diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5360 |
1 files changed, 2675 insertions, 2685 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 4a62b4a79..dead12618 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c - * \brief Version independent SSL functions. +/* + * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions. */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. @@ -7,21 +7,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ */ #ifdef REF_CHECK -# include <assert.h> +# include <assert.h> #endif #include <stdio.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" @@ -154,1365 +154,1358 @@ #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/ocsp.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include <openssl/dh.h> +# include <openssl/dh.h> #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include <openssl/engine.h> +# include <openssl/engine.h> #endif -const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ - /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ - (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, - 0, /* finish_mac_length */ - (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, - NULL, /* client_finished_label */ - 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ - NULL, /* server_finished_label */ - 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ - (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, - size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, - int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function, - }; +const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; + +SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { + /* + * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library + * bug + */ + (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) + ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) + ssl_undefined_function, + 0, /* finish_mac_length */ + (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, + NULL, /* client_finished_label */ + 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ + NULL, /* server_finished_label */ + 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ + (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, + int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, +}; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) - { - - if (s->method == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); - return(0); - } - - if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) - { - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session=NULL; - } - - s->error=0; - s->hit=0; - s->shutdown=0; - -#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not - * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ - /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep - * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ - if (s->renegotiate) return(1); +{ + + if (s->method == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); + return (0); + } + + if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + } + + s->error = 0; + s->hit = 0; + s->shutdown = 0; + +#if 0 + /* + * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not + * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) + */ + /* + * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep + * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) + */ + if (s->renegotiate) + return (1); #else - if (s->renegotiate) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } + if (s->renegotiate) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } #endif - s->type=0; + s->type = 0; - s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); + s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT); - s->version=s->method->version; - s->client_version=s->version; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; + s->version = s->method->version; + s->client_version = s->version; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; #if 0 - s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; + s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead; #endif - if (s->init_buf != NULL) - { - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf=NULL; - } + if (s->init_buf != NULL) { + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); - s->first_packet=0; + s->first_packet = 0; #if 1 - /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if - * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ - if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) - { - s->method->ssl_free(s); - s->method=s->ctx->method; - if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) - return(0); - } - else + /* + * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert + * back if we are not doing session-id reuse. + */ + if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) + && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { + s->method->ssl_free(s); + s->method = s->ctx->method; + if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) + return (0); + } else #endif - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return(1); - } + s->method->ssl_clear(s); + return (1); +} /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ -int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth) - { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - - ctx->method=meth; - - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list), - &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), - meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); - return(0); - } - return(1); - } +int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + ctx->method = meth; + + sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), + &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), + meth->version == + SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : + SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, + SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + return (0); + } + return (1); +} SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - SSL *s; - - if (ctx == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); - return(NULL); - } - if (ctx->method == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); - return(NULL); - } - - s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); - if (s == NULL) goto err; - memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - - s->options=ctx->options; - s->mode=ctx->mode; - s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; - - if (ctx->cert != NULL) - { - /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to - * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new - * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be - * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX - * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly - * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they - * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). - * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having - * duplicated it once. */ - - s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); - if (s->cert == NULL) - goto err; - } - else - s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ - - s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; - s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; - s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; - s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; +{ + SSL *s; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); + return (NULL); + } + if (ctx->method == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); + return (NULL); + } + + s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); + if (s == NULL) + goto err; + memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL)); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + s->options = ctx->options; + s->mode = ctx->mode; + s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; + + if (ctx->cert != NULL) { + /* + * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not + * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL + * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to + * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were + * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they + * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the + * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. + */ + + s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + if (s->cert == NULL) + goto err; + } else + s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ + + s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead; + s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; + s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; + s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; #if 0 - s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; + s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth; #endif - s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; - OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); - memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); - s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; - s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; - - s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); - if (!s->param) - goto err; - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); + s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; + OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); + memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); + s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; + s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; + + s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!s->param) + goto err; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); #if 0 - s->purpose = ctx->purpose; - s->trust = ctx->trust; + s->purpose = ctx->purpose; + s->trust = ctx->trust; #endif - s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; - s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; + s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; + s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s->ctx=ctx; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->ctx = ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; - s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s->initial_ctx=ctx; + s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; + s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->initial_ctx = ctx; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; + s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; # endif #endif - s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; + s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; - s->method=ctx->method; + s->method = ctx->method; - if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) - goto err; + if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) + goto err; - s->references=1; - s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; + s->references = 1; + s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; - SSL_clear(s); + SSL_clear(s); - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback; - s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback; + s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; + s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; #endif - return(s); -err: - if (s != NULL) - SSL_free(s); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return(NULL); - } + return (s); + err: + if (s != NULL) + SSL_free(s); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); +} -int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, - unsigned int sid_ctx_len) - { - if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); - return 0; - } - ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; - memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); +int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) +{ + if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; + memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; - } +} -int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, - unsigned int sid_ctx_len) - { - if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); - return 0; - } - ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; - memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); +int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) +{ + if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; + memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; - } +} int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) - { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - ctx->generate_session_id = cb; - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - return 1; - } +{ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ctx->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return 1; +} int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) - { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); - ssl->generate_session_id = cb; - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); - return 1; - } +{ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + ssl->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + return 1; +} int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, - unsigned int id_len) - { - /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how - * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to - * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with - * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in - * use by this SSL. */ - SSL_SESSION r, *p; - - if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) - return 0; - - r.ssl_version = ssl->version; - r.session_id_length = id_len; - memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); - /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a - * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it - * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be - * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ - if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && - (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) - { - memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, - SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); - r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; - } - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - return (p != NULL); - } + unsigned int id_len) +{ + /* + * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how + * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to + * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with + * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use + * by this SSL. + */ + SSL_SESSION r, *p; + + if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) + return 0; + + r.ssl_version = ssl->version; + r.session_id_length = id_len; + memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); + /* + * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a + * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it + * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be + * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. + */ + if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && + (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { + memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); + r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return (p != NULL); +} int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); +} int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); +} int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); +} int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); +} int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); +} int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); +} void SSL_free(SSL *s) - { - int i; +{ + int i; - if(s == NULL) - return; + if (s == NULL) + return; - i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("SSL",s); + REF_PRINT("SSL", s); #endif - if (i > 0) return; + if (i > 0) + return; #ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) - { - fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); /* ok */ - } + if (i < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } #endif - if (s->param) - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); - - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); - - if (s->bbio != NULL) - { - /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) - { - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); - } - BIO_free(s->bbio); - s->bbio=NULL; - } - if (s->rbio != NULL) - BIO_free_all(s->rbio); - if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) - BIO_free_all(s->wbio); - - if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - - /* add extra stuff */ - if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); - - /* Make the next call work :-) */ - if (s->session != NULL) - { - ssl_clear_bad_session(s); - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - } - - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); - - if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); - /* Free up if allocated */ + if (s->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); + + if (s->bbio != NULL) { + /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { + s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); + } + BIO_free(s->bbio); + s->bbio = NULL; + } + if (s->rbio != NULL) + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + + if (s->init_buf != NULL) + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + + /* add extra stuff */ + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); + + /* Make the next call work :-) */ + if (s->session != NULL) { + ssl_clear_bad_session(s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + } + + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); + + if (s->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(s->cert); + /* Free up if allocated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_hostname) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) - sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + if (s->tlsext_hostname) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (s->initial_ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); #endif - if (s->client_CA != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); + if (s->client_CA != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); - if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); + if (s->method != NULL) + s->method->ssl_free(s); - if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); + if (s->ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) - kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) + kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - if (s->next_proto_negotiated) - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); + if (s->next_proto_negotiated) + OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (s->srtp_profiles) - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); + if (s->srtp_profiles) + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif - OPENSSL_free(s); - } - -void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) - { - /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it - */ - if (s->bbio != NULL) - { - if (s->wbio == s->bbio) - { - s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; - s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; - } - } - if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) - BIO_free_all(s->rbio); - if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) - BIO_free_all(s->wbio); - s->rbio=rbio; - s->wbio=wbio; - } + OPENSSL_free(s); +} + +void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) +{ + /* + * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it + */ + if (s->bbio != NULL) { + if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { + s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; + s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; + } + } + if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + s->rbio = rbio; + s->wbio = wbio; +} BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) - { return(s->rbio); } +{ + return (s->rbio); +} BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) - { return(s->wbio); } +{ + return (s->wbio); +} int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) - { - return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); - } +{ + return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); +} int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) - { - int ret= -1; - BIO *b,*r; - - b=SSL_get_rbio(s); - r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); - if (r != NULL) - BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); - return(ret); - } +{ + int ret = -1; + BIO *b, *r; + + b = SSL_get_rbio(s); + r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); + return (ret); +} int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) - { - int ret= -1; - BIO *b,*r; - - b=SSL_get_wbio(s); - r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); - if (r != NULL) - BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); - return(ret); - } +{ + int ret = -1; + BIO *b, *r; + + b = SSL_get_wbio(s); + r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); + return (ret); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK -int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) - { - int ret=0; - BIO *bio=NULL; - - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); - - if (bio == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); - SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); - ret=1; -err: - return(ret); - } - -int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) - { - int ret=0; - BIO *bio=NULL; - - if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) - { - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); - - if (bio == NULL) - { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); - } - else - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); - ret=1; -err: - return(ret); - } - -int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) - { - int ret=0; - BIO *bio=NULL; - - if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) - { - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); - - if (bio == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); - SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); - } - else - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); - ret=1; -err: - return(ret); - } -#endif +int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) +{ + int ret = 0; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); + ret = 1; + err: + return (ret); +} +int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) +{ + int ret = 0; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) + || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { + bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); + } else + SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); + ret = 1; + err: + return (ret); +} + +int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) +{ + int ret = 0; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) + || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { + bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); + } else + SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); + ret = 1; + err: + return (ret); +} +#endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) - { - size_t ret = 0; - - if (s->s3 != NULL) - { - ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; - if (count > ret) - count = ret; - memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); - } - return ret; - } +{ + size_t ret = 0; + + if (s->s3 != NULL) { + ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); + } + return ret; +} /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) - { - size_t ret = 0; - - if (s->s3 != NULL) - { - ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; - if (count > ret) - count = ret; - memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); - } - return ret; - } +{ + size_t ret = 0; + if (s->s3 != NULL) { + ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); + } + return ret; +} int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->verify_mode); - } +{ + return (s->verify_mode); +} int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); +} -int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) - { - return(s->verify_callback); - } +int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { + return (s->verify_callback); +} int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return(ctx->verify_mode); - } +{ + return (ctx->verify_mode); +} int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); - } - -int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) - { - return(ctx->default_verify_callback); - } - -void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, - int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) - { - s->verify_mode=mode; - if (callback != NULL) - s->verify_callback=callback; - } - -void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) - { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); - } - -void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) - { - s->read_ahead=yes; - } +{ + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); +} + +int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { + return (ctx->default_verify_callback); +} + +void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, + int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) +{ + s->verify_mode = mode; + if (callback != NULL) + s->verify_callback = callback; +} + +void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) +{ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); +} + +void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) +{ + s->read_ahead = yes; +} int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->read_ahead); - } +{ + return (s->read_ahead); +} int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) - { - /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled - * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), - * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report - * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. - * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, - * so we'd better not return -1.) - */ - return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); - } +{ + /* + * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled + * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is + * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be + * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is + * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) + */ + return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); +} X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) - { - X509 *r; - - if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) - r=NULL; - else - r=s->session->peer; +{ + X509 *r; - if (r == NULL) return(r); + if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) + r = NULL; + else + r = s->session->peer; - CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + if (r == NULL) + return (r); - return(r); - } + CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + + return (r); +} STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) - { - STACK_OF(X509) *r; - - if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) - r=NULL; - else - r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; - - /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own - * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ - - return(r); - } - -/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to - * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ -void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f) - { - CERT *tmp; - - /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ - SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f)); - - /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or - * vice-versa */ - if (t->method != f->method) - { - t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ - t->method=f->method; /* change method */ - t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ - } - - tmp=t->cert; - if (f->cert != NULL) - { - CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); - t->cert=f->cert; - } - else - t->cert=NULL; - if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); - SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length); - } +{ + STACK_OF(X509) *r; + + if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) + || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) + r = NULL; + else + r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; + + /* + * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if + * we are a server, it does not. + */ + + return (r); +} + +/* + * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to + * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled + */ +void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) +{ + CERT *tmp; + + /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ + SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f)); + + /* + * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa + */ + if (t->method != f->method) { + t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ + t->method = f->method; /* change method */ + t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ + } + + tmp = t->cert; + if (f->cert != NULL) { + CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); + t->cert = f->cert; + } else + t->cert = NULL; + if (tmp != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(tmp); + SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length); +} /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - if ( (ctx == NULL) || - (ctx->cert == NULL) || - (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); - return(0); - } - if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); - return(0); - } - return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); - } +{ + if ((ctx == NULL) || + (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return (0); + } + if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, + SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + return (0); + } + return (X509_check_private_key + (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); +} /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) - { - if (ssl == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return(0); - } - if (ssl->cert == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); - return 0; - } - if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); - return(0); - } - if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); - return(0); - } - return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, - ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); - } +{ + if (ssl == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + if (ssl->cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return 0; + } + if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return (0); + } + if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + return (0); + } + return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, + ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); +} int SSL_accept(SSL *s) - { - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - /* Not properly initialized yet */ - SSL_set_accept_state(s); +{ + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_accept_state(s); - return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); - } + return (s->method->ssl_accept(s)); +} int SSL_connect(SSL *s) - { - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - /* Not properly initialized yet */ - SSL_set_connect_state(s); +{ + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_connect_state(s); - return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); - } + return (s->method->ssl_connect(s)); +} long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->method->get_timeout()); - } - -int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) - { - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(0); - } - return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); - } - -int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) - { - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) - { - return(0); - } - return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); - } - -int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) - { - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); - return(-1); - } - return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); - } +{ + return (s->method->get_timeout()); +} + +int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) +{ + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return (0); + } + return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num)); +} + +int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) +{ + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + return (0); + } + return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num)); +} + +int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) +{ + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); + return (-1); + } + return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num)); +} int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) - { - /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might - * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), - * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, - * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). - */ - - if (s->handshake_func == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); - return -1; - } - - if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) - return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); - else - return(1); - } +{ + /* + * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might + * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but + * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used + * (see ssl3_shutdown). + */ + + if (s->handshake_func == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) + return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); + else + return (1); +} int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) - { - if (s->renegotiate == 0) - s->renegotiate=1; +{ + if (s->renegotiate == 0) + s->renegotiate = 1; - s->new_session=1; + s->new_session = 1; - return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); - } + return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); +} int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) - { - if (s->renegotiate == 0) - s->renegotiate=1; +{ + if (s->renegotiate == 0) + s->renegotiate = 1; - s->new_session=0; + s->new_session = 0; - return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); - } + return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); +} int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) - { - /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; - * false again once a handshake has finished */ - return (s->renegotiate != 0); - } - -long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) - { - long l; - - switch (cmd) - { - case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: - return(s->read_ahead); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: - l=s->read_ahead; - s->read_ahead=larg; - return(l); - - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: - s->msg_callback_arg = parg; - return 1; - - case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: - return(s->options|=larg); - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: - return(s->options&=~larg); - case SSL_CTRL_MODE: - return(s->mode|=larg); - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: - return(s->mode &=~larg); - case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - return(s->max_cert_list); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - l=s->max_cert_list; - s->max_cert_list=larg; - return(l); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: - if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) - return 0; - s->max_send_fragment = larg; - return 1; - case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: - if (s->s3) - return s->s3->send_connection_binding; - else return 0; - default: - return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); - } - } - -long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) - { - switch(cmd) - { - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: - s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); - return 1; - - default: - return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); - } - } +{ + /* + * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a + * handshake has finished + */ + return (s->renegotiate != 0); +} + +long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) +{ + long l; + + switch (cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: + return (s->read_ahead); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: + l = s->read_ahead; + s->read_ahead = larg; + return (l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + s->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: + return (s->options |= larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: + return (s->options &= ~larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return (s->mode |= larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: + return (s->mode &= ~larg); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return (s->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l = s->max_cert_list; + s->max_cert_list = larg; + return (l); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: + if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + s->max_send_fragment = larg; + return 1; + case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: + if (s->s3) + return s->s3->send_connection_binding; + else + return 0; + default: + return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); + } +} + +long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + s->msg_callback = (void (*) + (int write_p, int version, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, + void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); + } +} LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return ctx->sessions; - } - -long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) - { - long l; - - switch (cmd) - { - case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: - return(ctx->read_ahead); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: - l=ctx->read_ahead; - ctx->read_ahead=larg; - return(l); - - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: - ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; - return 1; - - case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - return(ctx->max_cert_list); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - l=ctx->max_cert_list; - ctx->max_cert_list=larg; - return(l); - - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: - l=ctx->session_cache_size; - ctx->session_cache_size=larg; - return(l); - case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: - return(ctx->session_cache_size); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: - l=ctx->session_cache_mode; - ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; - return(l); - case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: - return(ctx->session_cache_mode); - - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: - return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: - return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: - return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: - return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: - return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: - return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); - case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: - return(ctx->options|=larg); - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: - return(ctx->options&=~larg); - case SSL_CTRL_MODE: - return(ctx->mode|=larg); - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: - return(ctx->mode&=~larg); - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: - if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) - return 0; - ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; - return 1; - default: - return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); - } - } - -long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) - { - switch(cmd) - { - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: - ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); - return 1; - - default: - return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); - } - } +{ + return ctx->sessions; +} + +long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) +{ + long l; + + switch (cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: + return (ctx->read_ahead); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: + l = ctx->read_ahead; + ctx->read_ahead = larg; + return (l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return (ctx->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l = ctx->max_cert_list; + ctx->max_cert_list = larg; + return (l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: + l = ctx->session_cache_size; + ctx->session_cache_size = larg; + return (l); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: + return (ctx->session_cache_size); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: + l = ctx->session_cache_mode; + ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; + return (l); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: + return (ctx->session_cache_mode); + + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: + return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: + return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: + return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: + return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: + return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: + return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: + return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: + return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: + return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: + return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: + return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: + return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: + return (ctx->options |= larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: + return (ctx->options &= ~larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return (ctx->mode |= larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: + return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: + if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; + return 1; + default: + return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); + } +} + +long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) + (int write_p, int version, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, + void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); + } +} int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) - { - long l; - - l=a->id-b->id; - if (l == 0L) - return(0); - else - return((l > 0)?1:-1); - } - -int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, - const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) - { - long l; - - l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id; - if (l == 0L) - return(0); - else - return((l > 0)?1:-1); - } +{ + long l; + + l = a->id - b->id; + if (l == 0L) + return (0); + else + return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); +} + +int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, + const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) +{ + long l; + + l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id; + if (l == 0L) + return (0); + else + return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); +} /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) - { - if (s != NULL) - { - if (s->cipher_list != NULL) - { - return(s->cipher_list); - } - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) - { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list); - } - } - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s != NULL) { + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { + return (s->cipher_list); + } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { + return (s->ctx->cipher_list); + } + } + return (NULL); +} /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) - { - if (s != NULL) - { - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) - { - return(s->cipher_list_by_id); - } - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) - { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); - } - } - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s != NULL) { + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { + return (s->cipher_list_by_id); + } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { + return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + } + } + return (NULL); +} /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ -const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n) - { - SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - - if (s == NULL) return(NULL); - sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s); - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) - return(NULL); - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n); - if (c == NULL) return(NULL); - return(c->name); - } +const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) +{ + SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + if (s == NULL) + return (NULL); + sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) + return (NULL); + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); + if (c == NULL) + return (NULL); + return (c->name); +} /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) - { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, - &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str); - /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it - * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string - * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which - * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as - * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence - * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been - * updated. */ - if (sk == NULL) - return 0; - else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); - return 0; - } - return 1; - } +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, + &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str); + /* + * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to + * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule + * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an + * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence + * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. + */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ -int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) - { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, - &s->cipher_list_by_id,str); - /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ - if (sk == NULL) - return 0; - else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); - return 0; - } - return 1; - } +int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, + &s->cipher_list_by_id, str); + /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ -char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) - { - char *p; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - SSL_CIPHER *c; - int i; - - if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || - (len < 2)) - return(NULL); - - p=buf; - sk=s->session->ciphers; - - if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) - return NULL; - - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) - { - int n; - - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); - n=strlen(c->name); - if (n+1 > len) - { - if (p != buf) - --p; - *p='\0'; - return buf; - } - strcpy(p,c->name); - p+=n; - *(p++)=':'; - len-=n+1; - } - p[-1]='\0'; - return(buf); - } - -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, - int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) - { - int i,j=0; - SSL_CIPHER *c; - unsigned char *q; +char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) +{ + char *p; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + SSL_CIPHER *c; + int i; + + if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) + return (NULL); + + p = buf; + sk = s->session->ciphers; + + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + return NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { + int n; + + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + n = strlen(c->name); + if (n + 1 > len) { + if (p != buf) + --p; + *p = '\0'; + return buf; + } + strcpy(p, c->name); + p += n; + *(p++) = ':'; + len -= n + 1; + } + p[-1] = '\0'; + return (buf); +} + +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, + unsigned char *p, + int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, + unsigned char *)) +{ + int i, j = 0; + SSL_CIPHER *c; + unsigned char *q; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - - if (sk == NULL) return(0); - q=p; - if (put_cb == NULL) - put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; - - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) - { - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); - /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && - (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) - continue; + int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + if (sk == NULL) + return (0); + q = p; + if (put_cb == NULL) + put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */ + if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && + (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) + continue; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && - nokrb5) - continue; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) + || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) && - s->psk_client_callback == NULL) - continue; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) + && s->psk_client_callback == NULL) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) && - !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) - continue; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ - j = put_cb(c,p); - p+=j; - } - /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. - * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */ - if (p != q) - { - if (!s->renegotiate) - { - static SSL_CIPHER scsv = - { - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 - }; - j = put_cb(&scsv,p); - p+=j; + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) + && !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ + j = put_cb(c, p); + p += j; + } + /* + * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add + * applicable SCSVs. + */ + if (p != q) { + if (!s->renegotiate) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = put_cb(&scsv, p); + p += j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif - } - - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) - { - static SSL_CIPHER scsv = - { - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 - }; - j = put_cb(&scsv,p); - p+=j; - } - } - - return(p-q); - } - -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) - { - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - int i,n; - - if (s->s3) - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; - - n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); - if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); - return(NULL); - } - if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) - sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ - else - { - sk= *skp; - sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); - } - - for (i=0; i<num; i+=n) - { - /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ - if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && - (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) - { - /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; - p += n; + } + + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = put_cb(&scsv, p); + p += j; + } + } + + return (p - q); +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + int num, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + int i, n; + + if (s->s3) + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; + + n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); + if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); + return (NULL); + } + if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) + sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ + else { + sk = *skp; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); + } + + for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) { + /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ + if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && + (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && + (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { + /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ + if (s->renegotiate) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + p += n; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); #endif - continue; - } - - /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && - (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) - { - /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version. - * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */ - if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - if (s->s3) - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - goto err; - } - p += n; - continue; - } - - c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); - p+=n; - if (c != NULL) - { - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - } - - if (skp != NULL) - *skp=sk; - return(sk); -err: - if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); - return(NULL); - } + continue; + } + + /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && + (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && + (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { + /* + * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher + * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected + * downgrade. + */ + if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + if (s->s3) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + goto err; + } + p += n; + continue; + } + + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p); + p += n; + if (c != NULL) { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + } + if (skp != NULL) + *skp = sk; + return (sk); + err: + if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); + return (NULL); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. @@ -1520,1619 +1513,1590 @@ err: */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) - { - if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) - return NULL; +{ + if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + return NULL; - return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? - s->session->tlsext_hostname : - s->tlsext_hostname; - } + return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? + s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; +} int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) - { - if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) - return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - return -1; - } +{ + if (s->session + && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> + tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) + return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + return -1; +} # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is +/* + * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by - * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. - * - * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte - * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte - * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. - * - * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: - * - * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the - * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection - * or have a default application level protocol. - * - * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the - * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the - * API that this fallback case was enacted. - * - * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list - * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's - * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol - * a client should use. - * - * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised - * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. - * - * It returns either - * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or - * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. + * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a + * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is + * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte + * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for + * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this + * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to + * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If + * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client + * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this + * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first + * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. + * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about + * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any + * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as + * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was + * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ -int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) - { - unsigned int i, j; - const unsigned char *result; - int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; - - /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ - for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) - { - for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) - { - if (server[i] == client[j] && - memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) - { - /* We found a match */ - result = &server[i]; - status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; - goto found; - } - j += client[j]; - j++; - } - i += server[i]; - i++; - } - - /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ - result = client; - status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; - - found: - *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; - *outlen = result[0]; - return status; - } - -/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's - * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't - * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. - * - * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned - * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols +int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *server, + unsigned int server_len, + const unsigned char *client, + unsigned int client_len) +{ + unsigned int i, j; + const unsigned char *result; + int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; + + /* + * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. + */ + for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { + for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { + if (server[i] == client[j] && + memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { + /* We found a match */ + result = &server[i]; + status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; + goto found; + } + j += client[j]; + j++; + } + i += server[i]; + i++; + } + + /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ + result = client; + status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; + + found: + *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; + *outlen = result[0]; + return status; +} + +/* + * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the + * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the + * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that + * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from + * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ -void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) - { - *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; - if (!*data) { - *len = 0; - } else { - *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; - } -} - -/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a - * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol - * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned - * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will - * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to - * it. - * - * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no - * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ -void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) - { - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; - } - -/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a +void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, + unsigned *len) +{ + *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; + if (!*data) { + *len = 0; + } else { + *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + } +} + +/* + * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when + * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol + * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is + * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This + * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a + * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it + * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the + * ServerHello. + */ +void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char + **out, + unsigned int *outlen, + void *arg), void *arg) +{ + ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; + ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; +} + +/* + * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). - * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's - * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can - * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. - * - * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this - * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. + * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The + * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The + * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must + * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns + * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ -void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) - { - ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; - ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; - } +void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, + unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + unsigned int inlen, + void *arg), void *arg) +{ + ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; + ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; +} # endif #endif int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, - const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, - int use_context) - { - if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) - return -1; + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, + int use_context) +{ + if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) + return -1; - return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, - llen, p, plen, - use_context); - } + return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, + llen, p, plen, + use_context); +} static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) - { - unsigned long l; - - l=(unsigned long) - ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )| - ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)| - ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)| - ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L); - return(l); - } - -/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of +{ + unsigned long l; + + l = (unsigned long) + ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) | + ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) | + ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) | + ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L); + return (l); +} + +/* + * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure - * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being - * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session - * with a matching session ID. */ -static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) - { - if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) - return(1); - if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) - return(1); - return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); - } - -/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on + * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing + * session with a matching session ID. + */ +static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) +{ + if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) + return (1); + if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) + return (1); + return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length)); +} + +/* + * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each - * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via - * ssl.h. */ + * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed + * via ssl.h. + */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) - { - SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; - - if (meth == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); - return(NULL); - } +{ + SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; + if (meth == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); + return (NULL); + } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - return NULL; - } + if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); + return NULL; + } #endif - if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); - goto err; - } - ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; + if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); + goto err; + } + ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; - memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); - ret->method=meth; + ret->method = meth; - ret->cert_store=NULL; - ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; - ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; - ret->session_cache_head=NULL; - ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; + ret->cert_store = NULL; + ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; + ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; + ret->session_cache_head = NULL; + ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; - /* We take the system default */ - ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); + /* We take the system default */ + ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); - ret->new_session_cb=0; - ret->remove_session_cb=0; - ret->get_session_cb=0; - ret->generate_session_id=0; + ret->new_session_cb = 0; + ret->remove_session_cb = 0; + ret->get_session_cb = 0; + ret->generate_session_id = 0; - memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); + memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats)); - ret->references=1; - ret->quiet_shutdown=0; + ret->references = 1; + ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; -/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ -/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL; - ret->master_key=NULL; - ret->key_arg=NULL; - ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ +/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ +/*- + ret->s2->challenge=NULL; + ret->master_key=NULL; + ret->key_arg=NULL; + ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ - ret->info_callback=NULL; + ret->info_callback = NULL; - ret->app_verify_callback=0; - ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; + ret->app_verify_callback = 0; + ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; - ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; - ret->read_ahead=0; - ret->msg_callback=0; - ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; - ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; + ret->read_ahead = 0; + ret->msg_callback = 0; + ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; + ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; #if 0 - ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ + ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ #endif - ret->sid_ctx_length=0; - ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; - if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - - ret->default_passwd_callback=0; - ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; - ret->client_cert_cb=0; - ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; - ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; - - ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); - if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; - ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); - if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; - - ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, - &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, - meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); - if (ret->cipher_list == NULL - || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); - goto err2; - } - - ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); - if (!ret->param) - goto err; - - if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); - goto err2; - } - if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); - goto err2; - } - if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); - goto err2; - } - - if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) - goto err; - - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); - - ret->extra_certs=NULL; - /* No compression for DTLS */ - if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); - - ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; + ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; + if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; + ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; + ret->client_cert_cb = 0; + ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0; + ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0; + + ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); + if (ret->sessions == NULL) + goto err; + ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); + if (ret->cert_store == NULL) + goto err; + + ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, + &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, + meth->version == + SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); + if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + goto err2; + } + + ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!ret->param) + goto err; + + if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + + if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) + goto err; + + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); + + ret->extra_certs = NULL; + /* No compression for DTLS */ + if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION) + ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); + + ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; - ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; - /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ - if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) - ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; + ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; + ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; + /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ + if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) + ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; - ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; - ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; + ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; + ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; - ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; + ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; + ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; - ret->psk_client_callback=NULL; - ret->psk_server_callback=NULL; + ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; + ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret); + SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS - ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT; - ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); - if (!ret->rbuf_freelist) - goto err; - ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; - ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0; - ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL; - ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); - if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) - { - OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist); - goto err; - } - ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; - ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0; - ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL; + ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT; + ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); + if (!ret->rbuf_freelist) + goto err; + ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; + ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0; + ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL; + ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); + if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) { + OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist); + goto err; + } + ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; + ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0; + ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO -#define eng_strx(x) #x -#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) - /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ - { - ENGINE *eng; - eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); - if (!eng) - { - ERR_clear_error(); - ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); - eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); - } - if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) - ERR_clear_error(); - } -#endif + ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; +# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO +# define eng_strx(x) #x +# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) + /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ + { + ENGINE *eng; + eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); + if (!eng) { + ERR_clear_error(); + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); + } + if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) + ERR_clear_error(); + } +# endif #endif - /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely - * deployed might change this. - */ - ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; - - return(ret); -err: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -err2: - if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); - return(NULL); - } + /* + * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely + * deployed might change this. + */ + ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; + + return (ret); + err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + err2: + if (ret != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ret); + return (NULL); +} #if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) - { OPENSSL_free(comp); } +{ + OPENSSL_free(comp); +} #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS -static void -ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list) - { - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next; - for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) - { - next = ent->next; - OPENSSL_free(ent); - } - OPENSSL_free(list); - } +static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list) +{ + SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next; + for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) { + next = ent->next; + OPENSSL_free(ent); + } + OPENSSL_free(list); +} #endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) - { - int i; +{ + int i; - if (a == NULL) return; + if (a == NULL) + return; - i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); + REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a); #endif - if (i > 0) return; + if (i > 0) + return; #ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) - { - fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); /* ok */ - } + if (i < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } #endif - if (a->param) - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); - - /* - * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference - * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed - * after the sessions were flushed. - * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, - * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then - * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. - * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) - */ - if (a->sessions != NULL) - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); - - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); - - if (a->sessions != NULL) - lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); - - if (a->cert_store != NULL) - X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); - if (a->cipher_list != NULL) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); - if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); - if (a->cert != NULL) - ssl_cert_free(a->cert); - if (a->client_CA != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); - if (a->extra_certs != NULL) - sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); -#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ - if (a->comp_methods != NULL) - sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); + if (a->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); + + /* + * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference + * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed + * after the sessions were flushed. + * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, + * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then + * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. + * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) + */ + if (a->sessions != NULL) + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); + + if (a->sessions != NULL) + lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); + + if (a->cert_store != NULL) + X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); + if (a->cipher_list != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); + if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); + if (a->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(a->cert); + if (a->client_CA != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); + if (a->extra_certs != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); +#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it + * removes a global database */ + if (a->comp_methods != NULL) + sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free); #else - a->comp_methods = NULL; + a->comp_methods = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (a->srtp_profiles) - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); + if (a->srtp_profiles) + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (a->psk_identity_hint) - OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); + if (a->psk_identity_hint) + OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); + SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (a->client_cert_engine) - ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); + if (a->client_cert_engine) + ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS - if (a->wbuf_freelist) - ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist); - if (a->rbuf_freelist) - ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist); + if (a->wbuf_freelist) + ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist); + if (a->rbuf_freelist) + ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist); #endif - OPENSSL_free(a); - } + OPENSSL_free(a); +} void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) - { - ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; - } - -void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) - { - ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; - } - -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) - { - ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; - ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; - } - -void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) - { - ctx->verify_mode=mode; - ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; - } - -void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) - { - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); - } +{ + ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) +{ + ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), + void *arg) +{ + ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; + ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, + int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) +{ + ctx->verify_mode = mode; + ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) +{ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); +} void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) - { - CERT_PKEY *cpk; - int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign; - int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; - int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; - unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a; - int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; +{ + CERT_PKEY *cpk; + int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign; + int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export; + int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl; + unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - int have_ecdh_tmp; + int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok; #endif - X509 *x = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; - int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0; - - if (c == NULL) return; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + X509 *x = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; + int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0; +#endif + if (c == NULL) + return; - kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); + kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); - rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || - (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); + rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); + rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || + (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else - rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; + rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); - dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || - (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); + dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); + dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || + (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else - dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; + dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); + have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); #endif - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); - rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); - rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); - dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); - dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); + rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); + rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); + dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); + dh_rsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ - dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); - have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); - mask_k=0; - mask_a=0; - emask_k=0; - emask_a=0; - - + dh_dsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); +#endif + mask_k = 0; + mask_a = 0; + emask_k = 0; + emask_a = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr,"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", - rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp, - rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", + rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc, + rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa); #endif - - cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); - if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) { - mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; - mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; - } - cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]); - if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) { - mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; - mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94; - } - - if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) - mask_k|=SSL_kRSA; - if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) - emask_k|=SSL_kRSA; + + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); + if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { + mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; + mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; + } + cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]); + if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { + mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; + mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94; + } + + if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) + mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; + if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) + emask_k |= SSL_kRSA; #if 0 - /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ - if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && - (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) - mask_k|=SSL_kEDH; - if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && - (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) - emask_k|=SSL_kEDH; + /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ + if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) + mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; + if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && + (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) + emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; #endif - if (dh_tmp_export) - emask_k|=SSL_kEDH; + if (dh_tmp_export) + emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; - if (dh_tmp) - mask_k|=SSL_kEDH; + if (dh_tmp) + mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; - if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr; - if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr; + if (dh_rsa) + mask_k |= SSL_kDHr; + if (dh_rsa_export) + emask_k |= SSL_kDHr; - if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd; - if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd; + if (dh_dsa) + mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; + if (dh_dsa_export) + emask_k |= SSL_kDHd; - if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) - { - mask_a|=SSL_aRSA; - emask_a|=SSL_aRSA; - } + if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { + mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; + emask_a |= SSL_aRSA; + } - if (dsa_sign) - { - mask_a|=SSL_aDSS; - emask_a|=SSL_aDSS; - } + if (dsa_sign) { + mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; + emask_a |= SSL_aDSS; + } - mask_a|=SSL_aNULL; - emask_a|=SSL_aNULL; + mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; + emask_a |= SSL_aNULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5; - mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5; - emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5; - emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5; + mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; + mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; + emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; + emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; #endif - /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or - * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. - */ - if (have_ecc_cert) - { - /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ - x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); - ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? - (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; - ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? - (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; - ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? - EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; - EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); - if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) - { - signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); - OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); - } + /* + * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites + * depending on the key usage extension. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (have_ecc_cert) { + /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ + x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; + ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; + ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; + EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (ecdh_ok) - { - - if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) - { - mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr; - mask_a|=SSL_aECDH; - if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) - { - emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr; - emask_a|=SSL_aECDH; - } - } - - if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) - { - mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe; - mask_a|=SSL_aECDH; - if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) - { - emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe; - emask_a|=SSL_aECDH; - } - } - } + if (ecdh_ok) { + + if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) { + mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; + mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { + emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; + emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; + } + } + + if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { + mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; + mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { + emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; + emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; + } + } + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (ecdsa_ok) - { - mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA; - emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA; - } + if (ecdsa_ok) { + mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; + emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; + } +#endif + } #endif - } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (have_ecdh_tmp) - { - mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH; - emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH; - } + if (have_ecdh_tmp) { + mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; + emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; - mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; - emask_k |= SSL_kPSK; - emask_a |= SSL_aPSK; + mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; + mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; + emask_k |= SSL_kPSK; + emask_a |= SSL_aPSK; #endif - c->mask_k=mask_k; - c->mask_a=mask_a; - c->export_mask_k=emask_k; - c->export_mask_a=emask_a; - c->valid=1; - } + c->mask_k = mask_k; + c->mask_a = mask_a; + c->export_mask_k = emask_k; + c->export_mask_a = emask_a; + c->valid = 1; +} /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) - { - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - int keysize = 0; - int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; - const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - - alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) - { - /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - if (pkey == NULL) return 0; - keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (keysize > 163) return 0; - } - - /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); - if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) - { - signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); - OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); - } - if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) - { - /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ - if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT); - return 0; - } - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ - if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE); - return 0; - } - } - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - /* signature alg must be RSA */ - - if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE); - return 0; - } - } - } - if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - { - /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ - if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; /* all checks are ok */ - } +{ + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int keysize = 0; + int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; + const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; + + alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { + /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if (pkey == NULL) + return 0; + keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (keysize > 163) + return 0; + } + + /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); + } + if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) { + /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, + SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT); + return 0; + } + if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { + /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ + if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, + SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE); + return 0; + } + } + if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { + /* signature alg must be RSA */ + + if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, + SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE); + return 0; + } + } + } + if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, + SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; /* all checks are ok */ +} #endif /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) - { - unsigned long alg_k,alg_a; - CERT *c; - int i; - - c=s->cert; - ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH - * since no certificate is needed for - * anon ECDH and for authenticated - * EECDH, the check for the auth - * algorithm will set i correctly - * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC - * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA - * we need an RSA cert. Placing the - * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA - * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. - */ - i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; - } - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - { - i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; - } - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) - i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) - i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - { - if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) - i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; - else - i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - } - else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) - { - /* VRS something else here? */ - return(NULL); - } - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) - i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) - i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */ - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return(NULL); - } - - return c->pkeys + i; - } +{ + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + CERT *c; + int i; + + c = s->cert; + ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + /* + * we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed + * for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth + * algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC + * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the + * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is + * chosen. + */ + i = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + i = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) + i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; + else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) + i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) + i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; + else + i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) { + /* VRS something else here? */ + return (NULL); + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) + i = SSL_PKEY_GOST94; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */ + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return (NULL); + } + + return c->pkeys + i; +} X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) - { - CERT_PKEY *cpk; - cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - if (!cpk) - return NULL; - return cpk->x509; - } - -EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) - { - unsigned long alg_a; - CERT *c; - int idx = -1; - - alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; - c=s->cert; - - if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) - idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - { - if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; - else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - } - else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) - idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; - if (idx == -1) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return(NULL); - } - if (pmd) - *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; - return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; - } - -void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) - { - int i; - - /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, - * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ - if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; - - i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; - if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) - && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) - || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session)) - && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) - { - CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - } - - /* auto flush every 255 connections */ - if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && - ((i & mode) == mode)) - { - if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) - ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good - :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) - { - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); - } - } - } +{ + CERT_PKEY *cpk; + cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); + if (!cpk) + return NULL; + return cpk->x509; +} + +EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, + const EVP_MD **pmd) +{ + unsigned long alg_a; + CERT *c; + int idx = -1; + + alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; + c = s->cert; + + if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) + idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) + idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; + else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) + idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) + idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; + if (idx == -1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return (NULL); + } + if (pmd) + *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; + return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; +} + +void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) +{ + int i; + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it + * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) + */ + if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) + return; + + i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) + && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) + || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) + && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { + CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + } + + /* auto flush every 255 connections */ + if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { + if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) + ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good + : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); + } + } +} const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) - { - return(s->method); - } +{ + return (s->method); +} int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) - { - int conn= -1; - int ret=1; - - if (s->method != meth) - { - if (s->handshake_func != NULL) - conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); - - if (s->method->version == meth->version) - s->method=meth; - else - { - s->method->ssl_free(s); - s->method=meth; - ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); - } - - if (conn == 1) - s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; - else if (conn == 0) - s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; - } - return(ret); - } - -int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) - { - int reason; - unsigned long l; - BIO *bio; - - if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); - - /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake - * etc, where we do encode the error */ - if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) - { - if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); - else - return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); - } - - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) - { - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); - if (BIO_should_read(bio)) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); - else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) - /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try - * to write to the rbio, and an application program where - * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it - * should wait for. - * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly - * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of - * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, - * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer - * to keep it. */ - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) - { - reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); - else - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ - } - } - - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) - { - bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); - if (BIO_should_write(bio)) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); - else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) - /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) - { - reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); - else - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); - } - } - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) - { - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); - } - - if (i == 0) - { - if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) - { - /* assume it is the socket being closed */ - return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); - } - else - { - if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && - (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) - return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); - } - } - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); - } +{ + int conn = -1; + int ret = 1; + + if (s->method != meth) { + if (s->handshake_func != NULL) + conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); + + if (s->method->version == meth->version) + s->method = meth; + else { + s->method->ssl_free(s); + s->method = meth; + ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); + } + + if (conn == 1) + s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; + else if (conn == 0) + s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; + } + return (ret); +} + +int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) +{ + int reason; + unsigned long l; + BIO *bio; + + if (i > 0) + return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); + + /* + * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, + * where we do encode the error + */ + if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { + if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); + else + return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); + } + + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + /* + * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write + * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio + * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. + * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have + * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and + * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it + * might be safer to keep it. + */ + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ + } + } + + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { + bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + /* + * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) + */ + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); + } + } + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); + } + + if (i == 0) { + if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { + /* assume it is the socket being closed */ + return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + } else { + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && + (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) + return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + } + } + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); +} int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) - { - int ret=1; - - if (s->handshake_func == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); - return(-1); - } - - s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); - - if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) - { - ret=s->handshake_func(s); - } - return(ret); - } - -/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so - * one of these calls will reset it */ +{ + int ret = 1; + + if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); + return (-1); + } + + s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); + + if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { + ret = s->handshake_func(s); + } + return (ret); +} + +/* + * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these + * calls will reset it + */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) - { - s->server=1; - s->shutdown=0; - s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; - s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; - /* clear the current cipher */ - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); - } +{ + s->server = 1; + s->shutdown = 0; + s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; + s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); +} void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) - { - s->server=0; - s->shutdown=0; - s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; - s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; - /* clear the current cipher */ - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); - } +{ + s->server = 0; + s->shutdown = 0; + s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; + s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); +} int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return(0); - } +{ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return (0); +} int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return(0); - } +{ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, + ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return (0); +} int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return(0); - } +{ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION, + ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return (0); +} SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return(NULL); - } +{ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return (NULL); +} const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) - { - if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) - return("TLSv1.2"); - else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) - return("TLSv1.1"); - else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) - return("TLSv1"); - else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - return("SSLv3"); - else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) - return("SSLv2"); - else - return("unknown"); - } +{ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) + return ("TLSv1.2"); + else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) + return ("TLSv1.1"); + else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) + return ("TLSv1"); + else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + return ("SSLv3"); + else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) + return ("SSLv2"); + else + return ("unknown"); +} SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) - { - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; - X509_NAME *xn; - SSL *ret; - int i; - - if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) - return(NULL); - - ret->version = s->version; - ret->type = s->type; - ret->method = s->method; - - if (s->session != NULL) - { - /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ - SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s); - } - else - { - /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect - * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- - * they should not both point to the same object, - * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ - - ret->method->ssl_free(ret); - ret->method = s->method; - ret->method->ssl_new(ret); - - if (s->cert != NULL) - { - if (ret->cert != NULL) - { - ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); - } - ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); - if (ret->cert == NULL) - goto err; - } - - SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, - s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); - } - - ret->options=s->options; - ret->mode=s->mode; - SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); - SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); - ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; - ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; - SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), - SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); - SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); - ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; - - SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); - - ret->debug=s->debug; - - /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ - if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) - goto err; - - /* setup rbio, and wbio */ - if (s->rbio != NULL) - { - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio)) - goto err; - } - if (s->wbio != NULL) - { - if (s->wbio != s->rbio) - { - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio)) - goto err; - } - else - ret->wbio=ret->rbio; - } - ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; - ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; - ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; - ret->server = s->server; - ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; - ret->new_session = s->new_session; - ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; - ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; - ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ - ret->rstate=s->rstate; - ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ - ret->hit=s->hit; - - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); - - /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ - if (s->cipher_list != NULL) - { - if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) - goto err; - } - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) - if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) - == NULL) - goto err; - - /* Dup the client_CA list */ - if (s->client_CA != NULL) - { - if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; - ret->client_CA=sk; - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) - { - xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); - if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) - { - X509_NAME_free(xn); - goto err; - } - } - } - - if (0) - { -err: - if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret); - ret=NULL; - } - return(ret); - } +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; + X509_NAME *xn; + SSL *ret; + int i; + + if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + ret->version = s->version; + ret->type = s->type; + ret->method = s->method; + + if (s->session != NULL) { + /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ + SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s); + } else { + /* + * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that + * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both + * point to the same object, and thus we can't use + * SSL_copy_session_id. + */ + + ret->method->ssl_free(ret); + ret->method = s->method; + ret->method->ssl_new(ret); + + if (s->cert != NULL) { + if (ret->cert != NULL) { + ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); + } + ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); + if (ret->cert == NULL) + goto err; + } + + SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + } + + ret->options = s->options; + ret->mode = s->mode; + SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); + SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); + ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; + ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; + SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); + SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); + ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; + + SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); + + ret->debug = s->debug; + + /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) + goto err; + + /* setup rbio, and wbio */ + if (s->rbio != NULL) { + if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) + goto err; + } + if (s->wbio != NULL) { + if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { + if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) + goto err; + } else + ret->wbio = ret->rbio; + } + ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; + ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; + ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; + ret->server = s->server; + ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; + ret->new_session = s->new_session; + ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; + ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; + ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, + * though */ + ret->rstate = s->rstate; + ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, + * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, + * ret->init_off */ + ret->hit = s->hit; + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); + + /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { + if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) + == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Dup the client_CA list */ + if (s->client_CA != NULL) { + if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) + goto err; + ret->client_CA = sk; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { + xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); + if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (0) { + err: + if (ret != NULL) + SSL_free(ret); + ret = NULL; + } + return (ret); +} void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) - { - if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); - OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); - s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; - } - if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); - OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); - s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; - } +{ + if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); + s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; + } + if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (s->expand != NULL) - { - COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); - s->expand=NULL; - } - if (s->compress != NULL) - { - COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); - s->compress=NULL; - } + if (s->expand != NULL) { + COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); + s->expand = NULL; + } + if (s->compress != NULL) { + COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); + s->compress = NULL; + } #endif - } +} /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) - { - if (s->cert != NULL) - return(s->cert->key->x509); - else - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s->cert != NULL) + return (s->cert->key->x509); + else + return (NULL); +} /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) - { - if (s->cert != NULL) - return(s->cert->key->privatekey); - else - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s->cert != NULL) + return (s->cert->key->privatekey); + else + return (NULL); +} const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) - { - if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) - return(s->session->cipher); - return(NULL); - } +{ + if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) + return (s->session->cipher); + return (NULL); +} + #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) - { - return NULL; - } +{ + return NULL; +} + const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) - { - return NULL; - } +{ + return NULL; +} #else const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) - { - if (s->compress != NULL) - return(s->compress->meth); - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s->compress != NULL) + return (s->compress->meth); + return (NULL); +} const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) - { - if (s->expand != NULL) - return(s->expand->meth); - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (s->expand != NULL) + return (s->expand->meth); + return (NULL); +} #endif -int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) - { - BIO *bbio; - - if (s->bbio == NULL) - { - bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); - if (bbio == NULL) return(0); - s->bbio=bbio; - } - else - { - bbio=s->bbio; - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); - } - (void)BIO_reset(bbio); -/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ - if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return(0); - } - if (push) - { - if (s->wbio != bbio) - s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); - } - else - { - if (s->wbio == bbio) - s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); - } - return(1); - } +int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) +{ + BIO *bbio; + + if (s->bbio == NULL) { + bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); + if (bbio == NULL) + return (0); + s->bbio = bbio; + } else { + bbio = s->bbio; + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) + s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); + } + (void)BIO_reset(bbio); +/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ + if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return (0); + } + if (push) { + if (s->wbio != bbio) + s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); + } else { + if (s->wbio == bbio) + s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); + } + return (1); +} void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) - { - if (s->bbio == NULL) return; - - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) - { - /* remove buffering */ - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); -#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ - assert(s->wbio != NULL); +{ + if (s->bbio == NULL) + return; + + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { + /* remove buffering */ + s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); +#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids + * adding one more preprocessor symbol */ + assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif - } - BIO_free(s->bbio); - s->bbio=NULL; - } - -void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) - { - ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; - } + } + BIO_free(s->bbio); + s->bbio = NULL; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) +{ + ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; +} int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); - } +{ + return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); +} -void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) - { - s->quiet_shutdown=mode; - } +void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) +{ + s->quiet_shutdown = mode; +} int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->quiet_shutdown); - } +{ + return (s->quiet_shutdown); +} -void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) - { - s->shutdown=mode; - } +void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) +{ + s->shutdown = mode; +} int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->shutdown); - } +{ + return (s->shutdown); +} int SSL_version(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->version); - } +{ + return (s->version); +} SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) - { - return(ssl->ctx); - } - -SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) - { - CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; - if (ssl->ctx == ctx) - return ssl->ctx; +{ + return (ssl->ctx); +} + +SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; + if (ssl->ctx == ctx) + return ssl->ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (ctx == NULL) - ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; #endif - ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); - if (ocert != NULL) - { - int i; - /* Copy negotiated digests from original */ - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) - { - CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i; - CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i; - rpk->digest = cpk->digest; - } - ssl_cert_free(ocert); - } - - /* - * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), - * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); - - /* - * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, - * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does - * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), - * leave it unchanged. - */ - if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && - (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && - (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) - { - ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; - memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); - } - - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (ssl->ctx != NULL) - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ - ssl->ctx = ctx; - - return(ssl->ctx); - } + ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + if (ocert != NULL) { + int i; + /* Copy negotiated digests from original */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i; + CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i; + rpk->digest = cpk->digest; + } + ssl_cert_free(ocert); + } + + /* + * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), + * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. + */ + OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); + + /* + * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, + * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does + * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), + * leave it unchanged. + */ + if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && + (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && + (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { + ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; + memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); + } + + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (ssl->ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + ssl->ctx = ctx; + + return (ssl->ctx); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); - } +{ + return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); +} int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, - const char *CApath) - { - return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); - } + const char *CApath) +{ + return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); +} #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) - { - ssl->info_callback=cb; - } - -/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned - function pointer. */ -void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) - { - return ssl->info_callback; - } + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) +{ + ssl->info_callback = cb; +} + +/* + * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function + * pointer. + */ +void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , + int /* type */ , + int /* val */ ) { + return ssl->info_callback; +} int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) - { - return(ssl->state); - } +{ + return (ssl->state); +} void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) - { - ssl->state = state; - } +{ + ssl->state = state; +} -void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) - { - ssl->verify_result=arg; - } +void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) +{ + ssl->verify_result = arg; +} long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) - { - return(ssl->verify_result); - } - -int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) - { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, - new_func, dup_func, free_func); - } - -int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) - { - return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); - } - -void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) - { - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); - } - -int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) - { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, - new_func, dup_func, free_func); - } - -int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) - { - return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); - } - -void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) - { - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); - } +{ + return (ssl->verify_result); +} + +int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) +{ + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); +} + +int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) +{ + return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); +} + +void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) +{ + return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); +} + +int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) +{ + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); +} + +int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) +{ + return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); +} + +void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) +{ + return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); +} int ssl_ok(SSL *s) - { - return(1); - } +{ + return (1); +} X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) - { - return(ctx->cert_store); - } +{ + return (ctx->cert_store); +} -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) - { - if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) - X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); - ctx->cert_store=store; - } +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) +{ + if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) + X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); + ctx->cert_store = store; +} int SSL_want(const SSL *s) - { - return(s->rwstate); - } +{ + return (s->rwstate); +} -/*! +/** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, - int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); - } +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, + int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); +} -void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, - int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); - } +void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, + int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); +} #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN -/*! +/** * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. @@ -3142,180 +3106,206 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ -RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) - {} +RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) +{ +} #endif -/*! +/** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); - } +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); +} -void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); - } +void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); +} #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); - } - -void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, - int keylength)) - { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); - } +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, + (void (*)(void))ecdh); +} + +void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, + EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)) +{ + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); +} #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) - { - if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - return 0; - } - if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); - if (identity_hint != NULL) - { - ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); - if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - return 0; - } - else - ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - return 1; - } +{ + if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (identity_hint != NULL) { + ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); + if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + return 0; + } else + ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + return 1; +} int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) - { - if (s == NULL) - return 0; - - if (s->session == NULL) - return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ - - if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - return 0; - } - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - if (identity_hint != NULL) - { - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - return 0; - } - else - s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - return 1; - } +{ + if (s == NULL) + return 0; + + if (s->session == NULL) + return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ + + if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + if (identity_hint != NULL) { + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + return 0; + } else + s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + return 1; +} const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) - { - if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) - return NULL; - return(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - } +{ + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) + return NULL; + return (s->session->psk_identity_hint); +} const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) - { - if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) - return NULL; - return(s->session->psk_identity); - } +{ + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) + return NULL; + return (s->session->psk_identity); +} void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, - char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int max_psk_len)) - { - s->psk_client_callback = cb; - } + unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const char *hint, + char *identity, + unsigned int + max_identity_len, + unsigned char *psk, + unsigned int + max_psk_len)) +{ + s->psk_client_callback = cb; +} void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, - char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int max_psk_len)) - { - ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; - } + unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const char *hint, + char *identity, + unsigned int + max_identity_len, + unsigned char *psk, + unsigned int + max_psk_len)) +{ + ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; +} void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, - unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) - { - s->psk_server_callback = cb; - } + unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const char *identity, + unsigned char *psk, + unsigned int + max_psk_len)) +{ + s->psk_server_callback = cb; +} void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, - unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) - { - ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; - } + unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const char *identity, + unsigned char *psk, + unsigned int + max_psk_len)) +{ + ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; +} #endif -void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) - { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); - } -void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) - { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); - } - -/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer - * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if - * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md - * Returns newly allocated ctx; +void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, + int content_type, const void *buf, + size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) +{ + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); +} + +void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, + void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, + int content_type, const void *buf, + size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) +{ + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); +} + +/* + * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer + * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. + * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly + * allocated ctx; */ -EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) +EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); - *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL); - return *hash; + ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); + *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (md) + EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL); + return *hash; } -void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) + +void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { - if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); - *hash=NULL; + if (*hash) + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); + *hash = NULL; } void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) - { - s->debug = debug; - } +{ + s->debug = debug; +} int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) - { - return s->hit; - } +{ + return s->hit; +} #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) -#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" +# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) -IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, - ssl_cipher_id); +IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); |