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-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h879
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c1123
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c72
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c292
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c316
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c64
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c1523
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c293
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c346
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c421
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h8
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c64
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c122
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c478
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c410
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c1154
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c53
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c400
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c158
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c464
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c161
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c423
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c198
23 files changed, 4662 insertions, 4760 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 11853fee5..a8b59a955 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -57,22 +57,22 @@
*/
#ifndef HEADER_RSA_H
-#define HEADER_RSA_H
+# define HEADER_RSA_H
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#error RSA is disabled.
-#endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# error RSA is disabled.
+# endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
@@ -82,230 +82,245 @@ extern "C" {
/* typedef struct rsa_st RSA; */
/* typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD; */
-struct rsa_meth_st
- {
- const char *name;
- int (*rsa_pub_enc)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa,int padding);
- int (*rsa_pub_dec)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa,int padding);
- int (*rsa_priv_enc)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa,int padding);
- int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa,int padding);
- int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0,const BIGNUM *I,RSA *rsa,BN_CTX *ctx); /* Can be null */
- int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* Can be null */
- int (*init)(RSA *rsa); /* called at new */
- int (*finish)(RSA *rsa); /* called at free */
- int flags; /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */
- char *app_data; /* may be needed! */
-/* New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary data
- * to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for this to work
- * the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *NOT* be used
- * RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead. Note: for backwards
- * compatibility this functionality is only enabled if the RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER
- * option is set in 'flags'.
- */
- int (*rsa_sign)(int type,
- const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
- int (*rsa_verify)(int dtype,
- const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- const RSA *rsa);
-/* If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be used. This
- * is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets rewired, but one day
- * it would be nice to assume there are no such things as "builtin software"
- * implementations. */
- int (*rsa_keygen)(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
- };
-
-struct rsa_st
- {
- /* The first parameter is used to pickup errors where
- * this is passed instead of aEVP_PKEY, it is set to 0 */
- int pad;
- long version;
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
- ENGINE *engine;
- BIGNUM *n;
- BIGNUM *e;
- BIGNUM *d;
- BIGNUM *p;
- BIGNUM *q;
- BIGNUM *dmp1;
- BIGNUM *dmq1;
- BIGNUM *iqmp;
- /* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
- int references;
- int flags;
-
- /* Used to cache montgomery values */
- BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n;
- BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_p;
- BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_q;
-
- /* all BIGNUM values are actually in the following data, if it is not
- * NULL */
- char *bignum_data;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding;
- BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
- };
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS 64 /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
-#endif
-
-#define RSA_3 0x3L
-#define RSA_F4 0x10001L
-
-#define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK 0x0001 /* don't check pub/private match */
-
-#define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC 0x0002
-#define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE 0x0004
-#define RSA_FLAG_BLINDING 0x0008
-#define RSA_FLAG_THREAD_SAFE 0x0010
-/* This flag means the private key operations will be handled by rsa_mod_exp
+struct rsa_meth_st {
+ const char *name;
+ int (*rsa_pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int (*rsa_pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int (*rsa_priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ int (*rsa_priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+ /* Can be null */
+ int (*rsa_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ /* Can be null */
+ int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+ /* called at new */
+ int (*init) (RSA *rsa);
+ /* called at free */
+ int (*finish) (RSA *rsa);
+ /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */
+ int flags;
+ /* may be needed! */
+ char *app_data;
+ /*
+ * New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary
+ * data to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for
+ * this to work the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should
+ * *NOT* be used RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead. Note:
+ * for backwards compatibility this functionality is only enabled if the
+ * RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER option is set in 'flags'.
+ */
+ int (*rsa_sign) (int type,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+ const RSA *rsa);
+ int (*rsa_verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+ /*
+ * If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be
+ * used. This is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets
+ * rewired, but one day it would be nice to assume there are no such
+ * things as "builtin software" implementations.
+ */
+ int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+};
+
+struct rsa_st {
+ /*
+ * The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed
+ * instead of aEVP_PKEY, it is set to 0
+ */
+ int pad;
+ long version;
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+ /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
+ ENGINE *engine;
+ BIGNUM *n;
+ BIGNUM *e;
+ BIGNUM *d;
+ BIGNUM *p;
+ BIGNUM *q;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1;
+ BIGNUM *dmq1;
+ BIGNUM *iqmp;
+ /* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ int references;
+ int flags;
+ /* Used to cache montgomery values */
+ BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_p;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_q;
+ /*
+ * all BIGNUM values are actually in the following data, if it is not
+ * NULL
+ */
+ char *bignum_data;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding;
+ BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
+};
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
+
+/* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS 64
+# endif
+
+# define RSA_3 0x3L
+# define RSA_F4 0x10001L
+
+# define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK 0x0001/* don't check pub/private
+ * match */
+
+# define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC 0x0002
+# define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE 0x0004
+# define RSA_FLAG_BLINDING 0x0008
+# define RSA_FLAG_THREAD_SAFE 0x0010
+/*
+ * This flag means the private key operations will be handled by rsa_mod_exp
* and that they do not depend on the private key components being present:
- * for example a key stored in external hardware. Without this flag bn_mod_exp
- * gets called when private key components are absent.
+ * for example a key stored in external hardware. Without this flag
+ * bn_mod_exp gets called when private key components are absent.
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY 0x0020
+# define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY 0x0020
-/* This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, rsa_verify functions.
+/*
+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, rsa_verify
+ * functions.
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER 0x0040
-
-#define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 0x0080 /* new with 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; the built-in
- * RSA implementation now uses blinding by
- * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
- * but other engines might not need it
- */
-#define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME 0x0100 /* new with 0.9.8f; the built-in RSA
- * implementation now uses constant time
- * operations by default in private key operations,
- * e.g., constant time modular exponentiation,
- * modular inverse without leaking branches,
- * division without leaking branches. This
- * flag disables these constant time
- * operations and results in faster RSA
- * private key operations.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag*/
- /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
- * implementation now uses constant time
- * modular exponentiation for secret exponents
- * by default. This flag causes the
- * faster variable sliding window method to
- * be used for all exponents.
- */
-#endif
-
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pad) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \
- pad, NULL)
+# define RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER 0x0040
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, ppad) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, ppad)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
- (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
- len, NULL)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
- (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
- 0, plen)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
-
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
-#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
-
-#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
-#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
-#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
-#define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
-#define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
+/*
+ * new with 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; the built-in
+ * RSA implementation now uses blinding by
+ * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
+ * but other engines might not need it
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 0x0080
+/*
+ * new with 0.9.8f; the built-in RSA
+ * implementation now uses constant time
+ * operations by default in private key operations,
+ * e.g., constant time modular exponentiation,
+ * modular inverse without leaking branches,
+ * division without leaking branches. This
+ * flag disables these constant time
+ * operations and results in faster RSA
+ * private key operations.
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME 0x0100
+# ifdef OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED
+/* deprecated name for the flag*/
+/*
+ * new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
+ * implementation now uses constant time
+ * modular exponentiation for secret exponents
+ * by default. This flag causes the
+ * faster variable sliding window method to
+ * be used for all exponents.
+ */
+# define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
+# endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pad) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \
+ pad, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, ppad) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, ppad)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
+ len, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
+ 0, plen)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
+
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
+# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
+# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
+# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
+# define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
/* EVP_PKEY_ only */
-#define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6
-#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11
+# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11
-#define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg) RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
-#define RSA_get_app_data(s) RSA_get_ex_data(s,0)
+# define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg) RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+# define RSA_get_app_data(s) RSA_get_ex_data(s,0)
-RSA * RSA_new(void);
-RSA * RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
-int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
+RSA *RSA_new(void);
+RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
+int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
/* Deprecated version */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-RSA * RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e,void
- (*callback)(int,int,void *),void *cb_arg);
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e, void
+ (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) */
/* New version */
-int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
-
-int RSA_check_key(const RSA *);
- /* next 4 return -1 on error */
-int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-void RSA_free (RSA *r);
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *);
+ /* next 4 return -1 on error */
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+void RSA_free(RSA *r);
/* "up" the RSA object's reference count */
-int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r);
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r);
-int RSA_flags(const RSA *r);
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *r);
void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
@@ -323,133 +338,145 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
-typedef struct rsa_pss_params_st
- {
- X509_ALGOR *hashAlgorithm;
- X509_ALGOR *maskGenAlgorithm;
- ASN1_INTEGER *saltLength;
- ASN1_INTEGER *trailerField;
- } RSA_PSS_PARAMS;
+typedef struct rsa_pss_params_st {
+ X509_ALGOR *hashAlgorithm;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskGenAlgorithm;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *saltLength;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *trailerField;
+} RSA_PSS_PARAMS;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r,int offset);
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r, int offset);
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *r,int offset);
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *r, int offset);
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
int i2d_RSA_NET(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
- int (*cb)(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify),
- int sgckey);
+ int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
+ int verify), int sgckey);
RSA *d2i_RSA_NET(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
- int (*cb)(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify),
- int sgckey);
+ int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
+ int verify), int sgckey);
int i2d_Netscape_RSA(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
- int (*cb)(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
- int verify));
+ int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
+ int verify));
RSA *d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
- int (*cb)(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
- int verify));
-#endif
+ int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
+ int verify));
+# endif
-/* The following 2 functions sign and verify a X509_SIG ASN1 object
- * inside PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption */
+/*
+ * The following 2 functions sign and verify a X509_SIG ASN1 object inside
+ * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption
+ */
int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
-/* The following 2 function sign and verify a ASN1_OCTET_STRING
- * object inside PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption */
+/*
+ * The following 2 function sign and verify a ASN1_OCTET_STRING object inside
+ * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption
+ */
int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
- const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
-int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
- const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+ RSA *rsa);
+int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa);
BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl);
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len);
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl);
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len);
-int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
- const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst);
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,
- const unsigned char *p,int pl);
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len,
- const unsigned char *p,int pl);
-int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl);
-int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len);
-int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl);
-int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len);
-int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl);
-int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+ int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+ int rsa_len);
+int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+ long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl,
+ const unsigned char *p, int pl);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len,
+ const unsigned char *p, int pl);
+int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f,
+ int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f,
+ int fl);
+int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid);
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen);
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
+ int sLen);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
- const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen);
+ const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash,
+ int sLen);
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
- const unsigned char *EM, int sLen);
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ const unsigned char *EM, int sLen);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
- const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen);
+ const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ int sLen);
int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r,int idx,void *arg);
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg);
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx);
RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
-/* If this flag is set the RSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used
- * in FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an
- * application sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility
- * to ensure the result is compliant.
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the RSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in
+ * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application
+ * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the
+ * result is compliant.
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400
+# define RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400
-/* If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
+/*
+ * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
* permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the
* usage is compliant.
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400
-/* Application has decided PRNG is good enough to generate a key: don't
+# define RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400
+/*
+ * Application has decided PRNG is good enough to generate a key: don't
* check.
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_CHECKED 0x0800
+# define RSA_FLAG_CHECKED 0x0800
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
@@ -457,125 +484,125 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the RSA functions. */
/* Function codes. */
-#define RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD 140
-#define RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT 146
-#define RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY 145
-#define RSA_F_MEMORY_LOCK 100
-#define RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 147
-#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL 143
-#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR 144
-#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 142
-#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY 154
-#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER 141
-#define RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN 129
-#define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123
-#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101
-#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102
-#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103
-#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104
-#define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY 105
-#define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 155
-#define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 156
-#define RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK 130
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD 106
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL 124
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP 131
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 132
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 133
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 134
-#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 135
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 148
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2 109
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23 110
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931 127
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE 111
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP 122
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1 112
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2 113
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23 114
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931 128
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT 115
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP 116
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 150
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 151
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 137
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE 138
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 152
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 153
-#define RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE 139
-#define RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING 136
-#define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN 117
-#define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 118
-#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY 119
-#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 120
-#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS 126
-#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 149
+# define RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD 140
+# define RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT 146
+# define RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY 145
+# define RSA_F_MEMORY_LOCK 100
+# define RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 147
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL 143
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR 144
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 142
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY 154
+# define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER 141
+# define RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN 129
+# define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123
+# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101
+# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102
+# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103
+# define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104
+# define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY 105
+# define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 155
+# define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 156
+# define RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK 130
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD 106
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL 124
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP 131
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 132
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 133
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 134
+# define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 135
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 148
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2 109
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23 110
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931 127
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE 111
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP 122
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1 112
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2 113
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23 114
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931 128
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT 115
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP 116
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 150
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 151
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 137
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE 138
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 152
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 153
+# define RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE 139
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING 136
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN 117
+# define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 118
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY 119
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 120
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS 126
+# define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 149
/* Reason codes. */
-#define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100
-#define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101
-#define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102
-#define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103
-#define RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 104
-#define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01 106
-#define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02 107
-#define RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 108
-#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE 109
-#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 110
-#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 132
-#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL 111
-#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE 122
-#define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY 112
-#define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 124
-#define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 125
-#define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123
-#define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 133
-#define RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE 144
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 143
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS 145
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS 149
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN 146
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 150
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER 139
-#define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 142
-#define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126
-#define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120
-#define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 134
-#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 105
-#define RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD 157
-#define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 140
-#define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113
-#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
-#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
-#define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 158
-#define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 148
-#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
-#define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR 159
-#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
-#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
-#define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130
-#define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED 136
-#define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED 135
-#define RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK 115
-#define RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 116
-#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 117
-#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST 151
-#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 118
-#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST 152
-#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM 153
-#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER 154
-#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE 155
-#define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING 147
-#define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 119
+# define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100
+# define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101
+# define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102
+# define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103
+# define RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 104
+# define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01 106
+# define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02 107
+# define RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 108
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE 109
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 110
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 132
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL 111
+# define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE 122
+# define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY 112
+# define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 124
+# define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 125
+# define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123
+# define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 133
+# define RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE 144
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 143
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS 145
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS 149
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN 146
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 150
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER 139
+# define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 142
+# define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126
+# define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120
+# define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 134
+# define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 105
+# define RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD 157
+# define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 140
+# define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113
+# define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
+# define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
+# define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 158
+# define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 148
+# define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
+# define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR 159
+# define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
+# define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
+# define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130
+# define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED 136
+# define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED 135
+# define RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK 115
+# define RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 116
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 117
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST 151
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 118
+# define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST 152
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM 153
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER 154
+# define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE 155
+# define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING 147
+# define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 119
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 4c8ecd923..93e071de7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2006.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -63,636 +64,586 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
#endif
#include "asn1_locl.h"
static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- unsigned char *penc = NULL;
- int penclen;
- penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
- if (penclen <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
- V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(penc);
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+ int penclen;
+ penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
+ if (penclen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
+ V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(penc);
+ return 0;
+}
static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
- {
- const unsigned char *p;
- int pklen;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
- return 0;
- if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA (pkey, rsa);
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int pklen;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
+ return 0;
+ if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
- {
- if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n,a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
- || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e,a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
+ || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
- {
- RSA *rsa;
- if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey (NULL, pder, derlen)))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- return 1;
- }
+ const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+ RSA *rsa;
+ if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
- {
- return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
- }
+{
+ return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
+}
static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- unsigned char *rk = NULL;
- int rklen;
- rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
-
- if (rklen <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
- V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *rk = NULL;
+ int rklen;
+ rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
+
+ if (rklen <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
+ V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
- {
- const unsigned char *p;
- int pklen;
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
- return 0;
- return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
- }
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int pklen;
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
+ return 0;
+ return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
+}
static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
- }
+{
+ return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
- }
+{
+ return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
+}
static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
- }
-
+{
+ RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen)
- {
- size_t i;
- if (!b)
- return;
- if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
- *pbuflen = i;
- }
+{
+ size_t i;
+ if (!b)
+ return;
+ if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
+ *pbuflen = i;
+}
static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv)
- {
- char *str;
- const char *s;
- unsigned char *m=NULL;
- int ret=0, mod_len = 0;
- size_t buf_len=0;
-
- update_buflen(x->n, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->e, &buf_len);
-
- if (priv)
- {
- update_buflen(x->d, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->dmp1, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->dmq1, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->iqmp, &buf_len);
- }
-
- m=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len+10);
- if (m == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (x->n != NULL)
- mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
-
- if(!BIO_indent(bp,off,128))
- goto err;
-
- if (priv && x->d)
- {
- if (BIO_printf(bp,"Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
- <= 0) goto err;
- str = "modulus:";
- s = "publicExponent:";
- }
- else
- {
- if (BIO_printf(bp,"Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
- <= 0) goto err;
- str = "Modulus:";
- s= "Exponent:";
- }
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,str,x->n,m,off)) goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,s,x->e,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (priv)
- {
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"privateExponent:",x->d,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"prime1:",x->p,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"prime2:",x->q,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"exponent1:",x->dmp1,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"exponent2:",x->dmq1,m,off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp,"coefficient:",x->iqmp,m,off))
- goto err;
- }
- ret=1;
-err:
- if (m != NULL) OPENSSL_free(m);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ char *str;
+ const char *s;
+ unsigned char *m = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
+ size_t buf_len = 0;
+
+ update_buflen(x->n, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->e, &buf_len);
+
+ if (priv) {
+ update_buflen(x->d, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->dmp1, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->dmq1, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->iqmp, &buf_len);
+ }
+
+ m = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (x->n != NULL)
+ mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (priv && x->d) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
+ <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ str = "modulus:";
+ s = "publicExponent:";
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
+ <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ str = "Modulus:";
+ s = "Exponent:";
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (priv) {
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (m != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ return (ret);
+}
static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
- {
- return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
- }
-
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
+}
static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
- {
- return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
- }
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
+}
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
- X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
- {
- const unsigned char *p;
- int plen;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
-
- *pmaskHash = NULL;
-
- if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- return NULL;
- p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
- plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
- pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
-
- if (!pss)
- return NULL;
-
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
- {
- ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
- && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- {
- p = param->value.sequence->data;
- plen = param->value.sequence->length;
- *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
- }
- }
-
- return pss;
- }
-
-static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
- {
- int rv = 0;
- if (!pss)
- {
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (pss->hashAlgorithm)
- {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
-
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
- {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (maskHash)
- {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->saltLength)
- {
- if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->trailerField)
- {
- if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- rv = 1;
-
- err:
- return rv;
-
- }
+ X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int plen;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+
+ *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+ if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ return NULL;
+ p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
+
+ if (!pss)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
+ && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ p = param->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = param->value.sequence->length;
+ *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pss;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ if (!pss) {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (maskHash) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->saltLength) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->trailerField) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return rv;
+
+}
static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
- const ASN1_STRING *sig,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
- {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss)
- {
- int rv;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
- pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
- rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
- if (pss)
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (maskHash)
- X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
- if (!rv)
- return 0;
- }
- else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (sig)
- return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
- return 1;
- }
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
+ int rv;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+ rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (sig)
+ return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+ return 1;
+}
static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
- {
- X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
- switch (op)
- {
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
- break;
+{
+ X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+ switch (op) {
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
+ break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
#endif
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
- *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
- return 1;
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+ *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
+ return 1;
- default:
- return -2;
+ default:
+ return -2;
- }
+ }
- if (alg)
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption),
- V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+ if (alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
- return 1;
+ return 1;
- }
+}
-/* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called
- * when a signature is encountered requiring special handling. We
- * currently only handle PSS.
+/*
+ * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
+ * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
*/
-
static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
- X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
- EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- int rv = -1;
- int saltlen;
- const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
- /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Decode PSS parameters */
- pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
-
- if (pss == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
- {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!maskHash)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
- mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
- if (mgf1md == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (pss->hashAlgorithm)
- {
- md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
- if (md == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (pss->saltLength)
- {
- saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
-
- /* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main
- * RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
- */
- if (saltlen < 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- saltlen = 20;
-
- /* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1)
- * and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
- */
- if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We have all parameters now set up context */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
- goto err;
- /* Carry on */
- rv = 2;
-
- err:
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (maskHash)
- X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
- return rv;
- }
+ X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int rv = -1;
+ int saltlen;
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Decode PSS parameters */
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+
+ if (pss == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!maskHash) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
+ if (mgf1md == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->saltLength) {
+ saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
+
+ /*
+ * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
+ * routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
+ */
+ if (saltlen < 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ saltlen = 20;
+
+ /*
+ * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
+ * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+ */
+ if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have all parameters now set up context */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Carry on */
+ rv = 2;
+
+ err:
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ return rv;
+}
static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
- X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
- {
- int pad_mode;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return 2;
- if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL;
- ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
- int saltlen, rv = 0;
- sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
- goto err;
- if (saltlen == -1)
- saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
- else if (saltlen == -2)
- {
- saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
- if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
- saltlen--;
- }
- pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
- if (!pss)
- goto err;
- if (saltlen != 20)
- {
- pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
- if (!pss->saltLength)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1)
- {
- pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pss->hashAlgorithm)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd);
- }
- if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1)
- {
- ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
- /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
- mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
- X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md);
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
- &stmp))
- goto err;
- pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm,
- OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
- }
- /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1))
- goto err;
- if (alg2)
- {
- os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
- if (!os2)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
- }
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
- os1 = os2 = NULL;
- rv = 3;
- err:
- if (mgf1alg)
- X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg);
- if (pss)
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (os1)
- ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
- return rv;
-
- }
- return 2;
- }
-
-const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] =
- {
- {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
-
- "RSA",
- "OpenSSL RSA method",
-
- rsa_pub_decode,
- rsa_pub_encode,
- rsa_pub_cmp,
- rsa_pub_print,
-
- rsa_priv_decode,
- rsa_priv_encode,
- rsa_priv_print,
-
- int_rsa_size,
- rsa_bits,
-
- 0,0,0,0,0,0,
-
- rsa_sig_print,
- int_rsa_free,
- rsa_pkey_ctrl,
- old_rsa_priv_decode,
- old_rsa_priv_encode,
- rsa_item_verify,
- rsa_item_sign
- },
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS
- }
- };
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
+{
+ int pad_mode;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return 2;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+ int saltlen, rv = 0;
+ sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen == -1)
+ saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
+ else if (saltlen == -2) {
+ saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+ if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
+ saltlen--;
+ }
+ pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
+ if (!pss)
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen != 20) {
+ pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (!pss->saltLength)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1) {
+ pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->hashAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd);
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1) {
+ ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+ /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
+ mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md);
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp))
+ goto err;
+ pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm,
+ OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
+ }
+ /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1))
+ goto err;
+ if (alg2) {
+ os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
+ if (!os2)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+ os1 = os2 = NULL;
+ rv = 3;
+ err:
+ if (mgf1alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (os1)
+ ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
+ return rv;
+
+ }
+ return 2;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = {
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
+
+ "RSA",
+ "OpenSSL RSA method",
+
+ rsa_pub_decode,
+ rsa_pub_encode,
+ rsa_pub_cmp,
+ rsa_pub_print,
+
+ rsa_priv_decode,
+ rsa_priv_encode,
+ rsa_priv_print,
+
+ int_rsa_size,
+ rsa_bits,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ rsa_sig_print,
+ int_rsa_free,
+ rsa_pkey_ctrl,
+ old_rsa_priv_decode,
+ old_rsa_priv_encode,
+ rsa_item_verify,
+ rsa_item_sign},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
+};
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
index 6ed5de3db..3d82c1d0c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* rsa_asn1.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2000.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -65,43 +66,44 @@
/* Override the default free and new methods */
static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- void *exarg)
+ void *exarg)
{
- if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
- *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)RSA_new();
- if(*pval) return 2;
- return 0;
- } else if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
- RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
- *pval = NULL;
- return 2;
- }
- return 1;
+ if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
+ *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)RSA_new();
+ if (*pval)
+ return 2;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+ RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
+ *pval = NULL;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, version, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, p, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, BIGNUM)
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, version, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, p, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, BIGNUM)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) = {
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
@@ -111,11 +113,11 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPrivateKey, RSAPrivateKey)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPublicKey, RSAPublicKey)
RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
- {
- return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), rsa);
- }
+{
+ return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), rsa);
+}
RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa)
- {
- return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), rsa);
- }
+{
+ return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), rsa);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index cc30e7713..f4383860b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -52,139 +52,163 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
- {
- BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- int r;
- int ret=1;
-
- if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
-
- i = BN_new();
- j = BN_new();
- k = BN_new();
- l = BN_new();
- m = BN_new();
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL ||
- m == NULL || ctx == NULL)
- {
- ret = -1;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* p prime? */
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
- if (r != 1)
- {
- ret = r;
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
- }
-
- /* q prime? */
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
- if (r != 1)
- {
- ret = r;
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
- }
-
- /* n = p*q? */
- r = BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
- }
-
- /* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
-
- r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
- r = BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
- r = BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
- r = BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
- r = BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx); /* remainder is 0 */
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- r = BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- if (!BN_is_one(i))
- {
- ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
- }
-
- if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL)
- {
- /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
- r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
- RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
- }
-
- /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
- r = BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one());
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
- if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
-
- if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
- RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
- }
-
- /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
- if(!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx))
- {
- ret = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
- RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
- }
- }
+{
+ BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ int r;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i = BN_new();
+ j = BN_new();
+ k = BN_new();
+ l = BN_new();
+ m = BN_new();
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL ||
+ m == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* p prime? */
+ r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ ret = r;
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
+ }
+
+ /* q prime? */
+ r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ ret = r;
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+ }
+
+ /* n = p*q? */
+ r = BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+ }
+
+ /* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
+
+ r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one());
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
+ r = BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx); /* remainder is 0 */
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_is_one(i)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+ }
+
+ if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
+ /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
+ r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+ }
+
+ /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */
+ r = BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one());
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+ }
+
+ /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
+ }
+ }
err:
- if (i != NULL) BN_free(i);
- if (j != NULL) BN_free(j);
- if (k != NULL) BN_free(k);
- if (l != NULL) BN_free(l);
- if (m != NULL) BN_free(m);
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (ret);
- }
+ if (i != NULL)
+ BN_free(i);
+ if (j != NULL)
+ BN_free(j);
+ if (k != NULL)
+ BN_free(k);
+ if (l != NULL)
+ BN_free(l);
+ if (m != NULL)
+ BN_free(m);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
index d3e44785d..5c416b53f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -64,194 +64,184 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
- {
- return(BN_num_bytes(r->n));
- }
+{
+ return (BN_num_bytes(r->n));
+}
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
+ return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
-int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
+ return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
-int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
+ return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
+ return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+}
int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
- {
- return((r == NULL)?0:r->meth->flags);
- }
+{
+ return ((r == NULL) ? 0 : r->meth->flags);
+}
void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
- {
- BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
- rsa->blinding=NULL;
- }
- rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
- }
+{
+ if (rsa->blinding != NULL) {
+ BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
+ rsa->blinding = NULL;
+ }
+ rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+}
int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int ret=0;
+{
+ int ret = 0;
- if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
+ if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- goto err;
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
- rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
- ret=1;
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+ rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
-
- if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (r2 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err;
-
- ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
+ BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
+
+ if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
}
BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
{
- BIGNUM local_n;
- BIGNUM *e,*n;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-
- if (in_ctx == NULL)
- {
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0;
- }
- else
- ctx = in_ctx;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (e == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->e == NULL)
- {
- e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
- if (e == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- e = rsa->e;
-
-
- if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
- {
- /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
- * exponent as unpredictable seed */
- RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
- n = &local_n;
- BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- n = rsa->n;
-
- ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
- rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret));
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (in_ctx == NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if(rsa->e == NULL)
- BN_free(e);
-
- return ret;
+ BIGNUM local_n;
+ BIGNUM *e, *n;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (in_ctx == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ ctx = in_ctx;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->e == NULL) {
+ e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ e = rsa->e;
+
+ if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
+ * unpredictable seed
+ */
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ n = &local_n;
+ BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ n = rsa->n;
+
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
+ rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret));
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ if (in_ctx == NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (rsa->e == NULL)
+ BN_free(e);
+
+ return ret;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c
index a859ded98..32f0c8887 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@
*
*/
-/* NB: This file contains deprecated functions (compatibility wrappers to the
- * "new" versions). */
+/*
+ * NB: This file contains deprecated functions (compatibility wrappers to the
+ * "new" versions).
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
@@ -64,38 +66,42 @@
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
+static void *dummy = &dummy;
#else
RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
- void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
- {
- BN_GENCB cb;
- int i;
- RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
- BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
+ void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
+{
+ BN_GENCB cb;
+ int i;
+ RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+ BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
- if(!rsa || !e) goto err;
+ if (!rsa || !e)
+ goto err;
- /* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
- * unsigned long can be larger */
- for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
- {
- if (e_value & (1UL<<i))
- if (BN_set_bit(e,i) == 0)
- goto err;
- }
+ /*
+ * The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, unsigned long
+ * can be larger
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(unsigned long) * 8; i++) {
+ if (e_value & (1UL << i))
+ if (BN_set_bit(e, i) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
- BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
+ BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
- if(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, &cb)) {
- BN_free(e);
- return rsa;
- }
-err:
- if(e) BN_free(e);
- if(rsa) RSA_free(rsa);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, &cb)) {
+ BN_free(e);
+ return rsa;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (e)
+ BN_free(e);
+ if (rsa)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index aa810459a..b147fff8b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -118,798 +118,787 @@
#ifndef RSA_NULL
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
- "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
- RSA_eay_init,
- RSA_eay_finish,
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL,
- 0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
- };
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = {
+ "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
+ RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
+ RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
+ RSA_eay_mod_exp,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
+ * if e == 3 */
+ RSA_eay_init,
+ RSA_eay_finish,
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
+};
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
- }
+{
+ return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
+}
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+# endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BN_BLINDING *ret;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
-
- ret = rsa->blinding;
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
- {
- /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
- *local = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
- *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
- * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
- * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
- * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
- */
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- {
- if (!got_write_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
- }
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
- ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
- }
+ BN_BLINDING *ret;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa->blinding;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
+ /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+ *local = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+ /*
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
+ * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
+ * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+ */
+ *local = 0;
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
+ if (!got_write_lock) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+ ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+ }
err:
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- return ret;
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
}
static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (unblind == NULL)
- /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
- * in BN_BLINDING. */
- return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
- /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
- * outside BN_BLINDING. */
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
- }
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /*
+ * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else {
+ /*
+ * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
+ */
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
+ }
+}
static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
- * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
- * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
- * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
- * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
- * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
- */
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- }
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
+ * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
+ * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
+ * to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+}
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- BN_init(&local_d);
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d= rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
- if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
- res = f;
- else
- res = ret;
- }
- else
- res = ret;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(res);
- i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /*
+ * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+ */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL) {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ BN_init(&local_d);
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
+ res = f;
+ else
+ res = ret;
+ } else
+ res = ret;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(res);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int j,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ /*
+ * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
+ */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL) {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = buf;
+ j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+# endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
/* signature verification */
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
- if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
-
- p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+ if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = buf;
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
- BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
- int ret=0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- {
- BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-
- /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
- */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- BN_init(&local_p);
- p = &local_p;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- BN_init(&local_q);
- q = &local_q;
- BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- {
- p = rsa->p;
- q = rsa->q;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
- /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
- * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- pr1 = &local_r1;
- BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- pr1 = r1;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
- * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
- * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
- * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
-
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
- * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
- * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
- * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
- {
- /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
- * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
- * mod_exp and return that instead. */
-
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
- }
- ret=1;
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+ BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ {
+ BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+ */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ BN_init(&local_p);
+ p = &local_p;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ BN_init(&local_q);
+ q = &local_q;
+ BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else {
+ p = rsa->p;
+ q = rsa->q;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
+ (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
+ * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ pr1 = &local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
+ * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
+ * break the private key operations: the following second correction
+ * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
+ * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
+ * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
+ * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
+ * absolute equality, just congruency.
+ */
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+ /*
+ * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
+ * return that instead.
+ */
+
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+ return (1);
+}
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+ return (1);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 9da79d920..25b3fa743 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@
*
*/
-/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
* made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
* only reason strings will be preserved.
*/
@@ -65,146 +66,166 @@
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,func,0)
-#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,0,reason)
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,0,reason)
-static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
- {
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "CHECK_PADDING_MD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT), "DO_RSA_PRINT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "INT_RSA_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_MEMORY_LOCK), "MEMORY_LOCK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "PKEY_RSA_SIGN"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY), "RSA_generate_key"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX), "RSA_generate_key_ex"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "RSA_ITEM_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK), "RSA_memory_lock"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP), "RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_private_decrypt"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_private_encrypt"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "RSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "RSA_PRIV_ENCODE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_public_decrypt"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_public_encrypt"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "RSA_PUB_DECODE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
-{0,NULL}
- };
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "CHECK_PADDING_MD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT), "DO_RSA_PRINT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "INT_RSA_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_MEMORY_LOCK), "MEMORY_LOCK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "PKEY_RSA_SIGN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY), "RSA_generate_key"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX), "RSA_generate_key_ex"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "RSA_ITEM_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK), "RSA_memory_lock"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP), "RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP),
+ "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1),
+ "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
+ "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
+ "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP),
+ "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
+ "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
+ "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_private_decrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_private_encrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "RSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "RSA_PRIV_ENCODE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_public_decrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_public_encrypt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "RSA_PUB_DECODE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
-static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
- {
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH) ,"algorithm mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE) ,"bad e value"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),"bad fixed header decrypt"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT) ,"bad pad byte count"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE) ,"bad signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01) ,"block type is not 01"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02) ,"block type is not 02"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),"data greater than mod len"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE) ,"data too large"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),"data too large for modulus"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL) ,"data too small"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too small for key size"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),"digest too big for rsa key"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),"dmp1 not congruent to d"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),"dmq1 not congruent to d"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1),"d e not congruent to 1"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID) ,"first octet invalid"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),"illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH) ,"invalid digest length"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER) ,"invalid header"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS) ,"invalid keybits"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),"invalid message length"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD) ,"invalid mgf1 md"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING) ,"invalid padding"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE) ,"invalid padding mode"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS),"invalid pss parameters"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN) ,"invalid pss saltlen"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH) ,"invalid salt length"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER) ,"invalid trailer"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST) ,"invalid x931 digest"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL) ,"key size too small"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID) ,"last octet invalid"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) ,"modulus too large"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD) ,"non fips rsa method"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) ,"no public exponent"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"operation not allowed in fips mode"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR) ,"pkcs decoding error"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED) ,"salt length check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED) ,"salt length recovery failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK) ,"sslv3 rollback attack"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),"the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE),"unknown algorithm type"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST) ,"unknown mask digest"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE) ,"unknown padding type"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST) ,"unknown pss digest"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),"unsupported mask algorithm"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),"unsupported mask parameter"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),"unsupported signature type"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING) ,"value missing"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
-{0,NULL}
- };
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT), "bad fixed header decrypt"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
+ "data greater than mod len"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+ "data too large for key size"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),
+ "data too large for modulus"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
+ "data too small for key size"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),
+ "digest too big for rsa key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmp1 not congruent to d"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmq1 not congruent to d"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1), "d e not congruent to 1"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID), "first octet invalid"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
+ "illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH), "invalid digest length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS), "invalid keybits"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE), "invalid padding mode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS), "invalid pss parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN), "invalid pss saltlen"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH), "invalid salt length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST), "invalid x931 digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q), "iqmp not inverse of q"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD), "non fips rsa method"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
+ "null before block missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),
+ "operation not allowed in fips mode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
+ "operation not supported for this keytype"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED), "padding check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR), "pkcs decoding error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+ "rsa operations not supported"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED), "salt length check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED), "salt length recovery failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK), "sslv3 rollback attack"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
+ "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE), "unknown algorithm type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST), "unknown mask digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE), "unknown padding type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST), "unknown pss digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),
+ "unsupported mask algorithm"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),
+ "unsupported mask parameter"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
+ "unsupported signature type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
#endif
void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
- if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL)
- {
- ERR_load_strings(0,RSA_str_functs);
- ERR_load_strings(0,RSA_str_reasons);
- }
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_reasons);
+ }
#endif
- }
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 42290cce6..2465fbdeb 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,17 +49,17 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
-
-/* NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which are
- * compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c.
- * - Geoff
+/*
+ * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
+ * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
+ * Geoff
*/
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -68,167 +68,181 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb);
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
-/* NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
- * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here so
- * that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application that
- * wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't have to
- * now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. */
+/*
+ * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
+ * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
+ * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
+ * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
+ * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
+ */
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
- {
+{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- if(rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
- return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#endif
- return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
- }
-
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
- {
- BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
- BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
- BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
- int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
-
- bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
- bitsq=bits-bitsp;
-
- /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
- if(!rsa->n && ((rsa->n=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->d && ((rsa->d=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->e && ((rsa->e=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->p && ((rsa->p=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->q && ((rsa->q=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
- if(!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
-
- BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
-
- /* generate p and q */
- for (;;)
- {
- if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
- if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
- goto err;
- }
- if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
- goto err;
- for (;;)
- {
- /* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
- * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
- * this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
- unsigned int degenerate = 0;
- do
- {
- if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
- goto err;
- } while((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
- if(degenerate == 3)
- {
- ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
- break;
- if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
- goto err;
- }
- if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
- {
- tmp=rsa->p;
- rsa->p=rsa->q;
- rsa->q=tmp;
- }
-
- /* calculate n */
- if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* calculate d */
- if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
- if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
- if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- pr0 = &local_r0;
- BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- pr0 = r0;
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */
-
- /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- p = &local_p;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- p = rsa->p;
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
-
- ok=1;
-err:
- if (ok == -1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,ERR_LIB_BN);
- ok=0;
- }
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
-
- return ok;
- }
-
+ return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
+ BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
+ int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r3 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
+ bitsq = bits - bitsp;
+
+ /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
+
+ /* generate p and q */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+ goto err;
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+ * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
+ * bail if it happens 3 times.
+ */
+ unsigned int degenerate = 0;
+ do {
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ goto err;
+ } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
+ if (degenerate == 3) {
+ ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+ tmp = rsa->p;
+ rsa->p = rsa->q;
+ rsa->q = tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate n */
+ if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d */
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err; /* p-1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err; /* q-1 */
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+ goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ pr0 = &local_r0;
+ BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ pr0 = r0;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx))
+ goto err; /* d */
+
+ /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ p = &local_p;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ p = rsa->p;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (ok == -1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ok;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index c95ceafc8..a6805debc 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -64,270 +64,273 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
-const char RSA_version[]="RSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RSA_version[] = "RSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth=NULL;
+static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = NULL;
RSA *RSA_new(void)
- {
- RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL);
+{
+ RSA *r = RSA_new_method(NULL);
- return r;
- }
+ return r;
+}
void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
- {
- default_RSA_meth = meth;
- }
+{
+ default_RSA_meth = meth;
+}
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
- {
- if (default_RSA_meth == NULL)
- {
+{
+ if (default_RSA_meth == NULL) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return FIPS_rsa_pkcs1_ssleay();
- else
- return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-#else
-#ifdef RSA_NULL
- default_RSA_meth=RSA_null_method();
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_rsa_pkcs1_ssleay();
+ else
+ return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
#else
- default_RSA_meth=RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+# ifdef RSA_NULL
+ default_RSA_meth = RSA_null_method();
+# else
+ default_RSA_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+# endif
#endif
-#endif
- }
+ }
- return default_RSA_meth;
- }
+ return default_RSA_meth;
+}
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
- {
- return rsa->meth;
- }
+{
+ return rsa->meth;
+}
int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
- {
- /* NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
- * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. */
- const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
- mtmp = rsa->meth;
- if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(rsa);
+{
+ /*
+ * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
+ * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
+ */
+ const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
+ mtmp = rsa->meth;
+ if (mtmp->finish)
+ mtmp->finish(rsa);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (rsa->engine)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
- rsa->engine = NULL;
- }
+ if (rsa->engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
+ rsa->engine = NULL;
+ }
#endif
- rsa->meth = meth;
- if (meth->init) meth->init(rsa);
- return 1;
- }
+ rsa->meth = meth;
+ if (meth->init)
+ meth->init(rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
- {
- RSA *ret;
+{
+ RSA *ret;
- ret=(RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
+ ret = (RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
+ ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (engine)
- {
- if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret->engine = engine;
- }
- else
- ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
- if(ret->engine)
- {
- ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
- if(!ret->meth)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD,
- ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
+ if (engine) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->engine = engine;
+ } else
+ ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
+ if (ret->engine) {
+ ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
+ if (!ret->meth) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
#endif
- ret->pad=0;
- ret->version=0;
- ret->n=NULL;
- ret->e=NULL;
- ret->d=NULL;
- ret->p=NULL;
- ret->q=NULL;
- ret->dmp1=NULL;
- ret->dmq1=NULL;
- ret->iqmp=NULL;
- ret->references=1;
- ret->_method_mod_n=NULL;
- ret->_method_mod_p=NULL;
- ret->_method_mod_q=NULL;
- ret->blinding=NULL;
- ret->mt_blinding=NULL;
- ret->bignum_data=NULL;
- ret->flags=ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
- if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data))
- {
+ ret->pad = 0;
+ ret->version = 0;
+ ret->n = NULL;
+ ret->e = NULL;
+ ret->d = NULL;
+ ret->p = NULL;
+ ret->q = NULL;
+ ret->dmp1 = NULL;
+ ret->dmq1 = NULL;
+ ret->iqmp = NULL;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->_method_mod_n = NULL;
+ ret->_method_mod_p = NULL;
+ ret->_method_mod_q = NULL;
+ ret->blinding = NULL;
+ ret->mt_blinding = NULL;
+ ret->bignum_data = NULL;
+ ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (ret->engine)
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
+ if (ret->engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
#endif
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return(NULL);
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
- if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret))
- {
+ if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (ret->engine)
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
+ if (ret->engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- ret=NULL;
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
void RSA_free(RSA *r)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if (r == NULL) return;
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
- i=CRYPTO_add(&r->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("RSA",r);
+ REF_PRINT("RSA", r);
#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"RSA_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "RSA_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ }
#endif
- if (r->meth->finish)
- r->meth->finish(r);
+ if (r->meth->finish)
+ r->meth->finish(r);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (r->engine)
- ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
+ if (r->engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
- if (r->n != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->n);
- if (r->e != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->e);
- if (r->d != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->d);
- if (r->p != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->p);
- if (r->q != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->q);
- if (r->dmp1 != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
- if (r->dmq1 != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
- if (r->iqmp != NULL) BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
- if (r->blinding != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
- if (r->mt_blinding != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
- if (r->bignum_data != NULL) OPENSSL_free_locked(r->bignum_data);
- OPENSSL_free(r);
- }
+ if (r->n != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->n);
+ if (r->e != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->e);
+ if (r->d != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->d);
+ if (r->p != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->p);
+ if (r->q != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->q);
+ if (r->dmp1 != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
+ if (r->dmq1 != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
+ if (r->iqmp != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+ if (r->blinding != NULL)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
+ if (r->mt_blinding != NULL)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
+ if (r->bignum_data != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free_locked(r->bignum_data);
+ OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
- {
- int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+{
+ int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("RSA",r);
+ REF_PRINT("RSA", r);
#endif
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 2)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "RSA_up_ref, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
+ if (i < 2) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "RSA_up_ref, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ }
#endif
- return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
- }
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
- }
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data,idx,arg));
- }
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data,idx));
- }
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+}
int RSA_memory_lock(RSA *r)
- {
- int i,j,k,off;
- char *p;
- BIGNUM *bn,**t[6],*b;
- BN_ULONG *ul;
+{
+ int i, j, k, off;
+ char *p;
+ BIGNUM *bn, **t[6], *b;
+ BN_ULONG *ul;
+
+ if (r->d == NULL)
+ return (1);
+ t[0] = &r->d;
+ t[1] = &r->p;
+ t[2] = &r->q;
+ t[3] = &r->dmp1;
+ t[4] = &r->dmq1;
+ t[5] = &r->iqmp;
+ k = sizeof(BIGNUM) * 6;
+ off = k / sizeof(BN_ULONG) + 1;
+ j = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ j += (*t[i])->top;
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc_locked((off + j) * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bn = (BIGNUM *)p;
+ ul = (BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]);
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ b = *(t[i]);
+ *(t[i]) = &(bn[i]);
+ memcpy((char *)&(bn[i]), (char *)b, sizeof(BIGNUM));
+ bn[i].flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+ bn[i].d = ul;
+ memcpy((char *)ul, b->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * b->top);
+ ul += b->top;
+ BN_clear_free(b);
+ }
- if (r->d == NULL) return(1);
- t[0]= &r->d;
- t[1]= &r->p;
- t[2]= &r->q;
- t[3]= &r->dmp1;
- t[4]= &r->dmq1;
- t[5]= &r->iqmp;
- k=sizeof(BIGNUM)*6;
- off=k/sizeof(BN_ULONG)+1;
- j=1;
- for (i=0; i<6; i++)
- j+= (*t[i])->top;
- if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc_locked((off+j)*sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- bn=(BIGNUM *)p;
- ul=(BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]);
- for (i=0; i<6; i++)
- {
- b= *(t[i]);
- *(t[i])= &(bn[i]);
- memcpy((char *)&(bn[i]),(char *)b,sizeof(BIGNUM));
- bn[i].flags=BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
- bn[i].d=ul;
- memcpy((char *)ul,b->d,sizeof(BN_ULONG)*b->top);
- ul+=b->top;
- BN_clear_free(b);
- }
-
- /* I should fix this so it can still be done */
- r->flags&= ~(RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC);
+ /* I should fix this so it can still be done */
+ r->flags &= ~(RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC);
- r->bignum_data=p;
- return(1);
- }
+ r->bignum_data = p;
+ return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h
index f5d2d5662..3e88187d9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen,
- RSA *rsa);
+extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
+ size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c
index e6f3e627c..982b31f28 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,36 +63,32 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- if (flen > tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ if (flen > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
- if (flen < tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- memcpy(to,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ if (flen < tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
-int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
+ memcpy(to, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
- if (flen > tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return(-1);
- }
+int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
- memset(to,0,tlen-flen);
- memcpy(to+tlen-flen,from,flen);
- return(tlen);
- }
+ if (flen > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ memset(to, 0, tlen - flen);
+ memcpy(to + tlen - flen, from, flen);
+ return (tlen);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c
index 2f2202f14..241b431ad 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* rsa_null.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-/* This is a dummy RSA implementation that just returns errors when called.
+/*
+ * This is a dummy RSA implementation that just returns errors when called.
* It is designed to allow some RSA functions to work while stopping those
* covered by the RSA patent. That is RSA, encryption, decryption, signing
* and verify is not allowed but RSA key generation, key checking and other
@@ -70,82 +72,84 @@
*/
static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-#if 0 /* not currently used */
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+#if 0 /* not currently used */
static int RSA_null_mod_exp(const BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
#endif
static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_null_meth={
- "Null RSA",
- RSA_null_public_encrypt,
- RSA_null_public_decrypt,
- RSA_null_private_encrypt,
- RSA_null_private_decrypt,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- RSA_null_init,
- RSA_null_finish,
- 0,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
- };
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_null_meth = {
+ "Null RSA",
+ RSA_null_public_encrypt,
+ RSA_null_public_decrypt,
+ RSA_null_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_null_private_decrypt,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ RSA_null_init,
+ RSA_null_finish,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
- {
- return(&rsa_null_meth);
- }
+{
+ return (&rsa_null_meth);
+}
static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return -1;
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -1;
+}
static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return -1;
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -1;
+}
static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return -1;
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -1;
+}
static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return -1;
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -1;
+}
-#if 0 /* not currently used */
+#if 0 /* not currently used */
static int RSA_null_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
- {
- ...err(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return -1;
- }
+{
+ ... err(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_MOD_EXP, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return -1;
+}
#endif
static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ return (1);
+}
static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ return (1);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index c36333199..499835f81 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -1,261 +1,257 @@
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */
-/* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
- basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
+/*
+ * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ */
/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
-/* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000,
- * <URL: http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z>
- * for problems with the security proof for the
- * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on.
- *
- * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto,
- * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!",
- * Dec. 2000, <URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>.
- * The new proof has stronger requirements for the
- * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead
- * of one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is
- * an equivalent notion.
+/*
+ * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security
+ * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new
+ * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,
+ * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:
+ * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements
+ * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of
+ * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
*/
#include "constant_time_locl.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
- const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
+ const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen,
- const unsigned char *param, int plen)
- {
- int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
- unsigned char *db, *seed;
- unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- to[0] = 0;
- seed = to + 1;
- db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
-
- if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
- return 0;
- memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
- emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
- db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
- memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
- if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
- return 0;
-#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
- memcpy(seed,
- "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
- 20);
-#endif
-
- dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if (dbmask == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
-
- if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
-
- OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
- return 1;
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+ int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+ unsigned char *db, *seed;
+ unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ to[0] = 0;
+ seed = to + 1;
+ db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ return 0;
+ memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
+ emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
+ db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+# ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
+ memcpy(seed,
+ "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
+ 20);
+# endif
+
+ dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (dbmask == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
+
+ if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
+ return 1;
+}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
- const unsigned char *param, int plen)
- {
- int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
- unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
- const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
- /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes:
- * em = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */
- unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
- phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
- return -1;
-
- /*
- * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
- * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
- * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
- * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus
- * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
- * This does not leak any side-channel information.
- */
- if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2)
- goto decoding_err;
-
- dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1;
- db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (db == NULL || em == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memset(em, 0, num);
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-
- /*
- * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
- * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
- * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
- */
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
-
- maskedseed = em + 1;
- maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
- if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
- goto cleanup;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
-
- if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto cleanup;
- for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
- db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
-
- if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
- goto cleanup;
-
- good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
-
- found_one_byte = 0;
- for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
- {
- /* Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */
- unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
- one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
- i, one_index);
- found_one_byte |= equals1;
- good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
- }
-
- good &= found_one_byte;
-
- /*
- * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
- * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
- * concern.
- */
- if (!good)
- goto decoding_err;
-
- msg_index = one_index + 1;
- mlen = dblen - msg_index;
-
- if (tlen < mlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- mlen = -1;
- }
- else
- {
- memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
-decoding_err:
- /* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
- * which kind of decoding error happened. */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
-cleanup:
- if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
- if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em);
- return mlen;
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen)
+{
+ int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
+ unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
+ const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
+ /*
+ * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
+ * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB
+ */
+ unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
+ phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
+ * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
+ * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
+ * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus
+ * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
+ * This does not leak any side-channel information.
+ */
+ if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2)
+ goto decoding_err;
+
+ dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1;
+ db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+ * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+ * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+ * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+ *
+ * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+ */
+ memset(em, 0, num);
+ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+
+ /*
+ * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
+ * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
+ * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
+ */
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+
+ maskedseed = em + 1;
+ maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+ goto cleanup;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
+
+ if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto cleanup;
+ for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
+ db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ good &=
+ constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
+
+ found_one_byte = 0;
+ for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) {
+ /*
+ * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
+ */
+ unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
+ one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
+ i, one_index);
+ found_one_byte |= equals1;
+ good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
+ }
+
+ good &= found_one_byte;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
+ * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
+ * concern.
+ */
+ if (!good)
+ goto decoding_err;
+
+ msg_index = one_index + 1;
+ mlen = dblen - msg_index;
+
+ if (tlen < mlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ mlen = -1;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ decoding_err:
+ /*
+ * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
+ * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
+ */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ cleanup:
+ if (db != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(db);
+ if (em != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(em);
+ return mlen;
+}
int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
- const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
- {
- long i, outlen = 0;
- unsigned char cnt[4];
- EVP_MD_CTX c;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- int mdlen;
- int rv = -1;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
- if (mdlen < 0)
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
- {
- cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
- cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
- cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
- cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
- goto err;
- if (outlen + mdlen <= len)
- {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
- goto err;
- outlen += mdlen;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
- goto err;
- memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
- outlen = len;
- }
- }
- rv = 0;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
- return rv;
- }
+ const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
+{
+ long i, outlen = 0;
+ unsigned char cnt[4];
+ EVP_MD_CTX c;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int mdlen;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
+ cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
+ cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
+ cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
+ cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
+ goto err;
+ if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ outlen += mdlen;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
+ outlen = len;
+ }
+ }
+ rv = 0;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ return rv;
+}
static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
- long seedlen)
- {
- return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
- }
+ long seedlen)
+{
+ return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
+}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index c2da56f6c..efa1fd3e9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,205 +65,211 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with 0xff data */
- j=tlen-3-flen;
- memset(p,0xff,j);
- p+=j;
- *(p++)='\0';
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with 0xff data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+ memset(p, 0xff, j);
+ p += j;
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i,j;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- p=from;
- if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 01))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- /* scan over padding data */
- j=flen-1; /* one for type. */
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (*p != 0xff) /* should decrypt to 0xff */
- {
- if (*p == 0)
- { p++; break; }
- else {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
- return(-1);
- }
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- if (i == j)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- if (i < 8)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
- return(-1);
- }
- i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
- j-=i;
- if (j > tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return(-1);
- }
- memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j);
-
- return(j);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = from;
+ if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */
+ if (*p == 0) {
+ p++;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ if (i == j) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (i < 8) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
+ j -= i;
+ if (j > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+ return (j);
+}
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int i,j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen-11))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with non-zero random data */
- j=tlen-3-flen;
-
- if (RAND_bytes(p,j) <= 0)
- return(0);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (*p == '\0')
- do {
- if (RAND_bytes(p,1) <= 0)
- return(0);
- } while (*p == '\0');
- p++;
- }
-
- *(p++)='\0';
-
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ do {
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ } while (*p == '\0');
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i;
- /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
-
- if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
- return -1;
-
- /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography
- * Standard", section 7.2.2. */
-
- if (flen > num)
- goto err;
-
- if (num < 11)
- goto err;
-
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (em == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- memset(em, 0, num);
- /*
- * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
- * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
- * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
- *
- * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
- */
- memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
-
- found_zero_byte = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < num; i++)
- {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index);
- found_zero_byte |= equals0;
- }
-
- /*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
- * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
- * also fails.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
-
- /* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
- * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */
- msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = num - msg_index;
-
- /* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
- * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */
- good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
-
- /*
- * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
- * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
- * information at the API boundary.
- * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
- * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
- */
- if (!good)
- {
- mlen = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
-
-err:
- if (em != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(em);
- if (mlen == -1)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
- return mlen;
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i;
+ /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+
+ if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
+ * section 7.2.2.
+ */
+
+ if (flen > num)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (num < 11)
+ goto err;
+
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset(em, 0, num);
+ /*
+ * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
+ * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
+ * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+ * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
+ *
+ * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
+ */
+ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
+ for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+ zero_index =
+ constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
+ zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+ * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+ * also fails.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+ */
+ msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+ /*
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
+ * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
+
+ /*
+ * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
+ * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
+ * information at the API boundary.
+ * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
+ * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
+ */
+ if (!good) {
+ mlen = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
+
+ err:
+ if (em != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(em);
+ if (mlen == -1)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ return mlen;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 157aa5c41..d61d6e8b6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2006.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -64,662 +65,595 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#include "evp_locl.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
/* RSA pkey context structure */
-typedef struct
- {
- /* Key gen parameters */
- int nbits;
- BIGNUM *pub_exp;
- /* Keygen callback info */
- int gentmp[2];
- /* RSA padding mode */
- int pad_mode;
- /* message digest */
- const EVP_MD *md;
- /* message digest for MGF1 */
- const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
- /* PSS/OAEP salt length */
- int saltlen;
- /* Temp buffer */
- unsigned char *tbuf;
- } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+typedef struct {
+ /* Key gen parameters */
+ int nbits;
+ BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+ /* Keygen callback info */
+ int gentmp[2];
+ /* RSA padding mode */
+ int pad_mode;
+ /* message digest */
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ /* message digest for MGF1 */
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+ /* PSS/OAEP salt length */
+ int saltlen;
+ /* Temp buffer */
+ unsigned char *tbuf;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
- rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
- if (!rctx)
- return 0;
- rctx->nbits = 1024;
- rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
- rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- rctx->md = NULL;
- rctx->mgf1md = NULL;
- rctx->tbuf = NULL;
-
- rctx->saltlen = -2;
-
- ctx->data = rctx;
- ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
- ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
+ rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
+ if (!rctx)
+ return 0;
+ rctx->nbits = 1024;
+ rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ rctx->md = NULL;
+ rctx->mgf1md = NULL;
+ rctx->tbuf = NULL;
+
+ rctx->saltlen = -2;
+
+ ctx->data = rctx;
+ ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+ ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
- if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
- return 0;
- sctx = src->data;
- dctx = dst->data;
- dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
- if (sctx->pub_exp)
- {
- dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
- if (!dctx->pub_exp)
- return 0;
- }
- dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
- dctx->md = sctx->md;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+ if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
+ return 0;
+ sctx = src->data;
+ dctx = dst->data;
+ dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+ if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+ dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+ if (!dctx->pub_exp)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+ dctx->md = sctx->md;
+ return 1;
+}
static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
- {
- if (ctx->tbuf)
- return 1;
- ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
- if (!ctx->tbuf)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
+ if (!ctx->tbuf)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- if (rctx)
- {
- if (rctx->pub_exp)
- BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
- if (rctx->tbuf)
- OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
- OPENSSL_free(rctx);
- }
- }
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ if (rctx) {
+ if (rctx->pub_exp)
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+ if (rctx->tbuf)
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+ }
+}
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-/* FIP checker. Return value indicates status of context parameters:
- * 1 : redirect to FIPS.
- * 0 : don't redirect to FIPS.
- * -1 : illegal operation in FIPS mode.
+/*
+ * FIP checker. Return value indicates status of context parameters: 1 :
+ * redirect to FIPS. 0 : don't redirect to FIPS. -1 : illegal operation in
+ * FIPS mode.
*/
static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
- int rv = -1;
- if (!FIPS_mode())
- return 0;
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
- rv = 0;
- if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
- return -1;
- if (rctx->md && !(rctx->md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
- return rv;
- if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
- return rv;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ int rv = -1;
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+ return 0;
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ rv = 0;
+ if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
+ return -1;
+ if (rctx->md && !(rctx->md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+ return rv;
+ if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+ return rv;
+ return 1;
+}
#endif
-static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
- const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
- {
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+ size_t tbslen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
- if (ret < 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return -1;
- }
+ ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- if (rctx->md)
- {
- if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
- RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (ret > 0)
- {
- unsigned int slen;
- ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
- rctx->pad_mode,
- rctx->saltlen,
- rctx->mgf1md,
- sig, &slen);
- if (ret > 0)
- *siglen = slen;
- else
- *siglen = 0;
- return ret;
- }
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ unsigned int slen;
+ ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
+ rctx->pad_mode,
+ rctx->saltlen,
+ rctx->mgf1md, sig, &slen);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ *siglen = slen;
+ else
+ *siglen = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
#endif
- if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2)
- {
- unsigned int sltmp;
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
- tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- ret = sltmp;
- }
- else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
- rctx->tbuf[tbslen] =
- RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
- sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
- }
- else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- {
- unsigned int sltmp;
- ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
- tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- ret = sltmp;
- }
- else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
- rctx->tbuf, tbs,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
- rctx->saltlen))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
- sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- }
- else
- return -1;
- }
- else
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *siglen = ret;
- return 1;
- }
-
+ if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
+ tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+ rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
+ sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+ tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
+ rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->saltlen))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
+ sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ } else
+ return -1;
+ } else
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *siglen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
- {
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
-
- if (rctx->md)
- {
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
- rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_X931_PADDING);
- if (ret < 1)
- return 0;
- ret--;
- if (rctx->tbuf[ret] !=
- RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
- RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
- RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (rout)
- memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
- }
- else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- {
- size_t sltmp;
- ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
- NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
- sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- ret = sltmp;
- }
- else
- return -1;
- }
- else
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *routlen = ret;
- return 1;
- }
+ unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
+ rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ if (ret < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ret--;
+ if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+ RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (rout)
+ memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ size_t sltmp;
+ ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+ NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+ sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else
+ return -1;
+ } else
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *routlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
- size_t rslen;
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ size_t rslen;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- int rv;
- rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
- if (rv < 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return -1;
- }
+ int rv;
+ rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY,
+ RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- if (rctx->md)
- {
+ if (rctx->md) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (rv > 0)
- {
- return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
- tbs, tbslen,
- rctx->md,
- rctx->pad_mode,
- rctx->saltlen,
- rctx->mgf1md,
- sig, siglen);
-
- }
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
+ tbs, tbslen,
+ rctx->md,
+ rctx->pad_mode,
+ rctx->saltlen,
+ rctx->mgf1md, sig, siglen);
+
+ }
#endif
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
- sig, siglen, rsa);
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen,
- sig, siglen) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
- else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- int ret;
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
- rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
- rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
- else
- return -1;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
- rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
- if (rslen == 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- }
-
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+ sig, siglen, rsa);
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ int ret;
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+ rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ } else
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+ rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (rslen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
- {
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *outlen = ret;
- return 1;
- }
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *outlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
- {
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
- rctx->pad_mode);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *outlen = ret;
- return 1;
- }
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *outlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
- {
- if (!md)
- return 1;
-
- if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD,
- RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
+{
+ if (!md)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
- {
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- switch (type)
- {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
- if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING))
- {
- if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
- return 0;
- if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- if (!(ctx->operation &
- (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
- goto bad_pad;
- if (!rctx->md)
- rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
- }
- if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
- {
- if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
- goto bad_pad;
- if (!rctx->md)
- rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
- }
- rctx->pad_mode = p1;
- return 1;
- }
- bad_pad:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
- RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
- *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return -2;
- }
- if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
- *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
- else
- {
- if (p1 < -2)
- return -2;
- rctx->saltlen = p1;
- }
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
- if (p1 < 256)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
- return -2;
- }
- rctx->nbits = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
- if (!p2)
- return -2;
- rctx->pub_exp = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
- if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
- return 0;
- rctx->md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
- return -2;
- }
- if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD)
- {
- if (rctx->mgf1md)
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
- else
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
- }
- else
- rctx->mgf1md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
- return 1;
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+ if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
+ if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
+ return 0;
+ if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (!(ctx->operation &
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
+ goto bad_pad;
+ if (!rctx->md)
+ rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+ if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
+ goto bad_pad;
+ if (!rctx->md)
+ rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+ rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bad_pad:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+ RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+ return -2;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+ else {
+ if (p1 < -2)
+ return -2;
+ rctx->saltlen = p1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+ if (p1 < 256) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ rctx->nbits = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+ if (!p2)
+ return -2;
+ rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+ if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+ if (rctx->mgf1md)
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+ else
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ } else
+ rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
- {
- X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *encalg = NULL;
- if (p2)
- CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(p2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- if (alg)
- X509_ALGOR_get0(&encalg, NULL, NULL, alg);
- if (encalg && OBJ_obj2nid(encalg) == NID_rsaesOaep)
- rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
- }
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
- return 1;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+ {
+ X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *encalg = NULL;
+ if (p2)
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(p2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ if (alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_get0(&encalg, NULL, NULL, alg);
+ if (encalg && OBJ_obj2nid(encalg) == NID_rsaesOaep)
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+ return 1;
#endif
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
- RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+ RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
- default:
- return -2;
+ }
+}
- }
- }
-
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- const char *type, const char *value)
- {
- if (!value)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode"))
- {
- int pm;
- if (!strcmp(value, "pkcs1"))
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "sslv23"))
- pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "none"))
- pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
- pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
- else
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
- RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- return -2;
- }
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen"))
- {
- int saltlen;
- saltlen = atoi(value);
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits"))
- {
- int nbits;
- nbits = atoi(value);
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp"))
- {
- int ret;
- BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
- if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
- return 0;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
- if (ret <= 0)
- BN_free(pubexp);
- return ret;
- }
-
- return -2;
- }
+ const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+ if (!value) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode")) {
+ int pm;
+ if (!strcmp(value, "pkcs1"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "sslv23"))
+ pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "none"))
+ pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
+ pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+ else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen")) {
+ int saltlen;
+ saltlen = atoi(value);
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits")) {
+ int nbits;
+ nbits = atoi(value);
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp")) {
+ int ret;
+ BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
+ if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
+ return 0;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ BN_free(pubexp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return -2;
+}
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- BN_GENCB *pcb, cb;
- int ret;
- if (!rctx->pub_exp)
- {
- rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
- if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
- return 0;
- }
- rsa = RSA_new();
- if (!rsa)
- return 0;
- if (ctx->pkey_gencb)
- {
- pcb = &cb;
- evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
- }
- else
- pcb = NULL;
- ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
- if (ret > 0)
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- else
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return ret;
- }
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth =
- {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
- pkey_rsa_init,
- pkey_rsa_copy,
- pkey_rsa_cleanup,
-
- 0,0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_keygen,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_sign,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_verify,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
-
-
- 0,0,0,0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_encrypt,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_decrypt,
-
- 0,0,
-
- pkey_rsa_ctrl,
- pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
-
-
- };
+{
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ BN_GENCB *pcb, cb;
+ int ret;
+ if (!rctx->pub_exp) {
+ rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+ if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (!rsa)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+ pcb = &cb;
+ evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+ } else
+ pcb = NULL;
+ ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ else
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+ pkey_rsa_init,
+ pkey_rsa_copy,
+ pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c
index 224db0fae..076f871b3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2006.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -63,31 +64,29 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *x, int off)
- {
- BIO *b;
- int ret;
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ int ret;
- if ((b=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- BIO_set_fp(b,fp,BIO_NOCLOSE);
- ret=RSA_print(b,x,off);
- BIO_free(b);
- return(ret);
- }
+ if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = RSA_print(b, x, off);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return (ret);
+}
#endif
int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pk;
- int ret;
- pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (!pk || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, (RSA *)x))
- return 0;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- return ret;
- }
-
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ int ret;
+ pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!pk || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, (RSA *)x))
+ return 0;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index 5f9f533d0..41bc0844e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* rsa_pss.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2005.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -64,237 +65,226 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
-static const unsigned char zeroes[] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
+static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
-#pragma optimize("g", off)
+# pragma optimize("g", off)
#endif
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
- {
- return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
- }
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
+ int sLen)
+{
+ return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
+}
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
- const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
- {
- int i;
- int ret = 0;
- int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
- const unsigned char *H;
- unsigned char *DB = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+ const unsigned char *H;
+ unsigned char *DB = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
- mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+ mgf1Hash = Hash;
- hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
- if (hLen < 0)
- goto err;
- /*
- * Negative sLen has special meanings:
- * -1 sLen == hLen
- * -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
- * -N reserved
- */
- if (sLen == -1) sLen = hLen;
- else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2;
- else if (sLen < -2)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
+ hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+ if (hLen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ /*-
+ * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+ * -1 sLen == hLen
+ * -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
+ * -N reserved
+ */
+ if (sLen == -1)
+ sLen = hLen;
+ else if (sLen == -2)
+ sLen = -2;
+ else if (sLen < -2) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
- MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
- emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
- goto err;
- }
- if (MSBits == 0)
- {
- EM++;
- emLen--;
- }
- if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2)) /* sLen can be small negative */
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
- goto err;
- }
- maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
- H = EM + maskedDBLen;
- DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
- if (!DB)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
- DB[i] ^= EM[i];
- if (MSBits)
- DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
- for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen-1); i++) ;
- if (DB[i++] != 0x1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
- goto err;
- if (maskedDBLen - i)
- {
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H_, NULL))
- goto err;
- if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- ret = 0;
- }
- else
- ret = 1;
+ MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+ emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (MSBits == 0) {
+ EM++;
+ emLen--;
+ }
+ if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2)) { /* sLen can be small negative */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+ H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+ DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
+ if (!DB) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
+ DB[i] ^= EM[i];
+ if (MSBits)
+ DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+ for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ;
+ if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
+ goto err;
+ if (maskedDBLen - i) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H_, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
- err:
- if (DB)
- OPENSSL_free(DB);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ err:
+ if (DB)
+ OPENSSL_free(DB);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return ret;
+ return ret;
- }
+}
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
- const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
- {
- return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
- }
+ const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
+{
+ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
+}
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
- const unsigned char *mHash,
- const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen)
- {
- int i;
- int ret = 0;
- int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
- unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ int sLen)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+ unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
- mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+ mgf1Hash = Hash;
- hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
- if (hLen < 0)
- goto err;
- /*
- * Negative sLen has special meanings:
- * -1 sLen == hLen
- * -2 salt length is maximized
- * -N reserved
- */
- if (sLen == -1) sLen = hLen;
- else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2;
- else if (sLen < -2)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
+ hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+ if (hLen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ /*-
+ * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+ * -1 sLen == hLen
+ * -2 salt length is maximized
+ * -N reserved
+ */
+ if (sLen == -1)
+ sLen = hLen;
+ else if (sLen == -2)
+ sLen = -2;
+ else if (sLen < -2) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
- MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
- emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (MSBits == 0)
- {
- *EM++ = 0;
- emLen--;
- }
- if (sLen == -2)
- {
- sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
- }
- else if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (sLen > 0)
- {
- salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
- if (!salt)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
- H = EM + maskedDBLen;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
- goto err;
- if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H, NULL))
- goto err;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
+ emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (MSBits == 0) {
+ *EM++ = 0;
+ emLen--;
+ }
+ if (sLen == -2) {
+ sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
+ } else if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sLen > 0) {
+ salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
+ if (!salt) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
+ H = EM + maskedDBLen;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
+ goto err;
+ if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
- if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
- goto err;
+ /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
+ goto err;
- p = EM;
+ p = EM;
- /* Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update
- * pointer. Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
- * be non-negative.
- */
- p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
- *p++ ^= 0x1;
- if (sLen > 0)
- {
- for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
- *p++ ^= salt[i];
- }
- if (MSBits)
- EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
+ /*
+ * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
+ * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
+ */
+ p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
+ *p++ ^= 0x1;
+ if (sLen > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
+ *p++ ^= salt[i];
+ }
+ if (MSBits)
+ EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
- /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
+ /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
- EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
+ EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
- ret = 1;
+ ret = 1;
- err:
- if (salt)
- OPENSSL_free(salt);
+ err:
+ if (salt)
+ OPENSSL_free(salt);
- return ret;
+ return ret;
- }
+}
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma optimize("",on)
+# pragma optimize("",on)
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
index f98e0a80a..e40023605 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -64,87 +64,85 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
- const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
- {
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING sig;
- int i,j,ret=1;
- unsigned char *p,*s;
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
+ RSA *rsa)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING sig;
+ int i, j, ret = 1;
+ unsigned char *p, *s;
- sig.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- sig.length=m_len;
- sig.data=(unsigned char *)m;
+ sig.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ sig.length = m_len;
+ sig.data = (unsigned char *)m;
- i=i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig,NULL);
- j=RSA_size(rsa);
- if (i > (j-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
- return(0);
- }
- s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- p=s;
- i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig,&p);
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(i,s,sigret,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
- ret=0;
- else
- *siglen=i;
+ i = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, NULL);
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ p = s;
+ i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, &p);
+ i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ *siglen = i;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s,(unsigned int)j+1);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- return(ret);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)j + 1);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ return (ret);
+}
int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
- const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- RSA *rsa)
- {
- int i,ret=0;
- unsigned char *s;
- const unsigned char *p;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig=NULL;
-
- if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- return(0);
- }
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *s;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = NULL;
- s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return (0);
+ }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- p=s;
- sig=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&p,(long)i);
- if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
- if ( ((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) ||
- (memcmp(m,sig->data,m_len) != 0))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- }
- else
- ret=1;
-err:
- if (sig != NULL) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig);
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s,(unsigned int)siglen);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+ p = s;
+ sig = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, (long)i);
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) ||
+ (memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 225bcfe2d..bc91da2c1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,273 +65,249 @@
#include "rsa_locl.h"
/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
- {
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i,j,ret=1;
- unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL;
- const unsigned char *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ X509_SIG sig;
+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+ int i, j, ret = 1;
+ unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *s = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR algor;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign)
- {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len,
- sigret, siglen, rsa);
- }
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if(type == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if(m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- return(0);
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = m;
- } else {
- sig.algor= &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- return(0);
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
- return(0);
- }
- parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter= &parameter;
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+ }
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ s = m;
+ } else {
+ sig.algor = &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
- sig.digest= &digest;
- sig.digest->data=(unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
- sig.digest->length=m_len;
+ sig.digest = &digest;
+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
- i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
- }
- j=RSA_size(rsa);
- if (i > (j-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
- return(0);
- }
- if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- tmps=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
- if (tmps == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- p=tmps;
- i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
- s=tmps;
- }
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(i,s,sigret,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
- ret=0;
- else
- *siglen=i;
+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+ }
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ tmps = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+ if (tmps == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ p = tmps;
+ i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ s = tmps;
+ }
+ i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ *siglen = i;
- if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps,(unsigned int)j+1);
- OPENSSL_free(tmps);
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmps);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
/*
* Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
- * using DER and checking encoding against original.
+ * using DER and checking encoding against original.
*/
-static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo, int dinfolen)
- {
- unsigned char *der = NULL;
- int derlen;
- int ret = 0;
- derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
- if (derlen <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
- ret = 1;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return ret;
- }
+static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo,
+ int dinfolen)
+{
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ int derlen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
+ if (derlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
+ ret = 1;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen,
- RSA *rsa)
- {
- int i,ret=0,sigtype;
- unsigned char *s;
- X509_SIG *sig=NULL;
+ unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0, sigtype;
+ unsigned char *s;
+ X509_SIG *sig = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- return(0);
- }
-
- if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm)
- {
- i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,
- sigbuf,rm,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
- return 0;
- *prm_len = i;
- return 1;
- }
+ if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return (0);
+ }
- s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) {
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,
+ sigbuf, rm, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ *prm_len = i;
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
- /* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
- * check for correct tag and length octets.
- */
- if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10)
- {
- if (rm)
- {
- memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
- *prm_len = 16;
- ret = 1;
- }
- else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else
- ret = 1;
- }
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- /* Special case: SSL signature */
- if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else ret = 1;
- } else {
- const unsigned char *p=s;
- sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
+ * tag and length octets.
+ */
+ if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) {
+ if (rm) {
+ memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
+ *prm_len = 16;
+ ret = 1;
+ } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
- if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+ /* Special case: SSL signature */
+ if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *p = s;
+ sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i);
- /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
- if(p != s+i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
- /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
- create forgeries */
- if(sig->algor->parameter
- && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+ if (p != s + i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
+ /*
+ * Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to create
+ * forgeries
+ */
+ if (sig->algor->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
- #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
- /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */
- fprintf(stderr,"in(%s) expect(%s)\n",OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
- OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
- #endif
- if (sigtype != dtype)
- {
- if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
- ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)))
- {
- /* ok, we will let it through */
+#ifdef RSA_DEBUG
+ /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */
+ fprintf(stderr, "in(%s) expect(%s)\n", OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
+ OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
+#endif
+ if (sigtype != dtype) {
+ if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
+ ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) {
+ /* ok, we will let it through */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
- fprintf(stderr,"signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
#endif
- }
- else
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
- RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (rm)
- {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
- if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
- RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- else
- {
- memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data,
- sig->digest->length);
- *prm_len = sig->digest->length;
- ret = 1;
- }
- }
- else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
- (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- }
- else
- ret=1;
- }
-err:
- if (sig != NULL) X509_SIG_free(sig);
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s,(unsigned int)siglen);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rm) {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
+ if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ else {
+ memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data, sig->digest->length);
+ *prm_len = sig->digest->length;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
+ (memcmp(m, sig->digest->data, m_len) != 0)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ X509_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- RSA *rsa)
- {
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
- if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify)
- {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len,
- sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
- }
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+ }
- return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
- }
+ return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index cfeff15bc..746e01f64 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,92 +63,87 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int i,j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen-11))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return(0);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+ if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return (0);
+ }
- /* pad out with non-zero random data */
- j=tlen-3-8-flen;
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
- if (RAND_bytes(p,j) <= 0)
- return(0);
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (*p == '\0')
- do {
- if (RAND_bytes(p,1) <= 0)
- return(0);
- } while (*p == '\0');
- p++;
- }
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
- memset(p,3,8);
- p+=8;
- *(p++)='\0';
+ /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- return(1);
- }
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ do {
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+ } while (*p == '\0');
+ p++;
+ }
-int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i,j,k;
- const unsigned char *p;
+ memset(p, 3, 8);
+ p += 8;
+ *(p++) = '\0';
- p=from;
- if (flen < 10)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
- return(-1);
- }
- if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 02))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
- return(-1);
- }
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+ int i, j, k;
+ const unsigned char *p;
- /* scan over padding data */
- j=flen-1; /* one for type */
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- if (*(p++) == 0) break;
+ p = from;
+ if (flen < 10) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
+ return (-1);
+ }
- if ((i == j) || (i < 8))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
- return(-1);
- }
- for (k = -9; k<-1; k++)
- {
- if (p[k] != 0x03) break;
- }
- if (k == -1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
- return(-1);
- }
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ j = flen - 1; /* one for type */
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
+ if (*(p++) == 0)
+ break;
- i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
- j-=i;
- if (j > tlen)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- return(-1);
- }
- memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j);
+ if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
+ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
+ if (p[k] != 0x03)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (k == -1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
+ return (-1);
+ }
- return(j);
- }
+ i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
+ j -= i;
+ if (j > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+ return (j);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
index c8705a0f6..e9712953e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
printf("No RSA support\n");
- return(0);
+ return (0);
}
#else
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#define SetKey \
+# define SetKey \
key->n = BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, key->n); \
key->e = BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, key->e); \
key->d = BN_bin2bn(d, sizeof(d)-1, key->d); \
@@ -31,185 +31,186 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
return (sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1);
static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
- {
+{
static unsigned char n[] =
-"\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
-"\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
-"\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
-"\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
-"\xF5";
+ "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
+ "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
+ "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
+ "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
+ "\xF5";
static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
static unsigned char d[] =
-"\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
-"\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
-"\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
-"\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
+ "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
+ "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
+ "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
+ "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
static unsigned char p[] =
-"\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
-"\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
-"\x0D";
-
+ "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+ "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
+ "\x0D";
+
static unsigned char q[] =
-"\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
-"\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
-"\x89";
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+ "\x89";
static unsigned char dmp1[] =
-"\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
-"\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
+ "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
+ "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
static unsigned char dmq1[] =
-"\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
-"\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
-"\x51";
+ "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
+ "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
+ "\x51";
static unsigned char iqmp[] =
-"\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
-"\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
+ "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
+ "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
-"\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89"
-"\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52"
-"\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44"
-"\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2";
+ "\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89"
+ "\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52"
+ "\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44"
+ "\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2";
SetKey;
- }
+}
static int key2(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
- {
+{
static unsigned char n[] =
-"\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8"
-"\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26"
-"\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8"
-"\x34\x77\xCF";
+ "\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8"
+ "\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26"
+ "\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8"
+ "\x34\x77\xCF";
static unsigned char e[] = "\x3";
static unsigned char d[] =
-"\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2"
-"\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41"
-"\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21"
-"\xE5\xEB";
+ "\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2"
+ "\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41"
+ "\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21"
+ "\xE5\xEB";
static unsigned char p[] =
-"\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92"
-"\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91";
+ "\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92"
+ "\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91";
static unsigned char q[] =
-"\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
-"\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F";
-
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F";
+
static unsigned char dmp1[] =
-"\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61"
-"\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B";
+ "\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61"
+ "\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B";
static unsigned char dmq1[] =
-"\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90"
-"\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F";
+ "\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90"
+ "\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F";
static unsigned char iqmp[] =
-"\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13"
-"\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D";
+ "\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13"
+ "\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D";
static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
-"\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a"
-"\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4"
-"\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52"
-"\x62\x51";
+ "\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a"
+ "\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4"
+ "\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52"
+ "\x62\x51";
SetKey;
- }
+}
static int key3(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
- {
+{
static unsigned char n[] =
-"\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
-"\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
-"\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD"
-"\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80"
-"\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25"
-"\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39"
-"\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68"
-"\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD"
-"\xCB";
+ "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
+ "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
+ "\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD"
+ "\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80"
+ "\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25"
+ "\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39"
+ "\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68"
+ "\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD"
+ "\xCB";
static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
static unsigned char d[] =
-"\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD"
-"\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41"
-"\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69"
-"\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA"
-"\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94"
-"\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A"
-"\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94"
-"\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3"
-"\xC1";
+ "\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD"
+ "\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41"
+ "\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69"
+ "\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA"
+ "\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94"
+ "\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A"
+ "\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94"
+ "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3"
+ "\xC1";
static unsigned char p[] =
-"\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60"
-"\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6"
-"\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A"
-"\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65"
-"\x99";
+ "\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60"
+ "\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6"
+ "\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A"
+ "\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65"
+ "\x99";
static unsigned char q[] =
-"\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
-"\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
-"\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
-"\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15"
-"\x03";
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+ "\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+ "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15"
+ "\x03";
static unsigned char dmp1[] =
-"\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A"
-"\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E"
-"\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E"
-"\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81";
+ "\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A"
+ "\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E"
+ "\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E"
+ "\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81";
static unsigned char dmq1[] =
-"\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9"
-"\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7"
-"\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D"
-"\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D";
-
+ "\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9"
+ "\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7"
+ "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D"
+ "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D";
+
static unsigned char iqmp[] =
-"\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23"
-"\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11"
-"\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
-"\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39"
-"\xF7";
+ "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23"
+ "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11"
+ "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
+ "\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39"
+ "\xF7";
static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
-"\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7"
-"\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce"
-"\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3"
-"\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06"
-"\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86"
-"\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4"
-"\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a"
-"\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1";
+ "\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7"
+ "\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce"
+ "\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3"
+ "\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06"
+ "\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86"
+ "\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4"
+ "\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a"
+ "\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1";
SetKey;
- }
+}
static int pad_unknown(void)
{
unsigned long l;
while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
- if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)
- return(1);
- return(0);
+ if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
}
-static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- int err=0;
+{
+ int err = 0;
int v;
RSA *key;
unsigned char ptext[256];
@@ -229,112 +230,102 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
- for (v = 0; v < 6; v++)
- {
- key = RSA_new();
- switch (v%3) {
- case 0:
- clen = key1(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- case 1:
- clen = key2(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- case 2:
- clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- }
- if (v/3 >= 1) key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
-
- num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (num != clen)
- {
- printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n");
- err=1;
- goto oaep;
- }
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0)
- {
- printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n");
- err=1;
- }
- else
- printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n");
-
- oaep:
- ERR_clear_error();
- num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num == -1 && pad_unknown())
- {
- printf("No OAEP support\n");
- goto next;
- }
- if (num != clen)
- {
- printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n");
- err=1;
- goto next;
- }
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0)
- {
- printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n");
- err=1;
- }
- else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0)
- printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v);
-
- /* Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT).
- Try decrypting ctext_ex */
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
-
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0)
- {
- printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n");
- err=1;
- }
- else
- printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
-
- /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
- for(n = 0 ; n < clen ; ++n)
- {
- int b;
- unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
- for(b = 0 ; b < 256 ; ++b)
- {
- if(b == saved)
- continue;
- ctext[n] = b;
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if(num > 0)
- {
- printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
- err = 1;
- }
- }
- }
- next:
- RSA_free(key);
- }
+ for (v = 0; v < 6; v++) {
+ key = RSA_new();
+ switch (v % 3) {
+ case 0:
+ clen = key1(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ clen = key2(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (v / 3 >= 1)
+ key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
+
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (num != clen) {
+ printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ goto oaep;
+ }
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else
+ printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+ oaep:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) {
+ printf("No OAEP support\n");
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if (num != clen) {
+ printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0)
+ printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v);
+
+ /*
+ * Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT). Try
+ * decrypting ctext_ex
+ */
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else
+ printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+ /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
+ for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
+ int b;
+ unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
+ for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) {
+ if (b == saved)
+ continue;
+ ctext[n] = b;
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ next:
+ RSA_free(key);
+ }
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
- if (err) printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
-#endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+ if (err)
+ printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
+# endif
return err;
- }
+}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
index 21548e37e..725ead049 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* rsa_x931.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2005.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -64,114 +65,103 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
- int j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- /* Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding
- * nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'.
- */
-
- j = tlen - flen - 2;
-
- if (j < 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)to;
-
- /* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
- if (j == 0)
- *p++ = 0x6A;
- else
- {
- *p++ = 0x6B;
- if (j > 1)
- {
- memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
- p += j - 1;
- }
- *p++ = 0xBA;
- }
- memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen);
- p += flen;
- *p = 0xCC;
- return(1);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ /*
+ * Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding
+ * nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'.
+ */
+
+ j = tlen - flen - 2;
+
+ if (j < 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ /* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
+ if (j == 0)
+ *p++ = 0x6A;
+ else {
+ *p++ = 0x6B;
+ if (j > 1) {
+ memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
+ p += j - 1;
+ }
+ *p++ = 0xBA;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ p += flen;
+ *p = 0xCC;
+ return (1);
+}
int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
- {
- int i = 0,j;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- p=from;
- if ((num != flen) || ((*p != 0x6A) && (*p != 0x6B)))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931,RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (*p++ == 0x6B)
- {
- j=flen-3;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
- {
- unsigned char c = *p++;
- if (c == 0xBA)
- break;
- if (c != 0xBB)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931,
- RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- j -= i;
-
- if (i == 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- }
- else j = flen - 2;
-
- if (p[j] != 0xCC)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
- return -1;
- }
-
- memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j);
-
- return(j);
- }
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
+{
+ int i = 0, j;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = from;
+ if ((num != flen) || ((*p != 0x6A) && (*p != 0x6B))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (*p++ == 0x6B) {
+ j = flen - 3;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ unsigned char c = *p++;
+ if (c == 0xBA)
+ break;
+ if (c != 0xBB) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ j -= i;
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ } else
+ j = flen - 2;
+
+ if (p[j] != 0xCC) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+ return (j);
+}
/* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */
int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid)
- {
- switch (nid)
- {
- case NID_sha1:
- return 0x33;
+{
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_sha1:
+ return 0x33;
- case NID_sha256:
- return 0x34;
+ case NID_sha256:
+ return 0x34;
- case NID_sha384:
- return 0x36;
+ case NID_sha384:
+ return 0x36;
- case NID_sha512:
- return 0x35;
-
- }
- return -1;
- }
+ case NID_sha512:
+ return 0x35;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
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