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-rwxr-xr-x[-rw-r--r--]tools/plink/ssh.c21304
1 files changed, 11140 insertions, 10164 deletions
diff --git a/tools/plink/ssh.c b/tools/plink/ssh.c
index bdbbc4fd5..cef4455e8 100644..100755
--- a/tools/plink/ssh.c
+++ b/tools/plink/ssh.c
@@ -1,10164 +1,11140 @@
-/*
- * SSH backend.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "putty.h"
-#include "tree234.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
-#include "sshgssc.h"
-#include "sshgss.h"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef FALSE
-#define FALSE 0
-#endif
-#ifndef TRUE
-#define TRUE 1
-#endif
-
-#define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
-#define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
-#define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
-#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
-#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
-
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
-
-#define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
-/* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
-#define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
-
-#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
-#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
-#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
-
-/*
- * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
- * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
- */
-typedef enum {
- SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
-} Pkt_KCtx;
-typedef enum {
- SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
- SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
-} Pkt_ACtx;
-
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
-#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
-
-static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
- NULL,
- "host not allowed to connect",
- "protocol error",
- "key exchange failed",
- "host authentication failed",
- "MAC error",
- "compression error",
- "service not available",
- "protocol version not supported",
- "host key not verifiable",
- "connection lost",
- "by application",
- "too many connections",
- "auth cancelled by user",
- "no more auth methods available",
- "illegal user name",
-};
-
-#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
-#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
-
-#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
-
-/*
- * Various remote-bug flags.
- */
-#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
-#define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
-#define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
-#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
-#define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
-#define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
-#define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
-#define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
-#define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
-#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
-
-/*
- * Codes for terminal modes.
- * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
- * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
- * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
- */
-static const struct {
- const char* const mode;
- int opcode;
- enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
-} ssh_ttymodes[] = {
- /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
- { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
- { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
- { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
- { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
-};
-
-/* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
-#define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
-/* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
-#define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
-#define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
-#define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
-#define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
-
-/* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
-static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
-{
- unsigned int ret;
- if (*s) {
- char *next = NULL;
- ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
- if (!next) ret = s[0];
- } else {
- ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
- }
- return ret;
-}
-static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
-{
- if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
- return 1; /* true */
- else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
- stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
- return 0; /* false */
- else
- return (atoi(s) != 0);
-}
-
-#define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
-#define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
-#define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
-static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
-{
- translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
- translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
- translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
- translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
- return "unknown";
-}
-static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
-{
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
- translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
- translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
- translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
- return "unknown";
-}
-#undef translate
-#undef translatec
-
-/* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
-enum {
- PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
- /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
- * fields to the packet logging code. */
- PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
-};
-
-/*
- * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
- * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
- * read
- *
- * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
- *
- * which explains the theory behind these macros.
- *
- * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
- * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
- * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
- * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
- *
- * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
- * - click Settings
- * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
- * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
- * Database for Edit and Continue'.
- */
-#define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
-#define crState(t) \
- struct t *s; \
- if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
- s = ssh->t;
-#define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
-#define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
-#define crReturn(z) \
- do {\
- *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
- } while (0)
-#define crReturnV \
- do {\
- *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
- } while (0)
-#define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
-#define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
-#define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
-#define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
-
-typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
-struct Packet;
-
-static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
-static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
-static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
-static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
-static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
-static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
-static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
-static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
-static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
-static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
-static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
-static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
-static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
-static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin);
-static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin);
-static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
-static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
-
-/*
- * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
- * various different purposes:
- *
- * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
- * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
- * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
- * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
- * happen very often.
- *
- * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
- * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
- * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
- * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
- * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
- * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
- *
- * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
- * channels.
- *
- * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
- * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
- *
- * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
- * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
- * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
- * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
- * data message.
- *
- * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
- * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
- * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
- */
-
-#define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
-#define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
-#define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
-#define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
-#define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
-#define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
-
-const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
-
-const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
- &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
-};
-const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
- &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
-};
-
-static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
-{
-}
-static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
- unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
- "none", NULL,
- ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
- ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
- ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
-};
-extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
-const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
- &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
-};
-
-enum { /* channel types */
- CHAN_MAINSESSION,
- CHAN_X11,
- CHAN_AGENT,
- CHAN_SOCKDATA,
- CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT, /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
- /*
- * CHAN_ZOMBIE is used to indicate a channel for which we've
- * already destroyed the local data source: for instance, if a
- * forwarded port experiences a socket error on the local side, we
- * immediately destroy its local socket and turn the SSH channel
- * into CHAN_ZOMBIE.
- */
- CHAN_ZOMBIE
-};
-
-/*
- * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
- */
-struct winadj {
- struct winadj *next;
- unsigned size;
-};
-
-/*
- * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
- */
-struct ssh_channel {
- Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
- unsigned remoteid, localid;
- int type;
- /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
- int halfopen;
- /*
- * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
- *
- * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
- * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
- * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
- * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
- *
- * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
- *
- * In SSH-2, the four bits mean:
- *
- * 1 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
- * 2 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
- * 4 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
- * 8 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
- *
- * A channel is completely finished with when we have both sent
- * and received CLOSE.
- *
- * The symbolic constants below use the SSH-2 terminology, which
- * is a bit confusing in SSH-1, but we have to use _something_.
- */
-#define CLOSES_SENT_EOF 1
-#define CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE 2
-#define CLOSES_RCVD_EOF 4
-#define CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE 8
- int closes;
-
- /*
- * This flag indicates that an EOF is pending on the outgoing side
- * of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data for
- * this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We can't
- * actually send the EOF until we've finished sending the data, so
- * we set this flag instead to remind us to do so once our buffer
- * is clear.
- */
- int pending_eof;
-
- /*
- * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
- * throttled.
- */
- int throttling_conn;
- union {
- struct ssh2_data_channel {
- bufchain outbuffer;
- unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
- /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
- int locwindow, locmaxwin;
- /*
- * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
- * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
- * last data packet or window adjust ack.
- */
- int remlocwin;
- /*
- * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
- * been acked.
- */
- struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
- enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
- } v2;
- } v;
- union {
- struct ssh_agent_channel {
- unsigned char *message;
- unsigned char msglen[4];
- unsigned lensofar, totallen;
- } a;
- struct ssh_x11_channel {
- Socket s;
- } x11;
- struct ssh_pfd_channel {
- Socket s;
- } pfd;
- } u;
-};
-
-/*
- * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
- * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
- * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
- *
- * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
- * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
- * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
- * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
- * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
- * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
- * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
- * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
- * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
- * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
- * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
- *
- * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
- * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
- * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
- * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
- * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
- * local host:port pair went with that port number.
- *
- * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
- * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
- */
-struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
-
-struct ssh_rportfwd {
- unsigned sport, dport;
- char dhost[256];
- char *sportdesc;
- struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
-};
-#define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
- ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
-
-/*
- * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
- * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
- * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
- * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
- * it.
- */
-struct ssh_portfwd {
- enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
- int type;
- unsigned sport, dport;
- char *saddr, *daddr;
- char *sserv, *dserv;
- struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
- int addressfamily;
- void *local;
-};
-#define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
- ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
- sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
-
-struct Packet {
- long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
- long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
- int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
- unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
- unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
- unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
- long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
- long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
- long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
-
- /*
- * State associated with packet logging
- */
- int logmode;
- int nblanks;
- struct logblank_t *blanks;
-};
-
-static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin);
-static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin);
-static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
-static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
-static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
-static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
-static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
-static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
-static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
-static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
-static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
-static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
-static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
-static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
-static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
-static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
-static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin);
-
-struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
- long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
- unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
- unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- int chunk;
- struct Packet *pktin;
-};
-
-struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
- long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
- int i;
- int cipherblk;
- unsigned long incoming_sequence;
- struct Packet *pktin;
-};
-
-typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
-typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
-
-struct queued_handler;
-struct queued_handler {
- int msg1, msg2;
- chandler_fn_t handler;
- void *ctx;
- struct queued_handler *next;
-};
-
-struct ssh_tag {
- const struct plug_function_table *fn;
- /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
-
- char *v_c, *v_s;
- void *exhash;
-
- Socket s;
-
- void *ldisc;
- void *logctx;
-
- unsigned char session_key[32];
- int v1_compressing;
- int v1_remote_protoflags;
- int v1_local_protoflags;
- int agentfwd_enabled;
- int X11_fwd_enabled;
- int remote_bugs;
- const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
- void *v1_cipher_ctx;
- void *crcda_ctx;
- const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
- void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
- const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
- void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
- const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
- void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
- const struct ssh_kex *kex;
- const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
- unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
- int v2_session_id_len;
- void *kex_ctx;
-
- char *savedhost;
- int savedport;
- int send_ok;
- int echoing, editing;
-
- void *frontend;
-
- int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
- int term_width, term_height;
-
- tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
- struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
- int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
- int exitcode;
- int close_expected;
- int clean_exit;
-
- tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
-
- enum {
- SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
- SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
- SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
- SSH_STATE_SESSION,
- SSH_STATE_CLOSED
- } state;
-
- int size_needed, eof_needed;
- int sent_console_eof;
- int got_pty; /* affects EOF behaviour on main channel */
-
- struct Packet **queue;
- int queuelen, queuesize;
- int queueing;
- unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
- int deferred_len, deferred_size;
-
- /*
- * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
- * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
- * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
- * got.
- */
- int fallback_cmd;
-
- bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
-
- Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
- Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
-
- struct X11Display *x11disp;
-
- int version;
- int conn_throttle_count;
- int overall_bufsize;
- int throttled_all;
- int v1_stdout_throttling;
- unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
-
- int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
- int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
- int do_ssh_init_crstate;
- int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
- int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
- int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
- int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
- int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
-
- void *do_ssh_init_state;
- void *do_ssh1_login_state;
- void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
- void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
-
- struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
- struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
-
- /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
- int protocol_initial_phase_done;
-
- void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pkt);
- struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
-
- /*
- * We maintain our own copy of a Conf structure here. That way,
- * when we're passed a new one for reconfiguration, we can check
- * the differences and potentially reconfigure port forwardings
- * etc in mid-session.
- */
- Conf *conf;
-
- /*
- * Values cached out of conf so as to avoid the tree234 lookup
- * cost every time they're used.
- */
- int logomitdata;
-
- /*
- * Dynamically allocated username string created during SSH
- * login. Stored in here rather than in the coroutine state so
- * that it'll be reliably freed if we shut down the SSH session
- * at some unexpected moment.
- */
- char *username;
-
- /*
- * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
- */
- void *agent_response;
- int agent_response_len;
- int user_response;
-
- /*
- * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
- * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
- * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
- * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
- * from the network which we need to delay processing until
- * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
- * store that data.
- */
- int frozen;
- bufchain queued_incoming_data;
-
- /*
- * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
- * with at any time.
- */
- handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
-
- /*
- * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
- * indications from a request.
- */
- struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
-
- /*
- * This module deals with sending keepalives.
- */
- Pinger pinger;
-
- /*
- * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
- * size-based rekeys.
- */
- unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
- unsigned long max_data_size;
- int kex_in_progress;
- long next_rekey, last_rekey;
- char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
-
- /*
- * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
- */
- char *fullhostname;
-
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- /*
- * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
- */
- struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
-#endif
-};
-
-#define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
-
-/* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
-static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- char *buf;
-
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- logevent(buf);
- sfree(buf);
-}
-
-#define bombout(msg) \
- do { \
- char *text = dupprintf msg; \
- ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
- logevent(text); \
- connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
- sfree(text); \
- } while (0)
-
-/* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
-
-static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
-{
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass))
- pkt->logmode = blanktype;
-}
-
-static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
-{
- if (ssh->logomitdata)
- pkt->logmode = blanktype;
-}
-
-static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
-}
-
-/* Helper function for common bits of parsing ttymodes. */
-static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh,
- void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
- void *data)
-{
- char *key, *val;
-
- for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, NULL, &key);
- val != NULL;
- val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, key, &key)) {
- /*
- * val[0] is either 'V', indicating that an explicit value
- * follows it, or 'A' indicating that we should pass the
- * value through from the local environment via get_ttymode.
- */
- if (val[0] == 'A')
- val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, key);
- else
- val++; /* skip the 'V' */
- if (val)
- do_mode(data, key, val);
- }
-}
-
-static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
- struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
- if (a->localid < b->localid)
- return -1;
- if (a->localid > b->localid)
- return +1;
- return 0;
-}
-static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
-{
- unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
- struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
- if (*a < b->localid)
- return -1;
- if (*a > b->localid)
- return +1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
-{
- struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
- struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
- int i;
- if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
- return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
- if (a->dport > b->dport)
- return +1;
- if (a->dport < b->dport)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
-{
- struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
- struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
-
- if (a->sport > b->sport)
- return +1;
- if (a->sport < b->sport)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
- * defined to sort before even the empty string.
- */
-static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
-{
- if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (a == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (b == NULL)
- return +1;
- return strcmp(a, b);
-}
-
-static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
-{
- struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
- struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
- int i;
- if (a->type > b->type)
- return +1;
- if (a->type < b->type)
- return -1;
- if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
- return +1;
- if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
- return -1;
- if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
- return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
- if (a->sport > b->sport)
- return +1;
- if (a->sport < b->sport)
- return -1;
- if (a->type != 'D') {
- if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
- return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
- if (a->dport > b->dport)
- return +1;
- if (a->dport < b->dport)
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
-{
- const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
- unsigned low, high, mid;
- int tsize;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- /*
- * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
- * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
- * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
- * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
- * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
- * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
- */
- tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
-
- low = -1;
- high = tsize;
- while (high - low > 1) {
- mid = (high + low) / 2;
- c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
- if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
- low = mid; /* this one is fine */
- else
- high = mid; /* this one is past it */
- }
- /*
- * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
- * largest ID in the initial sequence.
- */
- {
- unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
- assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
- }
- return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
-}
-
-static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
- fputc(buf[i], stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
-}
-
-static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
-{
- if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
- c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
- else
- from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
-}
-
-static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
-{
- if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
- c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
- else
- from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
-}
-
-static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
-{
- c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
-}
-
-static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- sfree(pkt->data);
- sfree(pkt);
-}
-static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
-{
- struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
-
- pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
- pkt->maxlen = 0;
- pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
- pkt->blanks = NULL;
-
- return pkt;
-}
-
-/*
- * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
- * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
- * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
- * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
- * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
- */
-static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
-{
- struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
-
- crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
-
- st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
-
- st->pktin->type = 0;
- st->pktin->length = 0;
-
- for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
- (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
- }
-
- st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
- st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
- st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
-
- if (st->biglen < 0) {
- bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
- " data stream corruption"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
-
- st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
- st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
-
- st->to_read = st->biglen;
- st->p = st->pktin->data;
- while (st->to_read > 0) {
- st->chunk = st->to_read;
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
- st->chunk = (*datalen);
- memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
- *data += st->chunk;
- *datalen -= st->chunk;
- st->p += st->chunk;
- st->to_read -= st->chunk;
- }
-
- if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
- st->biglen, NULL)) {
- bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
-
- if (ssh->cipher)
- ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
-
- st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
- st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
- if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
- bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
-
- st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
- st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
-
- if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
- unsigned char *decompblk;
- int decomplen;
- if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
- st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
- &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
- bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
-
- if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
- st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
- st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
- st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
- unsigned char);
- st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
- }
-
- memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
- sfree(decompblk);
- st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
- }
-
- st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
-
- /*
- * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
- */
- if (ssh->logctx) {
- int nblanks = 0;
- struct logblank_t blank;
- if (ssh->logomitdata) {
- int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
- /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
- if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
- (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
- } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
- }
- if (do_blank) {
- blank.offset = blank_prefix;
- blank.len = st->pktin->length;
- blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
- nblanks = 1;
- }
- }
- log_packet(ssh->logctx,
- PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
- ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
- st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
- nblanks, &blank, NULL);
- }
-
- crFinish(st->pktin);
-}
-
-static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
-{
- struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
-
- crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
-
- st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
-
- st->pktin->type = 0;
- st->pktin->length = 0;
- if (ssh->sccipher)
- st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
- else
- st->cipherblk = 8;
- if (st->cipherblk < 8)
- st->cipherblk = 8;
- st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
-
- if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
- ssh->scmac) {
- /*
- * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
- * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
- * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
- * cipher more than once and thus leak information
- * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
- * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
- * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
- * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
- * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
- * plausible.
- */
-
- /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
- st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
- unsigned char);
-
- /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
- for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
- (*datalen)--;
- }
-
- st->packetlen = 0;
- {
- unsigned char seq[4];
- ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
- PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
- ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
- }
-
- for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
- /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
- for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
- (*datalen)--;
- }
- /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
- ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
- st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
- st->cipherblk);
- /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
- ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
- st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
- st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
- /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
- if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
- st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
- (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
- break;
- if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
- bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
- }
- st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
- st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
- st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
- unsigned char);
- } else {
- st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
-
- /*
- * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
- * contain the length and padding details.
- */
- for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
- (*datalen)--;
- }
-
- if (ssh->sccipher)
- ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
- st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
-
- /*
- * Now get the length figure.
- */
- st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
-
- /*
- * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
- * do us any more damage.
- */
- if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
- (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
- bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * So now we can work out the total packet length.
- */
- st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
-
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
- */
- st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
- st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
- st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
- unsigned char);
-
- /*
- * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
- */
- for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
- st->i++) {
- while ((*datalen) == 0)
- crReturn(NULL);
- st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
- (*datalen)--;
- }
- /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
- if (ssh->sccipher)
- ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
- st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
- st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
-
- /*
- * Check the MAC.
- */
- if (ssh->scmac
- && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
- st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
- bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
- }
- /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
- st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
- if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
- bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
- ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
- crStop(NULL);
- }
- /*
- * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
- */
- st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
-
- st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
- st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
-
- st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
-
- /*
- * Decompress packet payload.
- */
- {
- unsigned char *newpayload;
- int newlen;
- if (ssh->sccomp &&
- ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
- st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
- &newpayload, &newlen)) {
- if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
- st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
- st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
- st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
- unsigned char);
- }
- st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
- memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
- sfree(newpayload);
- }
- }
-
- st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
- st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
- st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
-
- /*
- * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
- */
- if (ssh->logctx) {
- int nblanks = 0;
- struct logblank_t blank;
- if (ssh->logomitdata) {
- int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
- /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
- if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
- } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
- do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
- }
- if (do_blank) {
- blank.offset = blank_prefix;
- blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
- blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
- nblanks = 1;
- }
- }
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
- ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
- st->pktin->type),
- st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
- nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
- }
-
- crFinish(st->pktin);
-}
-
-static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
-{
- int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
- unsigned long crc;
-#ifdef __SC__
- /*
- * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
- * register allocation in this function and use the same register
- * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
- * following sledgehammer prevents this.
- */
- volatile
-#endif
- int len;
-
- if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
- ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
- pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
- pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
- sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
-
- if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
- unsigned char *compblk;
- int complen;
- zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
- pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
- &compblk, &complen);
- ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
- memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
- sfree(compblk);
- pkt->length = complen + 12;
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
- pkt->length += 4;
- len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
- pad = 8 - (len % 8);
- pktoffs = 8 - pad;
- biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
-
- for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
- pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
- crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
-
- if (ssh->cipher)
- ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
- pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
-
- if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
- return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
-}
-
-static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
-{
- if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
- 0, NULL, NULL);
- return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
-}
-
-static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- int len, backlog, offset;
- len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
- backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
- if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
- ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
- ssh_free_packet(pkt);
-}
-
-static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- int len, offset;
- len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
- if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
- ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
- ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
- ssh->deferred_size,
- unsigned char);
- }
- memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
- pkt->data + offset, len);
- ssh->deferred_len += len;
- ssh_free_packet(pkt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
- * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
- * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
- */
-static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
-{
- int argtype;
- Bignum bn;
- struct Packet *pkt;
-
- pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
-
- while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
- unsigned char *argp, argchar;
- char *sargp;
- unsigned long argint;
- int arglen;
- switch (argtype) {
- /* Actual fields in the packet */
- case PKT_INT:
- argint = va_arg(ap, int);
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
- break;
- case PKT_CHAR:
- argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
- break;
- case PKT_DATA:
- argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
- arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
- break;
- case PKT_STR:
- sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
- ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
- break;
- case PKT_BIGNUM:
- bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
- ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
- break;
- /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
- case PKTT_PASSWORD:
- dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- break;
- case PKTT_DATA:
- dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
- break;
- case PKTT_OTHER:
- end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- return pkt;
-}
-
-static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
-{
- struct Packet *pkt;
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, pkttype);
- pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
-}
-
-static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
-{
- struct Packet *pkt;
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, pkttype);
- pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
-}
-
-static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
-{
- char *ae, *be;
- unsigned long av, bv;
-
- av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
- bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
- if (av != bv)
- return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
- if (*ae == '.')
- ae++;
- if (*be == '.')
- be++;
- av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
- bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
- if (av != bv)
- return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
- * `uint32' into a hash state.
- */
-static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
-{
- unsigned char lenblk[4];
- PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
- h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
- h->bytes(s, str, len);
-}
-
-static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
-{
- unsigned char intblk[4];
- PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
- h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
-}
-
-/*
- * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
- */
-static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
-{
- if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
- unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
- int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
- pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
- pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
- if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
- }
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
-{
- if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
- pkt->nblanks++;
- pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
- assert(pkt->body);
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
- (pkt->body - pkt->data);
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
- pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
- }
- pkt->length += len;
- ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
- memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
-}
-static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
-{
- unsigned char x[4];
- PUT_32BIT(x, value);
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
- pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
-{
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
-{
- ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
-}
-static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
-{
- int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
- unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
- (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
- ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
- sfree(data);
-}
-static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
- p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
- p[0] = 0;
- for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
- p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
- i = 0;
- while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
- i++;
- memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
- *len = n + 1 - i;
- return p;
-}
-static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- int len;
- p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
- sfree(p);
-}
-
-static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
-{
- struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
- pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
- pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
- return pkt;
-}
-
-/* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
-#define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
-#define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
-#define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
-#define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
-#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
-#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
-#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
-#define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
-
-static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
-{
- struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
- pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
- pkt->forcepad = 0;
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
- pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
- return pkt;
-}
-
-/*
- * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
- * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
- * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
- */
-static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
-
- if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
- ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
- pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
- pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
- sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
- pkt->nblanks = 0;
-
- /*
- * Compress packet payload.
- */
- {
- unsigned char *newpayload;
- int newlen;
- if (ssh->cscomp &&
- ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
- pkt->length - 5,
- &newpayload, &newlen)) {
- pkt->length = 5;
- ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
- sfree(newpayload);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
- * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
- * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
- * after padding.
- */
- cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
- cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
- padding = 4;
- if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
- padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
- padding +=
- (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
- assert(padding <= 255);
- maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
- ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
- pkt->data[4] = padding;
- for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
- pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
- PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
- if (ssh->csmac)
- ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
- pkt->length + padding,
- ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
- ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
-
- if (ssh->cscipher)
- ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
- pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
-
- pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
-
- /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
- return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
-}
-
-/*
- * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
- * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
- * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
- *
- * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
- * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
- * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
- * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
- * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
- * works after packet encryption.
- *
- * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
- * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
- * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
- * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
- * then send them once we've finished.
- *
- * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
- * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
- *
- * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
- * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
- * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
- * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
- * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
- * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
- *
- * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
- * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
- * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
- * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
- * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
- * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
- * CBC.
- */
-
-static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
-static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
-
-/*
- * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- int len;
- int backlog;
- if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
- /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
- ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
- ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
- return;
- }
- len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
- backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
- if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
- ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
-
- ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
- ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
- ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
-
- ssh_free_packet(pkt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
-{
- int len;
- if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
- ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
- !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
- /*
- * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
- * get encrypted with a known IV.
- */
- struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
- ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
- }
- len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
- if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
- ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
- ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
- ssh->deferred_size,
- unsigned char);
- }
- memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
- ssh->deferred_len += len;
- ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
- ssh_free_packet(pkt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- assert(ssh->queueing);
-
- if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
- ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
- ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
- }
-
- ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
-}
-
-/*
- * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
- * set.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- if (ssh->queueing)
- ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
- else
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
- * set.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- if (ssh->queueing)
- ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
- else
- ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
-}
-
-/*
- * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
- * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
- *
- * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
- * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
- * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
- * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
- * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
- * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
- * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
- * ssh->queueing.
- */
-static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
-{
- int backlog;
- backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
- ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
- sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
- ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
- if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
- ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
-
- ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
- ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
- ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
- ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
- * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
- int padsize)
-{
-#if 0
- if (0) {
- /*
- * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
- * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
- *
- * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
- * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
- * always Cisco?)
- */
- pkt->forcepad = padsize;
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
- } else
-#endif
- {
- /*
- * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
- * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
- * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
- * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
- * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
- */
- ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
-
- /*
- * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
- * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
- * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
- * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
- * gain nothing by it.)
- */
- if (ssh->cscipher &&
- !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
- int stringlen, i;
-
- stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
- stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
- stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
- if (ssh->cscomp) {
- /*
- * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
- * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
- * length we want it. The compression-disabling
- * routine should return an integer indicating how
- * many bytes we should adjust our string length
- * by.
- */
- stringlen -=
- ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
- }
- pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
- for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
- char c = (char) random_byte();
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
- }
- ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
- }
- ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
- * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
- * packets that needed to be lumped together.
- */
-static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
-{
- int i;
-
- assert(!ssh->queueing);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
- ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
- ssh->queuelen = 0;
-
- ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
-}
-
-#if 0
-void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- int i, len;
- p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
- debug(("%s", string));
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- debug((" %02x", p[i]));
- debug(("\n"));
- sfree(p);
-}
-#endif
-
-static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- int len;
- p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
- hash_string(h, s, p, len);
- sfree(p);
-}
-
-/*
- * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
- */
-static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- unsigned long value;
- if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
- return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
- value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
- pkt->savedpos += 4;
- return value;
-}
-static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- unsigned long value;
- if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
- return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
- value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
- pkt->savedpos++;
- return value;
-}
-static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
-{
- int len;
- *p = NULL;
- *length = 0;
- if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
- return;
- len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
- if (len < 0)
- return;
- *length = len;
- pkt->savedpos += 4;
- if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
- return;
- *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
- pkt->savedpos += *length;
-}
-static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
-{
- if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
- return NULL;
- pkt->savedpos += length;
- return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
-}
-static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
- unsigned char **keystr)
-{
- int j;
-
- j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
- pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
- key, keystr, 0);
-
- if (j < 0)
- return FALSE;
-
- pkt->savedpos += j;
- assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
-
- return TRUE;
-}
-static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- int j;
- Bignum b;
-
- j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
- pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
-
- if (j < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- pkt->savedpos += j;
- return b;
-}
-static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
-{
- char *p;
- int length;
- Bignum b;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
- if (!p)
- return NULL;
- if (p[0] & 0x80)
- return NULL;
- b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
- return b;
-}
-
-/*
- * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
- * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
- * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
- * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
- * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
- */
-static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
- void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
- void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
-{
- unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
- unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
-
- /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
- /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
-
- /*
- * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
- * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
- */
- if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
- (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
- int pos, len, siglen;
-
- /*
- * Find the byte length of the modulus.
- */
-
- pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
- pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
- len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
- pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
- while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
- len--, pos++;
- /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
-
- /*
- * Now find the signature integer.
- */
- pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
- siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
- /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
-
- if (len != siglen) {
- unsigned char newlen[4];
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
- /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
- pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
- PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
- /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
- newlen[0] = 0;
- while (len-- > siglen) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
- /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
- }
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
- /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
- return;
- }
-
- /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
- }
-
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
-}
-
-/*
- * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
- * a list of known buggy implementations.
- */
-static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
-{
- char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
- imp = vstring;
- imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
- if (*imp) imp++;
- imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
- if (*imp) imp++;
-
- ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
-
- /*
- * General notes on server version strings:
- * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
- * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
- * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
- * so we can't distinguish them.
- */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == AUTO &&
- (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
- !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
- !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
- !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
- /*
- * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
- * to use a different defence against password length
- * sniffing.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == AUTO &&
- (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
- /*
- * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
- * handle having a null and a random length of data after
- * the password.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
- logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == AUTO &&
- (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
- /*
- * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
- * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
- * an AUTH_RSA message.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
- logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == AUTO &&
- !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
- (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
- wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
- wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
- /*
- * These versions have the HMAC bug.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == AUTO &&
- !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
- (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
- /*
- * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
- * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
- * generate the keys).
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == AUTO &&
- (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
- wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
- /*
- * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == AUTO &&
- wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
- /*
- * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
- * public-key authentication.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == AUTO &&
- (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
- wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
- wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
- wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
- wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
- /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
- wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
- /*
- * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == FORCE_ON ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == AUTO &&
- (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
- wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
- /*
- * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
- logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore2) == FORCE_ON) {
- /*
- * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
- * none detected automatically.
- */
- ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
- logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
- * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
- */
-static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
-{
- /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
- assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
- assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
- assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
- assert(*str == '-'); str++;
- while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
- assert(*str == '-'); str++;
-
- /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
- * underscores. */
- while (*str) {
- if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
- *str = '_';
- str++;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
- */
-static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
-{
- char *verstring;
-
- if (ssh->version == 2) {
- /*
- * Construct a v2 version string.
- */
- verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
- } else {
- /*
- * Construct a v1 version string.
- */
- verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
- (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
- svers : "1.5"),
- sshver);
- }
-
- ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
-
- if (ssh->version == 2) {
- size_t len;
- /*
- * Record our version string.
- */
- len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
- ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
- memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
- ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
- }
-
- logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
- strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
- s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
- sfree(verstring);
-}
-
-static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
-{
- struct do_ssh_init_state {
- int vslen;
- char version[10];
- char *vstring;
- int vstrsize;
- int i;
- int proto1, proto2;
- };
- crState(do_ssh_init_state);
-
- crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
-
- /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
- for (;;) {
- if (c != 'S') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != 'S') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != 'H') goto no;
- crReturn(1);
- if (c != '-') goto no;
- break;
- no:
- while (c != '\012')
- crReturn(1);
- crReturn(1);
- }
-
- s->vstrsize = 16;
- s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
- strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
- s->vslen = 4;
- s->i = 0;
- while (1) {
- crReturn(1); /* get another char */
- if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
- s->vstrsize += 16;
- s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
- }
- s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
- if (s->i >= 0) {
- if (c == '-') {
- s->version[s->i] = '\0';
- s->i = -1;
- } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
- s->version[s->i++] = c;
- } else if (c == '\012')
- break;
- }
-
- ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
- ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
-
- s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
- s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
- logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
- ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
-
- /*
- * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
- */
-
- /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
- s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
- /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
- s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0 && !s->proto1) {
- bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 3 && !s->proto2) {
- bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- if (s->proto2 && (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) >= 2 || !s->proto1))
- ssh->version = 2;
- else
- ssh->version = 1;
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
-
- /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) != 3)
- ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
-
- if (ssh->version == 2) {
- size_t len;
- /*
- * Record their version string.
- */
- len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
- ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
- memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
- ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
-
- /*
- * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
- */
- ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
- ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
- ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
- } else {
- /*
- * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
- */
- ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
- ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
- ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
- }
- if (ssh->version == 2)
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
-
- update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
- ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
-
- sfree(s->vstring);
-
- crFinish(0);
-}
-
-static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
- unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
-{
- struct Packet *pktin;
-
- pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
- if (pktin) {
- ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
- ssh_free_packet(pktin);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
- unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
-{
- bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
- *data += *datalen;
- *datalen = 0;
-}
-
-static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
-{
- void *vdata;
- unsigned char *data;
- int len, origlen;
-
- while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
- bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
- data = vdata;
- origlen = len;
-
- while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
- ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
-
- if (origlen > len)
- bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
-{
- if (ssh->s)
- sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
- ssh->frozen = frozen;
-}
-
-static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
-{
- /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
- if (ssh->logctx)
- log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
- 0, NULL, NULL);
-
- crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
-
- /*
- * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
- * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
- * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
- * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
- */
- while (1) {
- int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
- if (datalen == 0)
- crReturnV; /* more data please */
- ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
- data++;
- datalen--;
- if (ret == 0)
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
- * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
- * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
- * to the proper protocol handler.
- */
-
- while (1) {
- while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
- if (ssh->frozen) {
- ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
- /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
- * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
- * return, so break out. */
- break;
- } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
- /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
- * session. */
- ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
- } else {
- /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
- * session. */
- ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
- }
- /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
- }
- /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
- crReturnV;
- }
- crFinishV;
-}
-
-static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
- expire_timer_context(ssh);
- if (ssh->s) {
- sk_close(ssh->s);
- ssh->s = NULL;
- if (notify_exit)
- notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
- else
- ret = 1;
- }
- /*
- * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
- * through this connection.
- */
- if (ssh->channels) {
- while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_X11:
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
- break;
- }
- del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
- if (ssh->version == 2)
- bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
- sfree(c);
- }
- }
- /*
- * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
- * listening sockets.
- */
- if (ssh->portfwds) {
- struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
- while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
- /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
- if (pf->local)
- pfd_terminate(pf->local);
- del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
- free_portfwd(pf);
- }
- freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
- ssh->portfwds = NULL;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
- const char *error_msg, int error_code)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
- char addrbuf[256], *msg;
-
- sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
-
- if (type == 0)
- msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
- else
- msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
-
- logevent(msg);
- sfree(msg);
-}
-
-static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
- int calling_back)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
- int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
-
- if (!error_msg) {
- if (!ssh->close_expected)
- error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
- else
- error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
- }
-
- if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
- ssh->exitcode = 0;
-
- if (need_notify)
- notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
-
- if (error_msg)
- logevent(error_msg);
- if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
- connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
- ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
- ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
- /*
- * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
- * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
- */
- if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
- ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
-}
-
-/*
- * Connect to specified host and port.
- * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
- * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
- * freed by the caller.
- */
-static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
- char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
-{
- static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
- ssh_log,
- ssh_closing,
- ssh_receive,
- ssh_sent,
- NULL
- };
-
- SockAddr addr;
- const char *err;
- char *loghost;
- int addressfamily, sshprot;
-
- loghost = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_loghost);
- if (*loghost) {
- char *colon;
-
- ssh->savedhost = dupstr(loghost);
- ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
-
- /*
- * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
- * savedport.
- *
- * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
- */
- colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
- if (colon) {
- *colon++ = '\0';
- if (*colon)
- ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
- }
- } else {
- ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
- if (port < 0)
- port = 22; /* default ssh port */
- ssh->savedport = port;
- }
-
- /*
- * Try to find host.
- */
- addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
- logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
- (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
- (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
- addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
- if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
- sk_addr_free(addr);
- return err;
- }
- ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
-
- /*
- * Open socket.
- */
- ssh->fn = &fn_table;
- ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
- 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
- if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
- ssh->s = NULL;
- notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
- return err;
- }
-
- /*
- * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
- * send the version string too.
- */
- sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
- if (sshprot == 0)
- ssh->version = 1;
- if (sshprot == 3) {
- ssh->version = 2;
- ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
- */
- if (*loghost) {
- sfree(*realhost);
- *realhost = dupstr(loghost);
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
- */
-static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
-{
- int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
- ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
- assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
- if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
- * on the SSH connection itself back up).
- */
-static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
-{
- int i;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
- return;
- ssh->throttled_all = enable;
- ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
- if (!ssh->channels)
- return;
- for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
- /*
- * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
- */
- break;
- case CHAN_X11:
- x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
- break;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
-
- ssh->agent_response = reply;
- ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1)
- do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
- else
- do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
-}
-
-static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
-
- ssh->user_response = ret;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1)
- do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
- else
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
-
- /*
- * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
- * queued-data run.
- */
- ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
-}
-
-static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- void *sentreply = reply;
-
- if (!sentreply) {
- /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
- sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
- replylen = 5;
- }
- if (ssh->version == 2) {
- ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
- ssh2_try_send(c);
- } else {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
- PKT_INT, replylen,
- PKTT_DATA,
- PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
- PKTT_OTHER,
- PKT_END);
- }
- if (reply)
- sfree(reply);
-}
-
-/*
- * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
- * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
- * => log `wire_reason'.
- */
-static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
- int code, int clean_exit)
-{
- char *error;
- if (!client_reason)
- client_reason = wire_reason;
- if (client_reason)
- error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
- else
- error = dupstr("Disconnected");
- if (wire_reason) {
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
- PKT_END);
- } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
- struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
- }
- }
- ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
- ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
- ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
- sfree(error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
- */
-static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- int i, j, ret;
- unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
- struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
- struct MD5Context md5c;
- struct do_ssh1_login_state {
- int len;
- unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
- unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
- int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
- int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
- unsigned char session_id[16];
- int cipher_type;
- void *publickey_blob;
- int publickey_bloblen;
- char *publickey_comment;
- int publickey_encrypted;
- prompts_t *cur_prompt;
- char c;
- int pwpkt_type;
- unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
- int responselen;
- int keyi, nkeys;
- int authed;
- struct RSAKey key;
- Bignum challenge;
- char *commentp;
- int commentlen;
- int dlgret;
- Filename *keyfile;
- };
- crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
-
- crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
-
- if (!pktin)
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- logevent("Received public keys");
-
- ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
- if (!ptr) {
- bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
-
- if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
- !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
- bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- /*
- * Log the host key fingerprint.
- */
- {
- char logmsg[80];
- logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
- strcpy(logmsg, " ");
- hostkey.comment = NULL;
- rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
- sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
- logevent(logmsg);
- }
-
- ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
- s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
-
- ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
- ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
- ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
-
- MD5Init(&md5c);
- MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
- MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
- MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
- MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
- ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
-
- /*
- * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
- */
- if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
- servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
- bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
-
- s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
-
- /*
- * Verify the host key.
- */
- {
- /*
- * First format the key into a string.
- */
- int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
- char fingerprint[100];
- char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
- rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
- rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
-
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
- ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
- "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- sfree(keystr);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for user host key response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
-
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
- NULL, 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
- if (i < 16)
- s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
- }
-
- if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
- ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
- if (ret)
- ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
- } else {
- ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
- if (ret)
- ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
- }
- if (!ret) {
- bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- logevent("Encrypted session key");
-
- {
- int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
- char *cipher_string = NULL;
- int i;
- for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
- int next_cipher = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
- CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i);
- if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
- /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
- warn = 1;
- } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
- /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
- logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
- } else {
- switch (next_cipher) {
- case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
- cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
- case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
- cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
- case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
- cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
- }
- if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
- cipher_chosen = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!cipher_chosen) {
- if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
- bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
- "supporting 3DES encryption"));
- else
- /* shouldn't happen */
- bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
- if (warn) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for user response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
- }
-
- switch (s->cipher_type) {
- case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
- logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
- break;
- case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
- logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
- break;
- case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
- logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
- break;
- }
-
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
- PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
- PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
- PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
- PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
- PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
-
- logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
-
- sfree(s->rsabuf);
-
- ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
- s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
- &ssh_3des);
- ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
- ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
-
- ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
- logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
-
- if (servkey.modulus) {
- sfree(servkey.modulus);
- servkey.modulus = NULL;
- }
- if (servkey.exponent) {
- sfree(servkey.exponent);
- servkey.exponent = NULL;
- }
- if (hostkey.modulus) {
- sfree(hostkey.modulus);
- hostkey.modulus = NULL;
- }
- if (hostkey.exponent) {
- sfree(hostkey.exponent);
- hostkey.exponent = NULL;
- }
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- logevent("Successfully started encryption");
-
- fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
- {
- if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
- int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntil(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- }
-
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, ssh->username, PKT_END);
- {
- char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", ssh->username);
- logevent(userlog);
- if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
- (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
- c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
- c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
- }
- sfree(userlog);
- }
- }
-
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
-
- if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
- /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
- s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
- } else {
- s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
- }
- s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
- /*
- * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
- */
- s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
- if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
- int keytype;
- logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
- keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
- if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
- const char *error;
- if (rsakey_pubblob(s->keyfile,
- &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
- &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
- s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
- NULL);
- } else {
- char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
- "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
- error);
- c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
- sfree(msgbuf);
- s->publickey_blob = NULL;
- }
- } else {
- char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
- key_type_to_str(keytype));
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
- " (%s)\r\n",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
- key_type_to_str(keytype));
- c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
- sfree(msgbuf);
- s->publickey_blob = NULL;
- }
- } else
- s->publickey_blob = NULL;
-
- while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
- /*
- * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
- */
- void *r;
-
- s->authed = FALSE;
- s->tried_agent = 1;
- logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
-
- /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
- PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
- s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
- if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
- ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for agent response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- r = ssh->agent_response;
- s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
- }
- s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
- if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
- s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
- s->p = s->response + 5;
- s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
- s->p += 4;
- logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
- for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
- unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
- s->p += 4;
- {
- int n, ok = FALSE;
- do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
- n = ssh1_read_bignum
- (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
- &s->key.exponent);
- if (n < 0)
- break;
- s->p += n;
- n = ssh1_read_bignum
- (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
- &s->key.modulus);
- if (n < 0)
- break;
- s->p += n;
- if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
- break;
- s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
- s->p += 4;
- if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
- s->commentlen)
- break;
- s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
- s->p += s->commentlen;
- ok = TRUE;
- } while (0);
- if (!ok) {
- logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
- break;
- }
- }
- if (s->publickey_blob) {
- if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
- s->publickey_bloblen)) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
- "configured key file", s->keyi);
- s->tried_publickey = 1;
- } else
- /* Skip non-configured key */
- continue;
- }
- logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
- PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
- logevent("Key refused");
- continue;
- }
- logevent("Received RSA challenge");
- if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
- bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- {
- char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
- void *vret;
- int len, retlen;
- len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
- len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
- len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
- len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
- len += 16; /* session id */
- len += 4; /* response format */
- agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
- PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
- q = agentreq + 4;
- *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
- PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
- q += 4;
- q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
- q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
- q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
- memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
- q += 16;
- PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
- if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
- ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
- sfree(agentreq);
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
- " while waiting for agent"
- " response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- vret = ssh->agent_response;
- retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
- } else
- sfree(agentreq);
- ret = vret;
- if (ret) {
- if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
- logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
- PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
- PKT_END);
- sfree(ret);
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- logevent
- ("Pageant's response accepted");
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
- " RSA key \"");
- c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
- s->commentlen);
- c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
- }
- s->authed = TRUE;
- } else
- logevent
- ("Pageant's response not accepted");
- } else {
- logevent
- ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
- sfree(ret);
- }
- } else {
- logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
- }
- }
- freebn(s->key.exponent);
- freebn(s->key.modulus);
- freebn(s->challenge);
- if (s->authed)
- break;
- }
- sfree(s->response);
- if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
- logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
- } else {
- logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
- }
- if (s->authed)
- break;
- }
- if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
- /*
- * Try public key authentication with the specified
- * key file.
- */
- int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
- c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
- s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
- logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
- s->tried_publickey = 1;
- got_passphrase = FALSE;
- while (!got_passphrase) {
- /*
- * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
- */
- char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
- const char *error;
- if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
- c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
- passphrase = NULL;
- } else {
- int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
- dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
- s->publickey_comment), FALSE);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntil(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- }
- /*
- * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
- */
- s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
- ret = loadrsakey(s->keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
- &error);
- if (passphrase) {
- memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
- sfree(passphrase);
- }
- if (ret == 1) {
- /* Correct passphrase. */
- got_passphrase = TRUE;
- } else if (ret == 0) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
- c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
- c_write_str(ssh, " (");
- c_write_str(ssh, error);
- c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
- got_passphrase = FALSE;
- break; /* go and try something else */
- } else if (ret == -1) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
- got_passphrase = FALSE;
- /* and try again */
- } else {
- assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
- got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
- }
- }
-
- if (got_passphrase) {
-
- /*
- * Send a public key attempt.
- */
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
- PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
-
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
- continue; /* go and try something else */
- }
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
- bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- {
- int i;
- unsigned char buffer[32];
- Bignum challenge, response;
-
- if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
- bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
- freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
- }
-
- MD5Init(&md5c);
- MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
- MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
- MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
-
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
- PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
-
- freebn(challenge);
- freebn(response);
- }
-
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
- c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
- " our public key.\r\n");
- continue; /* go and try something else */
- } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- break; /* we're through! */
- }
-
- }
-
- /*
- * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
- */
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
- (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
- !s->tis_auth_refused) {
- s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
- logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
- logevent("TIS authentication declined");
- if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
- c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
- s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
- continue;
- } else {
- char *challenge;
- int challengelen;
- char *instr_suf, *prompt;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
- if (!challenge) {
- bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- logevent("Received TIS challenge");
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
- /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
- if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
- instr_suf = dupstr("");
- prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
- } else {
- instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
- prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
- }
- s->cur_prompt->instruction =
- dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
- (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
- instr_suf);
- s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
- sfree(instr_suf);
- }
- }
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
- (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
- !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
- s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
- logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
- logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
- c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
- s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
- continue;
- } else {
- char *challenge;
- int challengelen;
- char *instr_suf, *prompt;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
- if (!challenge) {
- bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
- s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
- /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
- if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
- instr_suf = dupstr("");
- prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
- } else {
- instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
- prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
- }
- s->cur_prompt->instruction =
- dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
- (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
- instr_suf);
- s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
- sfree(instr_suf);
- }
- }
- if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
- if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
- bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
- ssh->username, ssh->savedhost),
- FALSE);
- }
-
- /*
- * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
- * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
- * authentication.
- */
- {
- int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntil(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Failed to get a password (for example
- * because one was supplied on the command line
- * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
- /*
- * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
- * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
- * different lengths. One of these strings is the
- * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
- * The others are all random data in
- * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
- * listener can't tell which is the password, and
- * hence can't deduce the password length.
- *
- * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
- * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
- * password that a listener won't find it _that_
- * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
- * do is:
- *
- * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
- * containing string lengths 1 through 15
- *
- * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
- * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
- * packets containing string lengths N through
- * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
- * magnitude of the password length, but it will
- * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
- *
- * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
- * least in this context. For these servers, we need
- * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
- * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
- * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
- *
- * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
- * here _nor_ a padded password string.
- * For these servers we are left with no defences
- * against password length sniffing.
- */
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
- !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
- /*
- * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
- * we can use the primary defence.
- */
- int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
- char *randomstr;
-
- pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- if (pwlen < 16) {
- bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
- top = 15;
- } else {
- bottom = pwlen & ~7;
- top = bottom + 7;
- }
-
- assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
-
- randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
-
- for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
- if (i == pwlen) {
- defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
- PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- do {
- randomstr[j] = random_byte();
- } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
- }
- randomstr[i] = '\0';
- defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
- PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
- }
- }
- logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
- ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
- sfree(randomstr);
- }
- else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
- /*
- * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
- * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
- * can use the secondary defence.
- */
- char string[64];
- char *ss;
- int len;
-
- len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- if (len < sizeof(string)) {
- ss = string;
- strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- len++; /* cover the zero byte */
- while (len < sizeof(string)) {
- string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
- }
- } else {
- ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
- }
- logevent("Sending length-padded password");
- send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- } else {
- /*
- * The server is believed unable to cope with
- * any of our password camouflage methods.
- */
- int len;
- len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- logevent("Sending unpadded password");
- send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
- PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
- PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- }
- } else {
- send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- }
- logevent("Sent password");
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
- c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
- logevent("Authentication refused");
- } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- /* Clear up */
- if (s->publickey_blob) {
- sfree(s->publickey_blob);
- sfree(s->publickey_comment);
- }
-
- logevent("Authentication successful");
-
- crFinish(1);
-}
-
-static void ssh_channel_try_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- assert(c->pending_eof); /* precondition for calling us */
- if (c->halfopen)
- return; /* can't close: not even opened yet */
- if (ssh->version == 2 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0)
- return; /* can't send EOF: pending outgoing data */
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
- PKT_END);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
- } else {
- struct Packet *pktout;
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
- if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes)) {
- /*
- * Also send MSG_CLOSE.
- */
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
- }
- }
- c->pending_eof = FALSE; /* we've sent it now */
-}
-
-void sshfwd_write_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
-
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
- return;
-
- c->pending_eof = TRUE;
- ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
-}
-
-void sshfwd_unclean_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)
- return;
-
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_X11:
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
- break;
- }
- c->type = CHAN_ZOMBIE;
- ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
-}
-
-int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
-
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return 0;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
- PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- /*
- * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
- * connections are never individually throttled - because
- * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
- * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
- * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
- */
- return 0;
- } else {
- ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
- return ssh2_try_send(c);
- }
-}
-
-void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- int buflimit;
-
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
- } else {
- buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
- ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
- }
- if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
-
- assert(qh != NULL);
-
- assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
-
- if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
- }
- if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
- }
-
- if (qh->next) {
- ssh->qhead = qh->next;
-
- if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
- }
- if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
- }
- } else {
- ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
- }
-
- qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
-
- sfree(qh);
-}
-
-static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
- chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
-{
- struct queued_handler *qh;
-
- qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
- qh->msg1 = msg1;
- qh->msg2 = msg2;
- qh->handler = handler;
- qh->ctx = ctx;
- qh->next = NULL;
-
- if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
- ssh->qhead = qh;
-
- if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
- }
- if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
- assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
- }
- } else {
- ssh->qtail->next = qh;
- }
- ssh->qtail = qh;
-}
-
-static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
-{
- struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
-
- if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
- pf->sportdesc);
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
- pf->sportdesc);
-
- rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
- assert(rpf == pf);
- pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
- free_rportfwd(pf);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, Conf *conf)
-{
- struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
- int i;
- char *key, *val;
-
- if (!ssh->portfwds) {
- ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
- } else {
- /*
- * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
- * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
- * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
- * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
- * they were before.
- */
- struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
- int i;
- for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
- epf->status = DESTROY;
- }
-
- for (val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, NULL, &key);
- val != NULL;
- val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, key, &key)) {
- char *kp, *kp2, *vp, *vp2;
- char address_family, type;
- int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
- char *sports, *dports, *saddr, *host;
-
- kp = key;
-
- address_family = 'A';
- type = 'L';
- if (*kp == 'A' || *kp == '4' || *kp == '6')
- address_family = *kp++;
- if (*kp == 'L' || *kp == 'R')
- type = *kp++;
-
- if ((kp2 = strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
- /*
- * There's a colon in the middle of the source port
- * string, which means that the part before it is
- * actually a source address.
- */
- saddr = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
- sports = kp2+1;
- } else {
- saddr = NULL;
- sports = kp;
- }
- sport = atoi(sports);
- sserv = 0;
- if (sport == 0) {
- sserv = 1;
- sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
- if (!sport) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
- " port \"%s\"", sports);
- }
- }
-
- if (type == 'L' && !strcmp(val, "D")) {
- /* dynamic forwarding */
- host = NULL;
- dports = NULL;
- dport = -1;
- dserv = 0;
- type = 'D';
- } else {
- /* ordinary forwarding */
- vp = val;
- vp2 = vp + strcspn(vp, ":");
- host = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(vp2 - vp), vp);
- if (vp2)
- vp2++;
- dports = vp2;
- dport = atoi(dports);
- dserv = 0;
- if (dport == 0) {
- dserv = 1;
- dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
- if (!dport) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
- " port \"%s\"", dports);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (sport && dport) {
- /* Set up a description of the source port. */
- struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
-
- pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
- pfrec->type = type;
- pfrec->saddr = saddr;
- pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
- pfrec->sport = sport;
- pfrec->daddr = host;
- pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
- pfrec->dport = dport;
- pfrec->local = NULL;
- pfrec->remote = NULL;
- pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
- address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
- ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
-
- epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
- if (epfrec != pfrec) {
- if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
- /*
- * We already have a port forwarding up and running
- * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
- * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
- * as KEEP.
- */
- epfrec->status = KEEP;
- }
- /*
- * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
- * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
- */
- free_portfwd(pfrec);
- } else {
- pfrec->status = CREATE;
- }
- } else {
- sfree(saddr);
- sfree(host);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
- * not re-enabled.
- */
- for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
- if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
- char *message;
-
- message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
- epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
- epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
- epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
- epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
- epf->sport);
-
- if (epf->type != 'D') {
- char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
- epf->daddr, epf->dport);
- sfree(message);
- message = msg2;
- }
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
- sfree(message);
-
- /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
- * forwarding failed. */
- if (epf->remote) {
- struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- /*
- * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
- * end.
- */
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- /*
- * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
- * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
- * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
- * the rportfwd record from the local end
- * so that any connections the server tries
- * to make on it are rejected.
- */
- } else {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
- if (epf->saddr) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
- } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
- /* XXX: rport_acceptall may not represent
- * what was used to open the original connection,
- * since it's reconfigurable. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
- } else {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
- }
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
-
- del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
- free_rportfwd(rpf);
- } else if (epf->local) {
- pfd_terminate(epf->local);
- }
-
- delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
- free_portfwd(epf);
- i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
- }
-
- /*
- * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
- */
- for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
- if (epf->status == CREATE) {
- char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
- sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
- epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
- epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
- epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
- epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
- epf->sport,
- epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
- if (epf->type == 'D') {
- dportdesc = NULL;
- } else {
- dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
- epf->daddr,
- epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
- epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
- epf->dport,
- epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
- }
-
- if (epf->type == 'L') {
- const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
- epf->saddr, epf->sport,
- ssh, conf,
- &epf->local,
- epf->addressfamily);
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
- epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
- epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
- sportdesc, dportdesc,
- err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
- } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
- const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
- epf->saddr, epf->sport,
- ssh, conf,
- &epf->local,
- epf->addressfamily);
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
- epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
- epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
- sportdesc,
- err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
- } else {
- struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
-
- /*
- * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
- */
- if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
- if (ssh->version == 1)
- ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
- else
- ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
- }
-
- pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
- strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
- pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
- pf->dport = epf->dport;
- pf->sport = epf->sport;
- if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
- epf->daddr, epf->dport);
- sfree(pf);
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
- " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
-
- pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
- sportdesc = NULL;
- epf->remote = pf;
- pf->pfrec = epf;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
- PKT_INT, epf->sport,
- PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
- PKT_INT, epf->dport,
- PKT_END);
- ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
- SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
- ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
- } else {
- struct Packet *pktout;
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
- if (epf->saddr) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
- } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
- } else {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
- }
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
-
- ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
- ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
- }
- }
- }
- sfree(sportdesc);
- sfree(dportdesc);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *string;
- int stringlen, bufsize;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
- if (string == NULL) {
- bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
- return;
- }
-
- bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
- string, stringlen);
- if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
- ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
- * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
-
- logevent("Received X11 connect request");
- /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
- if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
- } else {
- c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- c->ssh = ssh;
-
- if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
- NULL, -1, ssh->conf) != NULL) {
- logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
- sfree(c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- } else {
- logevent
- ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
- c->remoteid = remoteid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
- c->closes = 0;
- c->pending_eof = FALSE;
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
- c->localid, PKT_END);
- logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
- * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
-
- /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
- if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- } else {
- c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- c->ssh = ssh;
- c->remoteid = remoteid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
- c->closes = 0;
- c->pending_eof = FALSE;
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
- c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
- c->u.a.message = NULL;
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
- PKT_END);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
- * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
- int remoteid;
- int hostsize, port;
- char *host;
- const char *e;
- c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- c->ssh = ssh;
-
- remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
- port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
-
- if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
- hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
- memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
- pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
- pf.dport = port;
- pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
-
- if (pfp == NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
- pf.dhost, port);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
- pf.dhost, port);
- e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
- c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
- if (e != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
- sfree(c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
- PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
- } else {
- c->remoteid = remoteid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
- c->closes = 0;
- c->pending_eof = FALSE;
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
- c->localid, PKT_END);
- logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
- if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
- c->remoteid = localid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
- c->throttling_conn = 0;
- pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
- }
-
- if (c && c->pending_eof) {
- /*
- * We have a pending close on this channel,
- * which we decided on before the server acked
- * the channel open. So now we know the
- * remoteid, we can close it again.
- */
- ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
- if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
- logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
- del234(ssh->channels, c);
- sfree(c);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Remote side closes a channel. */
- unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
- if (c && !c->halfopen) {
-
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE &&
- !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)) {
- /*
- * Received CHANNEL_CLOSE, which we translate into
- * outgoing EOF.
- */
- int send_close = FALSE;
-
- c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
-
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s)
- x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
- else
- send_close = TRUE;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- if (c->u.pfd.s)
- x11_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
- else
- send_close = TRUE;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- send_close = TRUE;
- }
-
- if (send_close && !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
- PKT_END);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
- }
- }
-
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION &&
- !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
-
- if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
- bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION for channel %d"
- " for which we never sent CHANNEL_CLOSE\n", i));
- }
-
- c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
- }
-
- if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes) &&
- !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION,
- PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
- }
-
- if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes))
- ssh_channel_destroy(c);
- } else {
- bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
- pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
- "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
- i));
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
- int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- char *p;
- int len;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
-
- c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
- if (c) {
- int bufsize = 0;
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_X11:
- bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
- break;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
- while (len > 0) {
- if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
- unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
- memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
- l);
- p += l;
- len -= l;
- c->u.a.lensofar += l;
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
- c->u.a.totallen =
- 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
- c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
- unsigned char);
- memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
- unsigned int l =
- min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
- (unsigned)len);
- memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
- l);
- p += l;
- len -= l;
- c->u.a.lensofar += l;
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
- void *reply;
- int replylen;
- if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
- c->u.a.totallen,
- &reply, &replylen,
- ssh_agentf_callback, c))
- ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
- sfree(c->u.a.message);
- c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
- }
- }
- bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
- break;
- }
- if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
- c->throttling_conn = 1;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
- /*
- * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
- * extra human-readable text on the end of the
- * session which we might mistake for another
- * encrypted packet, we close the session once
- * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
- */
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
-}
-
-/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
-static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
-{
- struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
- int i = 0;
- unsigned int arg = 0;
- while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
- if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
- switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
- case TTY_OP_CHAR:
- arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
- break;
- case TTY_OP_BOOL:
- arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
- break;
- }
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
-}
-
-
-static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
-
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
- ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
-
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
- ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
- ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
- ssh1_msg_channel_close;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
- logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
- do {
- crReturnV;
- } while (!pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
- && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
- crStopV;
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
- } else {
- logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
- ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
- }
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
- (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
- logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
- /*
- * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
- * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
- * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
- * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
- * cookie into the log.
- */
- if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
- PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
- PKTT_OTHER,
- PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
- PKT_END);
- } else {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
- PKTT_PASSWORD,
- PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
- PKTT_OTHER,
- PKT_END);
- }
- do {
- crReturnV;
- } while (!pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
- && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
- crStopV;
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
- } else {
- logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
- ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
- }
- }
-
- ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
-
- if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
- struct Packet *pkt;
- /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
- /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
- ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
- sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
- /* Send the pty request. */
- pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
- ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
- parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
- ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
- s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
- do {
- crReturnV;
- } while (!pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
- && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
- crStopV;
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
- ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
- ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
- ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
- }
- } else {
- ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression)) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
- do {
- crReturnV;
- } while (!pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
- && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
- crStopV;
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
- }
- logevent("Started compression");
- ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
- ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
- logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
- ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
- logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
- }
-
- /*
- * Start the shell or command.
- *
- * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
- * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
- * exists, we fall straight back to that.
- */
- {
- char *cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys) &&
- conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
- cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
- ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
- }
- if (*cmd)
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
- else
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
- logevent("Started session");
- }
-
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
- if (ssh->size_needed)
- ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
- if (ssh->eof_needed)
- ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
-
- if (ssh->ldisc)
- ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
- while (1) {
-
- /*
- * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
- * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
- * attention to the unusual ones.
- */
-
- crReturnV;
- if (pktin) {
- if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
- } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
- * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
- } else {
- bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- } else {
- while (inlen > 0) {
- int len = min(inlen, 512);
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
- PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
- PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
- in += len;
- inlen -= len;
- }
- }
- }
-
- crFinishV;
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
- */
-static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *msg;
- int msglen;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
- logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
-}
-
-static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* log reason code in disconnect message */
- char *msg;
- int msglen;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
- bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
-}
-
-static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
-}
-
-static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
-{
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
-
- /*
- * These special message types we install handlers for.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
-}
-
-static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
- ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
- if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
- ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
- else
- return;
- }
-
- do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
-}
-
-/*
- * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
- */
-static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
-{
- int needlen;
- if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
- return 0;
- needlen = strlen(needle);
- while (1) {
- /*
- * Is it at the start of the string?
- */
- if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
- !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
- (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
- /* either , or EOS follows */
- )
- return 1;
- /*
- * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
- * If no comma found, terminate.
- */
- while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
- haylen--, haystack++;
- if (haylen == 0)
- return 0;
- haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
- */
-static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
-{
- int needlen;
- if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
- return 0;
- needlen = strlen(needle);
- /*
- * Is it at the start of the string?
- */
- if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
- !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
- (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
- /* either , or EOS follows */
- )
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * SSH-2 key creation method.
- * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
- * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
- */
-#define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
-static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
- unsigned char *keyspace)
-{
- const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
- void *s;
- /* First hlen bytes. */
- s = h->init();
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
- hash_mpint(h, s, K);
- h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
- h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
- h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- h->final(s, keyspace);
- /* Next hlen bytes. */
- s = h->init();
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
- hash_mpint(h, s, K);
- h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
- h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
- h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
- */
-static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
- struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
- int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
- Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
- void *our_kexinit;
- int our_kexinitlen;
- int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
- const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
- int nmacs;
- const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
- const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
- const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
- const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
- const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
- const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
- char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
- int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
- void *hkey; /* actual host key */
- void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
- unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
- int n_preferred_kex;
- const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
- int n_preferred_ciphers;
- const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
- const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
- int userauth_succeeded; /* for delayed compression */
- int pending_compression;
- int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
- struct Packet *pktout;
- int dlgret;
- int guessok;
- int ignorepkt;
- };
- crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
-
- crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
-
- s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
- s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
- s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
-
- s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
- s->userauth_succeeded = FALSE;
- s->pending_compression = FALSE;
-
- /*
- * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
- */
- if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
- s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
- else
- s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
-
- begin_key_exchange:
- ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
- {
- int i, j, commalist_started;
-
- /*
- * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
- */
- s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
- switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_kexlist, i)) {
- case KEX_DHGEX:
- s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
- &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
- break;
- case KEX_DHGROUP14:
- s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
- &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
- break;
- case KEX_DHGROUP1:
- s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
- &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
- break;
- case KEX_RSA:
- s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
- &ssh_rsa_kex;
- break;
- case KEX_WARN:
- /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
- * the list. */
- if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
- s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
- */
- s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
- switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
- case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
- break;
- case CIPHER_DES:
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
- }
- break;
- case CIPHER_3DES:
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
- break;
- case CIPHER_AES:
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
- break;
- case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
- break;
- case CIPHER_WARN:
- /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
- * the list. */
- if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
- s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Set up preferred compression.
- */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression))
- s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
- else
- s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
-
- /*
- * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
- * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
- */
- ssh->queueing = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Flag that KEX is in progress.
- */
- ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
- /* List key exchange algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- commalist_started = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
- const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
- if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
- for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
- if (commalist_started)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
- commalist_started = 1;
- }
- }
- /* List server host key algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
- if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- }
- /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- commalist_started = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
- const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
- if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
- for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
- if (commalist_started)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
- commalist_started = 1;
- }
- }
- /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- commalist_started = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
- const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
- if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
- for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
- if (commalist_started)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
- commalist_started = 1;
- }
- }
- /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
- if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- }
- /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
- if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- }
- /* List client->server compression algorithms,
- * then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
- * same set twice.) */
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
- /* Prefer non-delayed versions */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
- /* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
- * they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
- * this function. */
- if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
- s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
- const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
- if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
- if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
- /* Reserved. */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
- }
-
- s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
- s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
- memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
-
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- if (!pktin)
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
-
- /*
- * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
- * to.
- */
- {
- char *str, *preferred;
- int i, j, len;
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
- bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- ssh->kex = NULL;
- ssh->hostkey = NULL;
- s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
- s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
- s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
- s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
- s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
- s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
- s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
-
- pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
-
- preferred = NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
- const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
- if (!k) {
- s->warn_kex = TRUE;
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
- if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
- if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
- ssh->kex = k->list[j];
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (ssh->kex)
- break;
- }
- if (!ssh->kex) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- /*
- * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
- * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
- * we end up using.
- */
- s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
- if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
- ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- s->guessok = s->guessok &&
- first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
- const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
- if (!c) {
- s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
- if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
- s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (s->cscipher_tobe)
- break;
- }
- if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
- for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
- const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
- if (!c) {
- s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
- if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
- s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (s->sccipher_tobe)
- break;
- }
- if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
- bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
- str ? str : "(null)"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
- for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
- if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
- s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
- for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
- if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
- s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
- const struct ssh_compress *c =
- i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
- if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
- s->cscomp_tobe = c;
- break;
- } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
- if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
- s->cscomp_tobe = c;
- break;
- } else {
- s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
- }
- }
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
- for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
- const struct ssh_compress *c =
- i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
- if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
- s->sccomp_tobe = c;
- break;
- } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
- if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
- s->sccomp_tobe = c;
- break;
- } else {
- s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
- }
- }
- }
- if (s->pending_compression) {
- logevent("Server supports delayed compression; "
- "will try this later");
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
- s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
-
- if (s->warn_kex) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
- ssh->kex->name,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
- " waiting for user response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- if (s->warn_cscipher) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
- "client-to-server cipher",
- s->cscipher_tobe->name,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
- " waiting for user response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- if (s->warn_sccipher) {
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
- "server-to-client cipher",
- s->sccipher_tobe->name,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
- " waiting for user response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- }
-
- ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
- s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
- sfree(s->our_kexinit);
- if (pktin->length > 5)
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
- pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
-
- if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
- crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
- }
-
- if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
- /*
- * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
- * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
- * either cipher...
- */
- {
- int csbits, scbits;
-
- csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
- scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
- s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
- }
- /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
- * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
- if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
- s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
-
- /*
- * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
- * requesting a group.
- */
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
- logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
- ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
- /*
- * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
- * much data.
- */
- s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
- bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
- s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
- if (!s->p || !s->g) {
- bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
- s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
- s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
- } else {
- ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
- ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
- s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
- s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
- logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
- ssh->kex->groupname);
- }
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
- ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
- /*
- * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
- */
- set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
- s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
- ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
- bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
- s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
- s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
- if (!s->f) {
- bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
-
- s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
-
- /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
- * involve user interaction. */
- set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
-
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
- hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
- hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
- hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
- }
- hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
- hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
-
- dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
- freebn(s->f);
- if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
- freebn(s->g);
- freebn(s->p);
- }
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
- ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
- ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
- /*
- * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
- * from the server.
- */
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
- bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
- s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
- s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
-
- {
- char *keydata;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
- s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
- memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
- }
-
- s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
- if (!s->rsakey) {
- sfree(s->rsakeydata);
- bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
-
- /*
- * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
- * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
- * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
- * we're using.
- */
- {
- int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
- int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
- int i, byte = 0;
- unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
- int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
-
- s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
-
- for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
- if ((i & 7) == 0) {
- byte = random_byte();
- }
- bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Encode this as an mpint.
- */
- kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
- kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
- PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
- memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
-
- /*
- * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
- */
- outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
- outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
- ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
- outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
-
- /*
- * And send it off in a return packet.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
-
- sfree(kstr2);
- sfree(kstr1);
- sfree(outstr);
- }
-
- ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
-
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
- sfree(s->rsakeydata);
- bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
-
- sfree(s->rsakeydata);
- }
-
- hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
- assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
- ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
-
- ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
-
-#if 0
- debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
- dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
-#endif
-
- if (!s->hkey ||
- !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
- (char *)s->exchange_hash,
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
- bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
- crStop(0);
- }
-
- /*
- * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
- * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
- */
- s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
- s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
- s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
- ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
- ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
- s->fingerprint,
- ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
- if (s->dlgret < 0) {
- do {
- crReturn(0);
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
- " for user host key response"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
- }
- ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
- if (s->dlgret == 0) {
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
- 0, TRUE);
- crStop(0);
- }
- if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
- logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
- logevent(s->fingerprint);
- }
- sfree(s->fingerprint);
- sfree(s->keystr);
- ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
-
- /*
- * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
- * the session id, used in session key construction and
- * authentication.
- */
- if (!s->got_session_id) {
- assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
- memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
- sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
- ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
- assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
- s->got_session_id = TRUE;
- }
-
- /*
- * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
- ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
-
- /*
- * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
- * client-to-server session keys.
- */
- if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
- ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
- ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
- ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
-
- if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
- ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
- ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
- ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
-
- if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
- ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
- ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
- ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
-
- /*
- * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
- * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
- */
- {
- unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
- assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
- assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
- assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
- assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
- memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
- }
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
- ssh->cscipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
- ssh->csmac->text_name);
- if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
- ssh->cscomp->text_name);
-
- /*
- * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
- * our queued higher-layer packets.
- */
- ssh->queueing = FALSE;
- ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
-
- /*
- * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
- */
- crWaitUntil(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
- bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
- crStop(0);
- }
- ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
-
- /*
- * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
- * server-to-client session keys.
- */
- if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
- ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
- ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
- ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
-
- if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
- ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
- ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
- ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
-
- if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
- ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
- ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
- ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
-
- /*
- * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
- * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
- */
- {
- unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
- assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
- assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
- assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
- ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
- assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
- ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
- ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
- memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
- }
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
- ssh->sccipher->text_name);
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
- ssh->scmac->text_name);
- if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
- logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
- ssh->sccomp->text_name);
-
- /*
- * Free shared secret.
- */
- freebn(s->K);
-
- /*
- * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
- * deferred rekey reason.
- */
- if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
- logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
- pktin = NULL;
- ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
- goto begin_key_exchange;
- }
-
- /*
- * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
- */
- ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
- ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0)
- ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
- ssh2_timer, ssh);
-
- /*
- * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
- * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
- * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
- * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
- * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
- * it would only confuse the layer above.
- */
- if (s->activated_authconn) {
- crReturn(0);
- }
- s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
- * function so that other things can run on top of the
- * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
- * start.
- *
- * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
- * inlen negative, because this is a special signal meaning
- * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
- * giving the reason for the rekey.
- *
- * inlen==-1 means always initiate a rekey;
- * inlen==-2 means that userauth has completed successfully and
- * we should consider rekeying (for delayed compression).
- */
- while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
- (!pktin && inlen < 0))) {
- wait_for_rekey:
- crReturn(1);
- }
- if (pktin) {
- logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
- } else {
- if (inlen == -2) {
- /*
- * authconn has seen a USERAUTH_SUCCEEDED. Time to enable
- * delayed compression, if it's available.
- *
- * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00 says that you
- * negotiate delayed compression in the first key exchange, and
- * both sides start compressing when the server has sent
- * USERAUTH_SUCCESS. This has a race condition -- the server
- * can't know when the client has seen it, and thus which incoming
- * packets it should treat as compressed.
- *
- * Instead, we do the initial key exchange without offering the
- * delayed methods, but note if the server offers them; when we
- * get here, if a delayed method was available that was higher
- * on our list than what we got, we initiate a rekey in which we
- * _do_ list the delayed methods (and hopefully get it as a
- * result). Subsequent rekeys will do the same.
- */
- assert(!s->userauth_succeeded); /* should only happen once */
- s->userauth_succeeded = TRUE;
- if (!s->pending_compression)
- /* Can't see any point rekeying. */
- goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
- /* else fall through to rekey... */
- s->pending_compression = FALSE;
- }
- /*
- * Now we've decided to rekey.
- *
- * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
- * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
- * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
- * we process it anyway!)
- */
- if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
- (char *)in);
- /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
- * hit the event log _too_ often. */
- ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
- ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0) {
- ssh->next_rekey =
- schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
- ssh2_timer, ssh);
- }
- goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is still utterly horrid */
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
- }
- }
- goto begin_key_exchange;
-
- crFinish(1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
- */
-static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
- int len)
-{
- bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
-}
-
-/*
- * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
- */
-static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- struct Packet *pktout;
- int ret;
-
- while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
- int len;
- void *data;
- bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
- if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
- len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
- if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
- len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
- dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
- end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
- c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
- }
-
- /*
- * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
- * still buffered.
- */
- ret = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
-
- /*
- * And if there's no data pending but we need to send an EOF, send
- * it.
- */
- if (!ret && c->pending_eof)
- ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- int bufsize;
- if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
- return; /* don't send on channels we've EOFed */
- bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
- if (bufsize == 0) {
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
- /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
- * notification since it will be polled */
- break;
- case CHAN_X11:
- x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
- break;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
- * buffer management */
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
- */
-static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
- c->closes = 0;
- c->pending_eof = FALSE;
- c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
- c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
- c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
- c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
- bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
-}
-
-/*
- * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
- */
-static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
-
- /*
- * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side has
- * already sent EOF on; there's no point, since it won't be
- * sending any more data anyway. Ditto if _we've_ already sent
- * CLOSE.
- */
- if (c->closes & (CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
- return;
-
- /*
- * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
- * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
- * window as well).
- */
- if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
- newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
-
- /*
- * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
- * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
- * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
- *
- * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
- */
- if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
- struct Packet *pktout;
- struct winadj *wa;
-
- /*
- * In order to keep track of how much window the client
- * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
- * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
- * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
- *
- * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
- * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
- * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
- *
- * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
- * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
- * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
- * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
- */
- if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
-
- /*
- * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
- * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
- * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
- */
- wa = snew(struct winadj);
- wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
- wa->next = NULL;
- if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
- c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
- else
- c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
- c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
- if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
- c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
- } else {
- /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
- c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
- c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
- }
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
- * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
- */
-static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
- if (!c ||
- (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
- pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
- char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
- ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
- pktin->type),
- c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
- sfree(buf);
- return NULL;
- }
- return c;
-}
-
-static int ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- struct winadj *wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
- if (!wa)
- return FALSE;
- c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
- c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
- sfree(wa);
- /*
- * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
- * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
- * complete.
- */
- if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
- c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
- /*
- * We may now initiate channel-closing procedures, if that winadj
- * was the last thing outstanding before we send CHANNEL_CLOSE.
- */
- ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
- return TRUE;
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /*
- * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
- * sent with want_reply false, are sent before this handler gets
- * installed, or are "winadj@putty" requests, which servers should
- * never respond to with success.
- *
- * However, at least one server ("boks_sshd") is known to return
- * SUCCESS for channel requests it's never heard of, such as
- * "winadj@putty". Raised with foxt.com as bug 090916-090424, but
- * for the sake of a quiet life, we handle it just the same as the
- * expected FAILURE.
- */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
- "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /*
- * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
- * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
- * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
- * installed.
- */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (!ssh2_handle_winadj_response(c))
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
- "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
- c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *data;
- int length;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
- ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
- return; /* extended but not stderr */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
- if (data) {
- int bufsize = 0;
- c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
- c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
- bufsize =
- from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
- data, length);
- break;
- case CHAN_X11:
- bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
- break;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- while (length > 0) {
- if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
- unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
- (unsigned)length);
- memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
- data, l);
- data += l;
- length -= l;
- c->u.a.lensofar += l;
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
- c->u.a.totallen =
- 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
- c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
- unsigned char);
- memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
- unsigned int l =
- min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
- (unsigned)length);
- memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
- data, l);
- data += l;
- length -= l;
- c->u.a.lensofar += l;
- }
- if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
- void *reply;
- int replylen;
- if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
- c->u.a.totallen,
- &reply, &replylen,
- ssh_agentf_callback, c))
- ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
- sfree(c->u.a.message);
- c->u.a.message = NULL;
- c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
- }
- }
- bufsize = 0;
- break;
- }
- /*
- * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
- * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
- * larger window.
- */
- if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
- c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
- c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
- /*
- * If we are not buffering too much data,
- * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
- * If we are buffering too much, we may still
- * need to adjust the window if the server's
- * sent excess data.
- */
- ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
- c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
- /*
- * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
- * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
- * throttle the whole channel.
- */
- if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
- (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) && bufsize > 0)) &&
- !c->throttling_conn) {
- c->throttling_conn = 1;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
-
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
- ssh->mainchan = NULL;
- update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
- break;
- case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
- logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
- break;
- case CHAN_AGENT:
- sfree(c->u.a.message);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
- logevent("Forwarded port closed");
- break;
- }
-
- del234(ssh->channels, c);
- if (ssh->version == 2)
- bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
- sfree(c);
-
- /*
- * See if that was the last channel left open.
- * (This is only our termination condition if we're
- * not running in -N mode.)
- */
- if (ssh->version == 2 &&
- !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
- count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
- /*
- * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
- * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
- * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
- * being sent by at least one side; apparently
- * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
- * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
- * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
- * this is more polite than sending a
- * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
- */
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- if ((c->closes & (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
- == (CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) && !c->v.v2.winadj_head) {
- /*
- * We have both sent and received EOF, and we have no
- * outstanding winadj channel requests, which means the
- * channel is in final wind-up. But we haven't sent CLOSE, so
- * let's do so now.
- */
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
- }
-
- if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes)) {
- /*
- * We have both sent and received CLOSE, which means we're
- * completely done with the channel.
- */
- ssh_channel_destroy(c);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_channel_got_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
-{
- if (c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)
- return; /* already seen EOF */
- c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
-
- if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
- x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.s);
- } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
- /* Manufacture an outgoing EOF in response to the incoming one. */
- sshfwd_write_eof(c);
- } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
- pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.s);
- } else if (c->type == CHAN_MAINSESSION) {
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
-
- if (!ssh->sent_console_eof &&
- (from_backend_eof(ssh->frontend) || ssh->got_pty)) {
- /*
- * Either from_backend_eof told us that the front end
- * wants us to close the outgoing side of the connection
- * as soon as we see EOF from the far end, or else we've
- * unilaterally decided to do that because we've allocated
- * a remote pty and hence EOF isn't a particularly
- * meaningful concept.
- */
- sshfwd_write_eof(c);
- }
- ssh->sent_console_eof = TRUE;
- }
-
- ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
-
- /*
- * When we receive CLOSE on a channel, we assume it comes with an
- * implied EOF if we haven't seen EOF yet.
- */
- ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
-
- /*
- * And we also send an outgoing EOF, if we haven't already, on the
- * assumption that CLOSE is a pretty forceful announcement that
- * the remote side is doing away with the entire channel. (If it
- * had wanted to send us EOF and continue receiving data from us,
- * it would have just sent CHANNEL_EOF.)
- */
- if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
- /*
- * Make sure we don't read any more from whatever our local
- * data source is for this channel.
- */
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
- ssh->send_ok = 0; /* stop trying to read from stdin */
- break;
- case CHAN_X11:
- x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, 1);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, 1);
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Send outgoing EOF.
- */
- sshfwd_write_eof(c);
- }
-
- /*
- * Now process the actual close.
- */
- if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
- c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
- ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
- return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
- c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
- c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- if (c->u.pfd.s)
- pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
- if (c->pending_eof)
- ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- static const char *const reasons[] = {
- "<unknown reason code>",
- "Administratively prohibited",
- "Connect failed",
- "Unknown channel type",
- "Resource shortage",
- };
- unsigned reason_code;
- char *reason_string;
- int reason_length;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
- return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
-
- reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
- reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
- logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
- reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
-
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
-
- del234(ssh->channels, c);
- sfree(c);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *type;
- int typelen, want_reply;
- int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
- if (!c)
- return;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
- want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
-
- /*
- * Having got the channel number, we now look at
- * the request type string to see if it's something
- * we recognise.
- */
- if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
- /*
- * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
- * the primary channel.
- */
- if (typelen == 11 &&
- !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
-
- ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
- ssh->exitcode);
- reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
-
- } else if (typelen == 11 &&
- !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
-
- int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
- char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
- char *msg;
- int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
- /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
- * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
- * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
- * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
- * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
- {
- unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
- pktin->savedpos;
- long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
- unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
- /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
- if (num == 0) {
- is_int = FALSE;
- } else {
- int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
-#define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
- do { \
- long q = offset; \
- if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
- q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
- if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
- ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
- result = TRUE; \
- } \
- } while(0)
- CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
- CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
-#undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
- if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
- is_int = TRUE;
- else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
- is_int = FALSE;
- else
- /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
- is_plausible = FALSE;
- }
- }
- ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
- if (is_plausible) {
- if (is_int) {
- /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
- int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
- ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
- } else {
- /* As per RFC 4254. */
- char *sig;
- int siglen;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
- /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
- * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
- if (siglen) {
- fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
- siglen, sig);
- }
-
- /*
- * Really hideous method of translating the
- * signal description back into a locally
- * meaningful number.
- */
-
- if (0)
- ;
-#define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
- else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
- ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
-#ifdef SIGABRT
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGALRM
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGFPE
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGHUP
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGILL
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGINT
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGKILL
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGPIPE
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGQUIT
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGSEGV
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGTERM
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGUSR1
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
-#endif
-#ifdef SIGUSR2
- TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
-#endif
-#undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
- else
- ssh->exitcode = 128;
- }
- core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
- if (msglen) {
- fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
- }
- /* ignore lang tag */
- } /* else don't attempt to parse */
- logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
- fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
- fmt_msg);
- if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
- if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
- reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
-
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * This is a channel request we don't know
- * about, so we now either ignore the request
- * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
- * on want_reply.
- */
- reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
- }
- if (want_reply) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *type;
- int typelen, want_reply;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
- want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
-
- /*
- * We currently don't support any global requests
- * at all, so we either ignore the request or
- * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
- * want_reply.
- */
- if (want_reply) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- char *type;
- int typelen;
- char *peeraddr;
- int peeraddrlen;
- int peerport;
- char *error = NULL;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
- c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- c->ssh = ssh;
-
- remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
-
- if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
- char *addrstr;
- const char *x11err;
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
- addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
- memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
- addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
- peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
- addrstr, peerport);
-
- if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
- error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
- else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
- addrstr, peerport, ssh->conf)) != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
- error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
- } else {
- logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
- c->type = CHAN_X11;
- }
-
- sfree(addrstr);
- } else if (typelen == 15 &&
- !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
- struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
- char *dummy;
- int dummylen;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
- pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
- peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
- logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
- "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
- if (realpf == NULL) {
- error = "Remote port is not recognised";
- } else {
- const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
- realpf->dhost,
- realpf->dport, c,
- ssh->conf,
- realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
- logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
- "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
- if (e != NULL) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
- error = "Port open failed";
- } else {
- logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
- c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
- }
- }
- } else if (typelen == 22 &&
- !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
- if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
- error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
- else {
- c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
- c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
- }
- } else {
- error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
- }
-
- c->remoteid = remid;
- c->halfopen = FALSE;
- if (error) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
- sfree(c);
- } else {
- ssh2_channel_init(c);
- c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
- c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
- * if we're going to display them.
- */
-static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner) &&
- bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
- char *banner = NULL;
- int size = 0;
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
- if (banner)
- bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
- }
-}
-
-/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
-static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
-{
- struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
- int i = 0;
- unsigned int arg = 0;
- while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
- if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
- switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
- case TTY_OP_CHAR:
- arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
- break;
- case TTY_OP_BOOL:
- arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
- break;
- }
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
- */
-static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
- enum {
- AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
- AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
- AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
- AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
- AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
- AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
- AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
- AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
- } type;
- int done_service_req;
- int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
- int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- int can_gssapi;
- int tried_gssapi;
-#endif
- int kbd_inter_refused;
- int we_are_in, userauth_success;
- prompts_t *cur_prompt;
- int num_prompts;
- char *username;
- char *password;
- int got_username;
- void *publickey_blob;
- int publickey_bloblen;
- int publickey_encrypted;
- char *publickey_algorithm;
- char *publickey_comment;
- unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
- int agent_responselen;
- unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
- int keyi, nkeys;
- char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
- int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
- int siglen, retlen, len;
- char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
- int try_send;
- int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
- struct Packet *pktout;
- Filename *keyfile;
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
- Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
- Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
- Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
- Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
- Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
-#endif
- };
- crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
-
- crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
-
- s->done_service_req = FALSE;
- s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
-#endif
-
- if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
- /*
- * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
- s->done_service_req = TRUE;
- }
- if (!s->done_service_req) {
- /*
- * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
- s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
- } else {
- bombout(("Server refused service request"));
- crStopV;
- }
- }
-
- /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
- * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
- bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
- ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
-
- /*
- * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
- */
- s->publickey_blob = NULL;
- if (!s->we_are_in) {
-
- /*
- * Load the public half of any configured public key file
- * for later use.
- */
- s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
- if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
- int keytype;
- logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
- keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
- if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
- const char *error;
- s->publickey_blob =
- ssh2_userkey_loadpub(s->keyfile,
- &s->publickey_algorithm,
- &s->publickey_bloblen,
- &s->publickey_comment, &error);
- if (s->publickey_blob) {
- s->publickey_encrypted =
- ssh2_userkey_encrypted(s->keyfile, NULL);
- } else {
- char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
- error);
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
- "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
- error);
- c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
- sfree(msgbuf);
- }
- } else {
- char *msgbuf;
- logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
- key_type_to_str(keytype));
- msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
- " (%s)\r\n",
- filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
- key_type_to_str(keytype));
- c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
- sfree(msgbuf);
- s->publickey_blob = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
- * public key configured, filter out all others).
- */
- s->nkeys = 0;
- s->agent_response = NULL;
- s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists()) {
-
- void *r;
-
- logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
-
- /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
- PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
- s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
- if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
- ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
- do {
- crReturnV;
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
- " waiting for agent response"));
- crStopV;
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- r = ssh->agent_response;
- s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
- }
- s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
- if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
- s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
- int keyi;
- unsigned char *p;
- p = s->agent_response + 5;
- s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
- p += 4;
- logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
- if (s->publickey_blob) {
- /* See if configured key is in agent. */
- for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
- s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
- if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
- !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
- s->publickey_bloblen)) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
- "configured key file", keyi);
- s->keyi = keyi;
- s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
- break;
- }
- p += 4 + s->pklen;
- p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
- }
- if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
- logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
- s->nkeys = 0;
- }
- }
- } else {
- logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
- }
- }
-
- }
-
- /*
- * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
- * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
- * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
- * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
- * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
- * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
- *
- * I think this best serves the needs of
- *
- * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
- * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
- * type both correctly
- *
- * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
- * need to fall back to passwords
- *
- * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
- * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
- * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
- * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
- * the username they will want to be able to get back and
- * retype it!
- */
- s->got_username = FALSE;
- while (!s->we_are_in) {
- /*
- * Get a username.
- */
- if (s->got_username && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
- /*
- * We got a username last time round this loop, and
- * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
- * it again.
- */
- } else if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
- int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
- * Terminate.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
- ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- } else {
- char *stuff;
- if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
- stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", ssh->username);
- c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
- sfree(stuff);
- }
- }
- s->got_username = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
- * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
- * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
- */
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
-
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
- s->gotit = FALSE;
- s->we_are_in = FALSE;
-
- s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
- s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
-
- /* Reset agent request state. */
- s->done_agent = FALSE;
- if (s->agent_response) {
- if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
- s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
- } else {
- s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
- s->keyi = 0;
- }
- }
-
- while (1) {
- char *methods = NULL;
- int methlen = 0;
-
- /*
- * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
- */
- if (!s->gotit)
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- /*
- * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
- * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
- * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
- * with.)
- */
- {
- int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
- /*
- * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
- * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
- * a script, which means nobody will read the
- * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
- * the banner will screw up processing on the
- * output of (say) plink.)
- */
- if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
- char *banner = snewn(size, char);
- bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
- c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
- sfree(banner);
- }
- bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
- }
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
- logevent("Access granted");
- s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = TRUE;
- break;
- }
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
- bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
- "type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
-
- s->gotit = FALSE;
-
- /*
- * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
- * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
- * helpfully try next.
- */
- if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
- if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
- /*
- * We have received an unequivocal Access
- * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
- * messages, or no message at all.
- *
- * For forms of authentication which are attempted
- * implicitly, by which I mean without printing
- * anything in the window indicating that we're
- * trying them, we should never print 'Access
- * denied'.
- *
- * If we do print a message saying that we're
- * attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
- * to print a followup message saying it failed -
- * but the message may sometimes be more specific
- * than simply 'Access denied'.
- *
- * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
- * authentication, we should break out of this
- * whole loop so as to go back to the username
- * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
- * username change attempts).
- */
- if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
- /* do nothing */
- } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
- s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
- if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
- logevent("Server refused our key");
- } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
- /* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
- * protocol bug causing client and server to
- * disagree on what is a correct signature. */
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused public-key signature"
- " despite accepting key!\r\n");
- logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
- " despite accepting key!");
- } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
- /* quiet, so no c_write */
- logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive authentication");
- } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
- /* always quiet, so no c_write */
- /* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
- * already logged this in the Event Log */
- } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
- logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication failed");
- c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
- } else {
- assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
- logevent("Password authentication failed");
- c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
- /* XXX perhaps we should allow
- * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
- s->we_are_in = FALSE;
- break;
- }
- }
- } else {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
- logevent("Further authentication required");
- }
-
- s->can_pubkey =
- in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
- s->can_passwd =
- in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
- s->can_keyb_inter = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_ki_auth) &&
- in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- if (!ssh->gsslibs)
- ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(ssh->conf);
- s->can_gssapi = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_gssapi_auth) &&
- in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
- ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
-#endif
- }
-
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
-
- if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
-
- /*
- * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
- */
-
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
-
- /* Unpack key from agent response */
- s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
- s->agentp += 4;
- s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
- s->agentp += s->pklen;
- s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
- s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
- s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
- s->agentp += 4;
- s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
- s->agentp += s->commentlen;
- /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
-
- /* See if server will accept it */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
- /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
-
- /* Offer of key refused. */
- s->gotit = TRUE;
-
- } else {
-
- void *vret;
-
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
- "public key \"");
- c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
- c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
- }
-
- /*
- * Server is willing to accept the key.
- * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
- /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
-
- /* Ask agent for signature. */
- s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
- ssh->v2_session_id_len;
- if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
- s->siglen -= 4;
- s->len = 1; /* message type */
- s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
- s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
- s->len += 4; /* flags */
- s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
- PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
- s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
- *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
- PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
- s->q += 4;
- memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
- s->q += s->pklen;
- PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
- s->q += 4;
- /* Now the data to be signed... */
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
- PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- s->q += 4;
- }
- memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
- ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
- memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
- s->pktout->length - 5);
- s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
- /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
- PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
- if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
- &vret, &s->retlen,
- ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
- do {
- crReturnV;
- if (pktin) {
- bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
- " while waiting for agent"
- " response"));
- crStopV;
- }
- } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
- vret = ssh->agent_response;
- s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
- }
- s->ret = vret;
- sfree(s->agentreq);
- if (s->ret) {
- if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
- logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
- ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
- s->pkblob, s->pklen,
- s->ret + 9,
- GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
- } else {
- /* FIXME: less drastic response */
- bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
- crStopV;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
- if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
- s->done_agent = TRUE;
- s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
- } else {
- s->keyi++;
- if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
- s->done_agent = TRUE;
- }
-
- } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
- !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
-
- struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
- char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
-
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
-
- s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
- *
- * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
- * willing to accept it.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
- /* no signature included */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
- (char *)s->publickey_blob,
- s->publickey_bloblen);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- logevent("Offered public key");
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
- /* Key refused. Give up. */
- s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
- continue; /* process this new message */
- }
- logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
-
- /*
- * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
- * the key.
- */
- if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
- c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
- c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
- }
- key = NULL;
- while (!key) {
- const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
- if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
- /*
- * Get a passphrase from the user.
- */
- int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
- dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
- s->publickey_comment),
- FALSE);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
- in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
- "Unable to authenticate",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
- TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
- passphrase =
- dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- } else {
- passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
- }
-
- /*
- * Try decrypting the key.
- */
- s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
- key = ssh2_load_userkey(s->keyfile, passphrase, &error);
- if (passphrase) {
- /* burn the evidence */
- memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
- sfree(passphrase);
- }
- if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
- if (passphrase &&
- (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
- key = NULL;
- /* and loop again */
- } else {
- c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
- c_write_str(ssh, error);
- c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
- key = NULL;
- break; /* try something else */
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (key) {
- unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
- int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
- int p;
-
- /*
- * We have loaded the private key and the server
- * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
- * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
- /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
- /* signature follows */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
- pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
- &pkblob_len);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
- pkblob_len);
-
- /*
- * The data to be signed is:
- *
- * string session-id
- *
- * followed by everything so far placed in the
- * outgoing packet.
- */
- sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
- ssh->v2_session_id_len;
- if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
- sigdata_len -= 4;
- sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
- p = 0;
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
- PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- p += 4;
- }
- memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
- ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
- memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
- s->pktout->length - 5);
- p += s->pktout->length - 5;
- assert(p == sigdata_len);
- sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
- sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
- ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
- sigblob, sigblob_len);
- sfree(pkblob);
- sfree(sigblob);
- sfree(sigdata);
-
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- logevent("Sent public key signature");
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
- key->alg->freekey(key->data);
- }
-
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
-
- /* GSSAPI Authentication */
-
- int micoffset, len;
- char *data;
- Ssh_gss_buf mic;
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
- s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
- s->gotit = TRUE;
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
-
- /*
- * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
- * list.
- */
- {
- int i, j;
- s->gsslib = NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
- int want_id = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
- CONF_ssh_gsslist, i);
- for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
- if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
- s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
- goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
- }
- }
- got_gsslib:
- /*
- * We always expect to have found something in
- * the above loop: we only came here if there
- * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
- * preference list should always mention
- * everything and only change the order.
- */
- assert(s->gsslib);
- }
-
- if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
- logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
-
- /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
- logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
-
- /* add mechanism info */
- s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
-
- /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
-
- /* length of OID + 2 */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
-
- /* length of OID */
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
-
- ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
- s->gss_buf.length);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
- continue;
- }
-
- /* check returned packet ... */
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
- s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
- s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
- if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
- ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
- ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
- memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
- s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
- continue;
- }
-
- /* now start running */
- s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
- ssh->fullhostname,
- &s->gss_srv_name);
- if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
- if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
- logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
- else
- logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
- continue;
- }
-
- /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
- s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
-
- if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
- s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* initial tokens are empty */
- SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
- SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
-
- /* now enter the loop */
- do {
- s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
- (s->gsslib,
- &s->gss_ctx,
- s->gss_srv_name,
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_gssapifwd),
- &s->gss_rcvtok,
- &s->gss_sndtok);
-
- if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
- s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
-
- if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
- &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
- logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
- sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
- }
-
- break;
- }
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
-
- /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
- * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
-
- if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
- }
-
- if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
- s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
- break;
- }
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
- s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
- s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
- }
- } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-
- if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
- s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
- s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
- continue;
- }
- logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
-
- /* Now send the MIC */
-
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
- micoffset = s->pktout->length;
- ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
- ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
-
- s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
- s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
-
- s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
-
- s->gotit = FALSE;
-
- s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
- s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
- continue;
-#endif
- } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
-
- /*
- * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
- */
-
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
-
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
-
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
- /* method */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
- /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
- * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
- * user without actually issuing any prompts).
- * Give up on it entirely. */
- s->gotit = TRUE;
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
- s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
- */
- while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
-
- char *name, *inst, *lang;
- int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
- * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
- */
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
- */
- s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
- char *prompt;
- int prompt_len;
- int echo;
- static char noprompt[] =
- "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
- echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
- if (!prompt_len) {
- prompt = noprompt;
- prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
- }
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
- dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
- echo);
- }
-
- if (name_len) {
- /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
- * local prompts? */
- s->cur_prompt->name =
- dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
- s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
- } else {
- s->cur_prompt->name =
- dupstr("SSH server authentication");
- s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
- }
- /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
- * has come from the server.
- * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
- * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
- /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
- * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
- * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
- if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
- s->cur_prompt->instruction =
- dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
- inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
- s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
- } else {
- s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
- * Display any instructions, and get the user's
- * response(s).
- */
- {
- int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
- TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Send the response(s) to the server.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
- for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
- }
- ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
-
- /*
- * Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
- * If there's another, a new one will be allocated
- * when we return to the top of this while loop.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
-
- /*
- * Get the next packet in case it's another
- * INFO_REQUEST.
- */
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- }
-
- /*
- * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
- */
- s->gotit = TRUE;
-
- } else if (s->can_passwd) {
-
- /*
- * Plain old password authentication.
- */
- int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
- int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
-
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
-
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
- ssh->username,
- ssh->savedhost),
- FALSE);
-
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
- */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
- TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
- /*
- * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
- * asked to change it.)
- */
- s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
-
- /*
- * Send the password packet.
- *
- * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
- * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
- * user's password.
- *
- * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
- * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
- * people who find out how long their password is!
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
- logevent("Sent password");
- s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
-
- /*
- * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
- * request.
- */
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- changereq_first_time = TRUE;
-
- while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
-
- /*
- * We're being asked for a new password
- * (perhaps not for the first time).
- * Loop until the server accepts it.
- */
-
- int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
- char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
- int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
-
- {
- char *msg;
- if (changereq_first_time)
- msg = "Server requested password change";
- else
- msg = "Server rejected new password";
- logevent(msg);
- c_write_str(ssh, msg);
- c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
- }
-
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
-
- s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
- s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
- s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
- s->cur_prompt->instruction =
- dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
- s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
- /*
- * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
- * for the "old" passwords in the original and
- * password-change messages to be the same, and
- * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
- * by the user entering a blank password originally
- * and the real password subsequently, so,
- * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
- *
- * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
- * to check this field.)
- */
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
- dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
- FALSE);
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
- FALSE);
- add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
- FALSE);
-
- /*
- * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
- * password twice.
- */
- while (!got_new) {
-
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
- while (ret < 0) {
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
- ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
- */
- /* burn the evidence */
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
- sfree(s->password);
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
- TRUE);
- crStopV;
- }
-
- /*
- * If the user specified a new original password
- * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
- * one.
- * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
- * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
- */
- if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
- memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
- /* burn the evidence */
- sfree(s->password);
- s->password =
- dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
- }
-
- /*
- * Check the two new passwords match.
- */
- got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
- == 0);
- if (!got_new)
- /* They don't. Silly user. */
- c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
-
- }
-
- /*
- * Send the new password (along with the old one).
- * (see above for padding rationale)
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
- /* service requested */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
- s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
- free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
- logevent("Sent new password");
-
- /*
- * Now see what the server has to say about it.
- * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
- * new password.)
- */
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- changereq_first_time = FALSE;
-
- }
-
- /*
- * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
- * of the loop. Either:
- * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
- * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
- * usual meaning
- * - we sent a new password, and the server was
- * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
- * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
- * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
- * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
- * the loop and start again.
- */
- s->gotit = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * We don't need the old password any more, in any
- * case. Burn the evidence.
- */
- memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
- sfree(s->password);
-
- } else {
- char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
- " (server sent: %.*s)",
- methlen, methods);
-
- ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
- "No supported authentication methods available",
- SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
- FALSE);
- sfree(str);
-
- crStopV;
-
- }
-
- }
- }
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
-
- /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
- if (s->publickey_blob) {
- sfree(s->publickey_blob);
- sfree(s->publickey_comment);
- }
- if (s->agent_response)
- sfree(s->agent_response);
-
- if (s->userauth_success) {
- /*
- * We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
- * packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
- * delayed compression.
- *
- * (Relying on we_are_in is not sufficient, as
- * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed is quite clear that it
- * triggers on USERAUTH_SUCCESS specifically, and we_are_in can
- * become set for other reasons.)
- */
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
- */
-
- ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
-
- /*
- * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
- * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
- ssh2_msg_global_request;
-
- /*
- * Create the main session channel.
- */
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell)) {
- ssh->mainchan = NULL;
- } else if (*conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host)) {
- /*
- * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
- * channel.
- */
- ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
- ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
- logeventf(ssh,
- "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
- conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host),
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host));
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port));
- /*
- * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
- * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
- * information.
- */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
- bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
- crStopV;
- /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
- }
- if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
- bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
- crStopV;
- }
- ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
- ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
- ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
- update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
- logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
- ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
- } else {
- ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
- ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
- ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
- bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
- crStopV;
- /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
- }
- if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
- bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
- crStopV;
- }
- ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
- ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
- ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
- update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
- logevent("Opened channel for session");
- ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
- }
-
- /*
- * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
- * general channel-based messages.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_data;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_request;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
- ssh2_msg_channel_open;
-
- if (ssh->mainchan && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple)) {
- /*
- * This message indicates to the server that we promise
- * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
- * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
- * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
- */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- }
-
- /*
- * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
- */
- if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
- (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
- conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth), ssh->conf))) {
- logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
- /*
- * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
- * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
- * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
- * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
- * cookie into the log.
- */
- dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
- end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
- " packet type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
- } else {
- logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
- ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Enable port forwardings.
- */
- ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
-
- /*
- * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
- */
- if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists()) {
- logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
- " packet type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
- } else {
- logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
- ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Now allocate a pty for the session.
- */
- if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
- /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
- /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
- ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
- sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
- /* Build the pty request. */
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
- parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
- ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
- " packet type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
- ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
- ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
- ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
- }
- } else {
- ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Send environment variables.
- *
- * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
- * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
- */
- if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) {
- char *key, *val;
-
- s->num_env = 0;
-
- for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, NULL, &key);
- val != NULL;
- val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, key, &key)) {
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- s->num_env++;
- }
-
- if (s->num_env) {
- logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
-
- s->env_ok = 0;
- s->env_left = s->num_env;
-
- while (s->env_left > 0) {
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
- " packet type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- } else {
- s->env_ok++;
- }
-
- s->env_left--;
- }
-
- if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
- logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
- } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
- logevent("All environment variables refused");
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
- } else {
- logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
- s->num_env - s->env_ok);
- c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
- }
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
- * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
- * of command.
- */
- if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
- int subsys;
- char *cmd;
-
- if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
- subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys2);
- cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
- } else {
- subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys);
- cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
- }
-
- s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
- if (subsys) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
- } else if (*cmd) {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
- } else {
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
- }
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
-
- crWaitUntilV(pktin);
-
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
- if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
- bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
- " packet type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- }
- /*
- * We failed to start the command. If this is the
- * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
- * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
- * back to it before complaining.
- */
- if (!ssh->fallback_cmd &&
- *conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
- logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
- ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
- continue;
- }
- bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
- crStopV;
- } else {
- logevent("Started a shell/command");
- }
- break;
- }
-
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
- if (ssh->size_needed)
- ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
- if (ssh->eof_needed)
- ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
-
- /*
- * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
- * failure handler.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
-
- /*
- * Transfer data!
- */
- if (ssh->ldisc)
- ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
- if (ssh->mainchan)
- ssh->send_ok = 1;
- while (1) {
- crReturnV;
- s->try_send = FALSE;
- if (pktin) {
-
- /*
- * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
- * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
- * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
- */
-
- bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
- crStopV;
- } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
- /*
- * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
- */
- ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
- s->try_send = TRUE;
- }
- if (s->try_send) {
- int i;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- /*
- * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
- */
- for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
- ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
- }
- }
-
- crFinishV;
-}
-
-/*
- * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
- */
-static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* log reason code in disconnect message */
- char *buf, *msg;
- int reason, msglen;
-
- reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
-
- if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
- buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
- ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
- } else {
- buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
- " type %d)", reason);
- }
- logevent(buf);
- sfree(buf);
- buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
- msglen, msg);
- logevent(buf);
- bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
- reason,
- (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
- ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
- msglen, msg));
- sfree(buf);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- /* log the debug message */
- char *msg;
- int msglen;
-
- /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of the return value */
- ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
- ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
-}
-
-static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- struct Packet *pktout;
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
- /*
- * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
- * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
- */
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
- */
-static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
-{
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
-
- /*
- * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
- * the coroutines will get it.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
- /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
- /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
- /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
- /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
-
- /*
- * These special message types we install handlers for.
- */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
- ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
-}
-
-static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
-
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
- now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
- struct Packet *pktin)
-{
- unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
- return;
-
- if (pktin) {
- ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
- ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
- ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
- }
-
- if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
- ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
- (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
- if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
- !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
- ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
- /*
- * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
- */
- do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
- }
- } else {
- do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
- }
-}
-
-static void ssh_cache_conf_values(Ssh ssh)
-{
- ssh->logomitdata = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitdata);
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to set up the connection.
- *
- * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
- */
-static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
- Conf *conf, char *host, int port, char **realhost,
- int nodelay, int keepalive)
-{
- const char *p;
- Ssh ssh;
-
- ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
- ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
- ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
- ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
- ssh->s = NULL;
- ssh->cipher = NULL;
- ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->cscipher = NULL;
- ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->sccipher = NULL;
- ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->csmac = NULL;
- ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->scmac = NULL;
- ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->cscomp = NULL;
- ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->sccomp = NULL;
- ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->kex = NULL;
- ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
- ssh->hostkey = NULL;
- ssh->exitcode = -1;
- ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
- ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
- ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
- ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
- ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
- ssh->ldisc = NULL;
- ssh->logctx = NULL;
- ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
- ssh->deferred_len = 0;
- ssh->deferred_size = 0;
- ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
- ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
- ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
- ssh->x11disp = NULL;
- ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
- ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
- ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
- ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
- ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
- ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
- ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
- ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
- ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
- ssh->v_c = NULL;
- ssh->v_s = NULL;
- ssh->mainchan = NULL;
- ssh->throttled_all = 0;
- ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
- ssh->queue = NULL;
- ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
- ssh->queueing = FALSE;
- ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
- ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
- bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
- ssh->frozen = FALSE;
- ssh->username = NULL;
- ssh->sent_console_eof = FALSE;
- ssh->got_pty = FALSE;
-
- *backend_handle = ssh;
-
-#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
- if (crypto_startup() == 0)
- return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
-#endif
-
- ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
- ssh->term_width = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_width);
- ssh->term_height = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_height);
-
- ssh->channels = NULL;
- ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
- ssh->portfwds = NULL;
-
- ssh->send_ok = 0;
- ssh->editing = 0;
- ssh->echoing = 0;
- ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
- ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
- ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
-
- ssh->protocol = NULL;
-
- ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
-
- ssh->pinger = NULL;
-
- ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
- ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
- ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
- CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
- ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
-
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
-#endif
-
- p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
- if (p != NULL)
- return p;
-
- random_ref();
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static void ssh_free(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
-
- if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
- ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
- if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
- ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
- if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
- ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
- if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
- ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
- if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
- ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
- if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
- if (ssh->cscomp)
- ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
- else
- zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
- }
- if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
- if (ssh->sccomp)
- ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
- else
- zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
- }
- if (ssh->kex_ctx)
- dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
- sfree(ssh->savedhost);
-
- while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
- ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
- sfree(ssh->queue);
-
- while (ssh->qhead) {
- struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
- ssh->qhead = qh->next;
- sfree(ssh->qhead);
- }
- ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
-
- if (ssh->channels) {
- while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
- switch (c->type) {
- case CHAN_X11:
- if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
- x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
- break;
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
- case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
- if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
- pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
- break;
- }
- sfree(c);
- }
- freetree234(ssh->channels);
- ssh->channels = NULL;
- }
-
- if (ssh->rportfwds) {
- while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
- free_rportfwd(pf);
- freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
- ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
- }
- sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
- if (ssh->x11disp)
- x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
- sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
- sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
- sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
- sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
- sfree(ssh->v_c);
- sfree(ssh->v_s);
- sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
- if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
- crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
- ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
- }
- if (ssh->s)
- ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
- expire_timer_context(ssh);
- if (ssh->pinger)
- pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
- bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
- sfree(ssh->username);
- conf_free(ssh->conf);
-#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
- if (ssh->gsslibs)
- ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
-#endif
- sfree(ssh);
-
- random_unref();
-}
-
-/*
- * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
- */
-static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Conf *conf)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
- unsigned long old_max_data_size;
- int i, rekey_time;
-
- pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, ssh->conf, conf);
- if (ssh->portfwds)
- ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, conf);
-
- rekey_time = conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time);
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != rekey_time &&
- rekey_time != 0) {
- long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
- long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
-
- if (new_next - now < 0) {
- rekeying = "timeout shortened";
- } else {
- ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
- }
- }
-
- old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
- ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
- CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
- if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
- ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
- if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
- ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
- rekeying = "data limit lowered";
- }
-
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression) !=
- conf_get_int(conf, CONF_compression)) {
- rekeying = "compression setting changed";
- rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++)
- if (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i) !=
- conf_get_int_int(conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
- rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
- rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
- }
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc) !=
- conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
- rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
- rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
- }
-
- conf_free(ssh->conf);
- ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
- ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
-
- if (rekeying) {
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
- } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
- ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
- */
-static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
-
- if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
-
- return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
- */
-static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- int override_value;
-
- if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
- * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
- */
- override_value = 0;
- if (ssh->throttled_all)
- override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- return override_value;
- } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
- if (!ssh->mainchan)
- return override_value;
- else
- return (override_value +
- bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
- */
-static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- ssh->term_width = width;
- ssh->term_height = height;
-
- switch (ssh->state) {
- case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
- case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
- case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
- break; /* do nothing */
- case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
- ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
- break;
- case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
- if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
- PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
- PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
- PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
- } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
- }
- break;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
- * protocol.
- */
-static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
-{
- static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
- {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
- };
- static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
- {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
- };
- static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
- {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
- };
- static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
- {NULL, TS_SEP},
- {"Break", TS_BRK},
- /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
- * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
- * required signals. */
- {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
- {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
- {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
- {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
- {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
- {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
- {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
- {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
- {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
- {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
- {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
- };
- static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
- {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
- };
- /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
- static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
- lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
- lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
- lenof(specials_end)];
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- int i = 0;
-#define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
- do { \
- assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
- memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
- i += lenof(name); \
- } while(0)
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
- * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
- * asked anyway. */
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
- ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
- } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
- ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY))
- ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
- if (ssh->mainchan)
- ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
- } /* else we're not ready yet */
-
- if (i) {
- ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
- return ssh_specials;
- } else {
- return NULL;
- }
-#undef ADD_SPECIALS
-}
-
-/*
- * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
- * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
- * hostname sort').
- */
-static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- if (code == TS_EOF) {
- if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
- /*
- * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
- * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
- */
- if (code == TS_EOF)
- ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
- return;
- }
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
- } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
- sshfwd_write_eof(ssh->mainchan);
- ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
- }
- logevent("Sent EOF message");
- } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
- || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
- } else {
- if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
- ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
- }
- }
- } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
- if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
- do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
- }
- } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
- if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
- || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
- } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
- } else {
- /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
- char *signame = NULL;
- if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
- if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
- if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
- if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
- if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
- if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
- if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
- if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
- if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
- if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
- if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
- if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
- if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
- /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
- * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
- if (signame) {
- /* It's a signal. */
- if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
- ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
- }
- } else {
- /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
- }
- }
-}
-
-void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- struct ssh_channel *c;
- c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
-
- c->ssh = ssh;
- ssh2_channel_init(c);
- c->halfopen = TRUE;
- c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
- c->u.pfd.s = s;
- add234(ssh->channels, c);
- return c;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
- * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
- */
-static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- int buflimit;
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
- ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
- }
- } else {
- if (ssh->mainchan) {
- ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
- bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
- ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
- if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple))
- buflimit = 0;
- else
- buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
- if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
- ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
- ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
-{
- struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
- Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
- struct Packet *pktout;
-
- logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
-
- if (ssh->version == 1) {
- send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
- PKT_INT, c->localid,
- PKT_STR, hostname,
- PKT_INT, port,
- /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
- PKT_END);
- } else {
- pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
- /*
- * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
- * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
- * convinced the server should be told details like that
- * about my local network configuration.
- * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
- * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
- * if it doesn't match this syntax.
- */
- ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
- ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
- ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
- }
-}
-
-static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- return ssh->s != NULL;
-}
-
-static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- return ssh->send_ok;
-}
-
-static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- if (option == LD_ECHO)
- return ssh->echoing;
- if (option == LD_EDIT)
- return ssh->editing;
- return FALSE;
-}
-
-static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
-}
-
-static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- ssh->logctx = logctx;
-}
-
-static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- if (ssh->s != NULL)
- return -1;
- else
- return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
-}
-
-/*
- * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
- * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
- */
-static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- return ssh->version;
-}
-
-/*
- * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
- * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
- * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
- */
-extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
-{
- Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
- return ssh->fallback_cmd;
-}
-
-Backend ssh_backend = {
- ssh_init,
- ssh_free,
- ssh_reconfig,
- ssh_send,
- ssh_sendbuffer,
- ssh_size,
- ssh_special,
- ssh_get_specials,
- ssh_connected,
- ssh_return_exitcode,
- ssh_sendok,
- ssh_ldisc,
- ssh_provide_ldisc,
- ssh_provide_logctx,
- ssh_unthrottle,
- ssh_cfg_info,
- "ssh",
- PROT_SSH,
- 22
-};
+/*
+ * SSH backend.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+#include "sshgssc.h"
+#include "sshgss.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
+ * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
+} Pkt_KCtx;
+typedef enum {
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
+} Pkt_ACtx;
+
+static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
+ NULL,
+ "host not allowed to connect",
+ "protocol error",
+ "key exchange failed",
+ "host authentication failed",
+ "MAC error",
+ "compression error",
+ "service not available",
+ "protocol version not supported",
+ "host key not verifiable",
+ "connection lost",
+ "by application",
+ "too many connections",
+ "auth cancelled by user",
+ "no more auth methods available",
+ "illegal user name",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Various remote-bug flags.
+ */
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
+#define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
+#define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
+#define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
+#define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
+#define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
+#define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
+#define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE 512
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ 1024
+
+/*
+ * Codes for terminal modes.
+ * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
+ * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
+ */
+static const struct {
+ const char* const mode;
+ int opcode;
+ enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
+} ssh_ttymodes[] = {
+ /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
+ { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
+ { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
+};
+
+/* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
+#define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
+/* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
+#define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
+#define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
+#define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
+#define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
+
+/* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
+static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ if (*s) {
+ char *next = NULL;
+ ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
+ if (!next) ret = s[0];
+ } else {
+ ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
+{
+ if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
+ return 1; /* true */
+ else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
+ return 0; /* false */
+ else
+ return (atoi(s) != 0);
+}
+
+#define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
+#define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
+#define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
+static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
+{
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
+ return "unknown";
+}
+static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
+{
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ return "unknown";
+}
+#undef translate
+#undef translatec
+
+/* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
+enum {
+ PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
+ * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
+ * read
+ *
+ * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
+ *
+ * which explains the theory behind these macros.
+ *
+ * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
+ * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
+ * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
+ * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
+ *
+ * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
+ * - click Settings
+ * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
+ * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
+ * Database for Edit and Continue'.
+ */
+#define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
+#define crBeginState crBegin(s->crLine)
+#define crStateP(t, v) \
+ struct t *s; \
+ if (!(v)) { s = (v) = snew(struct t); s->crLine = 0; } \
+ s = (v);
+#define crState(t) crStateP(t, ssh->t)
+#define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
+#define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
+#define crFinishFree(z) } sfree(s); return (z); }
+#define crFinishFreeV } sfree(s); return; }
+#define crReturn(z) \
+ do {\
+ *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
+ } while (0)
+#define crReturnV \
+ do {\
+ *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
+ } while (0)
+#define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
+#define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
+#define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
+#define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
+
+struct Packet;
+
+static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
+static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
+static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
+static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, const void *data, int len);
+static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
+static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
+static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, const char *data);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, const char *data, int len);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, const char *data);
+static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
+static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
+static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
+static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
+static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c);
+
+/*
+ * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
+ * various different purposes:
+ *
+ * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
+ * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
+ * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
+ * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
+ * happen very often.
+ *
+ * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
+ * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
+ * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
+ * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
+ * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
+ * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
+ * channels.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
+ * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
+ * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
+ * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
+ * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
+ * data message.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
+ * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
+ * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
+ */
+
+#define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
+#define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
+#define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
+#define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
+#define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
+#define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
+
+const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
+
+const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
+ &ssh_hmac_sha256, &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
+};
+const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
+ &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
+};
+
+static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
+{
+}
+static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
+ "none", NULL,
+ ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
+ ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
+ ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
+};
+extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
+const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
+ &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
+};
+
+enum { /* channel types */
+ CHAN_MAINSESSION,
+ CHAN_X11,
+ CHAN_AGENT,
+ CHAN_SOCKDATA,
+ CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT, /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
+ /*
+ * CHAN_SHARING indicates a channel which is tracked here on
+ * behalf of a connection-sharing downstream. We do almost nothing
+ * with these channels ourselves: all messages relating to them
+ * get thrown straight to sshshare.c and passed on almost
+ * unmodified to downstream.
+ */
+ CHAN_SHARING,
+ /*
+ * CHAN_ZOMBIE is used to indicate a channel for which we've
+ * already destroyed the local data source: for instance, if a
+ * forwarded port experiences a socket error on the local side, we
+ * immediately destroy its local socket and turn the SSH channel
+ * into CHAN_ZOMBIE.
+ */
+ CHAN_ZOMBIE
+};
+
+typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
+typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
+typedef void (*cchandler_fn_t)(struct ssh_channel *, struct Packet *, void *);
+
+/*
+ * Each channel has a queue of outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTS and their
+ * handlers.
+ */
+struct outstanding_channel_request {
+ cchandler_fn_t handler;
+ void *ctx;
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
+ */
+struct ssh_channel {
+ Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
+ unsigned remoteid, localid;
+ int type;
+ /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
+ int halfopen;
+ /*
+ * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
+ *
+ * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
+ * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
+ *
+ * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
+ *
+ * In SSH-2, the four bits mean:
+ *
+ * 1 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
+ * 2 We have sent SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ * 4 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
+ * 8 We have received SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ *
+ * A channel is completely finished with when we have both sent
+ * and received CLOSE.
+ *
+ * The symbolic constants below use the SSH-2 terminology, which
+ * is a bit confusing in SSH-1, but we have to use _something_.
+ */
+#define CLOSES_SENT_EOF 1
+#define CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE 2
+#define CLOSES_RCVD_EOF 4
+#define CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE 8
+ int closes;
+
+ /*
+ * This flag indicates that an EOF is pending on the outgoing side
+ * of the channel: that is, wherever we're getting the data for
+ * this channel has sent us some data followed by EOF. We can't
+ * actually send the EOF until we've finished sending the data, so
+ * we set this flag instead to remind us to do so once our buffer
+ * is clear.
+ */
+ int pending_eof;
+
+ /*
+ * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
+ * throttled.
+ */
+ int throttling_conn;
+ union {
+ struct ssh2_data_channel {
+ bufchain outbuffer;
+ unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
+ /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
+ int locwindow, locmaxwin;
+ /*
+ * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
+ * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
+ * last data packet or window adjust ack.
+ */
+ int remlocwin;
+ /*
+ * These store the list of channel requests that haven't
+ * been acked.
+ */
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *chanreq_head, *chanreq_tail;
+ enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
+ } v2;
+ } v;
+ union {
+ struct ssh_agent_channel {
+ unsigned char *message;
+ unsigned char msglen[4];
+ unsigned lensofar, totallen;
+ int outstanding_requests;
+ } a;
+ struct ssh_x11_channel {
+ struct X11Connection *xconn;
+ int initial;
+ } x11;
+ struct ssh_pfd_channel {
+ struct PortForwarding *pf;
+ } pfd;
+ struct ssh_sharing_channel {
+ void *ctx;
+ } sharing;
+ } u;
+};
+
+/*
+ * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
+ * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
+ * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
+ *
+ * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
+ * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
+ * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
+ * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
+ * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
+ * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
+ * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
+ * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
+ * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
+ * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
+ * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
+ *
+ * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
+ * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
+ * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
+ * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
+ * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
+ * local host:port pair went with that port number.
+ *
+ * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
+ * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
+ */
+struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
+
+struct ssh_rportfwd {
+ unsigned sport, dport;
+ char *shost, *dhost;
+ char *sportdesc;
+ void *share_ctx;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
+};
+
+static void free_rportfwd(struct ssh_rportfwd *pf)
+{
+ if (pf) {
+ sfree(pf->sportdesc);
+ sfree(pf->shost);
+ sfree(pf->dhost);
+ sfree(pf);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
+ * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
+ * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
+ * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
+ * it.
+ */
+struct ssh_portfwd {
+ enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
+ int type;
+ unsigned sport, dport;
+ char *saddr, *daddr;
+ char *sserv, *dserv;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
+ int addressfamily;
+ struct PortListener *local;
+};
+#define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
+ ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
+ sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
+
+struct Packet {
+ long length; /* length of packet: see below */
+ long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
+ int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
+ unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
+ unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
+ unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
+ long savedpos; /* dual-purpose saved packet position: see below */
+ long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
+ long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
+
+ /*
+ * A note on the 'length' and 'savedpos' fields above.
+ *
+ * Incoming packets are set up so that pkt->length is measured
+ * relative to pkt->body, which itself points to a few bytes after
+ * pkt->data (skipping some uninteresting header fields including
+ * the packet type code). The ssh_pkt_get* functions all expect
+ * this setup, and they also use pkt->savedpos to indicate how far
+ * through the packet being decoded they've got - and that, too,
+ * is an offset from pkt->body rather than pkt->data.
+ *
+ * During construction of an outgoing packet, however, pkt->length
+ * is measured relative to the base pointer pkt->data, and
+ * pkt->body is not really used for anything until the packet is
+ * ready for sending. In this mode, pkt->savedpos is reused as a
+ * temporary variable by the addstring functions, which write out
+ * a string length field and then keep going back and updating it
+ * as more data is appended to the subsequent string data field;
+ * pkt->savedpos stores the offset (again relative to pkt->data)
+ * of the start of the string data field.
+ */
+
+ /* Extra metadata used in SSH packet logging mode, allowing us to
+ * log in the packet header line that the packet came from a
+ * connection-sharing downstream and what if anything unusual was
+ * done to it. The additional_log_text field is expected to be a
+ * static string - it will not be freed. */
+ unsigned downstream_id;
+ const char *additional_log_text;
+};
+
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
+static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
+static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
+static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
+static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
+static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
+static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
+static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
+static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
+static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
+static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, unsigned long now);
+static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_msg_unexpected(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
+
+struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
+ long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
+ unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ int chunk;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
+struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
+ long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
+ int i;
+ int cipherblk;
+ unsigned long incoming_sequence;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
+struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag {
+ char length[4];
+ long packetlen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long incoming_sequence;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
+struct queued_handler;
+struct queued_handler {
+ int msg1, msg2;
+ chandler_fn_t handler;
+ void *ctx;
+ struct queued_handler *next;
+};
+
+struct ssh_tag {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
+
+ char *v_c, *v_s;
+ void *exhash;
+
+ Socket s;
+
+ void *ldisc;
+ void *logctx;
+
+ unsigned char session_key[32];
+ int v1_compressing;
+ int v1_remote_protoflags;
+ int v1_local_protoflags;
+ int agentfwd_enabled;
+ int X11_fwd_enabled;
+ int remote_bugs;
+ const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
+ void *v1_cipher_ctx;
+ void *crcda_ctx;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
+ void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
+ void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
+ void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_kex *kex;
+ const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
+ char *hostkey_str; /* string representation, for easy checking in rekeys */
+ unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ int v2_session_id_len;
+ void *kex_ctx;
+
+ int bare_connection;
+ int attempting_connshare;
+ void *connshare;
+
+ char *savedhost;
+ int savedport;
+ int send_ok;
+ int echoing, editing;
+
+ void *frontend;
+
+ int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
+ int term_width, term_height;
+
+ tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
+ struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
+ int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
+ int exitcode;
+ int close_expected;
+ int clean_exit;
+
+ tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
+
+ enum {
+ SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
+ SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
+ SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
+ SSH_STATE_SESSION,
+ SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ } state;
+
+ int size_needed, eof_needed;
+ int sent_console_eof;
+ int got_pty; /* affects EOF behaviour on main channel */
+
+ struct Packet **queue;
+ int queuelen, queuesize;
+ int queueing;
+ unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
+ int deferred_len, deferred_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
+ * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
+ * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
+ * got.
+ */
+ int fallback_cmd;
+
+ bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
+
+ Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
+ Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
+
+ struct X11Display *x11disp;
+ struct X11FakeAuth *x11auth;
+ tree234 *x11authtree;
+
+ int version;
+ int conn_throttle_count;
+ int overall_bufsize;
+ int throttled_all;
+ int v1_stdout_throttling;
+ unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
+
+ int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
+ int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
+
+ void *do_ssh_init_state;
+ void *do_ssh1_login_state;
+ void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
+ void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
+ void *do_ssh_connection_init_state;
+
+ struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
+ struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
+ struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag rdpkt2_bare_state;
+
+ /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
+ int protocol_initial_phase_done;
+
+ void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pkt);
+ struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
+ int (*do_ssh_init)(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c);
+
+ /*
+ * We maintain our own copy of a Conf structure here. That way,
+ * when we're passed a new one for reconfiguration, we can check
+ * the differences and potentially reconfigure port forwardings
+ * etc in mid-session.
+ */
+ Conf *conf;
+
+ /*
+ * Values cached out of conf so as to avoid the tree234 lookup
+ * cost every time they're used.
+ */
+ int logomitdata;
+
+ /*
+ * Dynamically allocated username string created during SSH
+ * login. Stored in here rather than in the coroutine state so
+ * that it'll be reliably freed if we shut down the SSH session
+ * at some unexpected moment.
+ */
+ char *username;
+
+ /*
+ * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
+ */
+ void *agent_response;
+ int agent_response_len;
+ int user_response;
+
+ /*
+ * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
+ * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
+ * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
+ * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
+ * from the network which we need to delay processing until
+ * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
+ * store that data.
+ */
+ int frozen;
+ bufchain queued_incoming_data;
+
+ /*
+ * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
+ * with at any time.
+ */
+ handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
+
+ /*
+ * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
+ * indications from a request.
+ */
+ struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
+ handler_fn_t q_saved_handler1, q_saved_handler2;
+
+ /*
+ * This module deals with sending keepalives.
+ */
+ Pinger pinger;
+
+ /*
+ * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
+ * size-based rekeys.
+ */
+ unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
+ unsigned long max_data_size;
+ int kex_in_progress;
+ unsigned long next_rekey, last_rekey;
+ char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
+
+ /*
+ * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
+ */
+ char *fullhostname;
+
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ /*
+ * GSSAPI libraries for this session.
+ */
+ struct ssh_gss_liblist *gsslibs;
+#endif
+};
+
+#define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
+
+/* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
+static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *buf;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ logevent(buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void bomb_out(Ssh ssh, char *text)
+{
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
+ logevent(text);
+ connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text);
+ sfree(text);
+}
+
+#define bombout(msg) bomb_out(ssh, dupprintf msg)
+
+/* Helper function for common bits of parsing ttymodes. */
+static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh,
+ void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
+ void *data)
+{
+ char *key, *val;
+
+ for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, NULL, &key);
+ val != NULL;
+ val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_ttymodes, key, &key)) {
+ /*
+ * val[0] is either 'V', indicating that an explicit value
+ * follows it, or 'A' indicating that we should pass the
+ * value through from the local environment via get_ttymode.
+ */
+ if (val[0] == 'A') {
+ val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, key);
+ if (val) {
+ do_mode(data, key, val);
+ sfree(val);
+ }
+ } else
+ do_mode(data, key, val + 1); /* skip the 'V' */
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
+ struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
+ if (a->localid < b->localid)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->localid > b->localid)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
+ struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
+ if (*a < b->localid)
+ return -1;
+ if (*a > b->localid)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
+ int i;
+ if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->dport > b->dport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->dport < b->dport)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
+ int i;
+ if ( (i = strcmp(a->shost, b->shost)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->sport > b->sport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->sport < b->sport)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
+ * defined to sort before even the empty string.
+ */
+static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (b == NULL)
+ return +1;
+ return strcmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
+ int i;
+ if (a->type > b->type)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->type < b->type)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
+ return -1;
+ if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->sport > b->sport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->sport < b->sport)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->type != 'D') {
+ if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->dport > b->dport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->dport < b->dport)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
+ unsigned low, high, mid;
+ int tsize;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ /*
+ * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
+ * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
+ * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
+ * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
+ * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
+ * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
+ */
+ tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
+
+ low = -1;
+ high = tsize;
+ while (high - low > 1) {
+ mid = (high + low) / 2;
+ c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
+ if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
+ low = mid; /* this one is fine */
+ else
+ high = mid; /* this one is past it */
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
+ * largest ID in the initial sequence.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
+ assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
+ }
+ return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
+ fputc(buf[i], stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+}
+
+static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
+ c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
+ else
+ from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
+}
+
+static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
+ c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
+ else
+ from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
+}
+
+static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
+{
+ c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+
+static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ sfree(pkt->data);
+ sfree(pkt);
+}
+static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
+
+ pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
+ pkt->maxlen = 0;
+
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+static void ssh1_log_incoming_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, pkt->type,
+ ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->type),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks, NULL,
+ 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_log_outgoing_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ /*
+ * For outgoing packets, pkt->length represents the length of the
+ * whole packet starting at pkt->data (including some header), and
+ * pkt->body refers to the point within that where the log-worthy
+ * payload begins. However, incoming packets expect pkt->length to
+ * represent only the payload length (that is, it's measured from
+ * pkt->body not from pkt->data). Temporarily adjust our outgoing
+ * packet to conform to the incoming-packet semantics, so that we
+ * can analyse it with the ssh_pkt_get functions.
+ */
+ pkt->length -= (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE ||
+ pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE) &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a password or similar packet, blank the password(s). */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = 0;
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->length;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ nblanks++;
+ } else if (pkt->type == SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /*
+ * If this is an X forwarding request packet, blank the fake
+ * auth data.
+ *
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we
+ * don't take any special action to blank the start of an X11
+ * channel, so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening
+ * an X connection without having session blanking enabled is
+ * likely to leak your cookie into the log.
+ */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
+ ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length,
+ nblanks, blanks, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Undo the above adjustment of pkt->length, to put the packet
+ * back in the state we found it.
+ */
+ pkt->length += (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
+ * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
+ * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
+ * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
+ * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
+ */
+static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+
+ st->pktin->type = 0;
+ st->pktin->length = 0;
+
+ for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
+ (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
+ st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
+ st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
+
+ if (st->biglen < 0) {
+ bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
+ " data stream corruption"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+
+ st->to_read = st->biglen;
+ st->p = st->pktin->data;
+ while (st->to_read > 0) {
+ st->chunk = st->to_read;
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
+ st->chunk = (*datalen);
+ memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
+ *data += st->chunk;
+ *datalen -= st->chunk;
+ st->p += st->chunk;
+ st->to_read -= st->chunk;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
+ st->biglen, NULL)) {
+ bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cipher)
+ ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
+
+ st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
+ st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
+ if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
+ bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
+
+ if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
+ unsigned char *decompblk;
+ int decomplen;
+ if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
+ st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
+ &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
+ bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
+ sfree(decompblk);
+ st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
+
+ /*
+ * Now pktin->body and pktin->length identify the semantic content
+ * of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
+ */
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh1_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_log_incoming_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip extended data type */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, pkt->type,
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->type),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks, &pkt->sequence,
+ 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_log_outgoing_packet(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blanks[4];
+ char *str;
+ int slen;
+
+ /*
+ * For outgoing packets, pkt->length represents the length of the
+ * whole packet starting at pkt->data (including some header), and
+ * pkt->body refers to the point within that where the log-worthy
+ * payload begins. However, incoming packets expect pkt->length to
+ * represent only the payload length (that is, it's measured from
+ * pkt->body not from pkt->data). Temporarily adjust our outgoing
+ * packet to conform to the incoming-packet semantics, so that we
+ * can analyse it with the ssh_pkt_get functions.
+ */
+ pkt->length -= (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->logomitdata &&
+ (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA ||
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) {
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data string. */
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip channel id */
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt); /* skip extended data type */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos + 4;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = slen;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a password packet, blank the password(s). */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (slen == 8 && !memcmp(str, "password", 8)) {
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ /* Blank the password field. */
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ /* If there's another password field beyond it (change of
+ * password), blank that too. */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str)
+ blanks[nblanks-1].len =
+ pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ssh->pkt_actx == SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER &&
+ pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /* If this is a keyboard-interactive response packet, blank
+ * the responses. */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ while (1) {
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (!str)
+ break;
+ }
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ } else if (pkt->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitpass)) {
+ /*
+ * If this is an X forwarding request packet, blank the fake
+ * auth data.
+ *
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we
+ * don't take any special action to blank the start of an X11
+ * channel, so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening
+ * an X connection without having session blanking enabled is
+ * likely to leak your cookie into the log.
+ */
+ pkt->savedpos = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (slen == 7 && !memcmp(str, "x11-req", 0)) {
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ blanks[nblanks].offset = pkt->savedpos;
+ blanks[nblanks].type = PKTLOG_BLANK;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &str, &slen);
+ if (str) {
+ blanks[nblanks].len = pkt->savedpos - blanks[nblanks].offset;
+ nblanks++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length, nblanks, blanks,
+ &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence,
+ pkt->downstream_id, pkt->additional_log_text);
+
+ /*
+ * Undo the above adjustment of pkt->length, to put the packet
+ * back in the state we found it.
+ */
+ pkt->length += (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+
+ st->pktin->type = 0;
+ st->pktin->length = 0;
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
+ else
+ st->cipherblk = 8;
+ if (st->cipherblk < 8)
+ st->cipherblk = 8;
+ st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
+
+ if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
+ ssh->scmac) {
+ /*
+ * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
+ * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
+ * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
+ * cipher more than once and thus leak information
+ * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
+ * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
+ * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
+ * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
+ * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
+ * plausible.
+ */
+
+ /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+
+ /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->packetlen = 0;
+ {
+ unsigned char seq[4];
+ ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
+ ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
+ }
+
+ for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
+ /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+ /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
+ st->cipherblk);
+ /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
+ ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
+ st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
+ /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
+ if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
+ ((st->len = toint(GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data))) ==
+ st->packetlen-4))
+ break;
+ if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
+ bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ } else {
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
+ * contain the length and padding details.
+ */
+ for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
+
+ /*
+ * Now get the length figure.
+ */
+ st->len = toint(GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data));
+
+ /*
+ * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
+ * do us any more damage.
+ */
+ if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
+ (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
+ bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * So now we can work out the total packet length.
+ */
+ st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
+ */
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
+ */
+ for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+ /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
+ st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the MAC.
+ */
+ if (ssh->scmac
+ && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
+ st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
+ bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
+ st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
+ if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
+ bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ /*
+ * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
+ */
+ st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
+
+ st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
+ st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
+
+ st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
+
+ st->pktin->length = st->packetlen - st->pad;
+ assert(st->pktin->length >= 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Decompress packet payload.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *newpayload;
+ int newlen;
+ if (ssh->sccomp &&
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
+ &newpayload, &newlen)) {
+ if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
+ st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
+ memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
+ sfree(newpayload);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * pktin->body and pktin->length should identify the semantic
+ * content of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
+ */
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + 6;
+ st->pktin->length -= 6;
+ assert(st->pktin->length >= 0); /* one last double-check */
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh2_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_bare_connection_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt2_bare_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_bare_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate);
+
+ /*
+ * Read the packet length field.
+ */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->length[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->packetlen = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(st->length));
+ if (st->packetlen <= 0 || st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
+ bombout(("Invalid packet length received"));
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->packetlen, unsigned char);
+
+ st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
+
+ st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the remainder of the packet.
+ */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->packetlen; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * pktin->body and pktin->length should identify the semantic
+ * content of the packet, excluding the initial type byte.
+ */
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[0];
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + 1;
+ st->pktin->length = st->packetlen - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ */
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh2_log_incoming_packet(ssh, st->pktin);
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
+{
+ int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
+ unsigned long crc;
+#ifdef __SC__
+ /*
+ * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
+ * register allocation in this function and use the same register
+ * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
+ * following sledgehammer prevents this.
+ */
+ volatile
+#endif
+ int len;
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh1_log_outgoing_packet(ssh, pkt);
+
+ if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
+ unsigned char *compblk;
+ int complen;
+ zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
+ pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
+ &compblk, &complen);
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
+ memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
+ sfree(compblk);
+ pkt->length = complen + 12;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
+ pkt->length += 4;
+ len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
+ pad = 8 - (len % 8);
+ pktoffs = 8 - pad;
+ biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
+
+ for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
+ pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
+ crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
+
+ if (ssh->cipher)
+ ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
+
+ if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
+ return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
+}
+
+static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
+{
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (!ssh->s)
+ return 0;
+ return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
+}
+
+static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len, backlog, offset;
+ len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len, offset;
+ len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
+ if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
+ ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
+ ssh->deferred_size,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
+ pkt->data + offset, len);
+ ssh->deferred_len += len;
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
+ * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
+ * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
+ */
+static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
+{
+ int argtype;
+ Bignum bn;
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+
+ pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
+
+ while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
+ unsigned char *argp, argchar;
+ char *sargp;
+ unsigned long argint;
+ int arglen;
+ switch (argtype) {
+ /* Actual fields in the packet */
+ case PKT_INT:
+ argint = va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
+ break;
+ case PKT_CHAR:
+ argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
+ break;
+ case PKT_DATA:
+ argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
+ arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
+ break;
+ case PKT_STR:
+ sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
+ break;
+ case PKT_BIGNUM:
+ bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
+ ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, pkttype);
+ pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, pkttype);
+ pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
+{
+ char *ae, *be;
+ unsigned long av, bv;
+
+ av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
+ bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
+ if (av != bv)
+ return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
+ if (*ae == '.')
+ ae++;
+ if (*be == '.')
+ be++;
+ av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
+ bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
+ if (av != bv)
+ return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
+ * `uint32' into a hash state.
+ */
+static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
+{
+ unsigned char lenblk[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
+ h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
+ h->bytes(s, str, len);
+}
+
+static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
+{
+ unsigned char intblk[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
+ h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ */
+static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
+{
+ if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
+ unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
+ int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
+ pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
+ pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+ if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
+ }
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, const void *data, int len)
+{
+ pkt->length += len;
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
+ memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
+}
+static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
+{
+ unsigned char x[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(x, value);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
+ pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data,
+ int len)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
+}
+static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
+{
+ int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
+ unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
+ (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
+ sfree(data);
+}
+static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
+ p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
+ p[0] = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
+ p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
+ i = 0;
+ while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
+ i++;
+ memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
+ *len = n + 1 - i;
+ return p;
+}
+static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
+ sfree(p);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
+ pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
+ pkt->type = pkt_type;
+ pkt->downstream_id = 0;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = NULL;
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+/* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
+#define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
+#define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
+#define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
+ pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
+ pkt->forcepad = 0;
+ pkt->type = pkt_type;
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
+ pkt->downstream_id = 0;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = NULL;
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
+ * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
+ * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
+ */
+static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ ssh2_log_outgoing_packet(ssh, pkt);
+
+ if (ssh->bare_connection) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial packet construction for the bare connection
+ * protocol.
+ */
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + 1, pkt->length - 5);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + 1;
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* only for diagnostics, really */
+ return pkt->length - 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compress packet payload.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *newpayload;
+ int newlen;
+ if (ssh->cscomp &&
+ ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
+ pkt->length - 5,
+ &newpayload, &newlen)) {
+ pkt->length = 5;
+ ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
+ sfree(newpayload);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
+ * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
+ * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
+ * after padding.
+ */
+ cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
+ cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
+ padding = 4;
+ if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
+ padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
+ padding +=
+ (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
+ assert(padding <= 255);
+ maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
+ ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
+ pkt->data[4] = padding;
+ for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
+ pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
+ if (ssh->csmac)
+ ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
+ pkt->length + padding,
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
+
+ if (ssh->cscipher)
+ ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
+
+ pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
+
+ /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
+ pkt->body = pkt->data;
+ return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
+ * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
+ * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
+ *
+ * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
+ * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
+ * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
+ * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
+ * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
+ * works after packet encryption.
+ *
+ * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
+ * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
+ * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
+ * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
+ * then send them once we've finished.
+ *
+ * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
+ * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
+ *
+ * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
+ * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
+ * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
+ * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
+ * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
+ * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
+ *
+ * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
+ * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
+ * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
+ * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
+ * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
+ * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
+ * CBC.
+ */
+
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
+static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
+
+/*
+ * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len;
+ int backlog;
+ if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
+ /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ return;
+ }
+ len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->body, len);
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
+
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
+{
+ int len;
+ if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
+ ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
+ /*
+ * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
+ * get encrypted with a known IV.
+ */
+ struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
+ }
+ len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
+ if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
+ ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
+ ssh->deferred_size,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->body, len);
+ ssh->deferred_len += len;
+ ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ assert(ssh->queueing);
+
+ if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
+ ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
+ ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
+ }
+
+ ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
+ * set.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ if (ssh->queueing)
+ ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
+ else
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
+ * set.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ if (ssh->queueing)
+ ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
+ else
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
+ *
+ * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
+ * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
+ * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
+ * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
+ * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
+ * ssh->queueing.
+ */
+static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int backlog;
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
+ ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
+ sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
+ ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
+ * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
+ int padsize)
+{
+#if 0
+ if (0) {
+ /*
+ * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
+ * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
+ *
+ * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
+ * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
+ * always Cisco?)
+ */
+ pkt->forcepad = padsize;
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ /*
+ * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
+ * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
+ * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
+ * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
+ * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+
+ /*
+ * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
+ * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
+ * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
+ * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
+ * gain nothing by it.)
+ */
+ if (ssh->cscipher &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
+ int stringlen, i;
+
+ stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
+ stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
+ stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
+ if (ssh->cscomp) {
+ /*
+ * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
+ * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
+ * length we want it. The compression-disabling
+ * routine should return an integer indicating how
+ * many bytes we should adjust our string length
+ * by.
+ */
+ stringlen -=
+ ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
+ char c = (char) random_byte();
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
+ * packets that needed to be lumped together.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ assert(!ssh->queueing);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
+ ssh->queuelen = 0;
+
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+}
+
+#if 0
+void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ debug(("%s", string));
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ debug((" %02x", p[i]));
+ debug(("\n"));
+ sfree(p);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ hash_string(h, s, p, len);
+ sfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ */
+static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
+ return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
+ value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
+ pkt->savedpos += 4;
+ return value;
+}
+static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
+ return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
+ value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
+ pkt->savedpos++;
+ return value;
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
+{
+ int len;
+ *p = NULL;
+ *length = 0;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
+ return;
+ len = toint(GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos));
+ if (len < 0)
+ return;
+ *length = len;
+ pkt->savedpos += 4;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
+ return;
+ *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
+ pkt->savedpos += *length;
+}
+static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
+{
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
+ return NULL;
+ pkt->savedpos += length;
+ return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
+}
+static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
+ unsigned char **keystr)
+{
+ int j;
+
+ j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
+ pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
+ key, keystr, 0);
+
+ if (j < 0)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ pkt->savedpos += j;
+ assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int j;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
+ pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
+
+ if (j < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pkt->savedpos += j;
+ return b;
+}
+static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int length;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ if (p[0] & 0x80)
+ return NULL;
+ b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
+ return b;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
+ * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
+ * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
+ * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
+ * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
+ */
+static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
+ void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
+ void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
+ unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
+
+ /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
+
+ /*
+ * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
+ * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) && pkblob_len > 4+7+4 &&
+ (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
+ int pos, len, siglen;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the byte length of the modulus.
+ */
+
+ pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
+ len = toint(GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos)); /* get length of exponent */
+ if (len < 0 || len > pkblob_len - pos - 4)
+ goto give_up;
+ pos += 4 + len; /* skip over exponent */
+ if (pkblob_len - pos < 4)
+ goto give_up;
+ len = toint(GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos)); /* find length of modulus */
+ if (len < 0 || len > pkblob_len - pos - 4)
+ goto give_up;
+ pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
+ while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
+ len--, pos++;
+ /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
+
+ /*
+ * Now find the signature integer.
+ */
+ pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
+ if (sigblob_len < pos+4)
+ goto give_up;
+ siglen = toint(GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos));
+ if (siglen != sigblob_len - pos - 4)
+ goto give_up;
+ /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
+
+ if (len != siglen) {
+ unsigned char newlen[4];
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
+ pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
+ PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
+ /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
+ newlen[0] = 0;
+ while (len-- > siglen) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
+ /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. We also come
+ * here as a fallback if we discover above that the key blob
+ * is misformatted in some way. */
+ give_up:;
+ }
+
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
+ * a list of known buggy implementations.
+ */
+static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
+{
+ char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
+ imp = vstring;
+ imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
+ if (*imp) imp++;
+ imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
+ if (*imp) imp++;
+
+ ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * General notes on server version strings:
+ * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
+ * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
+ * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
+ * so we can't distinguish them.
+ */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore1) == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
+ * to use a different defence against password length
+ * sniffing.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_plainpw1) == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
+ * handle having a null and a random length of data after
+ * the password.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
+ logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsa1) == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
+ * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
+ * an AUTH_RSA message.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
+ logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_hmac2) == AUTO &&
+ !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
+ (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the HMAC bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_derivekey2) == AUTO &&
+ !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
+ (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
+ * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
+ * generate the keys).
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rsapad2) == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("mod_sftp/0.[0-8]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("mod_sftp/0.9.[0-8]", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_pksessid2) == AUTO &&
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
+ * public-key authentication.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_rekey2) == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
+ wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
+ /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
+ wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == FORCE_ON ||
+ (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_maxpkt2) == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
+ wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
+ logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_ignore2) == FORCE_ON) {
+ /*
+ * Servers that don't support SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. Currently,
+ * none detected automatically.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 ignore bug");
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshbug_winadj) == FORCE_ON) {
+ /*
+ * Servers that don't support our winadj request for one
+ * reason or another. Currently, none detected automatically.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has winadj bug");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
+ * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
+ */
+static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
+{
+ /* Eat "<protoversion>-". */
+ while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
+ assert(*str == '-'); str++;
+
+ /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
+ * underscores. */
+ while (*str) {
+ if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
+ *str = '_';
+ str++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
+ */
+static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, const char *protoname, char *svers)
+{
+ char *verstring;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ /*
+ * Construct a v2 version string.
+ */
+ verstring = dupprintf("%s2.0-%s\015\012", protoname, sshver);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Construct a v1 version string.
+ */
+ assert(!strcmp(protoname, "SSH-")); /* no v1 bare connection protocol */
+ verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
+ (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
+ svers : "1.5"),
+ sshver);
+ }
+
+ ssh_fix_verstring(verstring + strlen(protoname));
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ size_t len;
+ /*
+ * Record our version string.
+ */
+ len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
+ ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
+ ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
+ strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
+ s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
+ sfree(verstring);
+}
+
+static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
+{
+ static const char protoname[] = "SSH-";
+
+ struct do_ssh_init_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int vslen;
+ char version[10];
+ char *vstring;
+ int vstrsize;
+ int i;
+ int proto1, proto2;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh_init_state);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /* Search for a line beginning with the protocol name prefix in
+ * the input. */
+ for (;;) {
+ for (s->i = 0; protoname[s->i]; s->i++) {
+ if ((char)c != protoname[s->i]) goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ no:
+ while (c != '\012')
+ crReturn(1);
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+
+ s->vstrsize = sizeof(protoname) + 16;
+ s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
+ strcpy(s->vstring, protoname);
+ s->vslen = strlen(protoname);
+ s->i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
+ s->vstrsize += 16;
+ s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
+ }
+ s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
+ if (s->i >= 0) {
+ if (c == '-') {
+ s->version[s->i] = '\0';
+ s->i = -1;
+ } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
+ s->version[s->i++] = c;
+ } else if (c == '\012')
+ break;
+ crReturn(1); /* get another char */
+ }
+
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
+ ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
+
+ s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
+ s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
+ ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
+
+ /*
+ * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
+ */
+
+ /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
+ s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
+ /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
+ s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0 && !s->proto1) {
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 3 && !s->proto2) {
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ if (s->proto2 && (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) >= 2 || !s->proto1))
+ ssh->version = 2;
+ else
+ ssh->version = 1;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
+
+ /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) != 3)
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, protoname, s->version);
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ size_t len;
+ /*
+ * Record their version string.
+ */
+ len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
+ ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
+ ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
+ ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
+ ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 2)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
+ ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
+
+ sfree(s->vstring);
+
+ crFinish(0);
+}
+
+static int do_ssh_connection_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ordinary SSH begins with the banner "SSH-x.y-...". This is just
+ * the ssh-connection part, extracted and given a trivial binary
+ * packet protocol, so we replace 'SSH-' at the start with a new
+ * name. In proper SSH style (though of course this part of the
+ * proper SSH protocol _isn't_ subject to this kind of
+ * DNS-domain-based extension), we define the new name in our
+ * extension space.
+ */
+ static const char protoname[] =
+ "SSHCONNECTION@putty.projects.tartarus.org-";
+
+ struct do_ssh_connection_init_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int vslen;
+ char version[10];
+ char *vstring;
+ int vstrsize;
+ int i;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh_connection_init_state);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /* Search for a line beginning with the protocol name prefix in
+ * the input. */
+ for (;;) {
+ for (s->i = 0; protoname[s->i]; s->i++) {
+ if ((char)c != protoname[s->i]) goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ no:
+ while (c != '\012')
+ crReturn(1);
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+
+ s->vstrsize = sizeof(protoname) + 16;
+ s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
+ strcpy(s->vstring, protoname);
+ s->vslen = strlen(protoname);
+ s->i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
+ s->vstrsize += 16;
+ s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
+ }
+ s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
+ if (s->i >= 0) {
+ if (c == '-') {
+ s->version[s->i] = '\0';
+ s->i = -1;
+ } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
+ s->version[s->i++] = c;
+ } else if (c == '\012')
+ break;
+ crReturn(1); /* get another char */
+ }
+
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
+ ssh->rdpkt2_bare_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
+
+ s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
+ s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
+ ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
+
+ /*
+ * Decide which SSH protocol version to support. This is easy in
+ * bare ssh-connection mode: only 2.0 is legal.
+ */
+ if (ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0) {
+ bombout(("Server announces compatibility with SSH-1 in bare ssh-connection protocol"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0) {
+ bombout(("Bare ssh-connection protocol cannot be run in SSH-1-only mode"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh->version = 2;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using bare ssh-connection protocol");
+
+ /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, protoname, s->version);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise bare connection protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh2_bare_connection_protocol;
+ ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_bare_connection_rdpkt;
+
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
+ ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Get authconn (really just conn) under way.
+ */
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ sfree(s->vstring);
+
+ crFinish(0);
+}
+
+static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
+ unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+
+ pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
+ if (pktin) {
+ ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+ ssh_free_packet(pktin);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
+ unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
+ *data += *datalen;
+ *datalen = 0;
+}
+
+static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ void *vdata;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int len, origlen;
+
+ while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
+ bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
+ data = vdata;
+ origlen = len;
+
+ while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
+ ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
+
+ if (origlen > len)
+ bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
+{
+ if (ssh->s)
+ sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
+ ssh->frozen = frozen;
+}
+
+static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
+
+ /*
+ * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
+ * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
+ * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
+ * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
+ if (datalen == 0)
+ crReturnV; /* more data please */
+ ret = ssh->do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
+ data++;
+ datalen--;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
+ * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
+ * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
+ * to the proper protocol handler.
+ */
+
+ while (1) {
+ while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
+ if (ssh->frozen) {
+ ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
+ /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
+ * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
+ * return, so break out. */
+ break;
+ } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
+ /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
+ * session. */
+ ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
+ } else {
+ /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
+ * session. */
+ ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
+ }
+ /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+ }
+ /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
+ crReturnV;
+ }
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
+ expire_timer_context(ssh);
+ if (ssh->s) {
+ sk_close(ssh->s);
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ if (notify_exit)
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
+ * through this connection.
+ */
+ if (ssh->channels) {
+ while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ break;
+ }
+ del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
+ if (ssh->version == 2)
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
+ * listening sockets.
+ */
+ if (ssh->portfwds) {
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
+ while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
+ /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
+ if (pf->local)
+ pfl_terminate(pf->local);
+ del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
+ free_portfwd(pf);
+ }
+ freetree234(ssh->portfwds);
+ ssh->portfwds = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void ssh_socket_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ char addrbuf[256], *msg;
+
+ if (ssh->attempting_connshare) {
+ /*
+ * While we're attempting connection sharing, don't loudly log
+ * everything that happens. Real TCP connections need to be
+ * logged when we _start_ trying to connect, because it might
+ * be ages before they respond if something goes wrong; but
+ * connection sharing is local and quick to respond, and it's
+ * sufficient to simply wait and see whether it worked
+ * afterwards.
+ */
+ } else {
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+
+ if (type == 0) {
+ if (sk_addr_needs_port(addr)) {
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ } else {
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s", addrbuf);
+ }
+ } else {
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+ }
+
+ logevent(msg);
+ sfree(msg);
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_connshare_log(Ssh ssh, int event, const char *logtext,
+ const char *ds_err, const char *us_err)
+{
+ if (event == SHARE_NONE) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is an error message indicating a
+ * reason why connection sharing couldn't be set up _at all_.
+ * Failing that, ds_err and us_err indicate why we couldn't be
+ * a downstream and an upstream respectively. */
+ if (logtext) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing: %s", logtext);
+ } else {
+ if (ds_err)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
+ " as downstream: %s", ds_err);
+ if (us_err)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
+ " as upstream: %s", us_err);
+ }
+ } else if (event == SHARE_DOWNSTREAM) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using existing shared connection at %s", logtext);
+ /* Also we should mention this in the console window to avoid
+ * confusing users as to why this window doesn't behave the
+ * usual way. */
+ if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
+ c_write_str(ssh,"Reusing a shared connection to this server.\r\n");
+ }
+ } else if (event == SHARE_UPSTREAM) {
+ /* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address too */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sharing this connection at %s", logtext);
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
+
+ if (!error_msg) {
+ if (!ssh->close_expected)
+ error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
+ else
+ error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
+ ssh->exitcode = 0;
+
+ if (need_notify)
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+
+ if (error_msg)
+ logevent(error_msg);
+ if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
+ connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ /*
+ * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
+ * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
+ */
+ if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to specified host and port.
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
+ * freed by the caller.
+ */
+static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
+ char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ ssh_socket_log,
+ ssh_closing,
+ ssh_receive,
+ ssh_sent,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+ char *loghost;
+ int addressfamily, sshprot;
+
+ loghost = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_loghost);
+ if (*loghost) {
+ char *tmphost;
+ char *colon;
+
+ tmphost = dupstr(loghost);
+ ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
+
+ /*
+ * A colon suffix on the hostname string also lets us affect
+ * savedport. (Unless there are multiple colons, in which case
+ * we assume this is an unbracketed IPv6 literal.)
+ */
+ colon = host_strrchr(tmphost, ':');
+ if (colon && colon == host_strchr(tmphost, ':')) {
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ if (*colon)
+ ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
+ }
+
+ ssh->savedhost = host_strduptrim(tmphost);
+ sfree(tmphost);
+ } else {
+ ssh->savedhost = host_strduptrim(host);
+ if (port < 0)
+ port = 22; /* default ssh port */
+ ssh->savedport = port;
+ }
+
+ ssh->fn = &fn_table; /* make 'ssh' usable as a Plug */
+
+ /*
+ * Try connection-sharing, in case that means we don't open a
+ * socket after all. ssh_connection_sharing_init will connect to a
+ * previously established upstream if it can, and failing that,
+ * establish a listening socket for _us_ to be the upstream. In
+ * the latter case it will return NULL just as if it had done
+ * nothing, because here we only need to care if we're a
+ * downstream and need to do our connection setup differently.
+ */
+ ssh->connshare = NULL;
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = TRUE; /* affects socket logging behaviour */
+ ssh->s = ssh_connection_sharing_init(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->conf, ssh, &ssh->connshare);
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
+ if (ssh->s != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We are a downstream.
+ */
+ ssh->bare_connection = TRUE;
+ ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_connection_init;
+ ssh->fullhostname = NULL;
+ *realhost = dupstr(host); /* best we can do */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We're not a downstream, so open a normal socket.
+ */
+ ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_init;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+ ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
+
+ ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
+ 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive,
+ (Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
+ * send the version string too.
+ */
+ sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
+ if (sshprot == 0)
+ ssh->version = 1;
+ if (sshprot == 3 && !ssh->bare_connection) {
+ ssh->version = 2;
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, "SSH-", NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
+ */
+ if (*loghost) {
+ sfree(*realhost);
+ *realhost = dupstr(loghost);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
+ */
+static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
+{
+ int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
+ ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
+ assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
+ if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
+ * on the SSH connection itself back up).
+ */
+static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
+ return;
+ ssh->throttled_all = enable;
+ ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
+ if (!ssh->channels)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ /*
+ * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
+ */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.xconn, enable);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.pf, enable);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
+
+ ssh->agent_response = reply;
+ ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
+
+ ssh->user_response = ret;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
+ * queued-data run.
+ */
+ ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
+}
+
+static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ void *sentreply = reply;
+
+ c->u.a.outstanding_requests--;
+ if (!sentreply) {
+ /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
+ sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
+ replylen = 5;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
+ ssh2_try_send(c);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_INT, replylen,
+ PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ if (reply)
+ sfree(reply);
+ /*
+ * If we've already seen an incoming EOF but haven't sent an
+ * outgoing one, this may be the moment to send it.
+ */
+ if (c->u.a.outstanding_requests == 0 && (c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF))
+ sshfwd_write_eof(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
+ * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
+ * => log `wire_reason'.
+ */
+static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
+ int code, int clean_exit)
+{
+ char *error;
+ if (!client_reason)
+ client_reason = wire_reason;
+ if (client_reason)
+ error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
+ else
+ error = dupstr("Disconnected");
+ if (wire_reason) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
+ sfree(error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
+ */
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ int i, j, ret;
+ unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ struct do_ssh1_login_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
+ unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
+ int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
+ int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
+ unsigned char session_id[16];
+ int cipher_type;
+ void *publickey_blob;
+ int publickey_bloblen;
+ char *publickey_comment;
+ int publickey_encrypted;
+ prompts_t *cur_prompt;
+ char c;
+ int pwpkt_type;
+ unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
+ int responselen;
+ int keyi, nkeys;
+ int authed;
+ struct RSAKey key;
+ Bignum challenge;
+ char *commentp;
+ int commentlen;
+ int dlgret;
+ Filename *keyfile;
+ struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ if (!pktin)
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Received public keys");
+
+ ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
+ if (!ptr) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
+
+ if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &s->servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
+ !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &s->hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
+ bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Log the host key fingerprint.
+ */
+ {
+ char logmsg[80];
+ logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
+ strcpy(logmsg, " ");
+ s->hostkey.comment = NULL;
+ rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
+ sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &s->hostkey);
+ logevent(logmsg);
+ }
+
+ ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
+ s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
+
+ ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
+ ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
+ ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, s->hostkey.bytes);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, s->servkey.bytes);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
+ MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+ ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
+ */
+ if (s->hostkey.bits > s->hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
+ s->servkey.bits > s->servkey.bytes * 8) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ s->len = (s->hostkey.bytes > s->servkey.bytes ?
+ s->hostkey.bytes : s->servkey.bytes);
+
+ s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify the host key.
+ */
+ {
+ /*
+ * First format the key into a string.
+ */
+ int len = rsastr_len(&s->hostkey);
+ char fingerprint[100];
+ char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
+ rsastr_fmt(keystr, &s->hostkey);
+ rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &s->hostkey);
+
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ sfree(keystr);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
+ NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
+ if (i < 16)
+ s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
+ }
+
+ if (s->hostkey.bytes > s->servkey.bytes) {
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &s->servkey);
+ if (ret)
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, s->servkey.bytes, &s->hostkey);
+ } else {
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &s->hostkey);
+ if (ret)
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, s->hostkey.bytes, &s->servkey);
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Encrypted session key");
+
+ {
+ int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
+ char *cipher_string = NULL;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
+ int next_cipher = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
+ CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i);
+ if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
+ /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
+ warn = 1;
+ } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
+ /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
+ logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
+ } else {
+ switch (next_cipher) {
+ case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+ cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
+ case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
+ cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
+ case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
+ cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
+ }
+ if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
+ cipher_chosen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!cipher_chosen) {
+ if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
+ bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
+ "supporting 3DES encryption"));
+ else
+ /* shouldn't happen */
+ bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
+ if (warn) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (s->cipher_type) {
+ case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+ logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
+ break;
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
+ break;
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
+ PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
+ PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
+ PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
+ PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
+
+ logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
+
+ sfree(s->rsabuf);
+
+ ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
+ s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
+ &ssh_3des);
+ ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
+ ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
+
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
+ logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
+
+ if (s->servkey.modulus) {
+ sfree(s->servkey.modulus);
+ s->servkey.modulus = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->servkey.exponent) {
+ sfree(s->servkey.exponent);
+ s->servkey.exponent = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->hostkey.modulus) {
+ sfree(s->hostkey.modulus);
+ s->hostkey.modulus = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->hostkey.exponent) {
+ sfree(s->hostkey.exponent);
+ s->hostkey.exponent = NULL;
+ }
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Successfully started encryption");
+
+ fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
+ {
+ if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ }
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, ssh->username, PKT_END);
+ {
+ char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", ssh->username);
+ logevent(userlog);
+ if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
+ (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ }
+ sfree(userlog);
+ }
+ }
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
+ /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
+ s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
+ } else {
+ s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
+ }
+ s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
+ /*
+ * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
+ */
+ s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
+ if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
+ int keytype;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
+ keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
+ const char *error;
+ if (rsakey_pubblob(s->keyfile,
+ &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
+ &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
+ s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(s->keyfile,
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
+ error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
+ " (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+
+ while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
+ /*
+ * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
+ */
+ void *r;
+
+ s->authed = FALSE;
+ s->tried_agent = 1;
+ logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
+
+ /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
+ s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for agent response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ r = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
+ if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
+ s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ s->p = s->response + 5;
+ s->nkeys = toint(GET_32BIT(s->p));
+ if (s->nkeys < 0) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant reported negative key count %d",
+ s->nkeys);
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ }
+ s->p += 4;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
+ for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
+ unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
+ s->p += 4;
+ {
+ int n, ok = FALSE;
+ do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, toint(s->responselen-(s->p-s->response)),
+ &s->key.exponent);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, toint(s->responselen-(s->p-s->response)),
+ &s->key.modulus);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
+ break;
+ s->commentlen = toint(GET_32BIT(s->p));
+ s->p += 4;
+ if (s->commentlen < 0 ||
+ toint(s->responselen - (s->p-s->response)) <
+ s->commentlen)
+ break;
+ s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
+ s->p += s->commentlen;
+ ok = TRUE;
+ } while (0);
+ if (!ok) {
+ logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
+ "configured key file", s->keyi);
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ } else
+ /* Skip non-configured key */
+ continue;
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("Key refused");
+ continue;
+ }
+ logevent("Received RSA challenge");
+ if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
+ void *vret;
+ int len, retlen;
+ len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
+ len += 16; /* session id */
+ len += 4; /* response format */
+ agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
+ PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
+ q = agentreq + 4;
+ *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
+ q += 4;
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
+ memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
+ q += 16;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
+ if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
+ " while waiting for agent"
+ " response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ vret = ssh->agent_response;
+ retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ } else
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ ret = vret;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
+ PKT_END);
+ sfree(ret);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response accepted");
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
+ " RSA key \"");
+ c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
+ s->commentlen);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
+ }
+ s->authed = TRUE;
+ } else
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response not accepted");
+ } else {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
+ sfree(ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
+ }
+ }
+ freebn(s->key.exponent);
+ freebn(s->key.modulus);
+ freebn(s->challenge);
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ sfree(s->response);
+ if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
+ logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
+ } else {
+ logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
+ }
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
+ /*
+ * Try public key authentication with the specified
+ * key file.
+ */
+ int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
+ s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ while (!got_passphrase) {
+ /*
+ * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
+ */
+ char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
+ const char *error;
+ if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ } else {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
+ s->publickey_comment), FALSE);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
+ */
+ s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
+ ret = loadrsakey(s->keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
+ &error);
+ if (passphrase) {
+ smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sfree(passphrase);
+ }
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ /* Correct passphrase. */
+ got_passphrase = TRUE;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
+ c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
+ c_write_str(ssh, " (");
+ c_write_str(ssh, error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ break; /* go and try something else */
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ /* and try again */
+ } else {
+ assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
+ got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_passphrase) {
+
+ /*
+ * Send a public key attempt.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try something else */
+ }
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ int i;
+ unsigned char buffer[32];
+ Bignum challenge, response;
+
+ if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
+ freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
+ }
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
+ MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
+
+ freebn(challenge);
+ freebn(response);
+ }
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
+ " our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try something else */
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ break; /* we're through! */
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
+ */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+ !s->tis_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("TIS authentication declined");
+ if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+ char *instr_suf, *prompt;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ logevent("Received TIS challenge");
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
+ /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
+ if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
+ instr_suf = dupstr("");
+ prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ } else {
+ instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
+ (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
+ instr_suf);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
+ sfree(instr_suf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_tis_auth) &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
+ !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+ char *instr_suf, *prompt;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
+ /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
+ if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
+ instr_suf = dupstr("");
+ prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ } else {
+ instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
+ (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
+ instr_suf);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE);
+ sfree(instr_suf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
+ bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
+ ssh->username, ssh->savedhost),
+ FALSE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
+ * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get a password (for example
+ * because one was supplied on the command line
+ * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ /*
+ * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
+ * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
+ * different lengths. One of these strings is the
+ * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
+ * The others are all random data in
+ * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
+ * listener can't tell which is the password, and
+ * hence can't deduce the password length.
+ *
+ * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
+ * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
+ * password that a listener won't find it _that_
+ * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
+ * do is:
+ *
+ * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
+ * containing string lengths 1 through 15
+ *
+ * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
+ * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
+ * packets containing string lengths N through
+ * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
+ * magnitude of the password length, but it will
+ * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
+ *
+ * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
+ * least in this context. For these servers, we need
+ * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
+ * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
+ * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
+ *
+ * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * here _nor_ a padded password string.
+ * For these servers we are left with no defences
+ * against password length sniffing.
+ */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
+ * we can use the primary defence.
+ */
+ int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
+ char *randomstr;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ if (pwlen < 16) {
+ bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
+ top = 15;
+ } else {
+ bottom = pwlen & ~7;
+ top = bottom + 7;
+ }
+
+ assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
+
+ randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
+
+ for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
+ if (i == pwlen) {
+ defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKT_STR,s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ do {
+ randomstr[j] = random_byte();
+ } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
+ }
+ randomstr[i] = '\0';
+ defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
+ PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
+ }
+ }
+ logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ sfree(randomstr);
+ }
+ else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
+ * can use the secondary defence.
+ */
+ char string[64];
+ char *ss;
+ int len;
+
+ len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ if (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ ss = string;
+ strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ len++; /* cover the zero byte */
+ while (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
+ }
+ } else {
+ ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
+ }
+ logevent("Sending length-padded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The server is believed unable to cope with
+ * any of our password camouflage methods.
+ */
+ int len;
+ len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ logevent("Sending unpadded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKT_INT, len,
+ PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ logevent("Sent password");
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+ logevent("Authentication refused");
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear up */
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ sfree(s->publickey_blob);
+ sfree(s->publickey_comment);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Authentication successful");
+
+ crFinish(1);
+}
+
+static void ssh_channel_try_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ assert(c->pending_eof); /* precondition for calling us */
+ if (c->halfopen)
+ return; /* can't close: not even opened yet */
+ if (ssh->version == 2 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0)
+ return; /* can't send EOF: pending outgoing data */
+
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE; /* we're about to send it */
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+ }
+}
+
+Conf *sshfwd_get_conf(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ return ssh->conf;
+}
+
+void sshfwd_write_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
+ return;
+
+ c->pending_eof = TRUE;
+ ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
+}
+
+void sshfwd_unclean_close(struct ssh_channel *c, const char *err)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded X11 connection terminated due to local "
+ "error: %s", err);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded port closed due to local error: %s", err);
+ break;
+ }
+ c->type = CHAN_ZOMBIE;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE; /* this will confuse a zombie channel */
+
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+}
+
+int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
+ PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
+ * connections are never individually throttled - because
+ * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
+ * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
+ * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
+ return ssh2_try_send(c);
+ }
+}
+
+void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ int buflimit;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
+ } else {
+ buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
+ ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
+ }
+ if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
+
+ assert(qh != NULL);
+
+ assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh->q_saved_handler1;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh->q_saved_handler2;
+ }
+
+ if (qh->next) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh->next;
+
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
+ ssh->q_saved_handler1 = ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1];
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
+ ssh->q_saved_handler2 = ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2];
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+ }
+
+ qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
+
+ sfree(qh);
+}
+
+static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
+ chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh;
+
+ qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
+ qh->msg1 = msg1;
+ qh->msg2 = msg2;
+ qh->handler = handler;
+ qh->ctx = ctx;
+ qh->next = NULL;
+
+ if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh;
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ ssh->q_saved_handler1 = ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1];
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ ssh->q_saved_handler2 = ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2];
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qtail->next = qh;
+ }
+ ssh->qtail = qh;
+}
+
+static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
+
+ if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+
+ rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
+ assert(rpf == pf);
+ pf->pfrec->remote = NULL;
+ free_rportfwd(pf);
+ }
+}
+
+int ssh_alloc_sharing_rportfwd(Ssh ssh, const char *shost, int sport,
+ void *share_ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
+ pf->dhost = NULL;
+ pf->dport = 0;
+ pf->share_ctx = share_ctx;
+ pf->shost = dupstr(shost);
+ pf->sport = sport;
+ pf->sportdesc = NULL;
+ if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
+ assert(ssh->version == 2);
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
+ }
+ if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
+ sfree(pf->shost);
+ sfree(pf);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void ssh_sharing_global_request_response(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_queue_global_request(Ssh ssh, void *share_ctx)
+{
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
+ ssh_sharing_global_request_response, share_ctx);
+}
+
+static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, Conf *conf)
+{
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+ char *key, *val;
+
+ if (!ssh->portfwds) {
+ ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
+ * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
+ * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
+ * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
+ * they were before.
+ */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ epf->status = DESTROY;
+ }
+
+ for (val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, NULL, &key);
+ val != NULL;
+ val = conf_get_str_strs(conf, CONF_portfwd, key, &key)) {
+ char *kp, *kp2, *vp, *vp2;
+ char address_family, type;
+ int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
+ char *sports, *dports, *saddr, *host;
+
+ kp = key;
+
+ address_family = 'A';
+ type = 'L';
+ if (*kp == 'A' || *kp == '4' || *kp == '6')
+ address_family = *kp++;
+ if (*kp == 'L' || *kp == 'R')
+ type = *kp++;
+
+ if ((kp2 = host_strchr(kp, ':')) != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * There's a colon in the middle of the source port
+ * string, which means that the part before it is
+ * actually a source address.
+ */
+ char *saddr_tmp = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(kp2 - kp), kp);
+ saddr = host_strduptrim(saddr_tmp);
+ sfree(saddr_tmp);
+ sports = kp2+1;
+ } else {
+ saddr = NULL;
+ sports = kp;
+ }
+ sport = atoi(sports);
+ sserv = 0;
+ if (sport == 0) {
+ sserv = 1;
+ sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
+ if (!sport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
+ " port \"%s\"", sports);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (type == 'L' && !strcmp(val, "D")) {
+ /* dynamic forwarding */
+ host = NULL;
+ dports = NULL;
+ dport = -1;
+ dserv = 0;
+ type = 'D';
+ } else {
+ /* ordinary forwarding */
+ vp = val;
+ vp2 = vp + host_strcspn(vp, ":");
+ host = dupprintf("%.*s", (int)(vp2 - vp), vp);
+ if (*vp2)
+ vp2++;
+ dports = vp2;
+ dport = atoi(dports);
+ dserv = 0;
+ if (dport == 0) {
+ dserv = 1;
+ dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
+ if (!dport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
+ " port \"%s\"", dports);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sport && dport) {
+ /* Set up a description of the source port. */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
+
+ pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
+ pfrec->type = type;
+ pfrec->saddr = saddr;
+ pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->sport = sport;
+ pfrec->daddr = host;
+ pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->dport = dport;
+ pfrec->local = NULL;
+ pfrec->remote = NULL;
+ pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
+ address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
+ ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
+
+ epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
+ if (epfrec != pfrec) {
+ if (epfrec->status == DESTROY) {
+ /*
+ * We already have a port forwarding up and running
+ * with precisely these parameters. Hence, no need
+ * to do anything; simply re-tag the existing one
+ * as KEEP.
+ */
+ epfrec->status = KEEP;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Anything else indicates that there was a duplicate
+ * in our input, which we'll silently ignore.
+ */
+ free_portfwd(pfrec);
+ } else {
+ pfrec->status = CREATE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sfree(saddr);
+ sfree(host);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
+ * not re-enabled.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
+ char *message;
+
+ message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
+ epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
+ epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sport);
+
+ if (epf->type != 'D') {
+ char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(message);
+ message = msg2;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
+ sfree(message);
+
+ /* epf->remote or epf->local may be NULL if setting up a
+ * forwarding failed. */
+ if (epf->remote) {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ /*
+ * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
+ * end.
+ */
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
+ * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
+ * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
+ * the rportfwd record from the local end
+ * so that any connections the server tries
+ * to make on it are rejected.
+ */
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
+ } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
+ /* XXX: rport_acceptall may not represent
+ * what was used to open the original connection,
+ * since it's reconfigurable. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "");
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "localhost");
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+
+ del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
+ free_rportfwd(rpf);
+ } else if (epf->local) {
+ pfl_terminate(epf->local);
+ }
+
+ delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
+ free_portfwd(epf);
+ i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == CREATE) {
+ char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
+ sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
+ epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->sport,
+ epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
+ if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ dportdesc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->daddr,
+ epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
+ epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->dport,
+ epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
+ }
+
+ if (epf->type == 'L') {
+ char *err = pfl_listen(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, conf, &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc, dportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ if (err)
+ sfree(err);
+ } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ char *err = pfl_listen(NULL, -1, epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, conf, &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+
+ if (err)
+ sfree(err);
+ } else {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
+ else
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
+ }
+
+ pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
+ pf->share_ctx = NULL;
+ pf->dhost = dupstr(epf->daddr);
+ pf->dport = epf->dport;
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ pf->shost = dupstr(epf->saddr);
+ } else if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_rport_acceptall)) {
+ pf->shost = dupstr("");
+ } else {
+ pf->shost = dupstr("localhost");
+ }
+ pf->sport = epf->sport;
+ if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(pf);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
+ " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
+
+ pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
+ sportdesc = NULL;
+ epf->remote = pf;
+ pf->pfrec = epf;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
+ PKT_INT, epf->sport,
+ PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
+ PKT_INT, epf->dport,
+ PKT_END);
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
+ SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, pf->shost);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sfree(sportdesc);
+ sfree(dportdesc);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *string;
+ int stringlen, bufsize;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
+ if (string == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
+ string, stringlen);
+ if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ logevent("Received X11 connect request");
+ /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ c->u.x11.xconn = x11_init(ssh->x11authtree, c, NULL, -1);
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ c->u.a.message = NULL;
+ c->u.a.outstanding_requests = 0;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
+ * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
+ int remoteid;
+ int hostsize, port;
+ char *host;
+ char *err;
+
+ remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
+ port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ pf.dhost = dupprintf("%.*s", hostsize, host);
+ pf.dport = port;
+ pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
+
+ if (pfp == NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ struct ssh_channel *c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ err = pfd_connect(&c->u.pfd.pf, pf.dhost, port,
+ c, ssh->conf, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", err);
+ sfree(err);
+ sfree(c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
+ }
+ }
+
+ sfree(pf.dhost);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->remoteid = localid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ }
+
+ if (c && c->pending_eof) {
+ /*
+ * We have a pending close on this channel,
+ * which we decided on before the server acked
+ * the channel open. So now we know the
+ * remoteid, we can close it again.
+ */
+ ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side closes a channel. */
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && !c->halfopen) {
+
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE &&
+ !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)) {
+ /*
+ * Received CHANNEL_CLOSE, which we translate into
+ * outgoing EOF.
+ */
+ int send_close = FALSE;
+
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
+
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn)
+ x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ else
+ send_close = TRUE;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf)
+ pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ else
+ send_close = TRUE;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ send_close = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (send_close && !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION &&
+ !(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
+
+ if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
+ bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION for channel %d"
+ " for which we never sent CHANNEL_CLOSE\n", i));
+ }
+
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes) &&
+ !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes))
+ ssh_channel_destroy(c);
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
+ pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
+ "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
+ i));
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
+ int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ char *p;
+ int len;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.xconn, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.pf, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ c->u.a.outstanding_requests++;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
+ * extra human-readable text on the end of the
+ * session which we might mistake for another
+ * encrypted packet, we close the session once
+ * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
+ */
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
+}
+
+/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
+static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int arg = 0;
+ while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
+ if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
+ switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
+ case TTY_OP_CHAR:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
+ break;
+ case TTY_OP_BOOL:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
+}
+
+int ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ return conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_agentfwd) && agent_exists();
+}
+
+static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
+ ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_close;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
+
+ if (ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(ssh)) {
+ logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward)) {
+ ssh->x11disp =
+ x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
+ ssh->conf);
+ if (!ssh->x11disp) {
+ /* FIXME: return an error message from x11_setup_display */
+ logevent("X11 forwarding not enabled: unable to"
+ " initialise X display");
+ } else {
+ ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_fake_auth
+ (ssh->x11authtree, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth));
+ ssh->x11auth->disp = ssh->x11disp;
+
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->protoname,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->datastring,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->protoname,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11auth->datastring,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
+
+ if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
+ ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
+ sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
+ /* Send the pty request. */
+ pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
+ parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
+ s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
+ ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression)) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
+ }
+ logevent("Started compression");
+ ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start the shell or command.
+ *
+ * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
+ * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
+ * exists, we fall straight back to that.
+ */
+ {
+ char *cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys) &&
+ conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
+ cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (*cmd)
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
+ else
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Started session");
+ }
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
+ if (ssh->size_needed)
+ ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
+ if (ssh->eof_needed)
+ ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
+
+ if (ssh->ldisc)
+ ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
+ while (1) {
+
+ /*
+ * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
+ * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
+ * attention to the unusual ones.
+ */
+
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
+ * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (inlen > 0) {
+ int len = min(inlen, 512);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, in, len,
+ PKT_END);
+ in += len;
+ inlen -= len;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log reason code in disconnect message */
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
+}
+
+static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * These special message types we install handlers for.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
+ if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
+ else
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
+ */
+static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ while (1) {
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
+ * If no comma found, terminate.
+ */
+ while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
+ haylen--, haystack++;
+ if (haylen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
+ */
+static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * SSH-2 key creation method.
+ * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
+ * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
+ */
+#define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
+static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
+ unsigned char *keyspace)
+{
+ const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
+ void *s;
+ /* First hlen bytes. */
+ s = h->init();
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ hash_mpint(h, s, K);
+ h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
+ h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
+ h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ h->final(s, keyspace);
+ /* Next hlen bytes. */
+ s = h->init();
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ hash_mpint(h, s, K);
+ h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
+ h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
+ h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
+ */
+static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
+ Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
+ void *our_kexinit;
+ int our_kexinitlen;
+ int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
+ const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
+ int nmacs;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
+ char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
+ int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
+ void *hkey; /* actual host key */
+ void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
+ unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ int n_preferred_kex;
+ const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
+ int n_preferred_ciphers;
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
+ const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
+ int userauth_succeeded; /* for delayed compression */
+ int pending_compression;
+ int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ int dlgret;
+ int guessok;
+ int ignorepkt;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
+
+ assert(!ssh->bare_connection);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+
+ s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
+ s->userauth_succeeded = FALSE;
+ s->pending_compression = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
+ */
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
+ s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
+ else
+ s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
+
+ begin_key_exchange:
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
+ {
+ int i, j, k, commalist_started;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_kexlist, i)) {
+ case KEX_DHGEX:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP14:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP1:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
+ break;
+ case KEX_RSA:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_rsa_kex;
+ break;
+ case KEX_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
+ case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_DES:
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_3DES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_AES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up preferred compression.
+ */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression))
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
+ else
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
+ * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag that KEX is in progress.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
+ /* List key exchange algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server host key algorithms. */
+ if (!s->got_session_id) {
+ /*
+ * In the first key exchange, we list all the algorithms
+ * we're prepared to cope with.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
+ if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In subsequent key exchanges, we list only the kex
+ * algorithm that was selected in the first key exchange,
+ * so that we keep getting the same host key and hence
+ * don't have to interrupt the user's session to ask for
+ * reverification.
+ */
+ assert(ssh->kex);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->hostkey->name);
+ }
+ /* List encryption algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
+ for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* List MAC algorithms (client->server then server->client). */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server compression algorithms,
+ * then server->client compression algorithms. (We use the
+ * same set twice.) */
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
+ /* Prefer non-delayed versions */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ /* We don't even list delayed versions of algorithms until
+ * they're allowed to be used, to avoid a race. See the end of
+ * this function. */
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded && s->preferred_comp->delayed_name) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout,
+ s->preferred_comp->delayed_name);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
+ if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded && c->delayed_name) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->delayed_name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ /* Reserved. */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
+ }
+
+ s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
+ s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
+ memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ if (!pktin)
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
+ * to.
+ */
+ {
+ char *str, *preferred;
+ int i, j, len;
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey = NULL;
+ s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
+
+ pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
+
+ preferred = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) {
+ s->warn_kex = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
+ if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
+ if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ ssh->kex = k->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ssh->kex) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
+ * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
+ * we end up using.
+ */
+ s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ssh->hostkey) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a host key algorithm (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ s->guessok = s->guessok &&
+ first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cscipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->sccipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
+ s->cscomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ } else if (in_commasep_string(c->delayed_name, str, len)) {
+ if (s->userauth_succeeded) {
+ s->sccomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ s->pending_compression = TRUE; /* try this later */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->pending_compression) {
+ logevent("Server supports delayed compression; "
+ "will try this later");
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
+ s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
+
+ ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
+ sfree(s->our_kexinit);
+ /* Include the type byte in the hash of server's KEXINIT */
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ pktin->body - 1, pktin->length + 1);
+
+ if (s->warn_kex) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
+ ssh->kex->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_cscipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "client-to-server cipher",
+ s->cscipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_sccipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "server-to-client cipher",
+ s->sccipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
+ /*
+ * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
+ * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
+ * either cipher...
+ */
+ {
+ int csbits, scbits;
+
+ csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
+ scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
+ s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
+ }
+ /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
+ * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
+ if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
+ s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
+ * requesting a group.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
+ /*
+ * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
+ * much data.
+ */
+ s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->p || !s->g) {
+ bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
+ } else {
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
+ ssh->kex->groupname);
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
+ ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
+ /*
+ * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
+ */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
+ s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
+ ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->f) {
+ bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
+
+ /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
+ * involve user interaction. */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
+ }
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
+
+ dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
+ freebn(s->f);
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ freebn(s->g);
+ freebn(s->p);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
+ ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
+ /*
+ * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
+ * from the server.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
+ bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+
+ {
+ char *keydata;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
+ s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
+ memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
+ }
+
+ s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
+ if (!s->rsakey) {
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
+
+ /*
+ * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
+ * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
+ * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
+ * we're using.
+ */
+ {
+ int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
+ int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
+ int i, byte = 0;
+ unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
+ int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
+
+ s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
+ if ((i & 7) == 0) {
+ byte = random_byte();
+ }
+ bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode this as an mpint.
+ */
+ kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
+ kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
+ PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
+ memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
+ */
+ outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
+ outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
+ ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
+ outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
+
+ /*
+ * And send it off in a return packet.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
+
+ sfree(kstr2);
+ sfree(kstr1);
+ sfree(outstr);
+ }
+
+ ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ }
+
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
+ assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
+ ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
+
+ ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
+
+#if 0
+ debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
+ dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
+#endif
+
+ if (!s->hkey ||
+ !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
+ (char *)s->exchange_hash,
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
+ bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
+ if (!s->got_session_id) {
+ /*
+ * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
+ * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
+ */
+ s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
+ s->fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
+ logevent(s->fingerprint);
+ sfree(s->fingerprint);
+ /*
+ * Save this host key, to check against the one presented in
+ * subsequent rekeys.
+ */
+ ssh->hostkey_str = s->keystr;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In a rekey, we never present an interactive host key
+ * verification request to the user. Instead, we simply
+ * enforce that the key we're seeing this time is identical to
+ * the one we saw before.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(ssh->hostkey_str, s->keystr)) {
+ bombout(("Host key was different in repeat key exchange"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ sfree(s->keystr);
+ }
+ ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
+
+ /*
+ * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
+ * the session id, used in session key construction and
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (!s->got_session_id) {
+ assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
+ memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
+ sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
+ assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
+ s->got_session_id = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * client-to-server session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
+ assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
+ assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
+ ssh->cscipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->csmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
+ ssh->cscomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
+ * our queued higher-layer packets.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = FALSE;
+ ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+ bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * server-to-client session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
+ assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
+ assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ smemclr(keyspace, sizeof(keyspace));
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
+ ssh->sccipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->scmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
+ ssh->sccomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Free shared secret.
+ */
+ freebn(s->K);
+
+ /*
+ * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
+ * deferred rekey reason.
+ */
+ if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
+ logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
+ pktin = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
+ ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0)
+ ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
+ * function so that other things can run on top of the
+ * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
+ * start.
+ *
+ * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
+ * inlen negative, because this is a special signal meaning
+ * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
+ * giving the reason for the rekey.
+ *
+ * inlen==-1 means always initiate a rekey;
+ * inlen==-2 means that userauth has completed successfully and
+ * we should consider rekeying (for delayed compression).
+ */
+ while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
+ (!pktin && inlen < 0))) {
+ wait_for_rekey:
+ if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
+ */
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ }
+ crReturnV;
+ }
+ if (pktin) {
+ logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
+ } else {
+ if (inlen == -2) {
+ /*
+ * authconn has seen a USERAUTH_SUCCEEDED. Time to enable
+ * delayed compression, if it's available.
+ *
+ * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00 says that you
+ * negotiate delayed compression in the first key exchange, and
+ * both sides start compressing when the server has sent
+ * USERAUTH_SUCCESS. This has a race condition -- the server
+ * can't know when the client has seen it, and thus which incoming
+ * packets it should treat as compressed.
+ *
+ * Instead, we do the initial key exchange without offering the
+ * delayed methods, but note if the server offers them; when we
+ * get here, if a delayed method was available that was higher
+ * on our list than what we got, we initiate a rekey in which we
+ * _do_ list the delayed methods (and hopefully get it as a
+ * result). Subsequent rekeys will do the same.
+ */
+ assert(!s->userauth_succeeded); /* should only happen once */
+ s->userauth_succeeded = TRUE;
+ if (!s->pending_compression)
+ /* Can't see any point rekeying. */
+ goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
+ /* else fall through to rekey... */
+ s->pending_compression = FALSE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we've decided to rekey.
+ *
+ * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
+ * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
+ * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
+ * we process it anyway!)
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
+ (char *)in);
+ /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
+ * hit the event log _too_ often. */
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0) {
+ ssh->next_rekey =
+ schedule_timer(conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time)*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+ }
+ goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is still utterly horrid */
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
+ }
+ }
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
+ */
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
+ int len)
+{
+ bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ int ret;
+
+ while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
+ int len;
+ void *data;
+ bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
+ len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
+ len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
+ c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
+ * still buffered.
+ */
+ ret = bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+
+ /*
+ * And if there's no data pending but we need to send an EOF, send
+ * it.
+ */
+ if (!ret && c->pending_eof)
+ ssh_channel_try_eof(c);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(Ssh ssh, struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ int bufsize;
+ if (c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)
+ return; /* don't send on channels we've EOFed */
+ bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
+ if (bufsize == 0) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
+ * notification since it will be polled */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
+ * buffer management */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_is_simple(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use the 'simple' variant of the SSH protocol if we're asked
+ * to, except not if we're also doing connection-sharing (either
+ * tunnelling our packets over an upstream or expecting to be
+ * tunnelled over ourselves), since then the assumption that we
+ * have only one channel to worry about is not true after all.
+ */
+ return (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_simple) &&
+ !ssh->bare_connection && !ssh->connshare);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
+ */
+static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->pending_eof = FALSE;
+ c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
+ ssh_is_simple(ssh) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_head = NULL;
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
+ bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct the common parts of a CHANNEL_OPEN.
+ */
+static struct Packet *ssh2_chanopen_init(struct ssh_channel *c, char *type)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, type);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ return pktout;
+}
+
+/*
+ * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of what message
+ * caused it, so we have to keep track of the outstanding
+ * CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
+ */
+static void ssh2_queue_chanreq_handler(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ cchandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *ocr =
+ snew(struct outstanding_channel_request);
+
+ assert(!(c->closes & (CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)));
+ ocr->handler = handler;
+ ocr->ctx = ctx;
+ ocr->next = NULL;
+ if (!c->v.v2.chanreq_head)
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_head = ocr;
+ else
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_tail->next = ocr;
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_tail = ocr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct the common parts of a CHANNEL_REQUEST. If handler is not
+ * NULL then a reply will be requested and the handler will be called
+ * when it arrives. The returned packet is ready to have any
+ * request-specific data added and be sent. Note that if a handler is
+ * provided, it's essential that the request actually be sent.
+ *
+ * The handler will usually be passed the response packet in pktin.
+ * If pktin is NULL, this means that no reply will ever be forthcoming
+ * (e.g. because the entire connection is being destroyed) and the
+ * handler should free any storage it's holding.
+ */
+static struct Packet *ssh2_chanreq_init(struct ssh_channel *c, char *type,
+ cchandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ assert(!(c->closes & (CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)));
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, type);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, handler != NULL);
+ if (handler != NULL)
+ ssh2_queue_chanreq_handler(c, handler, ctx);
+ return pktout;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static void ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *, struct Packet *,
+ void *);
+static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ /*
+ * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side has
+ * already sent EOF on; there's no point, since it won't be
+ * sending any more data anyway. Ditto if _we've_ already sent
+ * CLOSE.
+ */
+ if (c->closes & (CLOSES_RCVD_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Also, never widen the window for an X11 channel when we're
+ * still waiting to see its initial auth and may yet hand it off
+ * to a downstream.
+ */
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11 && c->u.x11.initial)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
+ * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
+ * window as well).
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
+ newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
+ * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
+ * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
+ *
+ * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
+ */
+ if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ unsigned *up;
+
+ /*
+ * In order to keep track of how much window the client
+ * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
+ * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
+ * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
+ *
+ * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
+ * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
+ * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
+ */
+ if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_WINADJ)) {
+ up = snew(unsigned);
+ *up = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(c, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org",
+ ssh2_handle_winadj_response, up);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
+ } else {
+ /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
+ }
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
+ * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
+ */
+static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (!c ||
+ (c->type != CHAN_SHARING && c->halfopen &&
+ pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
+ pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
+ char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
+ pktin->type),
+ c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+ sfree(buf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_handle_winadj_response(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned *sizep = ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * Winadj responses should always be failures. However, at least
+ * one server ("boks_sshd") is known to return SUCCESS for channel
+ * requests it's never heard of, such as "winadj@putty". Raised
+ * with foxt.com as bug 090916-090424, but for the sake of a quiet
+ * life, we don't worry about what kind of response we got.
+ */
+
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin += *sizep;
+ sfree(sizep);
+ /*
+ * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
+ * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
+ * complete.
+ */
+ if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_response(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *ocr;
+
+ if (!c) return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ ocr = c->v.v2.chanreq_head;
+ if (!ocr) {
+ ssh2_msg_unexpected(ssh, pktin);
+ return;
+ }
+ ocr->handler(c, pktin, ocr->ctx);
+ c->v.v2.chanreq_head = ocr->next;
+ sfree(ocr);
+ /*
+ * We may now initiate channel-closing procedures, if that
+ * CHANNEL_REQUEST was the last thing outstanding before we send
+ * CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ */
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
+ c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *data;
+ int length;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
+ return; /* extended but not stderr */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
+ if (data) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ bufsize =
+ from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
+ data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.xconn, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.pf, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ while (length > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ c->u.a.outstanding_requests++;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.message = NULL;
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
+ * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
+ * larger window.
+ */
+ if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
+ /*
+ * If we are not buffering too much data,
+ * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
+ * If we are buffering too much, we may still
+ * need to adjust the window if the server's
+ * sent excess data.
+ */
+ ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
+ /*
+ * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
+ * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
+ * throttle the whole channel.
+ */
+ if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin || (ssh_is_simple(ssh) && bufsize>0))
+ && !c->throttling_conn) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_check_termination(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ if (ssh->version == 2 &&
+ !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell) &&
+ count234(ssh->channels) == 0 &&
+ !(ssh->connshare && share_ndownstreams(ssh->connshare) > 0)) {
+ /*
+ * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here, because I'd
+ * believed that _every_ conforming SSH-2 connection had to
+ * end with a disconnect being sent by at least one side;
+ * apparently I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
+ * unceremoniously slam the connection shut when you're done,
+ * and indeed OpenSSH feels this is more polite than sending a
+ * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
+ */
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_downstream_connected(Ssh ssh, unsigned id)
+{
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u connected", id);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_downstream_disconnected(Ssh ssh, unsigned id)
+{
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u disconnected", id);
+ ssh_check_termination(ssh);
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_logf(Ssh ssh, unsigned id, const char *logfmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *buf;
+
+ va_start(ap, logfmt);
+ buf = dupvprintf(logfmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (id)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing downstream #%u: %s", id, buf);
+ else
+ logeventf(ssh, "Connection sharing: %s", buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void ssh_channel_destroy(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ logevent("Forwarded port closed");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+ assert(c->v.v2.chanreq_head == NULL);
+ }
+ sfree(c);
+
+ /*
+ * If that was the last channel left open, we might need to
+ * terminate.
+ */
+ ssh_check_termination(ssh);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_channel_check_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ if (c->halfopen) {
+ /*
+ * If we've sent out our own CHANNEL_OPEN but not yet seen
+ * either OPEN_CONFIRMATION or OPEN_FAILURE in response, then
+ * it's too early to be sending close messages of any kind.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((!((CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_RCVD_EOF) & ~c->closes) ||
+ c->type == CHAN_ZOMBIE) &&
+ !c->v.v2.chanreq_head &&
+ !(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE)) {
+ /*
+ * We have both sent and received EOF (or the channel is a
+ * zombie), and we have no outstanding channel requests, which
+ * means the channel is in final wind-up. But we haven't sent
+ * CLOSE, so let's do so now.
+ */
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_SENT_EOF | CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!((CLOSES_SENT_CLOSE | CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE) & ~c->closes)) {
+ assert(c->v.v2.chanreq_head == NULL);
+ /*
+ * We have both sent and received CLOSE, which means we're
+ * completely done with the channel.
+ */
+ ssh_channel_destroy(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_channel_got_eof(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ if (c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_EOF)
+ return; /* already seen EOF */
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_EOF;
+
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
+ x11_send_eof(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
+ if (c->u.a.outstanding_requests == 0) {
+ /* Manufacture an outgoing EOF in response to the incoming one. */
+ sshfwd_write_eof(c);
+ }
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
+ pfd_send_eof(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_MAINSESSION) {
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (!ssh->sent_console_eof &&
+ (from_backend_eof(ssh->frontend) || ssh->got_pty)) {
+ /*
+ * Either from_backend_eof told us that the front end
+ * wants us to close the outgoing side of the connection
+ * as soon as we see EOF from the far end, or else we've
+ * unilaterally decided to do that because we've allocated
+ * a remote pty and hence EOF isn't a particularly
+ * meaningful concept.
+ */
+ sshfwd_write_eof(c);
+ }
+ ssh->sent_console_eof = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When we receive CLOSE on a channel, we assume it comes with an
+ * implied EOF if we haven't seen EOF yet.
+ */
+ ssh2_channel_got_eof(c);
+
+ /*
+ * And we also send an outgoing EOF, if we haven't already, on the
+ * assumption that CLOSE is a pretty forceful announcement that
+ * the remote side is doing away with the entire channel. (If it
+ * had wanted to send us EOF and continue receiving data from us,
+ * it would have just sent CHANNEL_EOF.)
+ */
+ if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_SENT_EOF)) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure we don't read any more from whatever our local
+ * data source is for this channel.
+ */
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ ssh->send_ok = 0; /* stop trying to read from stdin */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.xconn, 1);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.pf, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Abandon any buffered data we still wanted to send to this
+ * channel. Receiving a CHANNEL_CLOSE is an indication that
+ * the server really wants to get on and _destroy_ this
+ * channel, and it isn't going to send us any further
+ * WINDOW_ADJUSTs to permit us to send pending stuff.
+ */
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+
+ /*
+ * Send outgoing EOF.
+ */
+ sshfwd_write_eof(c);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now process the actual close.
+ */
+ if (!(c->closes & CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE)) {
+ c->closes |= CLOSES_RCVD_CLOSE;
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ assert(c->halfopen); /* ssh2_channel_msg will have enforced this */
+ c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf)
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_ZOMBIE) {
+ /*
+ * This case can occur if a local socket error occurred
+ * between us sending out CHANNEL_OPEN and receiving
+ * OPEN_CONFIRMATION. In this case, all we can do is
+ * immediately initiate close proceedings now that we know the
+ * server's id to put in the close message.
+ */
+ ssh2_channel_check_close(c);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We never expect to receive OPEN_CONFIRMATION for any
+ * *other* channel type (since only local-to-remote port
+ * forwardings cause us to send CHANNEL_OPEN after the main
+ * channel is live - all other auxiliary channel types are
+ * initiated from the server end). It's safe to enforce this
+ * by assertion rather than by ssh_disconnect, because the
+ * real point is that we never constructed a half-open channel
+ * structure in the first place with any type other than the
+ * above.
+ */
+ assert(!"Funny channel type in ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation");
+ }
+
+ if (c->pending_eof)
+ ssh_channel_try_eof(c); /* in case we had a pending EOF */
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ static const char *const reasons[] = {
+ "<unknown reason code>",
+ "Administratively prohibited",
+ "Connect failed",
+ "Unknown channel type",
+ "Resource shortage",
+ };
+ unsigned reason_code;
+ char *reason_string;
+ int reason_length;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ assert(c->halfopen); /* ssh2_channel_msg will have enforced this */
+
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
+ reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
+ reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
+
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_ZOMBIE) {
+ /*
+ * This case can occur if a local socket error occurred
+ * between us sending out CHANNEL_OPEN and receiving
+ * OPEN_FAILURE. In this case, we need do nothing except allow
+ * the code below to throw the half-open channel away.
+ */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We never expect to receive OPEN_FAILURE for any *other*
+ * channel type (since only local-to-remote port forwardings
+ * cause us to send CHANNEL_OPEN after the main channel is
+ * live - all other auxiliary channel types are initiated from
+ * the server end). It's safe to enforce this by assertion
+ * rather than by ssh_disconnect, because the real point is
+ * that we never constructed a half-open channel structure in
+ * the first place with any type other than the above.
+ */
+ assert(!"Funny channel type in ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure");
+ }
+
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen, want_reply;
+ int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type == CHAN_SHARING) {
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(c->u.sharing.ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ return;
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * Having got the channel number, we now look at
+ * the request type string to see if it's something
+ * we recognise.
+ */
+ if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
+ /*
+ * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
+ * the primary channel.
+ */
+ if (typelen == 11 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
+
+ ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
+ ssh->exitcode);
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
+
+ } else if (typelen == 11 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
+
+ int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
+ char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
+ /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
+ * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
+ * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
+ * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
+ * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
+ pktin->savedpos;
+ long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
+ unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
+ /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
+ if (num == 0) {
+ is_int = FALSE;
+ } else {
+ int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
+#define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ int q = toint(offset); \
+ if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
+ q = toint(q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q)); \
+ if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
+ ((q = toint(q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))) != 0) && \
+ q == len) \
+ result = TRUE; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+ CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
+ CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
+#undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
+ if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
+ is_int = TRUE;
+ else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
+ is_int = FALSE;
+ else
+ /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
+ is_plausible = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
+ if (is_plausible) {
+ if (is_int) {
+ /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
+ int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
+ ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
+ } else {
+ /* As per RFC 4254. */
+ char *sig;
+ int siglen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
+ /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
+ * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
+ if (siglen) {
+ fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
+ siglen, sig);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Really hideous method of translating the
+ * signal description back into a locally
+ * meaningful number.
+ */
+
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
+ else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
+ ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
+#ifdef SIGABRT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGFPE
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGHUP
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGILL
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGINT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGKILL
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGPIPE
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGQUIT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGSEGV
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGTERM
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGUSR1
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGUSR2
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
+#endif
+#undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
+ else
+ ssh->exitcode = 128;
+ }
+ core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ if (msglen) {
+ fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
+ }
+ /* ignore lang tag */
+ } /* else don't attempt to parse */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
+ fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
+ fmt_msg);
+ if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
+ if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This is a channel request we don't know
+ * about, so we now either ignore the request
+ * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
+ * on want_reply.
+ */
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (want_reply) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen, want_reply;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support any global requests
+ * at all, so we either ignore the request or
+ * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
+ * want_reply.
+ */
+ if (want_reply) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+struct X11FakeAuth *ssh_sharing_add_x11_display(Ssh ssh, int authtype,
+ void *share_cs,
+ void *share_chan)
+{
+ struct X11FakeAuth *auth;
+
+ /*
+ * Make up a new set of fake X11 auth data, and add it to the tree
+ * of currently valid ones with an indication of the sharing
+ * context that it's relevant to.
+ */
+ auth = x11_invent_fake_auth(ssh->x11authtree, authtype);
+ auth->share_cs = share_cs;
+ auth->share_chan = share_chan;
+
+ return auth;
+}
+
+void ssh_sharing_remove_x11_display(Ssh ssh, struct X11FakeAuth *auth)
+{
+ del234(ssh->x11authtree, auth);
+ x11_free_fake_auth(auth);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen;
+ char *peeraddr;
+ int peeraddrlen;
+ int peerport;
+ char *error = NULL;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
+ unsigned our_winsize_override = 0;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
+ char *addrstr;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
+ addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
+ memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
+ addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
+ peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
+ addrstr, peerport);
+
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled && !ssh->connshare)
+ error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
+ else {
+ c->u.x11.xconn = x11_init(ssh->x11authtree, c,
+ addrstr, peerport);
+ c->type = CHAN_X11;
+ c->u.x11.initial = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a connection-sharing upstream, then we should
+ * initially present a very small window, adequate to take
+ * the X11 initial authorisation packet but not much more.
+ * Downstream will then present us a larger window (by
+ * fiat of the connection-sharing protocol) and we can
+ * guarantee to send a positive-valued WINDOW_ADJUST.
+ */
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ our_winsize_override = 128;
+
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
+ }
+
+ sfree(addrstr);
+ } else if (typelen == 15 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
+ char *shost;
+ int shostlen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &shost, &shostlen);/* skip address */
+ pf.shost = dupprintf("%.*s", shostlen, shost);
+ pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
+ peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %s:%d open request "
+ "from %s:%d", pf.shost, pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
+ sfree(pf.shost);
+
+ if (realpf == NULL) {
+ error = "Remote port is not recognised";
+ } else {
+ char *err;
+
+ if (realpf->share_ctx) {
+ /*
+ * This port forwarding is on behalf of a
+ * connection-sharing downstream, so abandon our own
+ * channel-open procedure and just pass the message on
+ * to sshshare.c.
+ */
+ share_got_pkt_from_server(realpf->share_ctx, pktin->type,
+ pktin->body, pktin->length);
+ sfree(c);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ err = pfd_connect(&c->u.pfd.pf, realpf->dhost, realpf->dport,
+ c, ssh->conf, realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
+ "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", err);
+ sfree(err);
+ error = "Port open failed";
+ } else {
+ logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (typelen == 22 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
+ if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
+ error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
+ else {
+ c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ c->u.a.message = NULL;
+ c->u.a.outstanding_requests = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
+ }
+
+ c->remoteid = remid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ if (error) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
+ sfree(c);
+ } else {
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
+ if (our_winsize_override) {
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
+ our_winsize_override;
+ }
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+void sshfwd_x11_sharing_handover(struct ssh_channel *c,
+ void *share_cs, void *share_chan,
+ const char *peer_addr, int peer_port,
+ int endian, int protomajor, int protominor,
+ const void *initial_data, int initial_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we've just discovered that an X
+ * forwarding channel on which we'd been handling the initial auth
+ * ourselves turns out to be destined for a connection-sharing
+ * downstream. So we turn the channel into a CHAN_SHARING, meaning
+ * that we completely stop tracking windows and buffering data and
+ * just pass more or less unmodified SSH messages back and forth.
+ */
+ c->type = CHAN_SHARING;
+ c->u.sharing.ctx = share_cs;
+ share_setup_x11_channel(share_cs, share_chan,
+ c->localid, c->remoteid, c->v.v2.remwindow,
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt, c->v.v2.locwindow,
+ peer_addr, peer_port, endian,
+ protomajor, protominor,
+ initial_data, initial_len);
+}
+
+void sshfwd_x11_is_local(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we've just discovered that an X
+ * forwarding channel is _not_ destined for a connection-sharing
+ * downstream but we're going to handle it ourselves. We stop
+ * presenting a cautiously small window and go into ordinary data
+ * exchange mode.
+ */
+ c->u.x11.initial = FALSE;
+ ssh2_set_window(c, ssh_is_simple(c->ssh) ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point,
+ * if we're going to display them.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner) &&
+ bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
+ char *banner = NULL;
+ int size = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
+ if (banner)
+ bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
+static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int arg = 0;
+ while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
+ if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
+ switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
+ case TTY_OP_CHAR:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
+ break;
+ case TTY_OP_BOOL:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_setup_x11(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh2_setup_x11_state {
+ int crLine;
+ };
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ crStateP(ssh2_setup_x11_state, ctx);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "x11-req",
+ ssh2_setup_x11, s);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0); /* many connections */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11auth->protoname);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, ssh->x11auth->datastring);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ /* Wait to be called back with either a response packet, or NULL
+ * meaning clean up and free our data */
+ crReturnV;
+
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ } else
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ }
+
+ crFinishFreeV;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_setup_agent(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh2_setup_agent_state {
+ int crLine;
+ };
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ crStateP(ssh2_setup_agent_state, ctx);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com",
+ ssh2_setup_agent, s);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ /* Wait to be called back with either a response packet, or NULL
+ * meaning clean up and free our data */
+ crReturnV;
+
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ } else
+ logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
+ }
+
+ crFinishFreeV;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_setup_pty(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh2_setup_pty_state {
+ int crLine;
+ };
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ crStateP(ssh2_setup_pty_state, ctx);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
+ ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
+ sscanf(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termspeed), "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
+ /* Build the pty request. */
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "pty-req",
+ ssh2_setup_pty, s);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_termtype));
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->ospeed);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
+
+ /* Wait to be called back with either a response packet, or NULL
+ * meaning clean up and free our data */
+ crReturnV;
+
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
+ ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh->got_pty = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishFreeV;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_setup_env(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh2_setup_env_state {
+ int crLine;
+ int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
+ };
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ crStateP(ssh2_setup_env_state, ctx);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /*
+ * Send environment variables.
+ *
+ * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
+ * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
+ */
+ s->num_env = 0;
+ {
+ char *key, *val;
+
+ for (val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, NULL, &key);
+ val != NULL;
+ val = conf_get_str_strs(ssh->conf, CONF_environmt, key, &key)) {
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "env", ssh2_setup_env, s);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, key);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, val);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ s->num_env++;
+ }
+ if (s->num_env)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
+ }
+
+ if (s->num_env) {
+ s->env_ok = 0;
+ s->env_left = s->num_env;
+
+ while (s->env_left > 0) {
+ /* Wait to be called back with either a response packet,
+ * or NULL meaning clean up and free our data */
+ crReturnV;
+ if (!pktin) goto out;
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS)
+ s->env_ok++;
+ s->env_left--;
+ }
+
+ if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
+ logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
+ } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
+ logevent("All environment variables refused");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
+ s->num_env - s->env_ok);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
+ }
+ }
+ out:;
+ crFinishFreeV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_authconn(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_response_authconn(struct ssh_channel *c, struct Packet *pktin,
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ do_ssh2_authconn(c->ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+}
+
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
+ int crLine;
+ enum {
+ AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
+ AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
+ AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
+ } type;
+ int done_service_req;
+ int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
+ int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ int can_gssapi;
+ int tried_gssapi;
+#endif
+ int kbd_inter_refused;
+ int we_are_in, userauth_success;
+ prompts_t *cur_prompt;
+ int num_prompts;
+ char *username;
+ char *password;
+ int got_username;
+ void *publickey_blob;
+ int publickey_bloblen;
+ int publickey_encrypted;
+ char *publickey_algorithm;
+ char *publickey_comment;
+ unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
+ int agent_responselen;
+ unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
+ int keyi, nkeys;
+ char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
+ int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
+ int siglen, retlen, len;
+ char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
+ int try_send;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ Filename *keyfile;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ struct ssh_gss_library *gsslib;
+ Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
+ Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
+ Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
+ Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
+ Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
+#endif
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
+
+ crBeginState;
+
+ /* Register as a handler for all the messages this coroutine handles. */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = ssh2_msg_authconn; duplicate case value */
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_authconn; duplicate case value */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_authconn;
+
+ s->done_service_req = FALSE;
+ s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = FALSE;
+ s->agent_response = NULL;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+ if (!ssh->bare_connection) {
+ if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth)) {
+ /*
+ * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+ s->done_service_req = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!s->done_service_req) {
+ /*
+ * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Server refused service request"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
+ * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
+ bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
+ ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
+
+ /*
+ * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
+ */
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ if (!s->we_are_in) {
+
+ /*
+ * Load the public half of any configured public key file
+ * for later use.
+ */
+ s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
+ if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
+ int keytype;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
+ keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
+ const char *error;
+ s->publickey_blob =
+ ssh2_userkey_loadpub(s->keyfile,
+ &s->publickey_algorithm,
+ &s->publickey_bloblen,
+ &s->publickey_comment, &error);
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ s->publickey_encrypted =
+ ssh2_userkey_encrypted(s->keyfile, NULL);
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
+ error);
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
+ error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
+ " (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
+ * public key configured, filter out all others).
+ */
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ s->agent_response = NULL;
+ s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent) && agent_exists()) {
+
+ void *r;
+
+ logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
+
+ /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
+ s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for agent response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ r = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
+ if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
+ s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ int keyi;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ p = s->agent_response + 5;
+ s->nkeys = toint(GET_32BIT(p));
+
+ /*
+ * Vet the Pageant response to ensure that the key
+ * count and blob lengths make sense.
+ */
+ if (s->nkeys < 0) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant response contained a negative"
+ " key count %d", s->nkeys);
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ goto done_agent_query;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *q = p + 4;
+ int lenleft = s->agent_responselen - 5 - 4;
+
+ for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
+ int bloblen, commentlen;
+ if (lenleft < 4) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant response was truncated");
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ goto done_agent_query;
+ }
+ bloblen = toint(GET_32BIT(q));
+ if (bloblen < 0 || bloblen > lenleft) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant response was truncated");
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ goto done_agent_query;
+ }
+ lenleft -= 4 + bloblen;
+ q += 4 + bloblen;
+ commentlen = toint(GET_32BIT(q));
+ if (commentlen < 0 || commentlen > lenleft) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant response was truncated");
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ goto done_agent_query;
+ }
+ lenleft -= 4 + commentlen;
+ q += 4 + commentlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += 4;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ /* See if configured key is in agent. */
+ for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
+ s->pklen = toint(GET_32BIT(p));
+ if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
+ !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
+ "configured key file", keyi);
+ s->keyi = keyi;
+ s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
+ break;
+ }
+ p += 4 + s->pklen;
+ p += toint(GET_32BIT(p)) + 4; /* comment */
+ }
+ if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
+ }
+ done_agent_query:;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
+ * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
+ * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
+ * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
+ * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
+ * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
+ *
+ * I think this best serves the needs of
+ *
+ * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
+ * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
+ * type both correctly
+ *
+ * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
+ * need to fall back to passwords
+ *
+ * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
+ * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
+ * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
+ * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
+ * the username they will want to be able to get back and
+ * retype it!
+ */
+ s->got_username = FALSE;
+ while (!s->we_are_in) {
+ /*
+ * Get a username.
+ */
+ if (s->got_username && !conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
+ /*
+ * We got a username last time round this loop, and
+ * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
+ * it again.
+ */
+ } else if ((ssh->username = get_remote_username(ssh->conf)) == NULL) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
+ * Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->username = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ } else {
+ char *stuff;
+ if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
+ stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", ssh->username);
+ c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
+ sfree(stuff);
+ }
+ }
+ s->got_username = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
+ * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
+ * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
+ */
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+ s->we_are_in = FALSE;
+
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
+ s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
+
+ /* Reset agent request state. */
+ s->done_agent = FALSE;
+ if (s->agent_response) {
+ if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
+ } else {
+ s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
+ s->keyi = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ char *methods = NULL;
+ int methlen = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
+ */
+ if (!s->gotit)
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ /*
+ * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
+ * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
+ * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
+ * with.)
+ */
+ {
+ int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
+ /*
+ * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
+ * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
+ * a script, which means nobody will read the
+ * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
+ * the banner will screw up processing on the
+ * output of (say) plink.)
+ */
+ if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
+ char *banner = snewn(size, char);
+ bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
+ c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
+ sfree(banner);
+ }
+ bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
+ }
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent("Access granted");
+ s->we_are_in = s->userauth_success = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
+ "type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
+ * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
+ * helpfully try next.
+ */
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
+ if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
+ /*
+ * We have received an unequivocal Access
+ * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
+ * messages, or no message at all.
+ *
+ * For forms of authentication which are attempted
+ * implicitly, by which I mean without printing
+ * anything in the window indicating that we're
+ * trying them, we should never print 'Access
+ * denied'.
+ *
+ * If we do print a message saying that we're
+ * attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
+ * to print a followup message saying it failed -
+ * but the message may sometimes be more specific
+ * than simply 'Access denied'.
+ *
+ * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
+ * authentication, we should break out of this
+ * whole loop so as to go back to the username
+ * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
+ * username change attempts).
+ */
+ if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
+ s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
+ if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
+ logevent("Server refused our key");
+ } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
+ /* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
+ * protocol bug causing client and server to
+ * disagree on what is a correct signature. */
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused public-key signature"
+ " despite accepting key!\r\n");
+ logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
+ " despite accepting key!");
+ } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
+ /* quiet, so no c_write */
+ logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive authentication");
+ } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
+ /* always quiet, so no c_write */
+ /* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
+ * already logged this in the Event Log */
+ } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
+ logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication failed");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+ } else {
+ assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
+ logevent("Password authentication failed");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username)) {
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow
+ * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
+ s->we_are_in = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
+ logevent("Further authentication required");
+ }
+
+ s->can_pubkey =
+ in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
+ s->can_passwd =
+ in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
+ s->can_keyb_inter = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_ki_auth) &&
+ in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ if (!ssh->gsslibs)
+ ssh->gsslibs = ssh_gss_setup(ssh->conf);
+ s->can_gssapi = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_try_gssapi_auth) &&
+ in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
+ ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries > 0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+
+ if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
+ */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
+
+ /* Unpack key from agent response */
+ s->pklen = toint(GET_32BIT(s->agentp));
+ s->agentp += 4;
+ s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
+ s->agentp += s->pklen;
+ s->alglen = toint(GET_32BIT(s->pkblob));
+ s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
+ s->commentlen = toint(GET_32BIT(s->agentp));
+ s->agentp += 4;
+ s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
+ s->agentp += s->commentlen;
+ /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
+
+ /* See if server will accept it */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
+
+ /* Offer of key refused. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ } else {
+
+ void *vret;
+
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
+ "public key \"");
+ c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Server is willing to accept the key.
+ * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+
+ /* Ask agent for signature. */
+ s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
+ s->siglen -= 4;
+ s->len = 1; /* message type */
+ s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
+ s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
+ s->len += 4; /* flags */
+ s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
+ PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
+ s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
+ *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
+ s->q += 4;
+ memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+ s->q += s->pklen;
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
+ s->q += 4;
+ /* Now the data to be signed... */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ s->q += 4;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
+ s->pktout->length - 5);
+ s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
+ /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
+ if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
+ &vret, &s->retlen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
+ " while waiting for agent"
+ " response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ vret = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->ret = vret;
+ sfree(s->agentreq);
+ if (s->ret) {
+ if (s->retlen >= 9 &&
+ s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE &&
+ GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5) <= (unsigned)(s->retlen-9)) {
+ logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
+ ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
+ s->pkblob, s->pklen,
+ s->ret + 9,
+ GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
+ } else {
+ /* FIXME: less drastic response */
+ bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
+ if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ s->done_agent = TRUE;
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->keyi++;
+ if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
+ s->done_agent = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
+ !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
+
+ struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
+ char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
+
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
+ *
+ * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
+ * willing to accept it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ /* no signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
+ (char *)s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ logevent("Offered public key");
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
+ /* Key refused. Give up. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
+ continue; /* process this new message */
+ }
+ logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
+
+ /*
+ * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
+ * the key.
+ */
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
+ c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
+ }
+ key = NULL;
+ while (!key) {
+ const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
+ if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ /*
+ * Get a passphrase from the user.
+ */
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
+ s->publickey_comment),
+ FALSE);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
+ in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
+ "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ passphrase =
+ dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ } else {
+ passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try decrypting the key.
+ */
+ s->keyfile = conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile);
+ key = ssh2_load_userkey(s->keyfile, passphrase, &error);
+ if (passphrase) {
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ sfree(passphrase);
+ }
+ if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
+ if (passphrase &&
+ (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
+ key = NULL;
+ /* and loop again */
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
+ c_write_str(ssh, error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
+ key = NULL;
+ break; /* try something else */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key) {
+ unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
+ int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
+ int p;
+
+ /*
+ * We have loaded the private key and the server
+ * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
+ * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
+ /* signature follows */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
+ pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
+ &pkblob_len);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
+ pkblob_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The data to be signed is:
+ *
+ * string session-id
+ *
+ * followed by everything so far placed in the
+ * outgoing packet.
+ */
+ sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
+ sigdata_len -= 4;
+ sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
+ p = 0;
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
+ PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ p += 4;
+ }
+ memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
+ s->pktout->length - 5);
+ p += s->pktout->length - 5;
+ assert(p == sigdata_len);
+ sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
+ sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
+ ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
+ sigblob, sigblob_len);
+ sfree(pkblob);
+ sfree(sigblob);
+ sfree(sigdata);
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ logevent("Sent public key signature");
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
+ key->alg->freekey(key->data);
+ }
+
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
+
+ /* GSSAPI Authentication */
+
+ int micoffset, len;
+ char *data;
+ Ssh_gss_buf mic;
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
+ s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
+
+ /*
+ * Pick the highest GSS library on the preference
+ * list.
+ */
+ {
+ int i, j;
+ s->gsslib = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < ngsslibs; i++) {
+ int want_id = conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf,
+ CONF_ssh_gsslist, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < ssh->gsslibs->nlibraries; j++)
+ if (ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j].id == want_id) {
+ s->gsslib = &ssh->gsslibs->libraries[j];
+ goto got_gsslib; /* double break */
+ }
+ }
+ got_gsslib:
+ /*
+ * We always expect to have found something in
+ * the above loop: we only came here if there
+ * was at least one viable GSS library, and the
+ * preference list should always mention
+ * everything and only change the order.
+ */
+ assert(s->gsslib);
+ }
+
+ if (s->gsslib->gsslogmsg)
+ logevent(s->gsslib->gsslogmsg);
+
+ /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
+
+ /* add mechanism info */
+ s->gsslib->indicate_mech(s->gsslib, &s->gss_buf);
+
+ /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
+
+ /* length of OID + 2 */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+
+ /* length of OID */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
+
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
+ s->gss_buf.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* check returned packet ... */
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
+ s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
+ s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
+ if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
+ ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+ ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
+ memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
+ s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* now start running */
+ s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->import_name(s->gsslib,
+ ssh->fullhostname,
+ &s->gss_srv_name);
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
+ logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
+ else
+ logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
+ s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->acquire_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
+ s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* initial tokens are empty */
+ SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
+ SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
+
+ /* now enter the loop */
+ do {
+ s->gss_stat = s->gsslib->init_sec_context
+ (s->gsslib,
+ &s->gss_ctx,
+ s->gss_srv_name,
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_gssapifwd),
+ &s->gss_rcvtok,
+ &s->gss_sndtok);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
+ s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
+
+ if (s->gsslib->display_status(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx,
+ &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
+ sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
+
+ /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
+ * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
+
+ if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->gsslib->free_tok(s->gsslib, &s->gss_sndtok);
+ }
+
+ if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
+ s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
+ s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
+ s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
+ }
+ } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
+ s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
+ continue;
+ }
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
+
+ /* Now send the MIC */
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
+ micoffset = s->pktout->length;
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
+ s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
+
+ s->gsslib->get_mic(s->gsslib, s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->gsslib->free_mic(s->gsslib, &mic);
+
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+
+ s->gsslib->release_name(s->gsslib, &s->gss_srv_name);
+ s->gsslib->release_cred(s->gsslib, &s->gss_ctx);
+ continue;
+#endif
+ } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
+
+ /*
+ * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
+ */
+
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
+ /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
+ * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
+ * user without actually issuing any prompts).
+ * Give up on it entirely. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
+ s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
+ */
+ while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
+
+ char *name, *inst, *lang;
+ int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
+ * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
+ */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
+ */
+ s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
+ char *prompt;
+ int prompt_len;
+ int echo;
+ static char noprompt[] =
+ "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
+ echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ if (!prompt_len) {
+ prompt = noprompt;
+ prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
+ }
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
+ echo);
+ }
+
+ if (name_len) {
+ /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
+ * local prompts? */
+ s->cur_prompt->name =
+ dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->cur_prompt->name =
+ dupstr("SSH server authentication");
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
+ }
+ /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
+ * has come from the server.
+ * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
+ * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
+ /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
+ * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
+ * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
+ if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
+ inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Display any instructions, and get the user's
+ * response(s).
+ */
+ {
+ int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the response(s) to the server.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
+ for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+
+ /*
+ * Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
+ * If there's another, a new one will be allocated
+ * when we return to the top of this while loop.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next packet in case it's another
+ * INFO_REQUEST.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
+ */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ } else if (s->can_passwd) {
+
+ /*
+ * Plain old password authentication.
+ */
+ int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
+ int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
+
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
+ ssh->username,
+ ssh->savedhost),
+ FALSE);
+
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
+ * asked to change it.)
+ */
+ s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+
+ /*
+ * Send the password packet.
+ *
+ * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
+ * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
+ * user's password.
+ *
+ * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
+ * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
+ * people who find out how long their password is!
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+ logevent("Sent password");
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
+ * request.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ changereq_first_time = TRUE;
+
+ while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
+
+ /*
+ * We're being asked for a new password
+ * (perhaps not for the first time).
+ * Loop until the server accepts it.
+ */
+
+ int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
+ char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
+ int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ {
+ char *msg;
+ if (changereq_first_time)
+ msg = "Server requested password change";
+ else
+ msg = "Server rejected new password";
+ logevent(msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
+
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
+ * for the "old" passwords in the original and
+ * password-change messages to be the same, and
+ * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
+ * by the user entering a blank password originally
+ * and the real password subsequently, so,
+ * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
+ *
+ * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
+ * to check this field.)
+ */
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
+ FALSE);
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
+ FALSE);
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
+ FALSE);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
+ * password twice.
+ */
+ while (!got_new) {
+
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
+ sfree(s->password);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the user specified a new original password
+ * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
+ * one.
+ * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
+ * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
+ */
+ if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
+ smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ sfree(s->password);
+ s->password =
+ dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the two new passwords match.
+ */
+ got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
+ == 0);
+ if (!got_new)
+ /* They don't. Silly user. */
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the new password (along with the old one).
+ * (see above for padding rationale)
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+ logevent("Sent new password");
+
+ /*
+ * Now see what the server has to say about it.
+ * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
+ * new password.)
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ changereq_first_time = FALSE;
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
+ * of the loop. Either:
+ * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
+ * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
+ * usual meaning
+ * - we sent a new password, and the server was
+ * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
+ * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
+ * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
+ * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
+ * the loop and start again.
+ */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need the old password any more, in any
+ * case. Burn the evidence.
+ */
+ smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
+ sfree(s->password);
+
+ } else {
+ char *str = dupprintf("No supported authentication methods available"
+ " (server sent: %.*s)",
+ methlen, methods);
+
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, str,
+ "No supported authentication methods available",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
+ FALSE);
+ sfree(str);
+
+ crStopV;
+
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
+
+ /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ sfree(s->publickey_blob);
+ sfree(s->publickey_comment);
+ }
+ if (s->agent_response)
+ sfree(s->agent_response);
+
+ if (s->userauth_success && !ssh->bare_connection) {
+ /*
+ * We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent any
+ * packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider enacting
+ * delayed compression.
+ *
+ * (Relying on we_are_in is not sufficient, as
+ * draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed is quite clear that it
+ * triggers on USERAUTH_SUCCESS specifically, and we_are_in can
+ * become set for other reasons.)
+ */
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "enabling delayed compression", -2, NULL);
+ }
+
+ ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
+ * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
+ ssh2_msg_global_request;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the main session channel.
+ */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_shell)) {
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
+
+ if (*conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host)) {
+ /*
+ * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
+ * channel.
+ */
+ ssh_send_port_open(ssh->mainchan,
+ conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host),
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_nc_port),
+ "main channel");
+ ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_chanopen_init(ssh->mainchan, "session");
+ logevent("Opening session as main channel");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
+ }
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
+ bombout(("Server refused to open channel"));
+ crStopV;
+ /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
+ }
+ if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
+ bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
+ ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ logevent("Opened main channel");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
+ * general channel-based messages.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_data;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_request;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_response;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_response;
+
+ /*
+ * Now the connection protocol is properly up and running, with
+ * all those dispatch table entries, so it's safe to let
+ * downstreams start trying to open extra channels through us.
+ */
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ share_activate(ssh->connshare, ssh->v_s);
+
+ if (ssh->mainchan && ssh_is_simple(ssh)) {
+ /*
+ * This message indicates to the server that we promise
+ * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
+ * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
+ * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan,
+ "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org",
+ NULL, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Enable port forwardings.
+ */
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, ssh->conf);
+
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) {
+ /*
+ * Send the CHANNEL_REQUESTS for the main session channel.
+ * Each one is handled by its own little asynchronous
+ * co-routine.
+ */
+
+ /* Potentially enable X11 forwarding. */
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_forward)) {
+ ssh->x11disp =
+ x11_setup_display(conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_display),
+ ssh->conf);
+ if (!ssh->x11disp) {
+ /* FIXME: return an error message from x11_setup_display */
+ logevent("X11 forwarding not enabled: unable to"
+ " initialise X display");
+ } else {
+ ssh->x11auth = x11_invent_fake_auth
+ (ssh->x11authtree, conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_x11_auth));
+ ssh->x11auth->disp = ssh->x11disp;
+
+ ssh2_setup_x11(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Potentially enable agent forwarding. */
+ if (ssh_agent_forwarding_permitted(ssh))
+ ssh2_setup_agent(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Now allocate a pty for the session. */
+ if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty))
+ ssh2_setup_pty(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Send environment variables. */
+ ssh2_setup_env(ssh->mainchan, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
+ * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
+ * of command.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ int subsys;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
+ subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys2);
+ cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2);
+ } else {
+ subsys = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_subsys);
+ cmd = conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd);
+ }
+
+ if (subsys) {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "subsystem",
+ ssh2_response_authconn, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
+ } else if (*cmd) {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "exec",
+ ssh2_response_authconn, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
+ } else {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "shell",
+ ssh2_response_authconn, NULL);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We failed to start the command. If this is the
+ * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
+ * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
+ * back to it before complaining.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->fallback_cmd &&
+ *conf_get_str(ssh->conf, CONF_remote_cmd2)) {
+ logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else {
+ logevent("Started a shell/command");
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
+ if (ssh->size_needed)
+ ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
+ if (ssh->eof_needed)
+ ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
+
+ /*
+ * Transfer data!
+ */
+ if (ssh->ldisc)
+ ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ if (ssh->mainchan)
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ while (1) {
+ crReturnV;
+ s->try_send = FALSE;
+ if (pktin) {
+
+ /*
+ * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
+ * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
+ * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
+ */
+
+ bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ /*
+ * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
+ */
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
+ s->try_send = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (s->try_send) {
+ int i;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ /*
+ * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
+ ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(ssh, c);
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log reason code in disconnect message */
+ char *buf, *msg;
+ int reason, msglen;
+
+ reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+
+ if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
+ buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
+ ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
+ } else {
+ buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
+ " type %d)", reason);
+ }
+ logevent(buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
+ msglen, msg);
+ logevent(buf);
+ bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
+ reason,
+ (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
+ ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
+ msglen, msg));
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log the debug message */
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of the return value */
+ ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_transport(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called if we receive a packet that isn't allowed by the protocol.
+ * This only applies to packets whose meaning PuTTY understands.
+ * Entirely unknown packets are handled below.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_unexpected(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *buf = dupprintf("Server protocol violation: unexpected %s packet",
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
+ pktin->type));
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
+ /*
+ * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
+ * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
+
+ /*
+ * Initially, we only accept transport messages (and a few generic
+ * ones). do_ssh2_authconn will add more when it starts.
+ * Messages that are understood but not currently acceptable go to
+ * ssh2_msg_unexpected.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_transport; duplicate case value */
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = ssh2_msg_transport; duplicate case value */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = ssh2_msg_transport;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = ssh2_msg_unexpected; duplicate case value */
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected; duplicate case value */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+
+ /*
+ * These messages have a special handler from the start.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
+
+ /*
+ * Initially, we set all ssh-connection messages to 'unexpected';
+ * do_ssh2_authconn will fill things in properly. We also handle a
+ * couple of messages from the transport protocol which aren't
+ * related to key exchange (UNIMPLEMENTED, IGNORE, DEBUG,
+ * DISCONNECT).
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = ssh2_msg_unexpected;
+
+ /*
+ * These messages have a special handler from the start.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, unsigned long now)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != 0 &&
+ now == ssh->next_rekey) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin) {
+ ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pktin)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ else if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_bare_connection_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
+static void ssh_cache_conf_values(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ ssh->logomitdata = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_logomitdata);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ */
+static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Conf *conf, char *host, int port, char **realhost,
+ int nodelay, int keepalive)
+{
+ const char *p;
+ Ssh ssh;
+
+ ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
+ ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
+ ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
+ ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ ssh->cipher = NULL;
+ ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->cscipher = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->sccipher = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->csmac = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->scmac = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->cscomp = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->sccomp = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey_str = NULL;
+ ssh->exitcode = -1;
+ ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
+ ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
+ ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
+ ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
+ ssh->ldisc = NULL;
+ ssh->logctx = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_len = 0;
+ ssh->deferred_size = 0;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+ ssh->x11disp = NULL;
+ ssh->x11auth = NULL;
+ ssh->x11authtree = newtree234(x11_authcmp);
+ ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
+ ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh2_bare_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh_connection_init_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
+ ssh->v_c = NULL;
+ ssh->v_s = NULL;
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ ssh->throttled_all = 0;
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
+ ssh->queue = NULL;
+ ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
+ ssh->queueing = FALSE;
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
+ bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
+ ssh->frozen = FALSE;
+ ssh->username = NULL;
+ ssh->sent_console_eof = FALSE;
+ ssh->got_pty = FALSE;
+ ssh->bare_connection = FALSE;
+ ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
+
+ *backend_handle = ssh;
+
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+ if (crypto_startup() == 0)
+ return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
+#endif
+
+ ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
+ ssh->term_width = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_width);
+ ssh->term_height = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_height);
+
+ ssh->channels = NULL;
+ ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
+ ssh->portfwds = NULL;
+
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ ssh->editing = 0;
+ ssh->echoing = 0;
+ ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
+ ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
+
+ ssh->protocol = NULL;
+
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
+
+ ssh->pinger = NULL;
+
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
+ ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
+ ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
+ CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
+
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ ssh->gsslibs = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ return p;
+
+ random_ref();
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void ssh_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+ struct X11FakeAuth *auth;
+
+ if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
+ if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
+ if (ssh->cscomp)
+ ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ else
+ zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
+ if (ssh->sccomp)
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ else
+ zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex_ctx)
+ dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
+ sfree(ssh->savedhost);
+
+ while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
+ ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
+ sfree(ssh->queue);
+
+ while (ssh->qhead) {
+ struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
+ ssh->qhead = qh->next;
+ sfree(qh);
+ }
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+
+ if (ssh->channels) {
+ while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.xconn != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.xconn);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT:
+ if (c->u.pfd.pf != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.pf);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ struct outstanding_channel_request *ocr, *nocr;
+ ocr = c->v.v2.chanreq_head;
+ while (ocr) {
+ ocr->handler(c, NULL, ocr->ctx);
+ nocr = ocr->next;
+ sfree(ocr);
+ ocr = nocr;
+ }
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+ }
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ freetree234(ssh->channels);
+ ssh->channels = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->connshare)
+ sharestate_free(ssh->connshare);
+
+ if (ssh->rportfwds) {
+ while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
+ free_rportfwd(pf);
+ freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
+ ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
+ }
+ sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
+ if (ssh->x11disp)
+ x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
+ while ((auth = delpos234(ssh->x11authtree, 0)) != NULL)
+ x11_free_fake_auth(auth);
+ freetree234(ssh->x11authtree);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
+ sfree(ssh->v_c);
+ sfree(ssh->v_s);
+ sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
+ sfree(ssh->hostkey_str);
+ if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
+ crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ssh->s)
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
+ expire_timer_context(ssh);
+ if (ssh->pinger)
+ pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
+ bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
+ sfree(ssh->username);
+ conf_free(ssh->conf);
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ if (ssh->gsslibs)
+ ssh_gss_cleanup(ssh->gsslibs);
+#endif
+ sfree(ssh);
+
+ random_unref();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
+ */
+static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Conf *conf)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
+ unsigned long old_max_data_size;
+ int i, rekey_time;
+
+ pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, ssh->conf, conf);
+ if (ssh->portfwds)
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, conf);
+
+ rekey_time = conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time);
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_time) != rekey_time &&
+ rekey_time != 0) {
+ unsigned long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
+ unsigned long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
+
+ if (now - ssh->last_rekey > rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC) {
+ rekeying = "timeout shortened";
+ } else {
+ ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
+ }
+ }
+
+ old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
+ ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(conf_get_str(ssh->conf,
+ CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
+ if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
+ if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
+ ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ rekeying = "data limit lowered";
+ }
+
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_compression) !=
+ conf_get_int(conf, CONF_compression)) {
+ rekeying = "compression setting changed";
+ rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+ if (conf_get_int_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i) !=
+ conf_get_int_int(conf, CONF_ssh_cipherlist, i)) {
+ rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
+ rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc) !=
+ conf_get_int(conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc)) {
+ rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
+ rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ conf_free(ssh->conf);
+ ssh->conf = conf_copy(conf);
+ ssh_cache_conf_values(ssh);
+
+ if (!ssh->bare_connection && rekeying) {
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
+ } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
+ */
+static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+
+ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
+
+ return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
+ */
+static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int override_value;
+
+ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
+ * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
+ */
+ override_value = 0;
+ if (ssh->throttled_all)
+ override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ return override_value;
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ if (!ssh->mainchan)
+ return override_value;
+ else
+ return (override_value +
+ bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
+ */
+static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh->term_width = width;
+ ssh->term_height = height;
+
+ switch (ssh->state) {
+ case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
+ case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
+ case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
+ break; /* do nothing */
+ case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
+ ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
+ break;
+ case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
+ if (!conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_nopty)) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
+ PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "window-change",
+ NULL, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
+ * protocol.
+ */
+static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
+{
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
+ {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh2_ignore_special[] = {
+ {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh2_rekey_special[] = {
+ {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
+ {NULL, TS_SEP},
+ {"Break", TS_BRK},
+ /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
+ * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
+ * required signals. */
+ {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
+ {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
+ {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
+ {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
+ {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
+ {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
+ {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
+ {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
+ {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
+ {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
+ {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
+ {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
+ };
+ /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
+ static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_ignore_special) +
+ lenof(ssh2_rekey_special) +
+ lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
+ lenof(specials_end)];
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int i = 0;
+#define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
+ do { \
+ assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
+ memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
+ i += lenof(name); \
+ } while(0)
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
+ * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
+ * asked anyway. */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE))
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_ignore_special);
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY) && !ssh->bare_connection)
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
+ if (ssh->mainchan)
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
+ } /* else we're not ready yet */
+
+ if (i) {
+ ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
+ return ssh_specials;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#undef ADD_SPECIALS
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
+ * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
+ * hostname sort').
+ */
+static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ if (code == TS_EOF) {
+ if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
+ /*
+ * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
+ * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
+ */
+ if (code == TS_EOF)
+ ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ sshfwd_write_eof(ssh->mainchan);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
+ }
+ logevent("Sent EOF message");
+ } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection &&
+ ssh->version == 2) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
+ }
+ } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "break", NULL, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
+ char *signame = NULL;
+ if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
+ if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
+ if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
+ if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
+ if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
+ if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
+ if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
+ if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
+ if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
+ if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
+ /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
+ * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
+ if (signame) {
+ /* It's a signal. */
+ if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_chanreq_init(ssh->mainchan, "signal", NULL, NULL);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, struct PortForwarding *pf)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->halfopen = TRUE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
+ c->u.pfd.pf = pf;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ return c;
+}
+
+unsigned ssh_alloc_sharing_channel(Ssh ssh, void *sharing_ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->type = CHAN_SHARING;
+ c->u.sharing.ctx = sharing_ctx;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ return c->localid;
+}
+
+void ssh_delete_sharing_channel(Ssh ssh, unsigned localid)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c)
+ ssh_channel_destroy(c);
+}
+
+void ssh_send_packet_from_downstream(Ssh ssh, unsigned id, int type,
+ const void *data, int datalen,
+ const char *additional_log_text)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+
+ pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(type);
+ pkt->downstream_id = id;
+ pkt->additional_log_text = additional_log_text;
+ ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, datalen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
+ * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
+ */
+static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int buflimit;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
+ bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
+ if (ssh_is_simple(ssh))
+ buflimit = 0;
+ else
+ buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
+ if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
+ ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now process any SSH connection data that was stashed in our
+ * queue while we were frozen.
+ */
+ ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
+}
+
+void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Opening connection to %s:%d for %s", hostname, port, org);
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
+ PKT_INT, c->localid,
+ PKT_STR, hostname,
+ PKT_INT, port,
+ /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_chanopen_init(c, "direct-tcpip");
+ {
+ char *trimmed_host = host_strduptrim(hostname);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, trimmed_host);
+ sfree(trimmed_host);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
+ /*
+ * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
+ * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
+ * convinced the server should be told details like that
+ * about my local network configuration.
+ * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
+ * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
+ * if it doesn't match this syntax.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->s != NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->send_ok;
+}
+
+static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ if (option == LD_ECHO)
+ return ssh->echoing;
+ if (option == LD_EDIT)
+ return ssh->editing;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
+}
+
+static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ ssh->logctx = logctx;
+}
+
+static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ if (ssh->s != NULL)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
+}
+
+/*
+ * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
+ * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
+ */
+static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->version;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
+ * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
+ * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
+ */
+extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->fallback_cmd;
+}
+
+Backend ssh_backend = {
+ ssh_init,
+ ssh_free,
+ ssh_reconfig,
+ ssh_send,
+ ssh_sendbuffer,
+ ssh_size,
+ ssh_special,
+ ssh_get_specials,
+ ssh_connected,
+ ssh_return_exitcode,
+ ssh_sendok,
+ ssh_ldisc,
+ ssh_provide_ldisc,
+ ssh_provide_logctx,
+ ssh_unthrottle,
+ ssh_cfg_info,
+ "ssh",
+ PROT_SSH,
+ 22
+};