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-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c1155
1 files changed, 1155 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49c6760d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1155 @@
+/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
+
+static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return(DTLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ dtls1_connect,
+ dtls1_get_client_method)
+
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL),l;
+ long num1;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+
+ /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ ret=dtls1_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ }
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->state=DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* at this point we check that we have the
+ * required stuff from the server */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
+ * sent back */
+ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
+ * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth=
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset (s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ /* number of bytes to be flushed */
+ num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
+ if (num1 > 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
+ * remove the buffering now */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret=1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func=dtls1_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ /* done with handshaking */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned int i,j;
+ unsigned long Time,l;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+ (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+ (s->session->not_resumable))
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p=s->s3->client_random;
+ /* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+ * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
+ for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
+ if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
+ {
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
+ }
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+ s->client_version=s->version;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i=0;
+ else
+ i=s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++)=i;
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
+ p+=i;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+ j=0;
+ else
+ j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++)=1+j;
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+ *(p++)=comp->id;
+ }
+ *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int n, al, ok = 0;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((data[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (data[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|data[1];
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ data+=2;
+
+ cookie_len = *(data++);
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long l;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+ (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q=p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p+=2;
+ n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
+#endif
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s2n(n,q);
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ l, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
+#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p+= enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length)
+ {
+ s2n(authp->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p+= authp->length;
+ n+= authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ ** kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
+ kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > sizeof epms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl,p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p+=outl;
+ n+=outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
+
+ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,p,n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p,0,n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n,p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
+ n+=2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+ /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
+ }
+#endif
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+ /*
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+ l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+ */
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned u=0;
+#endif
+ unsigned long n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n) ;
+
+ s->init_num=(int)n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
+ {
+ /* If we get an error, we need to
+ * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
+ * We then get retied later */
+ i=0;
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+ i=0;
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ i=0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+