Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/released'

Conflicts:
	openssl/Configure
	openssl/Makefile
	openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl

64 files changed, 421 insertions, 109 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES
index 9302f586a..4fcfd1d4b 100644
--- a/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,35 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+  *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+     can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+     server.
+
+     Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+     Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+     preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+  *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+     Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+     TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+     less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+     is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+     [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
 
   *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure
index c0c2d1a70..c0c2d1a70 100644..100755
--- a/openssl/Configure
+++ b/openssl/Configure
diff --git a/openssl/FAQ b/openssl/FAQ
index 35780f807..59d135396 100644
--- a/openssl/FAQ
+++ b/openssl/FAQ
@@ -768,6 +768,9 @@ openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
 acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
 more active team members (e.g. Steve).
 
+Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
+considered to be security issues. 
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile.org b/openssl/Makefile.org
index a9e27273d..c92806f92 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile.org
+++ b/openssl/Makefile.org
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
 			FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
 			export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
 		fi; \
-		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto  CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
-		touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
+		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto  CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+		(touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
 	else \
 		echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
 		exit 1; \
diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS
index 909fea96c..ed486d146 100644
--- a/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,8 +5,15 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
+      o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
 
+      o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
       o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
       o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
       o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README
index 05b670c5d..10b74d19d 100644
--- a/openssl/README
+++ b/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c
index 1096eee4c..b76db10a5 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/apps.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c
@@ -586,12 +586,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify,
 
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			ok = UI_add_input_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buf,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1);
 		if (ok >= 0 && verify)
 			{
 			buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
 			ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buff,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1, buf);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1, buf);
 			}
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			do
@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ double app_tminterval(int stop,int usertime)
 
 	if (proc==NULL)
 		{
-		if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+		if (check_winnt())
 			proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,FALSE,
 						GetCurrentProcessId());
 		if (proc==NULL) proc = (HANDLE)-1;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/crl.c b/openssl/apps/crl.c
index c395b2afd..8797d300c 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/crl.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/crl.c
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static const char *crl_usage[]={
 " -in arg         - input file - default stdin\n",
 " -out arg        - output file - default stdout\n",
 " -hash           - print hash value\n",
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+" -hash_old       - print old-style (MD5) hash value\n",
+#endif
 " -fingerprint    - print the crl fingerprint\n",
 " -issuer         - print issuer DN\n",
 " -lastupdate     - lastUpdate field\n",
@@ -108,6 +111,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	int informat,outformat;
 	char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL;
 	int hash=0,issuer=0,lastupdate=0,nextupdate=0,noout=0,text=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+       int hash_old=0;
+#endif
 	int fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0;
 	const char **pp;
 	X509_STORE *store = NULL;
@@ -192,6 +198,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			text = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash") == 0)
 			hash= ++num;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash_old") == 0)
+			hash_old= ++num;
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nameopt") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -304,6 +314,14 @@ bad:
 				BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
 					X509_NAME_hash(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
 				}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+			if (hash_old == i)
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
+					X509_NAME_hash_old(
+						X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
+				}
+#endif
 			if (lastupdate == i)
 				{
 				BIO_printf(bio_out,"lastUpdate=");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/dgst.c b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
index 81bd870f9..f4aec779c 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/dgst.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
@@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 			}
 		if (do_verify)
-			r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+			r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
 		else
-			r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+			r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
 		if (!r)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ecparam.c b/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
index 465480bed..976ebef12 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
  *                    in the asn1 der encoding
  *                    possible values: named_curve (default)
  *                                     explicit
- * -no_seed         - if 'explicit' parameters are choosen do not use the seed
+ * -no_seed         - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
  * -genkey          - generate ec key
  * -rand file       - files to use for random number input
  * -engine e        - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ bad:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "                                   "
 				" explicit\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed          if 'explicit'"
-				" parameters are choosen do not"
+				" parameters are chosen do not"
 				" use the seed\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey           generate ec"
 				" key\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/req.c b/openssl/apps/req.c
index 85526581c..5e034a85e 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/req.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/req.c
@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ bad:
 		if (inrand)
 			app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
 
+		if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
+			{
+			newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
+			}
+
 		if (keyalg)
 			{
 			genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey,
@@ -652,12 +657,6 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 			}
 	
-		if (newkey <= 0)
-			{
-			if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
-				newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
-			}
-
 		if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA))
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"private key length is too short,\n");
@@ -1649,6 +1648,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type,
 				keylen = atol(p + 1);
 				*pkeylen = keylen;
 				}
+			else
+				keylen = *pkeylen;
 			}
 		else if (p)
 			paramfile = p + 1;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
index 41f2e46f6..bd7f45b85 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ _vpaes_consts:
 .Lk_dsbo:	# decryption sbox final output
 	.quad	0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
 	.quad	0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
-.asciz	"Vector Permutaion AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.asciz	"Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
 .align	64
 .size	_vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
 ___
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index 1a30bf119..aa60203ba 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),"unknown signature algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG)          ,"unknown tag"},
-{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT)        ,"unkown format"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT)        ,"unknown format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER)   ,"unsupported cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
index b7dce5c1a..2227b2b52 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
 
 static void xopenlog(BIO* bp, char* name, int level)
 {
-	if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+	if (check_winnt())
 		bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL,name);
 	else
 		bp->ptr = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
index f34248ec4..21a1a3fe3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 7a5676de6..5461e6ee7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
index b62d1bfac..ba08279a0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -465,8 +465,6 @@ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
 	pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
 	if (!pcerts)
 		return 0;
-	if (!pcerts)
-		return 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++)
 		{
 		cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index da3949fa1..50cec9fbe 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal (const char *fmta,...)
 
 #if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
     /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
-    if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
+    if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
     {	HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0,_T("OPENSSL"));
 	const TCHAR *pmsg=buf;
 	ReportEvent(h,EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE,0,0,0,1,0,&pmsg,0);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
index 26f4a783f..1c575dc47 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
@@ -208,11 +208,15 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG
 	return ret;
 	}
 
+
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -246,6 +250,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -270,16 +279,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 		word = scalar->d[i];
 		while (mask)
 			{
-			if (word & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		mask = BN_TBIT;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
index 27846edb1..95c858960 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
 				!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
 				!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
 					load_dir, 0) ||
+				!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
 				!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
 				goto notfound;
 		return iterator;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 72a2a6727..ac6d441aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 				}
 
 			/* we fell off the end without starting */
-			if (j == i)
+			if ((j == i) && (num == 0))
 				{
 				/* Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on
 				 * reading until a new line. */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 250063de8..e1dc2b0f4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -810,7 +810,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
 		GCM_MUL(ctx,Yi);
 
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
 			ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
 	}
@@ -818,7 +822,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
 	(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EK0.c,ctx->key);
 	++ctr;
 	if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+		ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 		PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 	else
 		ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 }
@@ -913,7 +921,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 	}
 
 	if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+		ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
 		ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
 	else
 		ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
 
@@ -947,7 +959,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -969,7 +985,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -988,7 +1008,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1004,7 +1028,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			while (len--) {
@@ -1022,7 +1050,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		}
@@ -1066,7 +1098,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 	}
 
 	if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+		ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
 		ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
 	else
 		ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
 
@@ -1103,7 +1139,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1123,7 +1163,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1141,7 +1185,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
@@ -1159,7 +1207,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 			while (len--) {
@@ -1180,7 +1232,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+				ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		}
@@ -1225,7 +1281,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 	}
 
 	if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+		ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
 		ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
 	else
 		ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
 
@@ -1247,7 +1307,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
 		ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		GHASH(ctx,out,GHASH_CHUNK);
@@ -1262,7 +1326,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
 		ctr += (unsigned int)j;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		in  += i;
@@ -1282,7 +1350,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 		++ctr;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		while (len--) {
@@ -1324,7 +1396,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 	}
 
 	if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+		ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
 		ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
 	else
 		ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
 
@@ -1349,7 +1425,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
 		ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		out += GHASH_CHUNK;
@@ -1375,7 +1455,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
 		ctr += (unsigned int)j;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		out += i;
@@ -1386,7 +1470,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 		++ctr;
 		if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+			ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
 			PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
 		else
 			ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
 		while (len--) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index b27a5bb8c..ebe718072 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000106fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000107fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1g-fips 7 Apr 2014"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index dd2916372..aee1c30b0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 	EVP_MD_CTX m;
 	int do_not_lock;
 
+	if (!num)
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
 	 *
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index 5d134e186..34ffcd23f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static void readscreen(void)
   int		y;		/* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
   int		n = 16;		/* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
 
-  if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
+  if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
     return;
 
   /* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
index 07a412f84..bd2f000d5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@
 #define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb	SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
 #undef SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb
 #define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb	SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
+#undef ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported
+#define ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported        ssl3_cbc_record_digest_support
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late       ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_late
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early      ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_early
 
 /* Hack some long ENGINE names */
 #undef ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 27ca5150c..c6602dae4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
 
 	s=dir;
 	p=s;
-	for (;;p++)
+	do
 		{
 		if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0'))
 			{
@@ -264,9 +264,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
 				return 0;
 				}
 			}
-		if (*p == '\0')
-			break;
-		}
+		} while (*p++ != '\0');
 	return 1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5195ffef2..920066aeb 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1462,10 +1462,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 	 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
 	 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
 	 */
-	if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+		&& (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 		{
-		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-			return 1;
 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 		if(!ok)
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
index b7943e813..01bf09254 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_comp.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	int ret = 1;
 
 	/*
-	 * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+	 * On OpenSSL 1.0.0+ only:
 	 * for streaming set CMS_STREAM
 	 */
 	int flags = CMS_STREAM;
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
index 7ddf65326..9fee0a3eb 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_dec.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		goto err;
 
 	/* Decrypt S/MIME message */
-	if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, out, NULL, 0))
+	if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, NULL, out, 0))
 		goto err;
 
 	ret = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
index 42f762034..6823c34a0 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/cms/cms_sign.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	int ret = 1;
 
 	/* For simple S/MIME signing use CMS_DETACHED.
-	 * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only:
+	 * On OpenSSL 1.0.0 only:
 	 * for streaming detached set CMS_DETACHED|CMS_STREAM
 	 * for streaming non-detached set CMS_STREAM
 	 */
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
index ace34b62b..25c5381b9 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ variable points to a section containing further ENGINE configuration
 information.
 
 The section pointed to by B<engines> is a table of engine names (though see
-B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration informations
+B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration information
 specific to each ENGINE.
 
 Each ENGINE specific section is used to set default algorithms, load
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
index a40c873b9..1ad76a5f8 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ don't output the encoded version of the CRL.
 output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in
 a directory by issuer name.
 
+=item B<-hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the CRL issuer name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
 =item B<-issuer>
 
 output the issuer name.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
index ba6dc4689..5c7b45d4e 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ PKCS#8 private key format use the B<pkcs8> command.
 
 This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses
 an ASN.1 DER encoded SEC1 private key. When used with a public key it
-uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structur as specified in RFC 3280.
+uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as specified in RFC 3280.
 The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64
 encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key
 PKCS#8 format is also accepted.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
index f69a5c5a4..8e0d91798 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ by default.
 The filename to write certificates and private keys to, standard output by
 default.  They are all written in PEM format.
 
-=item B<-pass arg>, B<-passin arg>
+=item B<-passin arg>
 
 the PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about
 the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in
@@ -75,10 +75,15 @@ L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
 
 =item B<-passout arg>
 
-pass phrase source to encrypt any outputed private keys with. For more
+pass phrase source to encrypt any outputted private keys with. For more
 information about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section
 in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
 
+=item B<-password arg>
+
+With -export, -password is equivalent to -passout.
+Otherwise, -password is equivalent to -passin.
+
 =item B<-noout>
 
 this option inhibits output of the keys and certificates to the output file
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
index ff48bbdf2..0730d117b 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Reverses effect of B<-asn1-kludge>
 
 =item B<-newhdr>
 
-Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputed
+Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted
 request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.
 
 =item B<-batch>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index 4ebf7b585..3215b2e8c 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ s_client - SSL/TLS client program
 B<openssl> B<s_client>
 [B<-connect host:port>]
 [B<-verify depth>]
+[B<-verify_return_error>]
 [B<-cert filename>]
 [B<-certform DER|PEM>]
 [B<-key filename>]
@@ -90,6 +91,11 @@ Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
 with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
 will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
 
+=item B<-verify_return_error>
+
+Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
+abort the handshake with a fatal error.
+
 =item B<-CApath directory>
 
 The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
@@ -286,6 +292,13 @@ Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions
 these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the
 B<-no_sslv2> option.
 
+The B<s_client> utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the
+handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will
+accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test
+applications should B<not> do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM
+attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error>
+option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake.
+
 =head1 BUGS
 
 Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of
@@ -293,9 +306,6 @@ the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather
 hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical
 SSL client program would be much simpler.
 
-The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification
-fails.
-
 The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report
 information whenever a session is renegotiated.
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
index 3e503e17e..6758ba308 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ by using an appropriate certificate.
 
 =item B<-dcertform format>, B<-dkeyform format>, B<-dpass arg>
 
-addtional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively.
+additional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively.
 
 =item B<-nocert>
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
index 7fb6caa96..d6aa47d31 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ switch always overrides the settings in the config file.
 
 This is the main section and it specifies the name of another section
 that contains all the options for the B<-reply> command. This default
-section can be overriden with the B<-section> command line switch. (Optional)
+section can be overridden with the B<-section> command line switch. (Optional)
 
 =item B<oid_file>
 
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ included. Default is no. (Optional)
 =head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
 
 B<OPENSSL_CONF> contains the path of the configuration file and can be
-overriden by the B<-config> command line option.
+overridden by the B<-config> command line option.
 
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
index b05957bee..56db985c4 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ The name of an EGD socket to get random data from. (Optional)
 =item [request]...
 
 List of files containing B<RFC 3161> DER-encoded time stamp requests. If no
-requests are specifed only one request will be sent to the server and it will be
+requests are specified only one request will be sent to the server and it will be
 read from the standard input. (Optional)
 
 =back
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
index 5f51fdb47..da06e4446 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ necessary parameters are set, by re-creating the blinding parameters.
 
 BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the blinding factor B<A>.
 If B<r> is not NULL a copy the inverse blinding factor B<Ai> will be
-returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared amoung
+returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared among
 several threads). BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the
 inverse blinding factor B<Ai>. If B<r> is not NULL it will be used as
 the inverse blinding.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
index 34443045f..828ecf529 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod
@@ -52,8 +52,11 @@ ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and
 ERR_get_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags
 associated with the error code in *B<data>
 and *B<flags>, unless these are B<NULL>. *B<data> contains a string
-if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING>. If it has been allocated by OPENSSL_malloc(),
-*B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_MALLOCED> is true.
+if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING> is true. 
+
+An application B<MUST NOT> free the *B<data> pointer (or any other pointers
+returned by these functions) with OPENSSL_free() as freeing is handled
+automatically by the error library.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
index d375c46e0..0ea7d55c0 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine
 
 EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. B<type> is
 the cipher to derive the key and IV for. B<md> is the message digest to use.
-The B<salt> paramter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to
+The B<salt> parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to
 an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. B<data> is a buffer containing
 B<datal> bytes which is used to derive the keying data. B<count> is the
 iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to B<key>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 8271d3dfc..1c4bf184a 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ does not remain in memory.
 
 EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a
 similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex and
-EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> paramter does not need to be
+EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> parameter does not need to be
 initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation.
 
 EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() behave in a
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index b68eece03..46cac2bea 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
 to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
 log it for debugging purposes.
 
-By default some addtional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
+By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
 different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set
 they are enabled.
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
index d5b189611..54414a3f6 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ handle PKCS#8 format encrypted and unencrypted keys too.
 PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey()
 write a private key in an EVP_PKEY structure in PKCS#8
 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format using PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption
-algorithms. The B<cipher> argument specifies the encryption algoritm to
+algorithms. The B<cipher> argument specifies the encryption algorithm to
 use: unlike all other PEM routines the encryption is applied at the
 PKCS#8 level and not in the PEM headers. If B<cipher> is NULL then no
 encryption is used and a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo structure is used instead.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
index 81566839d..6fd6c0321 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification
 failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
 more informational output.
 
-All verification errors are printed, informations about the certificate chain
-are printed on request.
+All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
+is printed on request.
 The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
 certificates.
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
index 011a022a1..fe013085d 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 No shutdown setting, yet.
 
diff --git a/openssl/e_os.h b/openssl/e_os.h
index 79c139257..6a0aad1de 100644
--- a/openssl/e_os.h
+++ b/openssl/e_os.h
@@ -368,6 +368,13 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
 #    define DEFAULT_HOME  "C:"
 #  endif
 
+/* Avoid Windows 8 SDK GetVersion deprecated problems */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1800
+#  define check_winnt() (1)
+#else
+#  define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#endif 
+
 #else /* The non-microsoft world */
 
 #  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
index 8c278aa64..91b2ce882 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
@@ -180,8 +180,6 @@ int start_hash(gost_hash_ctx *ctx)
  */
 int hash_block(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,const byte *block, size_t length)
 	{
-	const byte *curptr=block;
-	const byte *barrier=block+(length-32);/* Last byte we can safely hash*/
 	if (ctx->left)
 		{
 		/*There are some bytes from previous step*/
@@ -196,24 +194,25 @@ int hash_block(gost_hash_ctx *ctx,const byte *block, size_t length)
 			{
 			return 1;
 			}	
-		curptr=block+add_bytes;
+		block+=add_bytes;
+		length-=add_bytes;
 		hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,ctx->remainder);
 		add_blocks(32,ctx->S,ctx->remainder);
 		ctx->len+=32;
 		ctx->left=0;
 		}
-	while (curptr<=barrier)
+	while (length>=32)
 		{	
-		hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,curptr);
+		hash_step(ctx->cipher_ctx,ctx->H,block);
 			
-		add_blocks(32,ctx->S,curptr);
+		add_blocks(32,ctx->S,block);
 		ctx->len+=32;
-		curptr+=32;
+		block+=32;
+		length-=32;
 		}	
-	if (curptr!=block+length)
+	if (length)
 		{
-		ctx->left=block+length-curptr;
-		memcpy(ctx->remainder,curptr,ctx->left);
+		memcpy(ctx->remainder,block,ctx->left=length);
 		}	
 	return 1;	
 	}
diff --git a/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat b/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
index be87fffee..3182a44a9 100755
--- a/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
+++ b/openssl/ms/do_win64a.bat
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 perl util\mkfiles.pl >MINFO
 
-cmd /c "nasm -f win64 -v" >NUL: 2>&1
+cmd /c "nasm -f win64 -v" >NUL 2>&1
 if %errorlevel% neq 0 goto ml64
 
 perl ms/uplink-x86_64.pl nasm > ms/uptable.asm
diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec
index 9436e9984..44147ce64 100644
--- a/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
 #Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1f
+Version: 1.0.1g
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 7a5596a6b..2e8cf681e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	unsigned int payload;
 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	pl = p;
-
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+	pl = p;
+
 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
 		{
 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+					    2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+					    payload + padding;
 		int r;
 
+		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+
 		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
 		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
 		 * payload, plus padding
 		 */
-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
 		bp = buffer;
 
 		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 		/* Random padding */
 		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
 
-		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
 
 		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+				buffer, write_length,
 				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
 		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
index 8242fd5ee..e4df84307 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <krb5.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+/* These can sometimes get redefined indirectly by krb5 header files
+ * after they get undefed in ossl_typ.h
+ */
+#undef X509_NAME
+#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
+#undef OCSP_REQUEST
+#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
+#endif
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 84670b6c1..2b93c639d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
 		send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
 	if (send_time)
 		{
-		unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
+		unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
 		unsigned char *p = result;
 		l2n(Time, p);
 		return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 52efed328..9ac19c05f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
 			{
 			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 		p= &(d[4]);
 
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
+		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
 			{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 			if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
index a77f7707f..c7bc6fbd7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ $!
 $! Define The Different SSL "library" Files.
 $!
 $ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ -
-	    "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,"+ -
+           "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,s3_cbc,"+ -
 	    "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ -
 	    "t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ -
 	    "d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ -
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ $ CCDEFS = "TCPIP_TYPE_''P4'"
 $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
 $ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
 $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
-$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
+$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
 $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
 	CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
 $!
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index dece04de0..7219a0e64 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 	 */
 	unsigned int max_send_fragment;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	/* Engine to pass requests for client certs to
 	 */
 	ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 56db83430..0c4cddedf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -986,7 +986,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 		}
 		else
 		{
-			EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+			if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
+				return -1;
 			mac_ctx = &hmac;
 		}
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 33afdeba3..bddffd92c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -662,6 +662,36 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+	 *
+	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+	 */
+	{
+	int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+	 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+	 * not. */
+	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+		hlen -= 5;
+	if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+		{
+		hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+		if (hlen >= 4)
+			hlen -= 4;
+		else
+			hlen = 0;
+
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+		s2n(hlen, ret);
+		memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+		ret += hlen;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -1261,7 +1291,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			}
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 		
 			if (size < 5) 
@@ -2558,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	unsigned int payload;
 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	pl = p;
-
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+	pl = p;
+
 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
 		{
 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
index c39c267f0..c992091e3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ extern "C" {
 /* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat	15
 
+/* ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding	21
+
 /* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket		35
 
diff --git a/openssl/util/libeay.num b/openssl/util/libeay.num
index 6debdb60a..aa86b2b8b 100644
--- a/openssl/util/libeay.num
+++ b/openssl/util/libeay.num
@@ -3511,6 +3511,7 @@ BIO_set_callback                        3903	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_ASIdOrRange                         3904	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
 i2d_ASIdentifiers                       3905	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
 CRYPTO_memcmp                           3906	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_consttime_swap                       3907	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 SEED_decrypt                            3908	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
 SEED_encrypt                            3909	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
 SEED_cbc_encrypt                        3910	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
index 1f1e13fb4..b41bb45e8 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ $out_def="out32";
 $tmp_def="tmp32";
 $inc_def="inc32";
 #enable max error messages, disable most common warnings
-$cflags="-DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp ";
+$cflags="-DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -q -w-ccc -w-rch -w-pia -w-aus -w-par -w-inl  -c -tWC -tWM -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -D_stricmp=stricmp -D_strnicmp=strnicmp -D_timeb=timeb -D_ftime=ftime ";
 if ($debug)
 {
     $cflags.="-Od -y -v -vi- -D_DEBUG";
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ $efile="";
 $exep='.exe';
 if ($no_sock)
 	{ $ex_libs=""; }
-else	{ $ex_libs="cw32mt.lib import32.lib"; }
+else	{ $ex_libs="cw32mt.lib import32.lib crypt32.lib ws2_32.lib"; }
 
 # static library stuff
 $mklib='tlib /P64';
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ $lfile='';
 $shlib_ex_obj="";
 $app_ex_obj="c0x32.obj"; 
 
-$asm='nasmw -f obj -d__omf__';
-$asm.=" /Zi" if $debug;
+$asm=(`nasm -v 2>NUL` ge `nasmw -v 2>NUL`?"nasm":"nasmw")." -f obj -d__omf__";
+$asm.=" -g" if $debug;
 $afile='-o';
 
 $bn_mulw_obj='';
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index ed5fea90d..af9176b2f 100755
--- a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ $zlib_lib="zlib1.lib";
 $l_flags =~ s/-L("\[^"]+")/\/libpath:$1/g;
 $l_flags =~ s/-L(\S+)/\/libpath:$1/g;
 
+my $ff = "";
+
 # C compiler stuff
 $cc='cl';
 if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/)
@@ -129,6 +131,7 @@ else	# Win32
 
     my $f = ' /MD';
     $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib);	# remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
+    $ff = "/fixed";
     $opt_cflags=$f.' /O2 /Ob2 /Oi /Ox /Oy /Ot /GL /Gy /GF /Zi';     
     $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /RTCc /RTC1 /Od /GS /GR /Gy /GF /Zi';   
     $lflags="/NOLOGO /SUBSYSTEM:CONSOLE /OPT:REF /OPT:ICF /LTCG:STATUS";
@@ -331,7 +334,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule
 			$ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
 			$ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
 			$ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
-			$ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
+			$ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $ff /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
 			$ret.="$name @<<\n  \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs \$(EX_LIBS) ";
 			$ret.="\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $ex\n<<\n";
 			}
@@ -368,7 +371,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
 		$ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
 		$ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
 		$ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
-		$ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) /map $efile$target @<<\n";
+		$ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) $ff /map $efile$target @<<\n";
 		$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files \$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $libs\n<<\n";
 		}
 	else