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-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c226
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c3
6 files changed, 161 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
index 72c82278f..af3c25514 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index a910636f8..8415d1d8b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a)
{
+ if (!a)
+ return;
if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) {
X509_free(a->data.x509);
} else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 136bfbda6..16db4c025 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -151,11 +151,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
+ X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth, i, ok = 0;
- int num;
+ int num, j, retry;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
@@ -224,85 +224,118 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
break;
}
+ /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+ j = num;
/*
* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
* We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
* complain.
*/
- /*
- * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
- */
-
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
- /* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
- /*
- * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
- * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
- * impersonation.
- */
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
- if (ok == 1)
- X509_free(xtmp);
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+ */
+ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
+ /* we have a self signed certificate */
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+ * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+ * possible impersonation.
+ */
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+ if (ok == 1)
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ bad_chain = 1;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We have a match: replace certificate with store
+ * version so we get any trust settings.
+ */
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = xtmp;
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ }
} else {
/*
- * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
- * we get any trust settings.
+ * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
*/
- X509_free(x);
- x = xtmp;
- (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
- ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ num--;
+ j--;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
}
- } else {
- /*
- * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
- */
- chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- ctx->last_untrusted--;
- num--;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
}
- }
-
- /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
- for (;;) {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num)
- break;
-
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
- break;
-
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth < num)
+ break;
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+ break;
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ return ok;
+ if (ok == 0)
+ break;
+ x = xtmp;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
- if (ok < 0)
- return ok;
- if (ok == 0)
- break;
+ /*
+ * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
+ * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
+ * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
+ */
+ retry = 0;
+ if (j == ctx->last_untrusted &&
+ !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+ while (j-- > 1) {
+ xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+ */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
- x = xtmp;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+ * alternate chain
+ */
+ while (num > j) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ num--;
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ }
+ retry = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
- num++;
- }
-
- /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+ } while (retry);
/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
@@ -1604,47 +1637,84 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, remaining;
p = buff1;
- i = ctm->length;
+ remaining = ctm->length;
str = (char *)ctm->data;
+ /*
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ */
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 10);
p += 10;
str += 10;
+ remaining -= 10;
} else {
- if (i < 13)
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 12);
p += 12;
str += 12;
+ remaining -= 12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
*(p++) = '0';
*(p++) = '0';
} else {
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
*(p++) = *(str++);
*(p++) = *(str++);
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
- if (*str == '.') {
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /*
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
+ */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.') {
str++;
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
- str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
}
}
*(p++) = 'Z';
*(p++) = '\0';
- if (*str == 'Z')
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
+ if (*str == 'Z') {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
offset = 0;
- else {
+ } else {
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
if (*str == '-')
@@ -1921,6 +1991,8 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index 1f8c0eccb..aacdf55aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
# define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS 0x2000
/* Check selfsigned CA signature */
# define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000
+/*
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting
+ * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
+ */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000
# define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1
# define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index d0543662c..6b0bf8a6e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
+ if (param == NULL)
+ return;
x509_verify_param_zero(param);
OPENSSL_free(param);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
index 033175257..9219f753b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
@@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ int X509_certificate_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
}
}
- /* /8 because it's 1024 bits we look for, not bytes */
- if (EVP_PKEY_size(pk) <= 1024 / 8)
- ret |= EVP_PKT_EXP;
if (pkey == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
return (ret);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-21 18:56:05 +0000