tmp_class; + if (elem == NULL) + return 0; + for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) { /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */ if (*p == ':') { @@ -350,13 +353,17 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT: + if(!vstart) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT); + return -1; + } if (!strncmp(vstart, "ASCII", 5)) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII; else if (!strncmp(vstart, "UTF8", 4)) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8; else if (!strncmp(vstart, "HEX", 3)) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX; - else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 3)) + else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 7)) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST; else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c index 00733a6a8..0b61fc930 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c @@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a) OPENSSL_free(a); } +void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a) +{ + if (a && a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) + OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length); + ASN1_STRING_free(a); +} + int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b) { int i; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c index f6cd4b2b8..a5d2da10b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, goto end; } } else { - if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 11) <= 0) + if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 14) <= 0) goto end; } M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c index 5817a2b8a..4a73ca9ea 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c @@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); + if(!p) + return 0; + ndef_aux->derbuf = p; *pbuf = p; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it); @@ -229,6 +232,9 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); + if(!p) + return 0; + ndef_aux->derbuf = p; *pbuf = p; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c index 90754831f..0a425cd29 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c @@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */ if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval; - if (key->pkey->value.octet_string) + if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING + && key->pkey->value.octet_string != NULL) OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data, key->pkey->value.octet_string->length); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c index 459566440..7fd336a40 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c @@ -304,9 +304,16 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; - - /* Allocate structure */ - if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { + if (*pval) { + /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ + i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); + if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { + tt = it->templates + i; + pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); + ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); + asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); + } + } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -386,6 +393,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; + /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ + for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { + if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { + const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; + ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; + seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); + pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); + ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); + } + } + /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c index d25c68c54..7d2964f02 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c @@ -315,13 +315,16 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) ASN1_STRING *str; int utype; - if (it && it->funcs) { + if (!it) + return 0; + + if (it->funcs) { const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs; if (pf->prim_new) return pf->prim_new(pval, it); } - if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)) + if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) utype = -1; else utype = it->utype; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c index 11d784ccd..7c54f9d1d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c @@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent, it->templates, pctx)) return 0; + break; } /* fall thru */ case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: @@ -289,6 +290,8 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1); + if(!seqtt) + return 0; tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt); if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld, indent + 2, seqtt, pctx)) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c index 1f1036409..a5a403c26 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c @@ -98,46 +98,55 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM) static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new(); - if(*pval) return 1; - else return 0; + *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new(); + if (*pval) + return 1; + else + return 0; } static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - if(!*pval) return; - if(it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); - else BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); - *pval = NULL; + if (!*pval) + return; + if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) + BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); + else + BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); + *pval = NULL; } -static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) +static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, + const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - BIGNUM *bn; - int pad; - if(!*pval) return -1; - bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; - /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */ - if(BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) pad = 0; - else pad = 1; - if(cont) { - if(pad) *cont++ = 0; - BN_bn2bin(bn, cont); - } - return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn); + BIGNUM *bn; + int pad; + if (!*pval) + return -1; + bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; + /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */ + if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) + pad = 0; + else + pad = 1; + if (cont) { + if (pad) + *cont++ = 0; + BN_bn2bin(bn, cont); + } + return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn); } static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - BIGNUM *bn; - if(!*pval) bn_new(pval, it); - bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; - if(!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) { - bn_free(pval, it); - return 0; - } - return 1; + BIGNUM *bn; + if (!*pval) + bn_new(pval, it); + bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; + if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) { + bn_free(pval, it); + return 0; + } + return 1; } - - diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c index f39361974..3aed44a3d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c @@ -97,87 +97,100 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG) static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - *(long *)pval = it->size; - return 1; + *(long *)pval = it->size; + return 1; } static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - *(long *)pval = it->size; + *(long *)pval = it->size; } -static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) +static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, + const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - long ltmp; - unsigned long utmp; - int clen, pad, i; - /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */ - char *cp = (char *)pval; - - /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */ - memcpy(<mp, cp, sizeof(long)); - - if(ltmp == it->size) return -1; - /* Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so - * we can cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading - * octet is set. - */ - if(ltmp < 0) utmp = -ltmp - 1; - else utmp = ltmp; - clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp); - /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */ - if(!(clen & 0x7)) pad = 1; - else pad = 0; - - /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */ - clen = (clen + 7) >> 3; - - if(cont) { - if(pad) *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0; - for(i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff); - if(ltmp < 0) cont[i] ^= 0xff; - utmp >>= 8; - } + long ltmp; + unsigned long utmp; + int clen, pad, i; + /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */ + char *cp = (char *)pval; + + /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */ + memcpy(<mp, cp, sizeof(long)); + + if (ltmp == it->size) + return -1; + /* + * Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can + * cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is + * set. + */ + if (ltmp < 0) + utmp = -ltmp - 1; + else + utmp = ltmp; + clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp); + /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */ + if (!(clen & 0x7)) + pad = 1; + else + pad = 0; + + /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */ + clen = (clen + 7) >> 3; + + if (cont) { + if (pad) + *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0; + for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff); + if (ltmp < 0) + cont[i] ^= 0xff; + utmp >>= 8; } - return clen + pad; + } + return clen + pad; } static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - int neg, i; - long ltmp; - unsigned long utmp = 0; - char *cp = (char *)pval; - if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) { - ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); - return 0; - } - /* Is it negative? */ - if(len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) neg = 1; - else neg = 0; - utmp = 0; - for(i = 0; i < len; i++) { - utmp <<= 8; - if(neg) utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff; - else utmp |= cont[i]; - } - ltmp = (long)utmp; - if(neg) { - ltmp++; - ltmp = -ltmp; - } - if(ltmp == it->size) { - ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); - return 0; - } - memcpy(cp, <mp, sizeof(long)); - return 1; + int neg, i; + long ltmp; + unsigned long utmp = 0; + char *cp = (char *)pval; + if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); + return 0; + } + /* Is it negative? */ + if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) + neg = 1; + else + neg = 0; + utmp = 0; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + utmp <<= 8; + if (neg) + utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff; + else + utmp |= cont[i]; + } + ltmp = (long)utmp; + if (neg) { + ltmp++; + ltmp = -ltmp; + } + if (ltmp == it->size) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); + return 0; + } + memcpy(cp, <mp, sizeof(long)); + return 1; } static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, - int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) - { - return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval); - } + int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) +{ + return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval); +} diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c index cd838e01c..55319acf9 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c @@ -172,8 +172,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { const unsigned char *q; X509 *ret; + int freeret = 0; + /* Save start position */ q = *pp; + + if(!a || *a == NULL) { + freeret = 1; + } ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length); /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */ if (!ret) @@ -186,7 +192,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) goto err; return ret; err: - X509_free(ret); + if(freeret) { + X509_free(ret); + if (a) + *a = NULL; + } return NULL; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c index 5dc763000..c2cf6e619 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c @@ -592,7 +592,6 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer, int fplace = 0; int padlen = 0; int zpadlen = 0; - int caps = 0; long intpart; long fracpart; long max10; @@ -630,8 +629,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer, /* convert integer part */ do { - iconvert[iplace++] = - (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10]; + iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10]; intpart = (intpart / 10); } while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert))); if (iplace == sizeof iconvert) @@ -640,8 +638,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer, /* convert fractional part */ do { - fconvert[fplace++] = - (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10]; + fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10]; fracpart = (fracpart / 10); } while (fplace < max); if (fplace == sizeof fconvert) @@ -713,6 +710,10 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer, if (*maxlen == 0) *maxlen = 1024; *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen); + if(!*buffer) { + /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ + return; + } if (*currlen > 0) { assert(*sbuffer != NULL); memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen); @@ -721,6 +722,10 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer, } else { *maxlen += 1024; *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen); + if(!*buffer) { + /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ + return; + } } } /* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h index 60083bfde..7878fb198 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h @@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void); # define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL 127 # define BIO_F_CONN_STATE 115 # define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ 132 +# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE 133 # define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL 116 # define BIO_F_FILE_READ 130 # define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL 129 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c index 8715f5cbc..d3e860686 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c @@ -70,14 +70,17 @@ long MS_CALLBACK BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, MS_STATIC char buf[256]; char *p; long r = 1; + int len; size_t p_maxlen; if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd) r = ret; - BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "BIO[%08lX]:", (unsigned long)bio); - p = &(buf[14]); - p_maxlen = sizeof buf - 14; + len = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"BIO[%p]: ",(void *)bio); + + p = buf + len; + p_maxlen = sizeof(buf) - len; + switch (cmd) { case BIO_CB_FREE: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "Free - %s\n", bio->method->name); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c index e8d3027c6..d9007aa3d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/bio/bio_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL), "CONN_CTRL"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_STATE), "CONN_STATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ), "DGRAM_SCTP_READ"}, + {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE), "DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL), "FILE_CTRL"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_READ), "FILE_READ"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL), "LINEBUFFER_CTRL"}, diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index fcbae5f74..388d90d02 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c @@ -1012,6 +1012,10 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag) */ sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len); + if(!authchunks) { + BIO_vfree(bio); + return (NULL); + } memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len)); ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, @@ -1347,6 +1351,10 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) optlen = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen); + if (!authchunks) { + BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR); + return -1; + } memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen)); ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen); @@ -1413,10 +1421,15 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) * yet, we have to save it and send it as soon as the socket gets dry. */ if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) { + char *tmp; data->saved_message.bio = b; + if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) { + BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR); + return -1; + } if (data->saved_message.data) OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data); - data->saved_message.data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl); + data->saved_message.data = tmp; memcpy(data->saved_message.data, in, inl); data->saved_message.length = inl; return inl; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile index 0cdbd2016..5361dc827 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile @@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ x86_64-mont5.s: asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ x86_64-gf2m.s: asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ -modexp512-x86_64.s: asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl - $(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ rsaz-x86_64.s: asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ rsaz-avx2.s: asm/rsaz-avx2.pl diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl deleted file mode 100644 index bfd6e9754..000000000 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1497 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env perl -# -# Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Intel Corp. -# Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com -# Jim Guilford -# Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com -# Maxim.Perminov@intel.com -# -# More information about algorithm used can be found at: -# http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf -# -# ==================================================================== -# Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. -# -# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -# are met: -# -# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -# -# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in -# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -# distribution. -# -# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this -# software must display the following acknowledgment: -# "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -# for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -# -# 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to -# endorse or promote products derived from this software without -# prior written permission. For written permission, please contact -# licensing@OpenSSL.org. -# -# 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" -# nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written -# permission of the OpenSSL Project. -# -# 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following -# acknowledgment: -# "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project -# for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" -# -# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY -# EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -# PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR -# ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) -# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, -# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -# ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED -# OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -# ==================================================================== - -$flavour = shift; -$output = shift; -if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } - -my $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); - -$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; -( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or -( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or -die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; - -open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; -*STDOUT=*OUT; - -use strict; -my $code=".text\n\n"; -my $m=0; - -# -# Define x512 macros -# - -#MULSTEP_512_ADD MACRO x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, dst, src1, src2, add_src, tmp1, tmp2 -# -# uses rax, rdx, and args -sub MULSTEP_512_ADD -{ - my ($x, $DST, $SRC2, $ASRC, $OP, $TMP)=@_; - my @X=@$x; # make a copy -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*0)($SRC2), %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [0] - mov ($ASRC), $X[0] - add %rax, $X[0] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[0], $DST -___ -for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) { -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $TMP - - mov (+8*$i)($SRC2), %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [$i] - mov (+8*$i)($ASRC), $X[$i] - add %rax, $X[$i] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $TMP, $X[$i] - adc \$0, %rdx -___ -} -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $X[0] -___ -} - -#MULSTEP_512 MACRO x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, dst, src2, src1_val, tmp -# -# uses rax, rdx, and args -sub MULSTEP_512 -{ - my ($x, $DST, $SRC2, $OP, $TMP)=@_; - my @X=@$x; # make a copy -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*0)($SRC2), %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [0] - add %rax, $X[0] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[0], $DST -___ -for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) { -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $TMP - - mov (+8*$i)($SRC2), %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [$i] - add %rax, $X[$i] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $TMP, $X[$i] - adc \$0, %rdx -___ -} -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $X[0] -___ -} - -# -# Swizzle Macros -# - -# macro to copy data from flat space to swizzled table -#MACRO swizzle pDst, pSrc, tmp1, tmp2 -# pDst and pSrc are modified -sub swizzle -{ - my ($pDst, $pSrc, $cnt, $d0)=@_; -$code.=<<___; - mov \$8, $cnt -loop_$m: - mov ($pSrc), $d0 - mov $d0#w, ($pDst) - shr \$16, $d0 - mov $d0#w, (+64*1)($pDst) - shr \$16, $d0 - mov $d0#w, (+64*2)($pDst) - shr \$16, $d0 - mov $d0#w, (+64*3)($pDst) - lea 8($pSrc), $pSrc - lea 64*4($pDst), $pDst - dec $cnt - jnz loop_$m -___ - - $m++; -} - -# macro to copy data from swizzled table to flat space -#MACRO unswizzle pDst, pSrc, tmp*3 -sub unswizzle -{ - my ($pDst, $pSrc, $cnt, $d0, $d1)=@_; -$code.=<<___; - mov \$4, $cnt -loop_$m: - movzxw (+64*3+256*0)($pSrc), $d0 - movzxw (+64*3+256*1)($pSrc), $d1 - shl \$16, $d0 - shl \$16, $d1 - mov (+64*2+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w - mov (+64*2+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w - shl \$16, $d0 - shl \$16, $d1 - mov (+64*1+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w - mov (+64*1+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w - shl \$16, $d0 - shl \$16, $d1 - mov (+64*0+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w - mov (+64*0+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w - mov $d0, (+8*0)($pDst) - mov $d1, (+8*1)($pDst) - lea 256*2($pSrc), $pSrc - lea 8*2($pDst), $pDst - sub \$1, $cnt - jnz loop_$m -___ - - $m++; -} - -# -# Data Structures -# - -# Reduce Data -# -# -# Offset Value -# 0C0 Carries -# 0B8 X2[10] -# 0B0 X2[9] -# 0A8 X2[8] -# 0A0 X2[7] -# 098 X2[6] -# 090 X2[5] -# 088 X2[4] -# 080 X2[3] -# 078 X2[2] -# 070 X2[1] -# 068 X2[0] -# 060 X1[12] P[10] -# 058 X1[11] P[9] Z[8] -# 050 X1[10] P[8] Z[7] -# 048 X1[9] P[7] Z[6] -# 040 X1[8] P[6] Z[5] -# 038 X1[7] P[5] Z[4] -# 030 X1[6] P[4] Z[3] -# 028 X1[5] P[3] Z[2] -# 020 X1[4] P[2] Z[1] -# 018 X1[3] P[1] Z[0] -# 010 X1[2] P[0] Y[2] -# 008 X1[1] Q[1] Y[1] -# 000 X1[0] Q[0] Y[0] - -my $X1_offset = 0; # 13 qwords -my $X2_offset = $X1_offset + 13*8; # 11 qwords -my $Carries_offset = $X2_offset + 11*8; # 1 qword -my $Q_offset = 0; # 2 qwords -my $P_offset = $Q_offset + 2*8; # 11 qwords -my $Y_offset = 0; # 3 qwords -my $Z_offset = $Y_offset + 3*8; # 9 qwords - -my $Red_Data_Size = $Carries_offset + 1*8; # (25 qwords) - -# -# Stack Frame -# -# -# offset value -# ... <old stack contents> -# ... -# 280 Garray - -# 278 tmp16[15] -# ... ... -# 200 tmp16[0] - -# 1F8 tmp[7] -# ... ... -# 1C0 tmp[0] - -# 1B8 GT[7] -# ... ... -# 180 GT[0] - -# 178 Reduce Data -# ... ... -# 0B8 Reduce Data -# 0B0 reserved -# 0A8 reserved -# 0A0 reserved -# 098 reserved -# 090 reserved -# 088 reduce result addr -# 080 exp[8] - -# ... -# 048 exp[1] -# 040 exp[0] - -# 038 reserved -# 030 loop_idx -# 028 pg -# 020 i -# 018 pData ; arg 4 -# 010 pG ; arg 2 -# 008 pResult ; arg 1 -# 000 rsp ; stack pointer before subtract - -my $rsp_offset = 0; -my $pResult_offset = 8*1 + $rsp_offset; -my $pG_offset = 8*1 + $pResult_offset; -my $pData_offset = 8*1 + $pG_offset; -my $i_offset = 8*1 + $pData_offset; -my $pg_offset = 8*1 + $i_offset; -my $loop_idx_offset = 8*1 + $pg_offset; -my $reserved1_offset = 8*1 + $loop_idx_offset; -my $exp_offset = 8*1 + $reserved1_offset; -my $red_result_addr_offset= 8*9 + $exp_offset; -my $reserved2_offset = 8*1 + $red_result_addr_offset; -my $Reduce_Data_offset = 8*5 + $reserved2_offset; -my $GT_offset = $Red_Data_Size + $Reduce_Data_offset; -my $tmp_offset = 8*8 + $GT_offset; -my $tmp16_offset = 8*8 + $tmp_offset; -my $garray_offset = 8*16 + $tmp16_offset; -my $mem_size = 8*8*32 + $garray_offset; - -# -# Offsets within Reduce Data -# -# -# struct MODF_2FOLD_MONT_512_C1_DATA { -# UINT64 t[8][8]; -# UINT64 m[8]; -# UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^768 % m */ -# UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */ -# UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */ -# }; - -my $T = 0; -my $M = 512; # = 8 * 8 * 8 -my $M1 = 576; # = 8 * 8 * 9 /* += 8 * 8 */ -my $M2 = 640; # = 8 * 8 * 10 /* += 8 * 8 */ -my $K1 = 704; # = 8 * 8 * 11 /* += 8 * 8 */ - -# -# FUNCTIONS -# - -{{{ -# -# MULADD_128x512 : Function to multiply 128-bits (2 qwords) by 512-bits (8 qwords) -# and add 512-bits (8 qwords) -# to get 640 bits (10 qwords) -# Input: 128-bit mul source: [rdi+8*1], rbp -# 512-bit mul source: [rsi+8*n] -# 512-bit add source: r15, r14, ..., r9, r8 -# Output: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, [rcx+8*1], [rcx+8*0] -# Clobbers all regs except: rcx, rsi, rdi -$code.=<<___; -.type MULADD_128x512,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 16 -MULADD_128x512: -___ - &MULSTEP_512([map("%r$_",(8..15))], "(+8*0)(%rcx)", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx"); -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*1)(%rdi), %rbp -___ - &MULSTEP_512([map("%r$_",(9..15,8))], "(+8*1)(%rcx)", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx"); -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size MULADD_128x512,.-MULADD_128x512 -___ -}}} - -{{{ -#MULADD_256x512 MACRO pDst, pA, pB, OP, TMP, X7, X6, X5, X4, X3, X2, X1, X0 -# -# Inputs: pDst: Destination (768 bits, 12 qwords) -# pA: Multiplicand (1024 bits, 16 qwords) -# pB: Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords) -# Dst = Ah * B + Al -# where Ah is (in qwords) A[15:12] (256 bits) and Al is A[7:0] (512 bits) -# Results in X3 X2 X1 X0 X7 X6 X5 X4 Dst[3:0] -# Uses registers: arguments, RAX, RDX -sub MULADD_256x512 -{ - my ($pDst, $pA, $pB, $OP, $TMP, $X)=@_; -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*12)($pA), $OP -___ - &MULSTEP_512_ADD($X, "(+8*0)($pDst)", $pB, $pA, $OP, $TMP); - push(@$X,shift(@$X)); - -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*13)($pA), $OP -___ - &MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*1)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP); - push(@$X,shift(@$X)); - -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*14)($pA), $OP -___ - &MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*2)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP); - push(@$X,shift(@$X)); - -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*15)($pA), $OP -___ - &MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*3)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP); - push(@$X,shift(@$X)); -} - -# -# mont_reduce(UINT64 *x, /* 1024 bits, 16 qwords */ -# UINT64 *m, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ -# MODF_2FOLD_MONT_512_C1_DATA *data, -# UINT64 *r) /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ -# Input: x (number to be reduced): tmp16 (Implicit) -# m (modulus): [pM] (Implicit) -# data (reduce data): [pData] (Implicit) -# Output: r (result): Address in [red_res_addr] -# result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10 - -my @X=map("%r$_",(8..15)); - -$code.=<<___; -.type mont_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 16 -mont_reduce: -___ - -my $STACK_DEPTH = 8; - # - # X1 = Xh * M1 + Xl -$code.=<<___; - lea (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$X1_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rdi # pX1 (Dst) 769 bits, 13 qwords - mov (+$pData_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rsi # pM1 (Bsrc) 512 bits, 8 qwords - add \$$M1, %rsi - lea (+$tmp16_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx # X (Asrc) 1024 bits, 16 qwords - -___ - - &MULADD_256x512("%rdi", "%rcx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", \@X); # rotates @X 4 times - # results in r11, r10, r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, X1[3:0] - -$code.=<<___; - xor %rax, %rax - # X1 += xl - add (+8*8)(%rcx), $X[4] - adc (+8*9)(%rcx), $X[5] - adc (+8*10)(%rcx), $X[6] - adc (+8*11)(%rcx), $X[7] - adc \$0, %rax - # X1 is now rax, r11-r8, r15-r12, tmp16[3:0] - - # - # check for carry ;; carry stored in rax - mov $X[4], (+8*8)(%rdi) # rdi points to X1 - mov $X[5], (+8*9)(%rdi) - mov $X[6], %rbp - mov $X[7], (+8*11)(%rdi) - - mov %rax, (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp) - - mov (+8*0)(%rdi), $X[4] - mov (+8*1)(%rdi), $X[5] - mov (+8*2)(%rdi), $X[6] - mov (+8*3)(%rdi), $X[7] - - # X1 is now stored in: X1[11], rbp, X1[9:8], r15-r8 - # rdi -> X1 - # rsi -> M1 - - # - # X2 = Xh * M2 + Xl - # do first part (X2 = Xh * M2) - add \$8*10, %rdi # rdi -> pXh ; 128 bits, 2 qwords - # Xh is actually { [rdi+8*1], rbp } - add \$`$M2-$M1`, %rsi # rsi -> M2 - lea (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$X2_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx # rcx -> pX2 ; 641 bits, 11 qwords -___ - unshift(@X,pop(@X)); unshift(@X,pop(@X)); -$code.=<<___; - - call MULADD_128x512 # args in rcx, rdi / rbp, rsi, r15-r8 - # result in r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, X2[1:0] - mov (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rax - - # X2 += Xl - add (+8*8-8*10)(%rdi), $X[6] # (-8*10) is to adjust rdi -> Xh to Xl - adc (+8*9-8*10)(%rdi), $X[7] - mov $X[6], (+8*8)(%rcx) - mov $X[7], (+8*9)(%rcx) - - adc %rax, %rax - mov %rax, (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp) - - lea (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Q_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rdi # rdi -> pQ ; 128 bits, 2 qwords - add \$`$K1-$M2`, %rsi # rsi -> pK1 ; 128 bits, 2 qwords - - # MUL_128x128t128 rdi, rcx, rsi ; Q = X2 * K1 (bottom half) - # B1:B0 = rsi[1:0] = K1[1:0] - # A1:A0 = rcx[1:0] = X2[1:0] - # Result = rdi[1],rbp = Q[1],rbp - mov (%rsi), %r8 # B0 - mov (+8*1)(%rsi), %rbx # B1 - - mov (%rcx), %rax # A0 - mul %r8 # B0 - mov %rax, %rbp - mov %rdx, %r9 - - mov (+8*1)(%rcx), %rax # A1 - mul %r8 # B0 - add %rax, %r9 - - mov (%rcx), %rax # A0 - mul %rbx # B1 - add %rax, %r9 - - mov %r9, (+8*1)(%rdi) - # end MUL_128x128t128 - - sub \$`$K1-$M`, %rsi - - mov (%rcx), $X[6] - mov (+8*1)(%rcx), $X[7] # r9:r8 = X2[1:0] - - call MULADD_128x512 # args in rcx, rdi / rbp, rsi, r15-r8 - # result in r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, X2[1:0] - - # load first half of m to rdx, rdi, rbx, rax - # moved this here for efficiency - mov (+8*0)(%rsi), %rax - mov (+8*1)(%rsi), %rbx - mov (+8*2)(%rsi), %rdi - mov (+8*3)(%rsi), %rdx - - # continue with reduction - mov (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rbp - - add (+8*8)(%rcx), $X[6] - adc (+8*9)(%rcx), $X[7] - - #accumulate the final carry to rbp - adc %rbp, %rbp - - # Add in overflow corrections: R = (X2>>128) += T[overflow] - # R = {r9, r8, r15, r14, ..., r10} - shl \$3, %rbp - mov (+$pData_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx # rsi -> Data (and points to T) - add %rcx, %rbp # pT ; 512 bits, 8 qwords, spread out - - # rsi will be used to generate a mask after the addition - xor %rsi, %rsi - - add (+8*8*0)(%rbp), $X[0] - adc (+8*8*1)(%rbp), $X[1] - adc (+8*8*2)(%rbp), $X[2] - adc (+8*8*3)(%rbp), $X[3] - adc (+8*8*4)(%rbp), $X[4] - adc (+8*8*5)(%rbp), $X[5] - adc (+8*8*6)(%rbp), $X[6] - adc (+8*8*7)(%rbp), $X[7] - - # if there is a carry: rsi = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF - # if carry is clear: rsi = 0x0000000000000000 - sbb \$0, %rsi - - # if carry is clear, subtract 0. Otherwise, subtract 256 bits of m - and %rsi, %rax - and %rsi, %rbx - and %rsi, %rdi - and %rsi, %rdx - - mov \$1, %rbp - sub %rax, $X[0] - sbb %rbx, $X[1] - sbb %rdi, $X[2] - sbb %rdx, $X[3] - - # if there is a borrow: rbp = 0 - # if there is no borrow: rbp = 1 - # this is used to save the borrows in between the first half and the 2nd half of the subtraction of m - sbb \$0, %rbp - - #load second half of m to rdx, rdi, rbx, rax - - add \$$M, %rcx - mov (+8*4)(%rcx), %rax - mov (+8*5)(%rcx), %rbx - mov (+8*6)(%rcx), %rdi - mov (+8*7)(%rcx), %rdx - - # use the rsi mask as before - # if carry is clear, subtract 0. Otherwise, subtract 256 bits of m - and %rsi, %rax - and %rsi, %rbx - and %rsi, %rdi - and %rsi, %rdx - - # if rbp = 0, there was a borrow before, it is moved to the carry flag - # if rbp = 1, there was not a borrow before, carry flag is cleared - sub \$1, %rbp - - sbb %rax, $X[4] - sbb %rbx, $X[5] - sbb %rdi, $X[6] - sbb %rdx, $X[7] - - # write R back to memory - - mov (+$red_result_addr_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rsi - mov $X[0], (+8*0)(%rsi) - mov $X[1], (+8*1)(%rsi) - mov $X[2], (+8*2)(%rsi) - mov $X[3], (+8*3)(%rsi) - mov $X[4], (+8*4)(%rsi) - mov $X[5], (+8*5)(%rsi) - mov $X[6], (+8*6)(%rsi) - mov $X[7], (+8*7)(%rsi) - - ret -.size mont_reduce,.-mont_reduce -___ -}}} - -{{{ -#MUL_512x512 MACRO pDst, pA, pB, x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, tmp*2 -# -# Inputs: pDst: Destination (1024 bits, 16 qwords) -# pA: Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords) -# pB: Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords) -# Uses registers rax, rdx, args -# B operand in [pB] and also in x7...x0 -sub MUL_512x512 -{ - my ($pDst, $pA, $pB, $x, $OP, $TMP, $pDst_o)=@_; - my ($pDst, $pDst_o) = ($pDst =~ m/([^+]*)\+?(.*)?/); - my @X=@$x; # make a copy - -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*0)($pA), $OP - - mov $X[0], %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [0] - mov %rax, (+$pDst_o+8*0)($pDst) - mov %rdx, $X[0] -___ -for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) { -$code.=<<___; - mov $X[$i], %rax - mul $OP # rdx:rax = %OP * [$i] - add %rax, $X[$i-1] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov %rdx, $X[$i] -___ -} - -for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) { -$code.=<<___; - mov (+8*$i)($pA), $OP -___ - - &MULSTEP_512(\@X, "(+$pDst_o+8*$i)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP); - push(@X,shift(@X)); -} - -$code.=<<___; - mov $X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst) - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst) - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst) - mov $X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst) - mov $X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst) - mov $X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst) - mov $X[6], (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst) - mov $X[7], (+$pDst_o+8*15)($pDst) -___ -} - -# -# mont_mul_a3b : subroutine to compute (Src1 * Src2) % M (all 512-bits) -# Input: src1: Address of source 1: rdi -# src2: Address of source 2: rsi -# Output: dst: Address of destination: [red_res_addr] -# src2 and result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10 -# Temp: Clobbers [tmp16], all registers -$code.=<<___; -.type mont_mul_a3b,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 16 -mont_mul_a3b: - # - # multiply tmp = src1 * src2 - # For multiply: dst = rcx, src1 = rdi, src2 = rsi - # stack depth is extra 8 from call -___ - &MUL_512x512("%rsp+$tmp16_offset+8", "%rdi", "%rsi", [map("%r$_",(10..15,8..9))], "%rbp", "%rbx"); -$code.=<<___; - # - # Dst = tmp % m - # Call reduce(tmp, m, data, dst) - - # tail recursion optimization: jmp to mont_reduce and return from there - jmp mont_reduce - # call mont_reduce - # ret -.size mont_mul_a3b,.-mont_mul_a3b -___ -}}} - -{{{ -#SQR_512 MACRO pDest, pA, x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, tmp*4 -# -# Input in memory [pA] and also in x7...x0 -# Uses all argument registers plus rax and rdx -# -# This version computes all of the off-diagonal terms into memory, -# and then it adds in the diagonal terms - -sub SQR_512 -{ - my ($pDst, $pA, $x, $A, $tmp, $x7, $x6, $pDst_o)=@_; - my ($pDst, $pDst_o) = ($pDst =~ m/([^+]*)\+?(.*)?/); - my @X=@$x; # make a copy -$code.=<<___; - # ------------------ - # first pass 01...07 - # ------------------ - mov $X[0], $A - - mov $X[1],%rax - mul $A - mov %rax, (+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst) -___ -for(my $i=2;$i<8;$i++) { -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $X[$i-2] - mov $X[$i],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[$i-2] - adc \$0, %rdx -___ -} -$code.=<<___; - mov %rdx, $x7 - - mov $X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst) - - # ------------------ - # second pass 12...17 - # ------------------ - - mov (+8*1)($pA), $A - - mov (+8*2)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*3)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*4)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[3] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[3] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*5)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[4] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[4] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[6],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[1] - - # ------------------ - # third pass 23...27 - # ------------------ - mov (+8*2)($pA), $A - - mov (+8*3)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[3] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*4)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[4] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[4] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*5)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[6],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[2] - - # ------------------ - # fourth pass 34...37 - # ------------------ - - mov (+8*3)($pA), $A - - mov (+8*4)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov (+8*5)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $x7 - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $x7, (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[6],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[5] - - # ------------------ - # fifth pass 45...47 - # ------------------ - mov (+8*4)($pA), $A - - mov (+8*5)($pA),%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[6],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $X[1] - - # ------------------ - # sixth pass 56...57 - # ------------------ - mov (+8*5)($pA), $A - - mov $X[6],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[0] - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - add $X[0], $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, $X[2] - - # ------------------ - # seventh pass 67 - # ------------------ - mov $X[6], $A - - mov $X[7],%rax - mul $A - add %rax, $X[2] - adc \$0, %rdx - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst) - - mov %rdx, (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst) - - # start finalize (add in squares, and double off-terms) - mov (+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst), $X[0] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst), $X[1] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst), $X[2] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst), $X[3] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst), $X[4] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst), $X[5] - - mov (+8*3)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - mov %rax, $x6 - mov %rdx, $X[6] - - add $X[0], $X[0] - adc $X[1], $X[1] - adc $X[2], $X[2] - adc $X[3], $X[3] - adc $X[4], $X[4] - adc $X[5], $X[5] - adc \$0, $X[6] - - mov (+8*0)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - mov %rax, (+$pDst_o+8*0)($pDst) - mov %rdx, $A - - mov (+8*1)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - - add $A, $X[0] - adc %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $A - mov $X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst) - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst) - - mov (+8*2)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - - add $A, $X[2] - adc %rax, $X[3] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $A - - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst) - mov $X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst) - - xor $tmp, $tmp - add $A, $X[4] - adc $x6, $X[5] - adc \$0, $tmp - - mov $X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst) - mov $X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst) - - # %%tmp has 0/1 in column 7 - # %%A6 has a full value in column 7 - - mov (+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst), $X[0] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst), $X[1] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst), $X[2] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst), $X[3] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst), $X[4] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst), $X[5] - mov (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst), $x6 - mov (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst), $x7 - - mov $X[7], %rax - mul %rax - mov %rax, $X[7] - mov %rdx, $A - - add $X[0], $X[0] - adc $X[1], $X[1] - adc $X[2], $X[2] - adc $X[3], $X[3] - adc $X[4], $X[4] - adc $X[5], $X[5] - adc $x6, $x6 - adc $x7, $x7 - adc \$0, $A - - add $tmp, $X[0] - - mov (+8*4)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - - add $X[6], $X[0] - adc %rax, $X[1] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $tmp - - mov $X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst) - mov $X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst) - - mov (+8*5)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - - add $tmp, $X[2] - adc %rax, $X[3] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov %rdx, $tmp - - mov $X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst) - mov $X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst) - - mov (+8*6)($pA), %rax - mul %rax - - add $tmp, $X[4] - adc %rax, $X[5] - adc \$0, %rdx - - mov $X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst) - mov $X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst) - - add %rdx, $x6 - adc $X[7], $x7 - adc \$0, $A - - mov $x6, (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst) - mov $x7, (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst) - mov $A, (+$pDst_o+8*15)($pDst) -___ -} - -# -# sqr_reduce: subroutine to compute Result = reduce(Result * Result) -# -# input and result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10 -# -$code.=<<___; -.type sqr_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 16 -sqr_reduce: - mov (+$pResult_offset+8)(%rsp), %rcx -___ - &SQR_512("%rsp+$tmp16_offset+8", "%rcx", [map("%r$_",(10..15,8..9))], "%rbx", "%rbp", "%rsi", "%rdi"); -$code.=<<___; - # tail recursion optimization: jmp to mont_reduce and return from there - jmp mont_reduce - # call mont_reduce - # ret -.size sqr_reduce,.-sqr_reduce -___ -}}} - -# -# MAIN FUNCTION -# - -#mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ -# UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ -# UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ -# struct mod_ctx_512 *data) - -# window size = 5 -# table size = 2^5 = 32 -#table_entries equ 32 -#table_size equ table_entries * 8 -$code.=<<___; -.globl mod_exp_512 -.type mod_exp_512,\@function,4 -mod_exp_512: - push %rbp - push %rbx - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - - # adjust stack down and then align it with cache boundary - mov %rsp, %r8 - sub \$$mem_size, %rsp - and \$-64, %rsp - - # store previous stack pointer and arguments - mov %r8, (+$rsp_offset)(%rsp) - mov %rdi, (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp) - mov %rsi, (+$pG_offset)(%rsp) - mov %rcx, (+$pData_offset)(%rsp) -.Lbody: - # transform g into montgomery space - # GT = reduce(g * C2) = reduce(g * (2^256)) - # reduce expects to have the input in [tmp16] - pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 - movdqu (+16*0)(%rsi), %xmm0 - movdqu (+16*1)(%rsi), %xmm1 - movdqu (+16*2)(%rsi), %xmm2 - movdqu (+16*3)(%rsi), %xmm3 - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*0)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*1)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*6)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*7)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm0, (+$tmp16_offset+16*2)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm1, (+$tmp16_offset+16*3)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm2, (+$tmp16_offset+16*4)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm3, (+$tmp16_offset+16*5)(%rsp) - - # load pExp before rdx gets blown away - movdqu (+16*0)(%rdx), %xmm0 - movdqu (+16*1)(%rdx), %xmm1 - movdqu (+16*2)(%rdx), %xmm2 - movdqu (+16*3)(%rdx), %xmm3 - - lea (+$GT_offset)(%rsp), %rbx - mov %rbx, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp) - call mont_reduce - - # Initialize tmp = C - lea (+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rcx - xor %rax, %rax - mov %rax, (+8*0)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*1)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*3)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*4)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*5)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*6)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+8*7)(%rcx) - mov %rax, (+$exp_offset+8*8)(%rsp) - movq \$1, (+8*2)(%rcx) - - lea (+$garray_offset)(%rsp), %rbp - mov %rcx, %rsi # pTmp - mov %rbp, %rdi # Garray[][0] -___ - - &swizzle("%rdi", "%rcx", "%rax", "%rbx"); - - # for (rax = 31; rax != 0; rax--) { - # tmp = reduce(tmp * G) - # swizzle(pg, tmp); - # pg += 2; } -$code.=<<___; - mov \$31, %rax - mov %rax, (+$i_offset)(%rsp) - mov %rbp, (+$pg_offset)(%rsp) - # rsi -> pTmp - mov %rsi, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp) - mov (+8*0)(%rsi), %r10 - mov (+8*1)(%rsi), %r11 - mov (+8*2)(%rsi), %r12 - mov (+8*3)(%rsi), %r13 - mov (+8*4)(%rsi), %r14 - mov (+8*5)(%rsi), %r15 - mov (+8*6)(%rsi), %r8 - mov (+8*7)(%rsi), %r9 -init_loop: - lea (+$GT_offset)(%rsp), %rdi - call mont_mul_a3b - lea (+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rsi - mov (+$pg_offset)(%rsp), %rbp - add \$2, %rbp - mov %rbp, (+$pg_offset)(%rsp) - mov %rsi, %rcx # rcx = rsi = addr of tmp -___ - - &swizzle("%rbp", "%rcx", "%rax", "%rbx"); -$code.=<<___; - mov (+$i_offset)(%rsp), %rax - sub \$1, %rax - mov %rax, (+$i_offset)(%rsp) - jne init_loop - - # - # Copy exponent onto stack - movdqa %xmm0, (+$exp_offset+16*0)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm1, (+$exp_offset+16*1)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm2, (+$exp_offset+16*2)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm3, (+$exp_offset+16*3)(%rsp) - - - # - # Do exponentiation - # Initialize result to G[exp{511:507}] - mov (+$exp_offset+62)(%rsp), %eax - mov %rax, %rdx - shr \$11, %rax - and \$0x07FF, %edx - mov %edx, (+$exp_offset+62)(%rsp) - lea (+$garray_offset)(%rsp,%rax,2), %rsi - mov (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rdx -___ - - &unswizzle("%rdx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", "%rax"); - - # - # Loop variables - # rcx = [loop_idx] = index: 510-5 to 0 by 5 -$code.=<<___; - movq \$505, (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp) - - mov (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rcx - mov %rcx, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp) - mov (+8*0)(%rcx), %r10 - mov (+8*1)(%rcx), %r11 - mov (+8*2)(%rcx), %r12 - mov (+8*3)(%rcx), %r13 - mov (+8*4)(%rcx), %r14 - mov (+8*5)(%rcx), %r15 - mov (+8*6)(%rcx), %r8 - mov (+8*7)(%rcx), %r9 - jmp sqr_2 - -main_loop_a3b: - call sqr_reduce - call sqr_reduce - call sqr_reduce -sqr_2: - call sqr_reduce - call sqr_reduce - - # - # Do multiply, first look up proper value in Garray - mov (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp), %rcx # bit index - mov %rcx, %rax - shr \$4, %rax # rax is word pointer - mov (+$exp_offset)(%rsp,%rax,2), %edx - and \$15, %rcx - shrq %cl, %rdx - and \$0x1F, %rdx - - lea (+$garray_offset)(%rsp,%rdx,2), %rsi - lea (+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rdx - mov %rdx, %rdi -___ - - &unswizzle("%rdx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", "%rax"); - # rdi = tmp = pG - - # - # Call mod_mul_a1(pDst, pSrc1, pSrc2, pM, pData) - # result result pG M Data -$code.=<<___; - mov (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rsi - call mont_mul_a3b - - # - # finish loop - mov (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp), %rcx - sub \$5, %rcx - mov %rcx, (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp) - jge main_loop_a3b - - # - -end_main_loop_a3b: - # transform result out of Montgomery space - # result = reduce(result) - mov (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rdx - pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 - movdqu (+16*0)(%rdx), %xmm0 - movdqu (+16*1)(%rdx), %xmm1 - movdqu (+16*2)(%rdx), %xmm2 - movdqu (+16*3)(%rdx), %xmm3 - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*4)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*5)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*6)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*7)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm0, (+$tmp16_offset+16*0)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm1, (+$tmp16_offset+16*1)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm2, (+$tmp16_offset+16*2)(%rsp) - movdqa %xmm3, (+$tmp16_offset+16*3)(%rsp) - call mont_reduce - - # If result > m, subract m - # load result into r15:r8 - mov (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rax - mov (+8*0)(%rax), %r8 - mov (+8*1)(%rax), %r9 - mov (+8*2)(%rax), %r10 - mov (+8*3)(%rax), %r11 - mov (+8*4)(%rax), %r12 - mov (+8*5)(%rax), %r13 - mov (+8*6)(%rax), %r14 - mov (+8*7)(%rax), %r15 - - # subtract m - mov (+$pData_offset)(%rsp), %rbx - add \$$M, %rbx - - sub (+8*0)(%rbx), %r8 - sbb (+8*1)(%rbx), %r9 - sbb (+8*2)(%rbx), %r10 - sbb (+8*3)(%rbx), %r11 - sbb (+8*4)(%rbx), %r12 - sbb (+8*5)(%rbx), %r13 - sbb (+8*6)(%rbx), %r14 - sbb (+8*7)(%rbx), %r15 - - # if Carry is clear, replace result with difference - mov (+8*0)(%rax), %rsi - mov (+8*1)(%rax), %rdi - mov (+8*2)(%rax), %rcx - mov (+8*3)(%rax), %rdx - cmovnc %r8, %rsi - cmovnc %r9, %rdi - cmovnc %r10, %rcx - cmovnc %r11, %rdx - mov %rsi, (+8*0)(%rax) - mov %rdi, (+8*1)(%rax) - mov %rcx, (+8*2)(%rax) - mov %rdx, (+8*3)(%rax) - - mov (+8*4)(%rax), %rsi - mov (+8*5)(%rax), %rdi - mov (+8*6)(%rax), %rcx - mov (+8*7)(%rax), %rdx - cmovnc %r12, %rsi - cmovnc %r13, %rdi - cmovnc %r14, %rcx - cmovnc %r15, %rdx - mov %rsi, (+8*4)(%rax) - mov %rdi, (+8*5)(%rax) - mov %rcx, (+8*6)(%rax) - mov %rdx, (+8*7)(%rax) - - mov (+$rsp_offset)(%rsp), %rsi - mov 0(%rsi),%r15 - mov 8(%rsi),%r14 - mov 16(%rsi),%r13 - mov 24(%rsi),%r12 - mov 32(%rsi),%rbx - mov 40(%rsi),%rbp - lea 48(%rsi),%rsp -.Lepilogue: - ret -.size mod_exp_512, . - mod_exp_512 -___ - -if ($win64) { -# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, -# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) -my $rec="%rcx"; -my $frame="%rdx"; -my $context="%r8"; -my $disp="%r9"; - -$code.=<<___; -.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind -.type mod_exp_512_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 16 -mod_exp_512_se_handler: - push %rsi - push %rdi - push %rbx - push %rbp - push %r12 - push %r13 - push %r14 - push %r15 - pushfq - sub \$64,%rsp - - mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax - mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip - - lea .Lbody(%rip),%r10 - cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<prologue label - jb .Lin_prologue - - mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp - - lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 - cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label - jae .Lin_prologue - - mov $rsp_offset(%rax),%rax # pull saved Rsp - - mov 32(%rax),%rbx - mov 40(%rax),%rbp - mov 24(%rax),%r12 - mov 16(%rax),%r13 - mov 8(%rax),%r14 - mov 0(%rax),%r15 - lea 48(%rax),%rax - mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx - mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp - mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 - mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 - mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 - mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 - -.Lin_prologue: - mov 8(%rax),%rdi - mov 16(%rax),%rsi - mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp - mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi - mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi - - mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord - mov $context,%rsi # context - mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) - .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq - - mov $disp,%rsi - xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER - mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase - mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc - mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry - mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord - lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData - lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame - mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 - mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 - mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 - mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) - call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) - - mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch - add \$64,%rsp - popfq - pop %r15 - pop %r14 - pop %r13 - pop %r12 - pop %rbp - pop %rbx - pop %rdi - pop %rsi - ret -.size mod_exp_512_se_handler,.-mod_exp_512_se_handler - -.section .pdata -.align 4 - .rva .LSEH_begin_mod_exp_512 - .rva .LSEH_end_mod_exp_512 - .rva .LSEH_info_mod_exp_512 - -.section .xdata -.align 8 -.LSEH_info_mod_exp_512: - .byte 9,0,0,0 - .rva mod_exp_512_se_handler -___ -} - -sub reg_part { -my ($reg,$conv)=@_; - if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/) { $reg .= $conv; } - elsif ($conv eq "b") { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/; } - elsif ($conv eq "w") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/; } - elsif ($conv eq "d") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/; } - return $reg; -} - -$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem; -$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; -$code =~ s/(\(\+[^)]+\))/eval $1/gem; -print $code; -close STDOUT; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 28a9fd53b..8c46e50bd 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -185,10 +185,10 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) goto err; } } - ret = 1; - err: if (r != rr) BN_copy(r, rr); + ret = 1; + err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile index 88535f963..60e896054 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ cmll-x86.s: asm/cmll-x86.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) asm/cmll-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ cmll-x86_64.s: asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERL) asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ -cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl +cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl $(PERL) asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ files: diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c index d93b14fa2..076b54578 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c @@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, return 0; } tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen); + if(!tmp) + return 0; /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl, in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c index e3ffeb21e..faca9aeb5 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c @@ -585,7 +585,11 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE); goto err; } - BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from))); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, + (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)))) { + CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } while (*p) buf->data[to++] = *(p++); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c index d03de2469..544fe9738 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c @@ -86,23 +86,10 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name) /* Need to load ENGINEs */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); #endif - /* Add others here? */ - ERR_clear_error(); - if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name, + CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name, CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION | - CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) { - BIO *bio_err; - ERR_load_crypto_strings(); - if ((bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE)) != NULL) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Auto configuration failed\n"); - ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - BIO_free(bio_err); - } - exit(1); - } - - return; + CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE); } void OPENSSL_no_config() diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h b/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h index 4d946395a..e85d31005 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h @@ -58,180 +58,155 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = { { -/* nibble 0 */ - 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L, - 0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L, - 0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, - 0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L, - 0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L, - 0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, - 0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L, - 0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L, - 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, - 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L, - 0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L, - 0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L, - 0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L, - 0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L, - }, { -/* nibble 1 */ - 0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, - 0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L, - 0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L, - 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L, - 0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L, - 0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L, - 0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L, - 0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L, - 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L, - 0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L, - 0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L, - 0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L, - 0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L, - 0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, - 0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, - 0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L, - }, { -/* nibble 2 */ - 0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L, - 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, - 0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L, - 0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L, - 0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, - 0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L, - 0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L, - 0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L, - 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, - 0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L, - 0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L, - 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L, - 0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, - 0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, - 0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L, - 0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L, - }, { -/* nibble 3 */ - 0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L, - 0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L, - 0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L, - 0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L, - 0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L, - 0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L, - 0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L, - 0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L, - 0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L, - 0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L, - 0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L, - 0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L, - 0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, - 0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L, - 0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, - 0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L, - }, { -/* nibble 4 */ - 0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L, - 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, - 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L, - 0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L, - 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L, - 0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L, - 0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L, - 0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L, - 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L, - 0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L, - 0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L, - 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L, - 0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L, - 0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L, - }, { -/* nibble 5 */ - 0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L, - 0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L, - 0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L, - 0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, - 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L, - 0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L, - 0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L, - 0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L, - 0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L, - 0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L, - 0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L, - 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, - 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L, - 0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L, - }, { -/* nibble 6 */ - 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, - 0x01000004L, - 0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, - 0x00000000L, - 0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, - 0x01004000L, - 0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, - 0x00000204L, - 0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, - 0x01004204L, - 0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, - 0x00004200L, - 0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, - 0x00000004L, - 0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, - 0x01000000L, - 0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, - 0x00000204L, - 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, - 0x01004004L, - 0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, - 0x00000000L, - 0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, - 0x01000200L, - 0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, - 0x00004200L, - 0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, - 0x01000000L, - 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, - 0x01004204L, - 0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, - 0x00004004L, - }, { -/* nibble 7 */ - 0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, - 0x00000000L, - 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, - 0x20820080L, - 0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, - 0x00020080L, - 0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, - 0x20800000L, - 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, - 0x20020000L, - 0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00820000L, - 0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, - 0x20800080L, - 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, - 0x00000080L, - 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, - 0x20820080L, - 0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, - 0x00820000L, - 0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, - 0x00800080L, - 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, - 0x20020000L, - 0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, - 0x20000080L, - 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, - 0x20800000L, - 0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, - 0x00000000L, - 0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, - 0x00820080L, - } + /* nibble 0 */ + 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L, + 0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L, + 0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, + 0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L, + 0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L, + 0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, + 0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L, + 0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L, + 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, + 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L, + 0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L, + 0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L, + 0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L, + 0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L, + }, + { + /* nibble 1 */ + 0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, + 0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L, + 0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L, + 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L, + 0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L, + 0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L, + 0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L, + 0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L, + 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L, + 0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L, + 0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L, + 0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L, + 0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L, + 0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, + 0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, + 0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L, + }, + { + /* nibble 2 */ + 0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L, + 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, + 0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L, + 0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L, + 0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, + 0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L, + 0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L, + 0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L, + 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, + 0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L, + 0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L, + 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L, + 0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, + 0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, + 0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L, + 0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L, + }, + { + /* nibble 3 */ + 0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L, + 0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L, + 0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L, + 0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L, + 0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L, + 0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L, + 0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L, + 0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L, + 0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L, + 0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L, + 0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L, + 0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L, + 0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, + 0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L, + 0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, + 0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L, + }, + { + /* nibble 4 */ + 0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L, + 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, + 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L, + 0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L, + 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L, + 0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L, + 0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L, + 0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L, + 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L, + 0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L, + 0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L, + 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L, + 0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L, + 0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L, + }, + { + /* nibble 5 */ + 0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L, + 0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L, + 0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L, + 0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, + 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L, + 0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L, + 0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L, + 0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L, + 0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L, + 0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L, + 0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L, + 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, + 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L, + 0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L, + }, + { + /* nibble 6 */ + 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, + 0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, + 0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L, + 0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L, + 0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, + 0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L, + 0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, + 0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, + 0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L, + 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L, + 0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, + 0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L, + 0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L, + 0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L, + 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, + 0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L, + }, + { + /* nibble 7 */ + 0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L, + 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L, + 0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, + 0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L, + 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, + 0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, + 0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L, + 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, + 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L, + 0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, + 0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, + 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, + 0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L, + 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L, + 0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L, + 0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, + } }; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c index a8349e737..c6bfc2d3f 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c @@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh; - void *pval = NULL; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; @@ -161,12 +160,15 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) dh = pkey->pkey.dh; str = ASN1_STRING_new(); + if(!str) { + DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data); if (str->length <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - pval = str; ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL); @@ -183,14 +185,14 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) } if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), - ptype, pval, penc, penclen)) + ptype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: if (penc) OPENSSL_free(penc); - if (pval) - ASN1_STRING_free(pval); + if (str) + ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } @@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); - ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 1; @@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); dherr: DH_free(dh); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 0; } @@ -282,7 +285,8 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); - ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); + prkey = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) @@ -296,7 +300,7 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) if (params != NULL) ASN1_STRING_free(params); if (prkey != NULL) - ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); return 0; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c index 494a887de..b3a31472a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c @@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, ret = 0; Zlen = DH_size(dh); Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen); + if(!Z) { + goto err; + } if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0) goto err; if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid, diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c index c142ce702..2a5cd7137 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c @@ -129,21 +129,23 @@ static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa; - void *pval = NULL; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; + ASN1_STRING *str = NULL; dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa; if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) { - ASN1_STRING *str; str = ASN1_STRING_new(); + if (!str) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data); if (str->length <= 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - pval = str; ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } else ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; @@ -158,14 +160,14 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) } if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA), - ptype, pval, penc, penclen)) + ptype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: if (penc) OPENSSL_free(penc); - if (pval) - ASN1_STRING_free(pval); + if (str) + ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } @@ -226,7 +228,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) goto decerr; if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY; - ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen))) goto decerr; } @@ -264,7 +266,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) if (ndsa) sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free); else - ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 1; @@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) dsaerr: BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (privkey) - ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free); DSA_free(dsa); return 0; @@ -315,7 +317,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); - ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) @@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) if (params != NULL) ASN1_STRING_free(params); if (prkey != NULL) - ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey); + ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); return 0; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c index c0fcbb18b..f629f0380 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, return (NULL); } strcpy(merged, filespec2); - } else + } else { /* * This part isn't as trivial as it looks. It assumes that the * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no @@ -322,13 +322,12 @@ static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by * filespec1. */ - { int spec2len, len; spec2len = strlen(filespec2); - len = spec2len + (filespec1 ? strlen(filespec1) : 0); + len = spec2len + strlen(filespec1); - if (filespec2 && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') { + if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') { spec2len--; len--; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c index 14d885df1..0eff96ec2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso) # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ const char *sp1, *sp2; /* Search result */ + const char *ext = NULL; /* possible extension to add */ if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); @@ -214,11 +215,19 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso) /* Now, let's see if there's a type, and save the position in sp2 */ sp2 = strchr(sp1, '.'); /* + * If there is a period and the next character is a semi-colon, + * we need to add an extension + */ + if (sp2 != NULL && sp2[1] == ';') + ext = ".EXE"; + /* * If we found it, that's where we'll cut. Otherwise, look for a version * number and save the position in sp2 */ - if (sp2 == NULL) + if (sp2 == NULL) { sp2 = strchr(sp1, ';'); + ext = ".EXE"; + } /* * If there was still nothing to find, set sp2 to point at the end of the * string @@ -244,6 +253,11 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso) strncpy(p->imagename, filename, sp1 - filename); p->imagename[sp1 - filename] = '\0'; + if (ext) { + strcat(p->imagename, ext); + if (*sp2 == '.') + sp2++; + } strcat(p->imagename, sp2); p->filename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->filename); @@ -525,7 +539,8 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { int len = strlen(filename); char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); - strcpy(not_translated, filename); + if(not_translated) + strcpy(not_translated, filename); return (not_translated); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index 292437409..b4b0e9f3b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -1017,14 +1017,8 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) EC_KEY *ret = NULL; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; - if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) { - ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - - if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(&priv_key, in, len)) == NULL) { + if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); return NULL; } @@ -1033,8 +1027,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (a) - *a = ret; } else ret = *a; @@ -1102,10 +1094,12 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY; } + if (a) + *a = ret; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { - if (ret) + if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret)) EC_KEY_free(ret); ret = NULL; } @@ -1232,16 +1226,19 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } - if (a) - *a = ret; } else ret = *a; if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + if (a == NULL || *a != ret) + EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } + if (a) + *a = ret; + return ret; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c index 023bd0ec6..6dbe9d825 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c @@ -69,16 +69,16 @@ * */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# include <openssl/fips.h> -#endif - #include <string.h> #include "ec_lcl.h" #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/obj_mac.h> #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +# include <openssl/fips.h> +#endif + typedef struct { int field_type, /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c index 73cc123e8..5a832ba1c 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c @@ -69,13 +69,13 @@ * */ +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include "ec_lcl.h" + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include <openssl/fips.h> #endif -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include "ec_lcl.h" - EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c index 9a59ef0c1..ed09f97ad 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static void bin28_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[28]) out[0] = *((const uint64_t *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; out[1] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; out[2] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; - out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 21))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; + out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in+20))) >> 8; } static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c index bcb4c446b..4279dd94b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c @@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags) static int int_def_cb(const char *alg, int len, void *arg) { unsigned int *pflags = arg; + if (alg == NULL) + return 0; if (!strncmp(alg, "ALL", len)) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_ALL; else if (!strncmp(alg, "RSA", len)) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8362754c7..000000000 --- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,701 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */ -/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp. - * Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com - * Jim Guilford - * Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com - * Maxim.Perminov@intel.com - * Ying.Huang@intel.com - * - * More information about algorithm used can be found at: - * http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - */ - -#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# include <openssl/rsa.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> - -/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */ -#undef COMPILE_RSAX - -#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) -# define COMPILE_RSAX -static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void); -#endif - -void ENGINE_load_rsax(void) -{ -/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */ -#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX - ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax(); - if (!toadd) - return; - ENGINE_add(toadd); - ENGINE_free(toadd); - ERR_clear_error(); -#endif -} - -#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX -# define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine" - -static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* RSA stuff */ -static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx); -static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r); -# endif - -static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = { - {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -}; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa = { - "Intel RSA-X method", - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp, - NULL, - NULL, - e_rsax_rsa_finish, - RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL -}; -# endif - -/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax"; -static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support"; - -/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */ -static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e) -{ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - const RSA_METHOD *meth1; -# endif - if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) || - !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) || -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) || -# endif - !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) || - !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) || - !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) || - !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) || - !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns)) - return 0; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec; - e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp; -# endif - return 1; -} - -static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void) -{ - ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); - if (!ret) - return NULL; - if (!bind_helper(ret)) { - ENGINE_free(ret); - return NULL; - } - return ret; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */ -static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1; -# endif - -static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e) -{ - return 1; -} - -/* (de)initialisation functions. */ -static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e) -{ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) - rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); -# endif - if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e) -{ - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) -{ - int to_return = 1; - - switch (cmd) { - /* The command isn't understood by this engine */ - default: - to_return = 0; - break; - } - - return to_return; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - -# ifdef _WIN32 -typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64; -# else -typedef unsigned long long UINT64; -# endif -typedef unsigned short UINT16; - -/* - * Table t is interleaved in the following manner: The order in memory is - * t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ... A particular 512-bit value is - * stored in t[][index] rather than the more normal t[index][]; i.e. the - * qwords of a particular entry in t are not adjacent in memory - */ - -/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */ -static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array); - -/* - * Extract array elements from BIGNUM b To set the whole array from b, call - * with n=8 - */ -static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n, - UINT64 *array); - -struct mod_ctx_512 { - UINT64 t[8][8]; - UINT64 m[8]; - UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */ - UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */ - UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */ -}; - -static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data); - -void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - struct mod_ctx_512 *data); - -typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx { - UINT64 type; - union { - struct mod_ctx_512 b512; - } ctx; - -} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX; - -static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM *m) -{ - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr; - - if (idx < 0 || idx > 2) - return NULL; - - hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); - if (!hptr) { - hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3 * sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX)); - if (!hptr) - return NULL; - hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type = hptr[0].type = 0; - RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr); - } - - if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m)) - return hptr + idx; - - if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { - UINT64 _m[8]; - bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m); - memset(&hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512)); - mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512); - } - - hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m); - return hptr + idx; -} - -static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) -{ - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); - if (hptr) { - OPENSSL_free(hptr); - RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL); - } - if (rsa->_method_mod_n) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - if (rsa->_method_mod_p) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - if (rsa->_method_mod_q) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e, - const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *rsax_mod_ctx) -{ - if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { - UINT64 _r[8]; - UINT64 _g[8]; - UINT64 _e[8]; - - /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */ - bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g); - bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e); - - mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512); - /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */ - interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r); - return 1; - } - } - - return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont); -} - -/* - * Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular - * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the - * necessary values. These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in the - * target openssl. - */ - -/* - * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into - * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM - */ -static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n, - UINT64 *array) -{ - int i; - UINT64 tmp; - unsigned char bn_buff[64]; - memset(bn_buff, 0, 64); - if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) { - printf("Can't support this byte size\n"); - return 0; - } - if (BN_num_bytes(b) != 0) { - if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff + (64 - BN_num_bytes(b)))) { - printf("Error's in bn2bin\n"); - /* We have to error, here */ - return 0; - } - } - while (n-- > 0) { - array[n] = 0; - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { - tmp = bn_buff[63 - (n * 8 + i)]; - array[n] |= tmp << (8 * i); - } - } - return 1; -} - -/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */ -static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array) -{ - unsigned char tmp[64]; - int n = 8; - int i; - while (n-- > 0) { - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { - tmp[63 - (n * 8 + i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n] >> (8 * i)); - }} - BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b); - return 0; -} - -/* The main 512bit precompute call */ -static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data) -{ - BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2; - - /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */ - BN_CTX *ctx; - /* Some tmps */ - UINT64 _t[8]; - int i, j, ret = 0; - - /* Init _m with m */ - BN_init(&_m); - interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m); - memset(_t, 0, 64); - - /* Inits */ - BN_init(&two_768); - BN_init(&two_640); - BN_init(&two_128); - BN_init(&two_512); - BN_init(&tmp); - BN_init(&tmp2); - - /* Create our context */ - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - goto err; - } - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - /* - * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once, - * and may be made constants. - */ - BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768); - BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640); - BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128); - BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512); - - if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) { - exit(1); - } - if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */ - exit(1); - } - - /* Precompute m1 */ - BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* Precompute m2 */ - BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* - * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should - * be non-negative. - */ - BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx); - if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { - BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); - } - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* Precompute t */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - BN_zero(&tmp); - if (i & 1) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); - } - if (i & 2) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); - } - if (i & 4) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); - } - - BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) { - goto err; - } - for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) - data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; - } - - /* Precompute m */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - data->m[i] = m[i]; - } - - ret = 1; - - err: - /* Cleanup */ - if (ctx != NULL) { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - BN_free(&two_768); - BN_free(&two_640); - BN_free(&two_128); - BN_free(&two_512); - BN_free(&tmp); - BN_free(&tmp2); - BN_free(&_m); - - return ret; -} - -static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; - BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; - int ret = 0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM local_p, local_q; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; - int error = 0; - - /* - * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) - */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - BN_init(&local_p); - p = &local_p; - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - BN_init(&local_q); - q = &local_q; - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else { - p = rsa->p; - q = rsa->q; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) - error = 1; - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) - error = 1; - } - - /* clean up */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - BN_free(&local_p); - BN_free(&local_q); - } - if (error) - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; - - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, - rsa->q))) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; - - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, - rsa->p))) - goto err; - - if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) - goto err; - /* - * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the - * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - pr1 = &local_r1; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - pr1 = r1; - if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* - * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' - * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can - * break the private key operations: the following second correction - * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen - * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) - goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp - (vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n, - e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n))) - goto err; - - /* - * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will - * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the - * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for - * absolute equality, just congruency. - */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) - goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { - /* - * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and - * return that instead. - */ - - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - d = rsa->d; - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, - rsa->n))) - goto err; - } - } - ret = 1; - - err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - - return ret; -} -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile index 30590d56b..c9afca7cb 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile -TEST=evp_test.c +TEST=evp_test.c evp_extra_test.c TESTDATA=evptests.txt APPS= diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c index bd7760d0c..f2643f324 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c @@ -203,9 +203,12 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; - } else if (!ctx->digest) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET); - return 0; + } else { + if (!ctx->digest) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET); + return 0; + } + type = ctx->digest; } #endif if (ctx->digest != type) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 41844bcab..8161b2632 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -790,6 +790,8 @@ static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, default: return 0; } +# else + cctx->str = NULL; # endif cctx->key_set = 1; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0f7b011ce --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> + +/* + * kExampleRSAKeyDER is an RSA private key in ASN.1, DER format. Of course, you + * should never use this key anywhere but in an example. + */ +static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyDER[] = { + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf8, + 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x59, + 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xd3, 0x37, + 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, 0x75, 0x71, + 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x97, 0x8a, + 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe4, + 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0xec, + 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, 0x58, 0x76, + 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xd8, + 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0xd7, + 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x2c, + 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xc7, + 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, 0x32, 0x85, + 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x5f, 0xee, + 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x66, 0x85, + 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa4, 0x0a, + 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x15, + 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0x83, + 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, 0x80, 0x1b, + 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x99, 0x73, + 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, 0x1f, 0x99, + 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x02, + 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, 0x40, 0x41, + 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x3d, 0x59, + 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xc6, 0xd9, + 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0xef, + 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x46, 0x87, + 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xdf, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, 0x55, 0xf5, + 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xb5, + 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x62, + 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0x64, + 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xfa, 0xb8, + 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe8, 0xba, + 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xfe, + 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x75, 0xe7, + 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0xfe, + 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xdb, + 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x34, + 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x84, 0x27, + 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0xc0, + 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0xba, + 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, + 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, 0x52, 0x2c, + 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x1e, + 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0x49, 0xaf, + 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xd1, 0x8a, + 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, 0x17, 0x17, + 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, 0x08, 0xf1, + 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf, +}; + +static const unsigned char kMsg[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; + +static const unsigned char kSignature[] = { + 0xa5, 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x47, 0x5d, 0x3c, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x4d, + 0x8c, 0xae, 0x4c, 0x14, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x36, 0xde, 0xf4, 0x3e, + 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x60, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x91, 0x28, 0xda, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x04, + 0x96, 0x7e, 0x63, 0x13, 0x90, 0xce, 0xb9, 0xb4, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x09, + 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x67, 0x78, 0x54, 0x04, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x62, 0x6e, 0x24, 0x67, + 0xb4, 0x40, 0xfc, 0x57, 0x62, 0xc6, 0xf1, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x97, 0x8f, 0x6a, + 0xa8, 0xae, 0x44, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x67, 0x17, 0x53, 0x19, 0x3a, 0xda, + 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x16, 0x3e, 0x86, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x2f, 0xfc, 0x23, 0x48, + 0xd9, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0x5a, 0x25, 0x79, 0xef, 0xa5, 0x7b, 0x04, + 0xed, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x18, 0x55, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x79, 0x5d, 0xd7, + 0x55, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x45, 0x02, 0x97, 0x60, 0x42, +}; + +/* + * kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8 is kExampleRSAKeyDER encoded in a PKCS #8 + * PrivateKeyInfo. + */ +static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8[] = { + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x76, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, + 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, + 0x02, 0x60, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, + 0x00, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, + 0xb4, 0x59, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xd3, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, + 0x75, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, + 0x97, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, + 0x50, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, + 0xdc, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, + 0x58, 0x76, 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, + 0x1a, 0xd8, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, + 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, + 0xa7, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, + 0x6d, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, + 0x32, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, + 0x5f, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, + 0x66, 0x85, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, + 0xa4, 0x0a, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, + 0xc2, 0x15, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, + 0x5b, 0x83, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, + 0x80, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, + 0x99, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, + 0x1f, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, + 0xb1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, + 0x40, 0x41, 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, + 0x3d, 0x59, 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, + 0xc6, 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, + 0x9f, 0xef, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, + 0x46, 0x87, 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, + 0x2c, 0xdf, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, + 0x55, 0xf5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, + 0xcd, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, + 0xb3, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, + 0x9b, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, + 0xfa, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, + 0xe8, 0xba, 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, + 0xe7, 0xfe, 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, + 0x75, 0xe7, 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, + 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, + 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, + 0x5a, 0x34, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, + 0x84, 0x27, 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, + 0xe9, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, + 0xb9, 0xba, 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, + 0x10, 0x06, 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, + 0x52, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, + 0xc4, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, + 0x49, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, + 0xd1, 0x8a, 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, + 0x17, 0x17, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, + 0x08, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf, +}; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +/* + * kExampleECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey + * structure. + */ +static const unsigned char kExampleECKeyDER[] = { + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x08, 0x72, 0x7a, + 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0xdd, 0x59, 0xc9, 0x4d, 0x89, 0x68, 0x77, 0x08, + 0xb5, 0x6f, 0xc9, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x77, 0x0e, 0xe8, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xce, 0x0a, + 0x8b, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, + 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0x69, + 0xe2, 0xbf, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x97, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x94, 0x8a, 0x4c, + 0xd5, 0x97, 0x6b, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x46, 0xfb, 0xdd, 0xa9, 0xa9, + 0x1e, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x5a, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xa8, 0x0a, 0x18, + 0xf9, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x1e, 0x56, 0xe2, 0x7c, 0x83, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x16, + 0x1a, 0x1c, 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x72, 0x22, + 0xc1, +}; + +/* + * kExampleBadECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey + * structure. The private key is equal to the order and will fail to import + */ +static const unsigned char kExampleBadECKeyDER[] = { + 0x30, 0x66, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, + 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, + 0x01, 0x07, 0x04, 0x4C, 0x30, 0x4A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, + 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, + 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51 +}; +#endif + +static EVP_PKEY *load_example_rsa_key(void) +{ + EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; + const unsigned char *derp = kExampleRSAKeyDER; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + + if (!d2i_RSAPrivateKey(&rsa, &derp, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER))) { + return NULL; + } + + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa)) { + goto out; + } + + ret = pkey; + pkey = NULL; + + out: + if (pkey) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + if (rsa) { + RSA_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_EVP_DigestSignInit(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + size_t sig_len = 0; + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx, md_ctx_verify; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx_verify); + + pkey = load_example_rsa_key(); + if (pkey == NULL || + !EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) || + !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))) { + goto out; + } + /* Determine the size of the signature. */ + if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) { + goto out; + } + /* Sanity check for testing. */ + if (sig_len != (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { + fprintf(stderr, "sig_len mismatch\n"); + goto out; + } + + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len); + if (sig == NULL || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, sig, &sig_len)) { + goto out; + } + + /* Ensure that the signature round-trips. */ + if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx_verify, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) + || !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx_verify, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) + || !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx_verify, sig, sig_len)) { + goto out; + } + + ret = 1; + + out: + if (!ret) { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx_verify); + if (pkey) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + if (sig) { + OPENSSL_free(sig); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + + pkey = load_example_rsa_key(); + if (pkey == NULL || + !EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) || + !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) || + !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, kSignature, sizeof(kSignature))) { + goto out; + } + ret = 1; + + out: + if (!ret) { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + if (pkey) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len, int expected_id) +{ + int ret = 0; + const unsigned char *p; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + + p = input; + pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(NULL, &p, input_len); + if (pkey == NULL || p != input + input_len) { + fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey failed\n"); + goto done; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != expected_id) { + fprintf(stderr, "Did not decode expected type\n"); + goto done; + } + + ret = 1; + + done: + if (!ret) { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + + if (pkey != NULL) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + return ret; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +/* Tests loading a bad key in PKCS8 format */ +static int test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + const unsigned char *derp = kExampleBadECKeyDER; + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + + p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &derp, sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)); + + if (!p8inf || derp != kExampleBadECKeyDER + sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse key\n"); + goto done; + } + + pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); + if (pkey) { + fprintf(stderr, "Imported invalid EC key\n"); + goto done; + } + + ret = 1; + + done: + if (p8inf != NULL) { + PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); + } + + if (pkey != NULL) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif + +int main(void) +{ + CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init(); + CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); + + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + /* Load up the software EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD definitions */ + OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(); + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + + if (!test_EVP_DigestSignInit()) { + fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (!test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit()) { + fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestVerifyInit failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER), + EVP_PKEY_RSA)) { + fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER) failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey + (kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8), EVP_PKEY_RSA)) { + fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8) failed\n"); + return 1; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleECKeyDER), + EVP_PKEY_EC)) { + fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER) failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (!test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY()) { + fprintf(stderr, "test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY failed\n"); + return 1; + } +#endif + + EVP_cleanup(); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); + ERR_free_strings(); + CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr); + + printf("PASS\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c b/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c index 5a3546a2d..f96a51781 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c @@ -500,6 +500,8 @@ static void int_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) EX_CLASS_ITEM *item; void *ptr; CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS **storage = NULL; + if (ex_data == NULL) + return; if ((item = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL) return; CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c index 4debf537f..24a84a7ae 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c @@ -852,7 +852,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block) { gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; +# if defined(GHASH) ctx->ghash = gcm_ghash_4bit; +# else + ctx->ghash = NULL; +# endif } # elif defined(GHASH_ASM_SPARC) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) { @@ -872,7 +876,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block) } else { gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; +# if defined(GHASH) ctx->ghash = gcm_ghash_4bit; +# else + ctx->ghash = NULL; +# endif } # else gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c index e1e13a613..c6774f457 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c @@ -312,15 +312,18 @@ void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type, d.type = type; d.names = OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names); - d.n = 0; - OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d); + /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */ + if(d.names) { + d.n = 0; + OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d); - qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof *d.names, do_all_sorted_cmp); + qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof *d.names, do_all_sorted_cmp); - for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n) - fn(d.names[n], arg); + for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n) + fn(d.names[n], arg); - OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names); + OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names); + } } static int free_type; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl index 15c00bbd5..d0ed459d3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl @@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]"; print OUT <<'EOF'; /* crypto/objects/obj_mac.h */ -/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the - * following command: - * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h +/* + * THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the following + * command: perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) @@ -132,21 +132,21 @@ print OUT <<'EOF'; * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ print OUT <<'EOF'; * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -176,28 +176,36 @@ print OUT <<'EOF'; * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -#define SN_undef "UNDEF" -#define LN_undef "undefined" -#define NID_undef 0 -#define OBJ_undef 0L - +#define SN_undef "UNDEF" +#define LN_undef "undefined" +#define NID_undef 0 +#define OBJ_undef 0L EOF +sub expand + { + my $string = shift; + + 1 while $string =~ s/\t+/' ' x (length($&) * 8 - length($`) % 8)/e; + + return $string; + } + foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %ordern) { $Cname=$ordern{$_}; - print OUT "#define SN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$sn{$Cname},"\"\n" if $sn{$Cname} ne ""; - print OUT "#define LN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$ln{$Cname},"\"\n" if $ln{$Cname} ne ""; - print OUT "#define NID_",$Cname,"\t\t",$nid{$Cname},"\n" if $nid{$Cname} ne ""; - print OUT "#define OBJ_",$Cname,"\t\t",$obj{$Cname},"\n" if $obj{$Cname} ne ""; print OUT "\n"; + print OUT expand("#define SN_$Cname\t\t\"$sn{$Cname}\"\n") if $sn{$Cname} ne ""; + print OUT expand("#define LN_$Cname\t\t\"$ln{$Cname}\"\n") if $ln{$Cname} ne ""; + print OUT expand("#define NID_$Cname\t\t$nid{$Cname}\n") if $nid{$Cname} ne ""; + print OUT expand("#define OBJ_$Cname\t\t$obj{$Cname}\n") if $obj{$Cname} ne ""; } close OUT; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl index 833f4ab88..1913b9d13 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl @@ -63,30 +63,36 @@ $pname =~ s|^.[^/]/||; print <<EOF; /* AUTOGENERATED BY $pname, DO NOT EDIT */ -typedef struct - { - int sign_id; - int hash_id; - int pkey_id; - } nid_triple; +typedef struct { + int sign_id; + int hash_id; + int pkey_id; +} nid_triple; -static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = - { +static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = { EOF foreach (@srt1) { my $xr = $_; my ($p1, $p2) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}}; - print "\t{NID_$xr, NID_$p1, NID_$p2},\n"; - } + my $o1 = " {NID_$xr, NID_$p1,"; + my $o2 = "NID_$p2},"; + if (length("$o1 $o2") < 78) + { + print "$o1 $o2\n"; + } + else + { + print "$o1\n $o2\n"; + } + } -print "\t};"; +print "};"; print <<EOF; -static const nid_triple * const sigoid_srt_xref[] = - { +static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = { EOF foreach (@srt2) @@ -95,10 +101,10 @@ foreach (@srt2) # If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm # needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table. next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef"; - print "\t\&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n"; + print " \&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n"; } -print "\t};\n\n"; +print "};\n"; sub check_oid { @@ -108,4 +114,3 @@ sub check_oid die "Not Found \"$chk\"\n"; } } - diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index e277caee8..4f20b97a8 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" { * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000200fL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000201fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2-fips 22 Jan 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2a-fips 19 Mar 2015" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2 22 Jan 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl b/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl index dc55b34e4..eb267a57e 100755 --- a/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl @@ -1249,6 +1249,7 @@ $code.=<<___; fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 + subcc $len, 2, $len stda %f0, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f2, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index dd6f6756b..31a1b983f 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -261,6 +261,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return NULL; + } + /* + * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really + * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). + * + * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an + * error. + * + * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before + * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. + */ + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return NULL; + } + i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -411,6 +430,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return NULL; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return NULL; + } + i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -707,6 +736,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return 0; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return 0; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; @@ -746,6 +785,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); + os = NULL; p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; @@ -755,6 +795,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) { M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); + os = NULL; p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; @@ -820,22 +861,30 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len); } - if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { - char *cont; - long contlen; - btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); - if (btmp == NULL) { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); - goto err; - } - contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); + if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) { /* - * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data - * instead of making an extra copy. + * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached + * digested data support is broken. */ - BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); - BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); - ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); + if (os == NULL) + goto err; + if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { + char *cont; + long contlen; + btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); + if (btmp == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); + goto err; + } + contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); + /* + * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data + * instead of making an extra copy. + */ + BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); + BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); + ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); + } } ret = 1; err: @@ -910,6 +959,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio, STACK_OF(X509) *cert; X509 *x509; + if (p7 == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); + return 0; + } + + if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + return 0; + } + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { cert = p7->d.sign->cert; } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c index c77381275..0c5fcaa6a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (cmd) { + /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { ret = p7->detached = (int)larg; @@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md) STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) { + if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) + return NULL; if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { return (p7->d.sign->signer_info); } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c index 1b6e501b7..737aebfa2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes) #else # include <openssl/opensslconf.h> # include OPENSSL_UNISTD +# include <stddef.h> # include <sys/types.h> # include <sys/socket.h> # ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c index 9c4a137bb..02148d5bf 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c @@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (DosQuerySysState) { char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024); + if(!buffer) + return 0; + if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) { /* * First 4 bytes in buffer is a pointer to the thread count there diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index c7106a313..ca3922e6c 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -698,9 +698,10 @@ static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return -1; } - if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey)) + if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) { /* Carry on */ return 2; + } return -1; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c index bc91da2c1..19461c636 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c @@ -261,19 +261,8 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, OBJ_nid2ln(dtype)); #endif if (sigtype != dtype) { - if (((dtype == NID_md5) && - (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) || - ((dtype == NID_md2) && - (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) { - /* ok, we will let it through */ -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) - fprintf(stderr, - "signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n"); -#endif - } else { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (rm) { const EVP_MD *md; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl index 8377299b1..4895eb3dd 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ sub sha1msg2 { sha1op38(0xca,@_); } &sub ("esp",32); &movdqu ($ABCD,&QWP(0,$ctx)); - &movd ($E,&QWP(16,$ctx)); + &movd ($E,&DWP(16,$ctx)); &and ("esp",-32); &movdqa ($BSWAP,&QWP(0x50,$tmp1)); # byte-n-word swap diff --git a/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c b/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c index 47457c722..de437acf6 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ void sk_zero(_STACK *st) return; if (st->num <= 0) return; - memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(st->data) * st->num); + memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num); st->num = 0; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c index 1b5765948..28884c2d4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c @@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) int i; lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE)); + if(!lock_cs) { + /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ + return; + } for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) { lock_cs[i] = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL); } @@ -168,6 +172,10 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) # else lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(rwlock_t)); # endif + if(!lock_cs) { + /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ + return; + } lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long)); for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) { lock_count[i] = 0; @@ -251,6 +259,12 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) int i; char filename[20]; + lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *)); + if(!lock_cs) { + /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ + return; + } + strcpy(filename, "/tmp/mttest.XXXXXX"); mktemp(filename); @@ -261,7 +275,6 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) arena = usinit(filename); unlink(filename); - lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *)); for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) { lock_cs[i] = usnewsema(arena, 1); } @@ -315,6 +328,14 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t)); lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long)); + if(!lock_cs || !lock_count) { + /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ + if(lock_cs) + OPENSSL_free(lock_cs); + if(lock_count) + OPENSSL_free(lock_count); + return; + } for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) { lock_count[i] = 0; pthread_mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), NULL); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c index 8bda83cbc..5d6627641 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c @@ -185,43 +185,37 @@ /* * There are 5 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, - * MSDOS and SGTTY + * MSDOS and SGTTY. + * + * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will + * remain respected. Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few + * systems that require something different. + * + * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration. We + * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely. */ -#if defined(__sgi) && !defined(TERMIOS) -# define TERMIOS -# undef TERMIO -# undef SGTTY -#endif - -#if defined(linux) && !defined(TERMIO) -# undef TERMIOS -# define TERMIO -# undef SGTTY -#endif - -#ifdef _LIBC -# undef TERMIOS -# define TERMIO -# undef SGTTY -#endif +#if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) -#if !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) && !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) -# undef TERMIOS -# undef TERMIO -# define SGTTY -#endif - -#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) -# undef TERMIOS -# undef TERMIO -# undef SGTTY -#endif +# if defined(_LIBC) +# undef TERMIOS +# define TERMIO +# undef SGTTY +/* + * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, NETWARE use entirely other mechanisms. + * MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE should probably go away, but that needs to be confirmed. + */ +# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) \ + && !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) +# define TERMIOS +# undef TERMIO +# undef SGTTY +# endif -#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) -# undef TERMIOS -# undef TERMIO -# undef SGTTY #endif #ifdef TERMIOS diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c index bc6e566c9..01795f4b3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) goto err; pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if (pktmp == NULL) + goto err; i = X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); if (!i) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c index 476d51c0b..dca6ab2ec 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c @@ -230,8 +230,12 @@ static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, goto merr; if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual)) goto merr; - qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps); - qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new(); + if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if(!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new())) + goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) goto merr; @@ -290,14 +294,18 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, POLICYQUALINFO *qual; if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new())) goto merr; - qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice); + if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (!(not = USERNOTICE_new())) goto merr; qual->d.usernotice = not; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i); if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) { - not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new(); + if(!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new())) + goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) goto merr; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index f65323be0..ed6099e12 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c @@ -901,8 +901,13 @@ static int do_check_string(ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal, int astrlen; unsigned char *astr; astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a); - if (astrlen < 0) + if (astrlen < 0) { + /* + * -1 could be an internal malloc failure or a decoding error from + * malformed input; we can't distinguish. + */ return -1; + } rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags); if (rv > 0 && peername) *peername = BUF_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen); diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod index 4eeb55be2..e9280bc50 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings. =item B<DEFAULT> -the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and, as of OpenSSL -1.0.0, is normally B<ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL>. This must be the first cipher string +the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and +is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string specified. =item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT> diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod index 25c5381b9..d5cce54f4 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod @@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ section containing configuration module specific information. E.g. ... engine stuff here ... -Currently there are two configuration modules. One for ASN1 objects another -for ENGINE configuration. +The features of each configuration module are described below. =head2 ASN1 OBJECT CONFIGURATION MODULE @@ -191,6 +190,25 @@ For example: # Supply all default algorithms default_algorithms = ALL +=head2 EVP CONFIGURATION MODULE + +This modules has the name B<alg_section> which points to a section containing +algorithm commands. + +Currently the only algorithm command supported is B<fips_mode> whose +value should be a boolean string such as B<on> or B<off>. If the value is +B<on> this attempt to enter FIPS mode. If the call fails or the library is +not FIPS capable then an error occurs. + +For example: + + alg_section = evp_settings + + [evp_settings] + + fips_mode = on + + =head1 NOTES If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod index 38f026afc..2372b373c 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp> [B<-no_cert_verify>] [B<-no_chain>] [B<-no_cert_checks>] +[B<-no_explicit>] [B<-port num>] [B<-index file>] [B<-CA file>] @@ -189,6 +190,10 @@ testing purposes. do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA certificates. +=item B<-no_explicit> + +do not explicitly trust the root CA if it is set to be trusted for OCSP signing. + =item B<-no_cert_checks> don't perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate. @@ -301,8 +306,9 @@ CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the OCSP verify succeeds. -Otherwise the root CA of the OCSP responders CA is checked to see if it -is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP verify succeeds. +Otherwise, if B<-no_explicit> is B<not> set the root CA of the OCSP responders +CA is checked to see if it is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP +verify succeeds. If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails. diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ae2b53d35 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_TIME_set, ASN1_TIME_adj, ASN1_TIME_check, ASN1_TIME_set_string, +ASN1_TIME_print, ASN1_TIME_diff - ASN.1 Time functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t); + ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t, + int offset_day, long offset_sec); + int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str); + int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t); + int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *b, const ASN1_TIME *s); + + int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec, + const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The function ASN1_TIME_set() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the +time represented by the time_t value B<t>. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME +structure is allocated and returned. + +ASN1_TIME_adj() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time represented +by the time B<offset_day> and B<offset_sec> after the time_t value B<t>. +The values of B<offset_day> or B<offset_sec> can be negative to set a +time before B<t>. The B<offset_sec> value can also exceed the number of +seconds in a day. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME structure is allocated +and returned. + +ASN1_TIME_set_string() sets ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time +represented by string B<str> which must be in appropriate ASN.1 time +format (for example YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ). + +ASN1_TIME_check() checks the syntax of ASN1_TIME structure B<s>. + +ASN1_TIME_print() prints out the time B<s> to BIO B<b> in human readable +format. It will be of the format MMM DD HH:MM:SS YYYY [GMT], for example +"Feb 3 00:55:52 2015 GMT" it does not include a newline. If the time +structure has invalid format it prints out "Bad time value" and returns +an error. + +ASN1_TIME_diff() sets B<*pday> and B<*psec> to the time difference between +B<from> and B<to>. If B<to> represents a time later than B<from> then +one or both (depending on the time difference) of B<*pday> and B<*psec> +will be positive. If B<to> represents a time earlier than B<from> then +one or both of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be negative. If B<to> and B<from> +represent the same time then B<*pday> and B<*psec> will both be zero. +If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are non-zero they will always have the same +sign. The value of B<*psec> will always be less than the number of seconds +in a day. If B<from> or B<to> is NULL the current time is used. + +=head1 NOTES + +The ASN1_TIME structure corresponds to the ASN.1 structure B<Time> +defined in RFC5280 et al. The time setting functions obey the rules outlined +in RFC5280: if the date can be represented by UTCTime it is used, else +GeneralizedTime is used. + +The ASN1_TIME structure is represented as an ASN1_STRING internally and can +be freed up using ASN1_STRING_free(). + +The ASN1_TIME structure can represent years from 0000 to 9999 but no attempt +is made to correct ancient calendar changes (for example from Julian to +Gregorian calendars). + +Some applications add offset times directly to a time_t value and pass the +results to ASN1_TIME_set() (or equivalent). This can cause problems as the +time_t value can overflow on some systems resulting in unexpected results. +New applications should use ASN1_TIME_adj() instead and pass the offset value +in the B<offset_sec> and B<offset_day> parameters instead of directly +manipulating a time_t value. + +=head1 BUGS + +ASN1_TIME_print() currently does not print out the time zone: it either prints +out "GMT" or nothing. But all certificates complying with RFC5280 et al use GMT +anyway. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Set a time structure to one hour after the current time and print it out: + + #include <time.h> + #include <openssl/asn1.h> + ASN1_TIME *tm; + time_t t; + BIO *b; + t = time(NULL); + tm = ASN1_TIME_adj(NULL, t, 0, 60 * 60); + b = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + ASN1_TIME_print(b, tm); + ASN1_STRING_free(tm); + BIO_free(b); + +Determine if one time is later or sooner than the current time: + + int day, sec; + + if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, NULL, to)) + /* Invalid time format */ + + if (day > 0 || sec > 0) + printf("Later\n"); + else if (day < 0 || sec < 0) + printf("Sooner\n"); + else + printf("Same\n"); + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ASN1_TIME_set() and ASN1_TIME_adj() return a pointer to an ASN1_TIME structure +or NULL if an error occurred. + +ASN1_TIME_set_string() returns 1 if the time value is successfully set and +0 otherwise. + +ASN1_TIME_check() returns 1 if the structure is syntactically correct and 0 +otherwise. + +ASN1_TIME_print() returns 1 if the time is successfully printed out and 0 if +an error occurred (I/O error or invalid time format). + +ASN1_TIME_diff() returns 1 for sucess and 0 for failure. It can fail if the +pass ASN1_TIME structure has invalid syntax for example. + +=cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod index 8ff1c3115..3ed92bdbb 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME - CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType - get and set CMS content types + CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType, CMS_get0_content - get and set CMS content types and content =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); + ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -26,11 +27,15 @@ undefined. ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType() returns a pointer to the embedded content type. +CMS_get0_content() returns a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> pointer +containing the embedded content. + =head1 NOTES -As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return internal -pointers which should B<not> be freed up. CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the -supplied OID and it B<should> be freed up after use. +As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type(), CMS_get0_eContentType() and +CMS_get0_content() return internal pointers which should B<not> be freed up. +CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the supplied OID and it B<should> be freed up +after use. The B<ASN1_OBJECT> values returned can be converted to an integer B<NID> value using OBJ_obj2nid(). For the currently supported content types the following @@ -43,6 +48,15 @@ values are returned: NID_pkcs7_encrypted NID_pkcs7_enveloped +The return value of CMS_get0_content() is a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> +content pointer. That means that for example: + + ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pconf = CMS_get0_content(cms); + +B<*pconf> could be NULL if there is no embedded content. Applications can +access, modify or create the embedded content in a B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure +using this function. Applications usually will not need to modify the +embedded content as it is normally set by higher level functions. =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod index 0c4d92685..cc0b537b8 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ #include <openssl/conf.h> int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, - unsigned long flags); + unsigned long flags); int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, - unsigned long flags); + unsigned long flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ NULL the standard OpenSSL application name B<openssl_conf> is used. The behaviour can be cutomized using B<flags>. CONF_modules_load() is idential to CONF_modules_load_file() except it -read configuration information from B<cnf>. +reads configuration information from B<cnf>. =head1 NOTES @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The following B<flags> are currently recognized: B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> if set errors returned by individual configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is -considered fatal and no further modules are loads. +considered fatal and no further modules are loaded. Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If B<CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT> is set no error information is added. @@ -42,7 +42,84 @@ B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> if set will make CONF_load_modules_file() ignore missing configuration files. Normally a missing configuration file return an error. -=head1 RETURN VALUE +B<CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION> if set and B<appname> is not NULL will use the +default section pointed to by B<openssl_conf> if B<appname> does not exist. + +Applications should call these functions after loading builtin modules using +OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(), any ENGINEs for example using +ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), any algorithms for example +OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms() and (if the application uses libssl) +SSL_library_init(). + +By using CONF_modules_load_file() with appropriate flags an application can +customise application configuration to best suit its needs. In some cases the +use of a configuration file is optional and its absence is not an error: in +this case B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> would be set. + +Errors during configuration may also be handled differently by different +applications. For example in some cases an error may simply print out a warning +message and the application continue. In other cases an application might +consider a configuration file error as fatal and exit immediately. + +Applications can use the CONF_modules_load() function if they wish to load a +configuration file themselves and have finer control over how errors are +treated. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Load a configuration file and print out any errors and exit (missing file +considered fatal): + + if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(1); + } + +Load default configuration file using the section indicated by "myapp", +tolerate missing files, but exit on other errors: + + if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, "myapp", + CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(1); + } + +Load custom configuration file and section, only print warnings on error, +missing configuration file ignored: + + if (CONF_modules_load_file("/something/app.cnf", "myapp", + CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: error loading configuration file\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + +Load and parse configuration file manually, custom error handling: + + FILE *fp; + CONF *cnf = NULL; + long eline; + fp = fopen("/somepath/app.cnf", "r"); + if (fp == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error opening configuration file\n"); + /* Other missing configuration file behaviour */ + } else { + cnf = NCONF_new(NULL); + if (NCONF_load_fp(cnf, fp, &eline) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld of configuration file\n", eline); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + /* Other malformed configuration file behaviour */ + } else if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, "appname", 0) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring application\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + /* Other configuration error behaviour */ + } + fclose(fp); + NCONF_free(cnf); + } + +=head1 RETURN VALUES These functions return 1 for success and a zero or negative value for failure. If module errors are not ignored the return code will reflect the diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod index 2027569f4..e859689bc 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ EC_KEY_new, EC_KEY_get_flags, EC_KEY_set_flags, EC_KEY_clear_flags, EC_KEY_new_b int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv); const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub); - unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key); - void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags); point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform); void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, @@ -69,16 +67,6 @@ on the key to confirm that it is valid. The functions EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key, EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, and EC_KEY_set_public_key get and set the EC_GROUP object, the private key and the EC_POINT public key for the B<key> respectively. -The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags get and set the value of the encoding flags for the B<key>. There are two encoding -flags currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY. These flags define the behaviour of how the B<key> is -converted into ASN1 in a call to i2d_ECPrivateKey. If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for the curve are not encoded -along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key. - -When reading a private key encoded with EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY, -d2i_ECPrivateKey generates the missing public key -automatically. Private keys encoded with EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS cannot -be loaded using d2i_ECPrivateKey. - The functions EC_KEY_get_conv_form and EC_KEY_set_conv_form get and set the point_conversion_form for the B<key>. For a description of point_conversion_forms please refer to L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>. @@ -106,15 +94,15 @@ EC_KEY_get0_group returns the EC_GROUP associated with the EC_KEY. EC_KEY_get0_private_key returns the private key associated with the EC_KEY. -EC_KEY_get_enc_flags returns the value of the current encoding flags for the EC_KEY. - EC_KEY_get_conv_form return the point_conversion_form for the EC_KEY. =head1 SEE ALSO -L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, -L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>, -L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)> +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>, +L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>, +L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>, +L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, +L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)> =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod index 69eb0d1a0..858baf424 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod @@ -81,8 +81,13 @@ on the curve there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore a poin and EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m functions where B<x> is the x co-ordinate and B<y_bit> is a value 0 or 1 to identify which of the two possible values for y should be used. -In addition EC_POINTs can be converted to and from various external representations. Supported representations are octet strings, BIGNUMs and hexadecimal. The format of the external representation is described by the point_conversion_form. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)> for -a description of point_conversion_form. Octet strings are stored in a buffer along with an associated buffer length. A point held in a BIGNUM is calculated by converting the point to an octet string and then converting that octet string into a BIGNUM integer. Points in hexadecimal format are stored in a NULL terminated character string where each character is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f). +In addition EC_POINTs can be converted to and from various external +representations. Supported representations are octet strings, BIGNUMs and +hexadecimal. Octet strings are stored in a buffer along with an associated +buffer length. A point held in a BIGNUM is calculated by converting the point to +an octet string and then converting that octet string into a BIGNUM integer. +Points in hexadecimal format are stored in a NULL terminated character string +where each character is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f). The functions EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point, EC_POINT_point2bn, EC_POINT_bn2point, EC_POINT_point2hex and EC_POINT_hex2point convert from and to EC_POINTs for the formats: octet string, BIGNUM and hexadecimal respectively. diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod index 888de88f6..2d25b2669 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod @@ -15,31 +15,24 @@ OPENSSL_config, OPENSSL_no_config - simple OpenSSL configuration functions OPENSSL_config() configures OpenSSL using the standard B<openssl.cnf> configuration file name using B<config_name>. If B<config_name> is NULL then -the default name B<openssl_conf> will be used. Any errors are ignored. Further -calls to OPENSSL_config() will have no effect. The configuration file format -is documented in the L<conf(5)|conf(5)> manual page. +the file specified in the environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> will be used, +and if that is not set then a system default location is used. +Errors are silently ignored. +Multiple calls have no effect. OPENSSL_no_config() disables configuration. If called before OPENSSL_config() no configuration takes place. =head1 NOTES -It is B<strongly> recommended that B<all> new applications call OPENSSL_config() -or the more sophisticated functions such as CONF_modules_load() during -initialization (that is before starting any threads). By doing this -an application does not need to keep track of all configuration options -and some new functionality can be supported automatically. - -It is also possible to automatically call OPENSSL_config() when an application -calls OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms() by compiling an application with the -preprocessor symbol B<OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF> #define'd. In this way configuration -can be added without source changes. - -The environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> can be set to specify the location -of the configuration file. - -Currently ASN1 OBJECTs and ENGINE configuration can be performed future -versions of OpenSSL will add new configuration options. +The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and +forget it" function. +It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer +control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration +functions such as CONF_modules_load() directly. This function is deprecated +and its use should be avoided. +Applications should instead call CONF_modules_load() during +initialization (that is before starting any threads). There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is advisable. For example new ENGINE functionality was added to OpenSSL 0.9.7. @@ -55,17 +48,6 @@ configuration file. Applications should free up configuration at application closedown by calling CONF_modules_free(). -=head1 RESTRICTIONS - -The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and -forget it" function. As a result its behaviour is somewhat limited. It ignores -all errors silently and it can only load from the standard configuration file -location for example. - -It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer -control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration -functions such as CONF_load_modules() directly. - =head1 RETURN VALUES Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value. diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod index f8b530df9..0def17aac 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod @@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ but would not match a peer certificate with a DNS name of =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions return 1 for a successful match, 0 for a failed match -and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure. +and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure +or an ASN.1 decoding error. -X509_check_ip_asc() can also return -2 if the IP address string is malformed. +All functions can also return -2 if the input is malformed. For example, +X509_check_host() returns -2 if the provided B<name> contains embedded +NULs. =head1 NOTES diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6ddb2f6d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_CMS_ContentInfo, i2d_CMS_ContentInfo - CMS ContentInfo functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/cms.h> + + CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(CMS_ContentInfo **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_CMS_ContentInfo(CMS_ContentInfo *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an CMS ContentInfo structure. + +Otherwise they behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +These functions were first added to OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod index 3768c410d..704b4ab35 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -d2i_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECPKParameters_bio, i2d_ECPKParameters_bio, d2i_ECPKParameters_fp, i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x), ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities +d2i_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECPKParameters_bio, i2d_ECPKParameters_bio, d2i_ECPKParameters_fp, i2d_ECPKParameters_fp, ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000..adeffe643 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +i2d_ECPrivateKey, d2i_ECPrivate_key - Encode and decode functions for saving and +reading EC_KEY structures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ec.h> + + EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); + int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); + + unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key); + void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The ECPrivateKey encode and decode routines encode and parse an +B<EC_KEY> structure into a binary format (ASN.1 DER) and back again. + +These functions are similar to the d2i_X509() functions, and you should refer to +that page for a detailed description (see L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>). + +The format of the external representation of the public key written by +i2d_ECPrivateKey (such as whether it is stored in a compressed form or not) is +described by the point_conversion_form. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)> +for a description of point_conversion_form. + +When reading a private key encoded without an associated public key (e.g. if +EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY has been used - see below), then d2i_ECPrivateKey generates +the missing public key automatically. Private keys encoded without parameters +(e.g. if EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS has been used - see below) cannot be loaded using +d2i_ECPrivateKey. + +The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags get and set the +value of the encoding flags for the B<key>. There are two encoding flags +currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY. These flags +define the behaviour of how the B<key> is converted into ASN1 in a call to +i2d_ECPrivateKey. If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for +the curve are not encoded along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is +set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +d2i_ECPrivateKey() returns a valid B<EC_KEY> structure or B<NULL> if an error +occurs. The error code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +i2d_ECPrivateKey() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a +negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +EC_KEY_get_enc_flags returns the value of the current encoding flags for the +EC_KEY. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>, +L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>, +L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>, +L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, +L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>, +L<d2i_ECPrivateKey(3)|d2i_ECPrivateKey(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod index fea6e868e..5b7c16fd0 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod @@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ successful a pointer to the B<X509> structure is returned. If an error occurred then B<NULL> is returned. If B<px> is not B<NULL> then the returned structure is written to B<*px>. If B<*px> is not B<NULL> then it is assumed that B<*px> contains a valid B<X509> -structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. If the call is -successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the +structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. This "reuse" capability is present +for historical compatibility but its use is B<strongly discouraged> (see BUGS +below, and the discussion in the RETURN VALUES section). + +If the call is successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the parsed data. i2d_X509() encodes the structure pointed to by B<x> into DER format. @@ -233,7 +236,10 @@ i2d_re_X509_tbs(). d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by -L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used +with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not +freed in the event of error but may be in a potentially invalid or inconsistent +state. i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod index 94ab7bc72..0c9dbf2f3 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod @@ -2,29 +2,58 @@ =head1 NAME -SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm +SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final, SHA224, SHA224_Init, SHA224_Update, +SHA224_Final, SHA256, SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final, SHA384, +SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final, SHA512, SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, +SHA512_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include <openssl/sha.h> - unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, - unsigned char *md); - int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c); - int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, - unsigned long len); + int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c); + unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, + unsigned char *md); + + int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); + int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); + int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); + unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, + unsigned char *md); + + int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); + int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); + int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); + unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, + unsigned char *md); + + int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); + int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); + int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); + unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, + unsigned char *md); + + int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); + int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); + int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); + unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, + unsigned char *md); =head1 DESCRIPTION +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the hash +functions directly. + SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a 160 bit output. SHA1() computes the SHA-1 message digest of the B<n> bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest -is placed in a static array. +is placed in a static array. Note: setting B<md> to NULL is B<not thread safe>. The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory: @@ -37,24 +66,29 @@ be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>). SHA1_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the B<SHA_CTX>. -Applications should use the higher level functions -L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> -etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. +The SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 families of functions operate in the +same way as for the SHA1 functions. Note that SHA224 and SHA256 use a +B<SHA256_CTX> object instead of B<SHA_CTX>. SHA384 and SHA512 use B<SHA512_CTX>. +The buffer B<md> must have space for the output from the SHA variant being used +(defined by SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH and +SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH). Also note that, as for the SHA1() function above, the +SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() functions are not thread safe if +B<md> is NULL. The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be used only when backward compatibility is required. =head1 RETURN VALUES -SHA1() returns a pointer to the hash value. +SHA1(), SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() return a pointer to the hash +value. -SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. +SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() and equivalent SHA224, SHA256, +SHA384 and SHA512 functions return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. =head1 CONFORMING TO -SHA: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180 (Secure Hash -Standard), -SHA-1: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-1 (Secure Hash +US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-4 (Secure Hash Standard), ANSI X9.30 diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod index ab87efcc2..4e3428046 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ least one of these flags must be set. recognise options intended for use in SSL/TLS clients or servers. One or both of these flags must be set. -=item SSL_CONF_CERTIFICATE +=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE recognise certificate and private key options. diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod index 6d073cb9f..2bf1a60e9 100755 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod @@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. Note: if no B<-key> option is set then a private key is not loaded: it does not currently use the B<Certificate> file. +=item B<ServerInfoFile> + +Attempts to use the file B<value> in the "serverinfo" extension using the +function SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file. + =item B<DHParameters> Attempts to use the file B<value> as the set of temporary DH parameters for diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000..527164b07 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead, +SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead, SSL_set_read_ahead, SSL_get_read_ahead +- manage whether to read as many input bytes as possible + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); + void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); + + #define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) + #define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) + #define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) + #define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() and SSL_set_read_ahead() set whether we should read as +many input bytes as possible (for non-blocking reads) or not. For example if +B<x> bytes are currently required by OpenSSL, but B<y> bytes are available from +the underlying BIO (where B<y> > B<x>), then OpenSSL will read all B<y> bytes +into its buffer (providing that the buffer is large enough) if reading ahead is +on, or B<x> bytes otherwise. The parameter B<yes> or B<m> should be 0 to ensure +reading ahead is off, or non zero otherwise. + +SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead is a synonym for SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, and +SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead is a synonym for SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead. + +SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() and SSL_get_read_ahead() indicate whether reading +ahead has been set or not. + +=head1 NOTES + +These functions have no impact when used with DTLS. The return values for +SSL_CTX_get_read_head() and SSL_get_read_ahead() are undefined for DTLS. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_get_read_ahead and SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead return 0 if reading ahead is off, +and non zero otherwise. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod index 43f2874e8..9dd071b62 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod @@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ The number of bytes pending is returned. SSL_pending() takes into account only bytes from the TLS/SSL record that is currently being processed (if any). If the B<SSL> object's -I<read_ahead> flag is set, additional protocol bytes may have been -read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by +I<read_ahead> flag is set (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>), additional protocol +bytes may have been read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by SSL_pending(). Up to OpenSSL 0.9.6, SSL_pending() does not check if the record type @@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ of pending data is application data. =head1 SEE ALSO -L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod index 8d5b8c380..242087e69 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure. =item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); +=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + =item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_data>(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx); =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) @@ -237,6 +239,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure. =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); +=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B<SSL_CTX_get_timeout>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); @@ -325,6 +329,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure. =item void B<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); + =item void B<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); =item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); @@ -707,6 +713,7 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)|SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)>, diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c index 971a1ed31..5924791b7 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c @@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ static int bind_gost(ENGINE *e, const char *id) int ret = 0; if (id && strcmp(id, engine_gost_id)) return 0; + if (ameth_GostR3410_94) { + printf("GOST engine already loaded\n"); + goto end; + } if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_gost_id)) { printf("ENGINE_set_id failed\n"); diff --git a/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c b/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c index 2d6331d69..6f09ffb96 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c +++ b/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c @@ -967,11 +967,11 @@ static int ubsec_dh_generate_key(DH *dh) if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { pub_key = BN_new(); + if (pub_key == NULL) + goto err; pub_key_len = BN_num_bits(dh->p); if (bn_wexpand(pub_key, dh->p->top) == NULL) goto err; - if (pub_key == NULL) - goto err; } else { pub_key = dh->pub_key; } diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec index c90dc69a4..909f2bfab 100644 --- a/openssl/openssl.spec +++ b/openssl/openssl.spec @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Release: 1 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools Name: openssl -Version: 1.0.2 +Version: 1.0.2a Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz License: OpenSSL Group: System Environment/Libraries diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 2553c3de6..21048003b 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1108,8 +1108,10 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); if (is_ccs) { + /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); + ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) + == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } else { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 28457579b..ee78921ba 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) ssl3_clear(s); if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) - s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; + s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; else @@ -543,6 +543,9 @@ int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client) { int ret; + /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ + SSL_clear(s); + SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); s->d1->listen = 1; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c index c07be8fd3..940ca6927 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return (0); + return -1; } rdata->packet = s->packet; @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } - if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) } } #endif - } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h index 4af7e4a7f..30bbcf278 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ extern "C" { # define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF # define DTLS1_2_VERSION 0xFEFD # define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_2_VERSION +# define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0xFE # define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100 diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c index f8a943930..d55b93f76 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s) OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0 && s->session->master_key_length - < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); + <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &c, 1); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c index daba6dd7a..19bb48c9c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -371,7 +371,8 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s) static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) { - int is_export, i, n, keya, ek; + int is_export, i, n, keya; + unsigned int ek; unsigned long len; unsigned char *p; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; @@ -454,11 +455,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); return (-1); } - i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, - &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), - &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), - (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); @@ -475,23 +471,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) } else ek = 5; + /* + * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is + * 1 byte message type + * 3 bytes cipher + * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear) + * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc) + * 2-byte key args length (IV etc) + * clear key + * encrypted key + * key args + * + * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes + * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of + * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, + * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length + * must be zero). + */ + if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || + (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + /* + * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key. + * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted + * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. + */ + if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || + (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + return -1; + } + + i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, + &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), + &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), + (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + /* bad decrypt */ # if 1 /* * If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master * secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ - if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) - || (is_export && ((i != ek) - || (s->s2->tmp.clear + - (unsigned int)i != (unsigned int) - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) { + if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) + || (is_export && i != (int)ek))) { ERR_clear_error(); if (is_export) i = ek; else i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0) + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0) return 0; } # else @@ -513,7 +547,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) # endif if (is_export) - i += s->s2->tmp.clear; + i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index f186c3cf9..91053d59e 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -717,8 +717,9 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) } else i = 1; - if (i) - ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, + sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c index cdbf0f095..cda2d8c77 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } #endif + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof buf); return (ret); } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c index ec56c5549..221ae039e 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) return -1; } - if (!s->read_ahead) + /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ + if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; else { @@ -707,6 +708,10 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) packlen *= 4; wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); + if(!wb->buf) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } wb->len = packlen; } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ @@ -780,7 +785,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); if (i <= 0) { - if (i < 0) { + if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); wb->buf = NULL; } @@ -1425,7 +1430,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } - if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; @@ -1448,7 +1453,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) return (0); #endif - } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 2c6fb282b..c016139b1 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -2251,10 +2251,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { int idx = -1; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; - if (n) + if (n > 1) { n2s(p, i); - else + } else { + if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto f_err; + } i = 0; + } if (n && n != i + 2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -3260,14 +3267,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { + unsigned char *senc = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { - unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; + unsigned char *p, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; @@ -3278,32 +3287,38 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ - if (slen_full > 0xFF00) + if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (!senc) return -1; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + p = senc; - i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) + goto err; /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); - if (sess == NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; - } + if (sess == NULL) + goto err; sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); - if (slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; + if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + goto err; } p = senc; - i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + goto err; + } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /*- @@ -3317,26 +3332,26 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - return -1; + goto err; + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, - &hctx, 1) < 0) { - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; - } + &hctx, 1) < 0) + goto err; } else { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) + goto err; + if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) + goto err; + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) + goto err; memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } @@ -3357,14 +3372,19 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); + if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) + goto err; p += len; - EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); + if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) + goto err; p += len; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); + if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) + goto err; + if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) + goto err; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; @@ -3381,6 +3401,12 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); + err: + if (senc) + OPENSSL_free(senc); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return -1; } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index 2b0f6628c..a6d845dc9 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern "C" { * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ -# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" +# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" /* * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index f8c265cdd..39d48eabf 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -421,7 +421,9 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, id = 0x02000000L | ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)os.data[1] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[2]; - } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR + || (ssl_version >> 8) == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR + || ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if (os.length != 2) { c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH; c.line = __LINE__; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index b038c55ae..2cc9a4a21 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in * ALL!) */ - {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2, + SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0}, /* * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here @@ -1027,6 +1027,10 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id, if (cipher_id && cipher_id != cp->id) continue; #endif + if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp)) + goto ok; + if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2) + goto ok; if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) continue; if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) @@ -1045,6 +1049,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id, continue; } + ok: + #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); #endif diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c index 0ee6e4642..5478840de 100755 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c @@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ static int ssl_set_option_list(const char *elem, int len, void *usr) * len == -1 indicates not being called in list context, just for single * command line switches, so don't allow +, -. */ + if (elem == NULL) + return 0; if (len != -1) { if (*elem == '+') { elem++; @@ -384,6 +386,18 @@ static int cmd_PrivateKey(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) return rv > 0; } +static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) +{ + int rv = 1; + if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE)) + return -2; + if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER)) + return -2; + if (cctx->ctx) + rv = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(cctx->ctx, value); + return rv > 0; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { @@ -442,6 +456,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = { SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL), SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), + SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE) #endif diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h index 46ea18a07..79b85b9ed 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -370,10 +370,10 @@ # define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040L /* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */ -# define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001L -# define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002L +# define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001UL +# define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002UL # define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */ -# define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004L +# define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004UL /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */ diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c index 0113b6526..9f5d58624 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count) if (!do_client && !do_server) { fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - break; + goto err; } if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) { if (c_write) { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 0f5baa6e4..577885fe0 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -260,6 +260,11 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; } + if(!count) { + /* Should never happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } len = slen / count; if (count == 1) slen = 0; @@ -550,16 +555,24 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { - EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv); - } else - EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); - + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) + || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } + } else { + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } + } /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ - if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size) - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, - *mac_secret_size, mac_secret); - + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size + && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, + *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO if (s->msg_callback) { int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0; @@ -650,6 +663,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(p1); goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG @@ -967,6 +981,8 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, err = 1; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2)); if (err) return 0; else @@ -1130,6 +1146,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, co, col, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); @@ -1240,6 +1257,8 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, out, buff, olen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen); #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 72be01dd6..d85d26e59 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) { *pcurves = fips_curves_default; - *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); + pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); } else # endif { @@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) size_t i; int nid; char etmp[20]; + if (elem == NULL) + return 0; if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) @@ -2965,6 +2967,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; + s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; } /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { @@ -3618,6 +3621,7 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (c->shared_sigalgs) { OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; + c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; } /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { @@ -3640,12 +3644,14 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; } nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); - if (!nmatch) - return 1; - salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); - if (!salgs) - return 0; - nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); + if (nmatch) { + salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); + if (!salgs) + return 0; + nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); + } else { + salgs = NULL; + } c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; return 1; @@ -3948,6 +3954,8 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) size_t i; char etmp[20], *p; int sig_alg, hash_alg; + if (elem == NULL) + return 0; if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) @@ -4122,10 +4130,10 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, # endif } else { if (!x || !pk) - goto end; + return 0; idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); if (idx == -1) - goto end; + return 0; cpk = c->pkeys + idx; if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; diff --git a/openssl/test/Makefile b/openssl/test/Makefile index bc4a9200a..338867952 100644 --- a/openssl/test/Makefile +++ b/openssl/test/Makefile @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SSLTEST= ssltest RSATEST= rsa_test ENGINETEST= enginetest EVPTEST= evp_test +EVPEXTRATEST=evp_extra_test IGETEST= igetest JPAKETEST= jpaketest SRPTEST= srptest @@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ EXE= $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST) $(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ $(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ $(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ - $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ + $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ $(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \ $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ OBJ= $(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \ $(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \ $(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \ $(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \ - $(EVPTEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \ + $(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \ $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \ @@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \ $(DESTEST).c $(SHATEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \ $(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \ $(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \ - $(EVPTEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \ + $(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \ $(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c EXHEADER= @@ -144,13 +145,16 @@ alltests: \ test_rand test_bn test_ec test_ecdsa test_ecdh \ test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \ test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \ - test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \ + test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \ test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_ocsp test_v3name test_heartbeat \ test_constant_time test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt +test_evp_extra: $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) + ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST) + test_des: $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST) @@ -484,6 +488,9 @@ $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) @target=$(EVPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD) +$(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) + @target=$(EVPEXTRATEST); $(BUILD_CMD) + $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) @target=$(ECDSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD) @@ -629,6 +636,19 @@ enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h enginetest.o: enginetest.c +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h +evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h +evp_extra_test.o: evp_extra_test.c evp_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h diff --git a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl index f55fd69ce..51abeef2c 100644 --- a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl +++ b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl @@ -59,23 +59,31 @@ my $redir = " 2> cms.err > cms.out"; if ( $^O eq "VMS" && -f "OSSLX:openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "pipe mcr OSSLX:openssl"; $null_path = "NL:"; + # On VMS, the lowest 3 bits of the exit code indicates severity + # 1 is success (perl translates it to 0 for $?), 2 is error + # (perl doesn't translate it) + $failure_code = 512; # 2 << 8 = 512 } # Make MSYS work elsif ( $^O eq "MSWin32" && -f "../apps/openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "cmd /c ..\\apps\\openssl"; - $null_path = "/dev/null"; + $null_path = "NUL"; + $failure_code = 256; } elsif ( -f "../apps/openssl$ENV{EXE_EXT}" ) { $ossl_path = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl"; $null_path = "/dev/null"; + $failure_code = 256; } elsif ( -f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe"; - $null_path = "/dev/null"; + $null_path = "NUL"; + $failure_code = 256; } elsif ( -f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe"; - $null_path = "/dev/null"; + $null_path = "NUL"; + $failure_code = 256; } else { die "Can't find OpenSSL executable"; @@ -97,7 +105,7 @@ if ($? == 0) { $no_ec = 1; } -elsif ($^O eq "VMS" ? $? == 512 : $? == 256) +elsif ($? == $failure_code) { $no_ec = 0; } @@ -111,7 +119,7 @@ if ($? == 0) { $no_ec2m = 1; } -elsif ($? == 256) +elsif ($? == $failure_code) { $no_ec2m = 0; } @@ -125,7 +133,7 @@ if ($? == 0) { $no_ecdh = 1; } -elsif ($? == 256) +elsif ($? == $failure_code) { $no_ecdh = 0; } diff --git a/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f2a8f7b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/openssl/util/libeay.num b/openssl/util/libeay.num index 4a11d7827..b977e4e4b 100644 --- a/openssl/util/libeay.num +++ b/openssl/util/libeay.num @@ -1806,6 +1806,7 @@ d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG 2341 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_get 2350 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_digest 2362 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_CRL_digest 2391 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP +ASN1_STRING_clear_free 2392 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7 2397 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_cmp 2398 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length 2399 EXIST::FUNCTION: diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl index 88388f532..7b6776dda 100644 --- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl +++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl @@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ foreach $lib (keys %csrc) print OUT @out; undef @out; print OUT <<"EOF"; -/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes +/* + * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ EOF @@ -473,7 +474,7 @@ EOF ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void); ${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void); ${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); -#define ${lib}err(f,r) ERR_${lib}_error((f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__) +# define ${lib}err(f,r) ERR_${lib}_error((f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__) EOF } @@ -484,7 +485,7 @@ EOF EOF foreach $i (@function) { - $z=6-int(length($i)/8); + $z=48 - length($i); if($fcodes{$i} eq "X") { $fassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/; $findcode = $1; @@ -498,13 +499,13 @@ EOF $fassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:"; print STDERR "New Function code $i\n" if $debug; } - printf OUT "#define $i%s $fcodes{$i}\n","\t" x $z; + printf OUT "# define $i%s $fcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z; } print OUT "\n/* Reason codes. */\n"; foreach $i (@reasons) { - $z=6-int(length($i)/8); + $z=48 - length($i); if($rcodes{$i} eq "X") { $rassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/; $findcode = $1; @@ -518,7 +519,7 @@ EOF $rassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:"; print STDERR "New Reason code $i\n" if $debug; } - printf OUT "#define $i%s $rcodes{$i}\n","\t" x $z; + printf OUT "# define $i%s $rcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z; } print OUT <<"EOF"; @@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ EOF * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ EOF * */ -/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes +/* + * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file, * only reason strings will be preserved. */ @@ -642,11 +644,10 @@ EOF /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,func,0) -#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,0,reason) +# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,func,0) +# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,0,reason) -static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_functs[]= - { +static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_functs[] = { EOF # Add each function code: if a function name is found then use it. foreach $i (@function) { @@ -657,20 +658,22 @@ EOF $fn = $ftrans{$fn}; } # print OUT "{ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,$i,0),\t\"$fn\"},\n"; - print OUT "{ERR_FUNC($i),\t\"$fn\"},\n"; + if(length($i) + length($fn) > 58) { + print OUT " {ERR_FUNC($i),\n \"$fn\"},\n"; + } else { + print OUT " {ERR_FUNC($i), \"$fn\"},\n"; + } } print OUT <<"EOF"; -{0,NULL} - }; + {0, NULL} +}; -static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_reasons[]= - { +static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_reasons[] = { EOF # Add each reason code. foreach $i (@reasons) { my $rn; my $rstr = "ERR_REASON($i)"; - my $nspc = 0; if (exists $err_reason_strings{$i}) { $rn = $err_reason_strings{$i}; } else { @@ -678,90 +681,87 @@ EOF $rn = $1; $rn =~ tr/_[A-Z]/ [a-z]/; } - $nspc = 40 - length($rstr) unless length($rstr) > 40; - $nspc = " " x $nspc; - print OUT "{${rstr}${nspc},\"$rn\"},\n"; + if(length($i) + length($rn) > 56) { + print OUT " {${rstr},\n \"$rn\"},\n"; + } else { + print OUT " {${rstr}, \"$rn\"},\n"; + } } if($static) { print OUT <<"EOF"; -{0,NULL} - }; + {0, NULL} +}; #endif ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void) - { +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - if (ERR_func_error_string(${lib}_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) - { - ERR_load_strings($load_errcode,${lib}_str_functs); - ERR_load_strings($load_errcode,${lib}_str_reasons); - } + if (ERR_func_error_string(${lib}_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { + ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_reasons); + } #endif - } +} EOF } else { print OUT <<"EOF"; -{0,NULL} - }; + {0, NULL} +}; #endif #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME -static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_lib_name[]= - { -{0 ,${lib}_LIB_NAME}, -{0,NULL} - }; +static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_lib_name[] = { + {0, ${lib}_LIB_NAME}, + {0, NULL} +}; #endif - -static int ${lib}_lib_error_code=0; -static int ${lib}_error_init=1; +static int ${lib}_lib_error_code = 0; +static int ${lib}_error_init = 1; ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void) - { - if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0) - ${lib}_lib_error_code=ERR_get_next_error_library(); +{ + if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0) + ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); - if (${lib}_error_init) - { - ${lib}_error_init=0; + if (${lib}_error_init) { + ${lib}_error_init = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_functs); - ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_reasons); + ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons); #endif #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME - ${lib}_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(${lib}_lib_error_code,0,0); - ERR_load_strings(0,${lib}_lib_name); + ${lib}_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(${lib}_lib_error_code, 0, 0); + ERR_load_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name); #endif - } - } + } +} ${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void) - { - if (${lib}_error_init == 0) - { +{ + if (${lib}_error_init == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_functs); - ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_reasons); + ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs); + ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons); #endif #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME - ERR_unload_strings(0,${lib}_lib_name); + ERR_unload_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name); #endif - ${lib}_error_init=1; - } - } + ${lib}_error_init = 1; + } +} ${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) - { - if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0) - ${lib}_lib_error_code=ERR_get_next_error_library(); - ERR_PUT_error(${lib}_lib_error_code,function,reason,file,line); - } +{ + if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0) + ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + ERR_PUT_error(${lib}_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); +} EOF } diff --git a/openssl/util/openssl-format-source b/openssl/util/openssl-format-source index 4e9014743..8c3a7c0db 100755 --- a/openssl/util/openssl-format-source +++ b/openssl/util/openssl-format-source @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ do -e 's/^((DECLARE|IMPLEMENT)_(EXTERN_ASN1|ASN1|ADB|STACK_OF|PKCS12_STACK_OF).*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ -e 's/^([ \t]*(make_dh|make_dh_bn|make_rfc5114_td)\(.*\)[ \t,]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ -e 's/^(ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE\(.*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ - -e 's/^((ASN1|ADB)_.*_END\(.*[\){=,;]+[ \t]*)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ + -e 's/^((ASN1|ADB)_.*_(end|END)\(.*[\){=,;]+[ \t]*)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ -e '/ASN1_(ITEM_ref|ITEM_ptr|ITEM_rptr|PCTX)/ || s/^((ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[){=,]+[ \t]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1/;' \ -e 's/^(} (ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[\){=,;]+)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \ | \ diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl b/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl index 82f1aa76e..1d4e9dc5d 100644 --- a/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl +++ b/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl @@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ $bf_enc_src=""; 'x86_64-mont' => 'crypto/bn', 'x86_64-mont5' => 'crypto/bn', 'x86_64-gf2m' => 'crypto/bn', - 'modexp512-x86_64' => 'crypto/bn', 'aes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes', 'vpaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes', 'bsaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes', diff --git a/packages.txt b/packages.txt index 2164cd089..26471d8d8 100644 --- a/packages.txt +++ b/packages.txt @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ libxcb git version libxkbfile-1.0.8
mesa git version
mkfontscale git version
-openssl-1.0.2
+openssl-1.0.2a
pixman git version
presentproto-1.0
pthreads-w32 cvs version
|