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-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c872
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diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
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+/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+
+static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+ int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+ {
+ int chunk,n;
+ unsigned int j;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int A1_len;
+
+ chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ HMAC_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ HMAC_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+
+ n=0;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len);
+ HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
+
+ if (olen > chunk)
+ {
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
+ out+=j;
+ olen-=j;
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
+ }
+ else /* last one */
+ {
+ HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+ memcpy(out,A1,olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+ }
+
+static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1,
+ unsigned char *label, int label_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1,
+ unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+ {
+ int len,i;
+ const unsigned char *S1,*S2;
+
+ len=slen/2;
+ S1=sec;
+ S2= &(sec[len]);
+ len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */
+
+
+ tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);
+ tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen);
+
+ for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
+ out1[i]^=out2[i];
+ }
+
+static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+ unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+
+ TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE];
+ p=buf;
+
+ memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE);
+ p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ km,tmp,num);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n"); }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ }
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ {
+ static const unsigned char empty[]="";
+ unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2];
+ unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
+ unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
+ int client_write;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+#endif
+ key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+ printf("\talg= %ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms,
+ (void *)comp);
+ printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", (void *)c);
+ printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+ c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
+ printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ {
+ int ki;
+ for (ki=0; ki<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; ki++)
+ printf("%02x", key_block[ki]); printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ {
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
+ s->read_hash=m;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->expand == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash=m;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->compress == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+ cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ {
+ ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
+ exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n=i;
+ ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
+ exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write=0;
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
+ * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ p=buf;
+ memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len);
+ p+=exp_label_len;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j,
+ tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+ key=tmp1;
+
+ if (k > 0)
+ {
+ p=buf;
+ memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE);
+ p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0,
+ iv1,iv2,k*2);
+ if (client_write)
+ iv=iv1;
+ else
+ iv= &(iv1[k]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length=0;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int ki;
+ printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ printf("\tkey= ");
+ for (ki=0; ki<c->key_len; ki++) printf("%02x", key[ki]);
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("\t iv= ");
+ for (ki=0; ki<c->iv_len; ki++) printf("%02x", iv[ki]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\niv=");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
+ return(1);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p1,*p2;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return(1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
+
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num*=2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
+
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("client random\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("server random\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("pre-master\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+ tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("\nkey block\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ {
+ /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+ * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ if (s->write_hash != NULL)
+ n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+ ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->read_hash != NULL)
+ n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+ ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
+ (enc == NULL))
+ {
+ memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
+ rec->input=rec->data;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ l=rec->length;
+ bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ {
+ i=bs-((int)l%bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j=i-1;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
+ rec->input[k]=j;
+ l+=i;
+ rec->length+=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long ui;
+ printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%ld %ld], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ,
+ (unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ printf("\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("\trec->input=");
+ for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!send)
+ {
+ if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long ki;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
+ for (ki=0; ki<l; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[ki]); printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ {
+ ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
+ i++;
+ /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
+ * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
+ * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
+ * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
+ * now or no buggy implementation supports compression
+ * [steve]
+ */
+ if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ && !s->expand)
+ {
+ /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
+ s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ i--;
+ }
+ /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
+ * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
+ if (i > (int)rec->length)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
+ * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
+ * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
+ {
+ if (rec->data[j] != ii)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ rec->length-=i;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out)
+ {
+ unsigned int ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in_ctx);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return((int)ret);
+ }
+
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx,
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
+
+ q=buf;
+ memcpy(q,str,slen);
+ q+=slen;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in1_ctx);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+ q+=i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in2_ctx);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+ q+=i;
+
+ tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf),
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buf2,sizeof buf2);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return sizeof buf2;
+ }
+
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ unsigned int md_size;
+ int i;
+ HMAC_CTX hmac;
+ unsigned char buf[5];
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->write_hash;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
+
+ buf[0]=rec->type;
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+ }
+ else {
+ buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+ buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ }
+
+ buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
+ buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
+
+ /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL);
+
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hmac,dtlsseq,8);
+ }
+ else
+ HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5);
+ HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length);
+ HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("sec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("seq=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("buf=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("rec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+ if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+ return(md_size);
+ }
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", (void *)s,out, p,len);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ /* Setup the stuff to munge */
+ memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,
+ buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len,
+ s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ }
+
+int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ {
+ switch (code)
+ {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+