diff options
| author | Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> | 2015-07-07 08:57:00 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> | 2015-07-07 09:01:38 -0400 |
| commit | f65ff03d106f4cfe162bfde4780426b7bbc2e4ee (patch) | |
| tree | 571dd0bd95a0341fcb1817a3a17df69b1d43e3de /openssl | |
| parent | 4241d28e545a02eb753c8f713149e20747f044b6 (diff) | |
| download | vcxsrv-f65ff03d106f4cfe162bfde4780426b7bbc2e4ee.tar.gz vcxsrv-f65ff03d106f4cfe162bfde4780426b7bbc2e4ee.tar.bz2 vcxsrv-f65ff03d106f4cfe162bfde4780426b7bbc2e4ee.zip | |
Update openssl: 1.0.1m -> 1.0.1o
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl')
209 files changed, 2395 insertions, 897 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES index 74179ab87..759b2a7bb 100644 --- a/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,83 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015] + + *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI + incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been + restored. + + Changes between 1.0.1m and 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015] + + *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop + + When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop + if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial + field. + + This can be used to perform denial of service against any + system which processes public keys, certificate requests or + certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with + client authentication enabled. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. + (CVE-2015-1788) + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time + + X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME + string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, + X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the + time string. + + An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of + various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in + a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients + that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client + authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification + callbacks. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and + independently by Hanno Böck. + (CVE-2015-1789) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent + + The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent + correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs + with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. + + Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 + structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and + servers are not affected. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). + (CVE-2015-1790) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function + + When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop + if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform + denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using + the CMS code. + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. + (CVE-2015-1792) + [Stephen Henson] + + *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket + + If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to + reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to + a double free of the ticket data. + (CVE-2015-1791) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits. + [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper] + Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure index 5f02c7c6e..0a0b8d04f 100755 --- a/openssl/Configure +++ b/openssl/Configure @@ -230,12 +230,12 @@ my %table=( #### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups "solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc "solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64", #### -"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ my %table=( #### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one. #"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::", -"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::", +"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::", #### IRIX 5.x configs # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate. @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ my %table=( #### SPARC Linux setups # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently # assisted with debugging of following two configs. -"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but # -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what. "linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ my %table=( "BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it diff --git a/openssl/Makefile.org b/openssl/Makefile.org index c92806f92..cf82487f4 100644 --- a/openssl/Makefile.org +++ b/openssl/Makefile.org @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar EXHEADER= e_os2.h HEADER= e_os.h -all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc +all: Makefile build_all # as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower # Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn @@ -270,7 +270,10 @@ reflect: sub_all: build_all build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools -build_libs: build_crypto build_ssl build_engines +build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc + +build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc +build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc build_crypto: @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) @@ -459,6 +462,9 @@ tests: rehash report: @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl +update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE + @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) + depend: @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) @@ -483,26 +489,10 @@ util/libeay.num:: util/ssleay.num:: $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update -crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h - $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h -crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num - $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h -crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num - $(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h - -apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf - $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf - -crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl - $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h - - TABLE: Configure (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE -update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend - # Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is # pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS index 12616d2c1..fb69ad3e5 100644 --- a/openssl/NEWS +++ b/openssl/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,18 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015] + + o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1m and OpenSSL 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015] + + o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) + o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) + o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) + o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) + o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015] o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README index ecdcfb237..bf3b71540 100644 --- a/openssl/README +++ b/openssl/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.1m 19 Mar 2015 + OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/openssl/apps/Makefile b/openssl/apps/Makefile index 72657ea65..cafe55458 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/Makefile +++ b/openssl/apps/Makefile @@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO) sreq.o: req.c $(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c +openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf + $(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf + files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO @@ -127,12 +130,12 @@ links: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff -depend: - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \ - $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \ - else \ - $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \ - fi +update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend + +depend: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi +local_depend: + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \ dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new @@ -144,10 +147,10 @@ clean: rm -f req $(DLIBSSL): - (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all) + (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl) $(DLIBCRYPTO): - (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all) + (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto) $(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL) $(RM) $(EXE) diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c index 9862afde3..680123834 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/apps.c +++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) char *prompt = NULL; prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info); - if(!prompt) { + if (!prompt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); return 0; @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) { buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz); - if(!buff) { + if (!buff) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_free(prompt); @@ -2238,6 +2238,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc, flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains")) + flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS; else return 0; diff --git a/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c b/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c index 7a0f16943..11b078759 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c +++ b/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf) { CONF *cnf = NULL; int len; - long errline; + long errline = 0; unsigned char *p; ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL; diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c index 5d29a64c5..97ad0c1ff 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/ca.c +++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c @@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE); tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if(!tofree) { + if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #else len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1; tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if(!tofree) { + if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } @@ -2803,7 +2803,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; tmp = BUF_strdup(str); - if(!tmp) { + if (!tmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } @@ -2825,7 +2825,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, if (prevtm) { *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); - if(!*prevtm) { + if (!*prevtm) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } @@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, goto err; } comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); - if(!comp_time) { + if (!comp_time) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c index 0cc4b46d8..d7645c0d6 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/cms.c +++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c @@ -581,6 +581,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, + "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n"); diff --git a/openssl/apps/dhparam.c b/openssl/apps/dhparam.c index f86311c28..d3b6d58ad 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/dhparam.c +++ b/openssl/apps/dhparam.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ # undef PROG # define PROG dhparam_main -# define DEFBITS 512 +# define DEFBITS 2048 /*- * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM) @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, " -5 generate parameters using 5 as the generator value\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, - " numbits number of bits in to generate (default 512)\n"); + " numbits number of bits in to generate (default 2048)\n"); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n"); diff --git a/openssl/apps/enc.c b/openssl/apps/enc.c index 5c2cf7a4a..7b7c70b13 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/enc.c +++ b/openssl/apps/enc.c @@ -548,9 +548,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) else OPENSSL_cleanse(str, strlen(str)); } - if ((hiv != NULL) && !set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n"); - goto end; + if (hiv != NULL) { + int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); + if (siz == 0) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n"); + } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n"); + goto end; + } } if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL) && EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) { @@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n"); goto end; } - if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, sizeof key)) { + if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n"); goto end; } diff --git a/openssl/apps/gendh.c b/openssl/apps/gendh.c index adaa10178..fef6f1b17 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/gendh.c +++ b/openssl/apps/gendh.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ # include <openssl/x509.h> # include <openssl/pem.h> -# define DEFBITS 512 +# define DEFBITS 2048 # undef PROG # define PROG gendh_main diff --git a/openssl/apps/ocsp.c b/openssl/apps/ocsp.c index 71def2611..572f0643e 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/ocsp.c +++ b/openssl/apps/ocsp.c @@ -519,6 +519,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, + "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n"); diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c index 7918500a6..fabf9cfb2 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() */ #define USE_SOCKETS #define NON_MAIN #include "apps.h" @@ -747,7 +748,7 @@ int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, /* Initialize a random secret */ if (!cookie_initialized) { - if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH)) { + if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c index ef41cec1a..28737b6d1 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c @@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ static void sc_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, + " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, " -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n"); @@ -547,7 +549,7 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; - if(!pass) { + if (!pass) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); return NULL; } @@ -1177,13 +1179,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key)) goto end; - if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) || - (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) { - /* - * BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting default verify locations\n"); - */ + if ((CAfile || CApath) + && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + } + if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); - /* goto end; */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (servername != NULL) { diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c index bcf5c3313..b58e5e07c 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile); -static DH *get_dh512(void); +static DH *get_dh2048(void); #endif #ifdef MONOLITH @@ -227,30 +227,48 @@ static void s_server_init(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -static unsigned char dh512_p[] = { - 0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75, - 0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F, - 0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3, - 0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12, - 0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C, - 0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33, +static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = { + 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6, + 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1, + 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9, + 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD, + 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17, + 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F, + 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD, + 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30, + 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E, + 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4, + 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58, + 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B, + 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C, + 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B, + 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD, + 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C, + 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C, + 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29, + 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B, + 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C, + 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55, + 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B, }; -static unsigned char dh512_g[] = { +static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = { 0x02, }; -static DH *get_dh512(void) +DH *get_dh2048() { - DH *dh = NULL; + DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) - return (NULL); - dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL); - dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL); - if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) - return (NULL); - return (dh); + return NULL; + dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL); + dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL); + if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { + DH_free(dh); + return NULL; + } + return dh; } #endif @@ -523,6 +541,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, + " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n"); @@ -720,7 +740,7 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) num = inl; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num); - if(!wbuf) + if (!wbuf) return 0; OPENSSL_free(b->ptr); @@ -998,7 +1018,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) int off = 0; int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_dhe = 0, nocert = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - int no_ecdhe; + int no_ecdhe = 0; #endif int state = 0; const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL; @@ -1654,7 +1674,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n"); - dh = get_dh512(); + dh = get_dh2048(); + if (dh == NULL) { + ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + goto end; + } } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); @@ -2251,8 +2275,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context) ret = 1; goto err; } - l += k; - i -= k; + if (k > 0) { + l += k; + i -= k; + } if (i <= 0) break; } @@ -2916,7 +2942,8 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, { unsigned int count = 0; do { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0) + return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg. diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_time.c b/openssl/apps/s_time.c index a40997a22..38788f713 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_time.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_time.c @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; maxTime = atoi(*(++argv)); - if(maxTime <= 0) { + if (maxTime <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n"); badop = 1; } diff --git a/openssl/apps/smime.c b/openssl/apps/smime.c index 7b351f601..53e43c5e7 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/smime.c +++ b/openssl/apps/smime.c @@ -442,6 +442,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, + "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n"); diff --git a/openssl/apps/srp.c b/openssl/apps/srp.c index c679448ee..c0ff4171c 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/srp.c +++ b/openssl/apps/srp.c @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE); tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if(!tofree) { + if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) # else len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1; tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if(!tofree) { + if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/apps/verify.c b/openssl/apps/verify.c index 7295c769f..e29f9bb7e 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/verify.c +++ b/openssl/apps/verify.c @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (ret == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]"); - BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-attime timestamp]"); + BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-engine e]"); #endif diff --git a/openssl/crypto/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/Makefile index 2355661f4..618c95878 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/Makefile @@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ install: lint: @target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) -depend: +update: local_depend + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi + +depend: local_depend + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi +local_depend: @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h - @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi clean: rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile index 45ede0a0b..b3a95812a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile index f7787005d..d774f7821 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile @@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c index 70c2b8e62..7e26704a5 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c @@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp) else { ret = a->length; i = a->data[0]; + if (ret == 1 && i == 0) + neg = 0; if (!neg && (i > 127)) { pad = 1; pb = 0; @@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp) p += a->length - 1; i = a->length; /* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */ - while (!*n) { + while (!*n && i > 1) { *(p--) = 0; n--; i--; @@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } - if (BN_is_negative(bn)) + if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn)) ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER; else ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c index 11b582dd3..65749239b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ #define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val) {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val} #define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX 20 +/* Maximum number of nested sequences */ +#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH 50 /* Input formats */ @@ -110,13 +112,16 @@ typedef struct { int exp_count; } tag_exp_arg; +static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, + int *perr); static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr); static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr); static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok); static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass); -static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf); +static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf, + int depth, int *perr); static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype); static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len); @@ -133,6 +138,16 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf) ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf) { + int err = 0; + ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err); + if (err) + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err); + return ret; +} + +static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, + int *perr) +{ ASN1_TYPE *ret; tag_exp_arg asn1_tags; tag_exp_type *etmp; @@ -152,17 +167,22 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf) asn1_tags.imp_class = -1; asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII; asn1_tags.exp_count = 0; - if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) + if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) { + *perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG; return NULL; + } if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) { if (!cnf) { - ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, - ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG); + *perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG; return NULL; } - ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf); + if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) { + *perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING; + return NULL; + } + ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr); } else ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype); @@ -280,7 +300,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) int tmp_tag, tmp_class; if (elem == NULL) - return 0; + return -1; for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) { /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */ @@ -353,7 +373,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT: - if(!vstart) { + if (!vstart) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT); return -1; } @@ -435,7 +455,8 @@ static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass) /* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */ -static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf) +static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf, + int depth, int *perr) { ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL; @@ -454,7 +475,8 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf) goto bad; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) { ASN1_TYPE *typ = - ASN1_generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf); + generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf, + depth + 1, perr); if (!typ) goto bad; if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ)) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c index 7e2f28e6d..96110c540 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) { /* We want multipart/signed */ /* Generate a random boundary */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0) + return 0; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { c = bound[i] & 0xf; if (c < 10) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c index 4a73ca9ea..31949b879 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); - if(!p) + if (!p) return 0; ndef_aux->derbuf = p; @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); - if(!p) + if (!p) return 0; ndef_aux->derbuf = p; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c index 7d2964f02..b0c73beeb 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c @@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, else asn1_cb = 0; - if (!combine) - *pval = NULL; - #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (it->sname) CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c index 7c54f9d1d..5e7d53e98 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1); - if(!seqtt) + if (!seqtt) return 0; tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt); if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld, diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c index d51b76e79..f56e837b3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) /* Save start position */ q = *pp; - if(!a || *a == NULL) { + if (!a || *a == NULL) { freeret = 1; } ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length); @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) goto err; return ret; err: - if(freeret) { + if (freeret) { X509_free(ret); if (a) *a = NULL; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile index d01bfaa31..6dd201553 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile index c395d8049..ef526f6be 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c index c2cf6e619..7c81e25d4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c @@ -704,32 +704,29 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer, /* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */ assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL); - if (buffer) { - while (*currlen >= *maxlen) { - if (*buffer == NULL) { - if (*maxlen == 0) - *maxlen = 1024; - *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen); - if(!*buffer) { - /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ - return; - } - if (*currlen > 0) { - assert(*sbuffer != NULL); - memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen); - } - *sbuffer = NULL; - } else { - *maxlen += 1024; - *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen); - if(!*buffer) { - /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ - return; - } + /* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */ + assert(*currlen <= *maxlen); + + if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) { + *maxlen += 1024; + if (*buffer == NULL) { + *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen); + if (!*buffer) { + /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ + return; + } + if (*currlen > 0) { + assert(*sbuffer != NULL); + memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen); + } + *sbuffer = NULL; + } else { + *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen); + if (!*buffer) { + /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */ + return; } } - /* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */ - assert(*sbuffer != NULL || *buffer != NULL); } if (*currlen < *maxlen) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c index da88a8a1b..a04f32a00 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c @@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); #if 1 - RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + return -1; num = (n & 0x07); if (outl > num) @@ -178,7 +179,8 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) num = nt->lwn; nt->lwn = 0; } else { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + return -1; num = (n & 7); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c index 5267010cb..07934f8a6 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c @@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in) /* copy app data */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data, - &bio->ex_data)) + &bio->ex_data)) { + BIO_free(new_bio); goto err; + } if (ret == NULL) { eoc = new_bio; @@ -549,8 +551,8 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in) } return (ret); err: - if (ret != NULL) - BIO_free(ret); + BIO_free_all(ret); + return (NULL); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index b495db26e..e3e3dd050 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c @@ -299,16 +299,17 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b) /* Calculate time left until timer expires */ memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)); - timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec; - timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec; - if (timeleft.tv_usec < 0) { + if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) { + timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec; timeleft.tv_sec--; - timeleft.tv_usec += 1000000; + } else { + timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec; } - - if (timeleft.tv_sec < 0) { + if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) { timeleft.tv_sec = 0; timeleft.tv_usec = 1; + } else { + timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec; } /* @@ -953,7 +954,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag) */ sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len); - if(!authchunks) { + if (!authchunks) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } @@ -1293,7 +1294,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen); if (!authchunks) { - BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR); + BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen)); @@ -1364,8 +1365,8 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) { char *tmp; data->saved_message.bio = b; - if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) { - BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR); + if (!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) { + BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } if (data->saved_message.data) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile index 6dd136be5..3d0158c15 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile @@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: bn_prime.h depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h index 7d57e9834..47d8c71d9 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h @@ -797,6 +797,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \ BN_ULONG *_not_const; \ memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \ + /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */ \ RAND_pseudo_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); \ memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \ (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \ @@ -910,6 +911,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void); # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137 +# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124 @@ -925,12 +927,14 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void); # define BN_F_BN_NEW 113 # define BN_F_BN_RAND 114 # define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122 +# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146 # define BN_F_BN_USUB 115 /* Reason codes. */ # define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100 # define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101 # define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114 +# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118 # define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102 # define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103 # define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104 @@ -938,6 +942,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void); # define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110 # define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106 # define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115 +# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119 # define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111 # define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107 # define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c index faa7e226b..e7a703826 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"}, + {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"}, @@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"}, + {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"}, {0, NULL} }; @@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"}, + {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"}, @@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"}, + {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"}, diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c index aeee49a01..a0ba8de31 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c @@ -694,9 +694,10 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) } # else { - int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy - * of p */ - top = p->top; + int i; + int ubits = BN_num_bits(u); + int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */ + int top = p->top; BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp; bn_wexpand(u, top); @@ -740,8 +741,12 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) ubits--; } - if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1) - break; + if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) { + if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */ + goto err; + if (udp[0] == 1) + break; + } if (ubits < vbits) { i = ubits; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h index 1059d1d4b..904a72349 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b, # endif # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 -# if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4 +# if __GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4) /* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */ # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c index 4dcaae32b..ab10b957b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c @@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a) char *buf; char *p; - buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2); + if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) { + /* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */ + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3); + } else { + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2); + } if (buf == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c index 7ac71ec8e..f9fb2e9e4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c @@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask; time_t tim; + if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) { + BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + if (bits == 0) { BN_zero(rnd); return 1; @@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) unsigned char c; for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0) + goto err; if (c >= 128 && i > 0) buf[i] = buf[i - 1]; else if (c < 42) @@ -168,7 +174,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) } #endif - if (top != -1) { + if (top >= 0) { if (top) { if (bit == 0) { buf[0] = 1; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c index 4f3e8ffed..9673d9a30 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c @@ -137,6 +137,11 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n) bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); + if (n < 0) { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT); + return 0; + } + r->neg = a->neg; nw = n / BN_BITS2; if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL) @@ -174,6 +179,11 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n) bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); + if (n < 0) { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT); + return 0; + } + nw = n / BN_BITS2; rb = n % BN_BITS2; lb = BN_BITS2 - rb; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile index 2efba47f0..352efb841 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c b/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c index d287e340a..eff3e0815 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a) return; if (a->data != NULL) { - memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max); + OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->max); OPENSSL_free(a->data); } OPENSSL_free(a); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile index 6ce6fc99c..228f1dc71 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile index f3f485988..4c4b5e9ba 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile index 54e7cc39d..6a2840867 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c b/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c index c5597a3f7..774e6dc91 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c @@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx) void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx) { + if (!ctx) + return; CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile index 9820adb21..b124b5dbf 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c index 076b54578..a8322dcdf 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, return 0; } tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen); - if(!tmp) + if (!tmp) return 0; /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl, @@ -297,8 +297,9 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF; memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen); /* Add random padding to end */ - if (olen > inlen + 4) - RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen); + if (olen > inlen + 4 + && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0) + return 0; /* Encrypt twice */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c index 8851603f6..8b3756082 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto) BIO_free(f); f = tbio; } - while (f != upto); + while (f && f != upto); } else BIO_free_all(f); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile index efda832dc..a1e9464a1 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile index 78bb32410..d5f5c5824 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c index 7f1fd6804..7fd858e21 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c @@ -806,8 +806,6 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void) if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1) return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) (); - (void)GetDesktopWindow(); /* return value is ignored */ - h = GetProcessWindowStation(); if (h == NULL) return -1; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile index a6e100132..fbc77c163 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/des.c b/openssl/crypto/des/des.c index 2bff28125..586aed723 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/des/des.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/des/des.c @@ -455,8 +455,10 @@ void doencryption(void) rem = l % 8; len = l - rem; if (feof(DES_IN)) { - for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) - RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1); + for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) { + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0) + goto problems; + } buf[l++] = rem; ex = 1; len += rem; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c index b4eecc381..bfaabde51 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c @@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len, const unsigned char *cp; static int start = 1; + if (len < 0) + return -1; + if (outbuf == NULL) { outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BSIZE + HDRSIZE); if (outbuf == NULL) @@ -132,7 +135,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len, if (len < 8) { cp = shortbuf; memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len); - RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) { + return -1; + } rnum = 8; } else { cp = buf; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile index f23b4f7fd..6d574f407 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c index 1dec10983..873eb2e22 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) dh = pkey->pkey.dh; str = ASN1_STRING_new(); - if(!str) { + if (!str) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile index 5fef4ca5a..810920137 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index c808ab609..d686ab0af 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, goto err; if (!seed_len) { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0) + goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { seed_is_random = 0; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index b30eab031..6edb26d97 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { #define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ - if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \ + if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \ (a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \ (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ - if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ + if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) #define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ - if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \ + if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \ (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ - if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ + if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile index fb2709ed6..36b8ead04 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c index d2a48bb66..09b8eafcc 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) * honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any * error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as * "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard - * "if(DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd + * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd * times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return * value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-) */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c index 0eff96ec2..d0794b8fb 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { int len = strlen(filename); char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); - if(not_translated) + if (not_translated) strcpy(not_translated, filename); return (not_translated); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile index f85fc845c..2753b28be 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile @@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c index c245d886d..0d04cc692 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, } /* test required by X9.62 */ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index b4b0e9f3b..4ad849498 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { int ret = 0, ok = 0; unsigned char *buffer = NULL; - size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len; + size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len, bn_len; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL || @@ -1130,18 +1130,32 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) priv_key->version = a->version; - buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key); + bn_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key); + + /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */ + + buf_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(a->group) + 7) / 8; + + if (bn_len > buf_len) { + ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); if (buffer == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer)) { + if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer + buf_len - bn_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } + if (buf_len - bn_len > 0) { + memset(buffer, 0, buf_len - bn_len); + } + if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c index d3f534999..dd6f0ac40 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index ebdffc821..55ce3fe9b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) goto err; /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h index 319e651f6..d79ed1e4d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h @@ -451,14 +451,6 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); -/* method functions in ec2_mult.c */ -int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, - const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, - const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], - BN_CTX *); -int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); -int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c index 9a54f41e4..e2275207e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c @@ -934,6 +934,13 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point); } +/* + * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return + * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values: + * 1: The point is on the curve + * 0: The point is not on the curve + * -1: An error occurred + */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c index a911a0ac4..5ef12ec02 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c @@ -338,12 +338,14 @@ static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *name, const unsigned char *buf, if (buf == NULL) return 1; - if (off) { + if (off > 0) { if (off > 128) off = 128; memset(str, ' ', off); if (BIO_write(fp, str, off) <= 0) return 0; + } else { + off = 0; } if (BIO_printf(fp, "%s", name) <= 0) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c index e5cec8be8..1bc3f39ad 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, } /* test required by X9.62 */ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c index a18b32761..fede530bc 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x"); @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257")) ABORT; @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831")) ABORT; @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D")) @@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E" "84F3B9CAC2FC632551")) @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973")) @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5" @@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx)) ABORT; /* P = -2Q */ @@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) # define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \ + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \ @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void) if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \ + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \ @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void) if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; # endif - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) { + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) { /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) @@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) ABORT; - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx)) ABORT; /* P = -2Q */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile index ba05fea05..f0766356a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile index e89e0c010..4ce00e8f9 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c index b2d78f3d5..0f301f86d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c @@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) int nid, ret = 0; /* fill digest values with some random data */ - if (!RAND_pseudo_bytes(digest, 20) || - !RAND_pseudo_bytes(wrong_digest, 20)) { + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 || + RAND_pseudo_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) { BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n"); goto builtin_err; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile index d29bdd09a..8ceb747fa 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_table.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_table.c index 2e1a7e855..27d31f70c 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_table.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_table.c @@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb, ENGINE_PILE_DOALL dall; dall.cb = cb; dall.arg = arg; - lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_arg(&table->piles, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(int_cb), - ENGINE_PILE_DOALL, &dall); + if (table) + lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_arg(&table->piles, + LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(int_cb), + ENGINE_PILE_DOALL, &dall); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile index 862b23ba1..b6f3ef177 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile index ef75678ad..ed1502d3a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c index a4550349b..5c32e35e1 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c @@ -491,7 +491,8 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b) * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all, * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured. */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0) + goto berr; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size); longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size); ctx->buf_len += md->digest->md_size; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 245c18a69..1ede7bd39 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES +#include <openssl/crypto.h> # include <openssl/evp.h> # include <openssl/err.h> # include <string.h> @@ -753,7 +754,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: /* Save the AAD for later use */ - if (arg != 13) + if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return 0; memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; @@ -914,7 +915,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, /* Retrieve tag */ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */ - if (memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); goto err; } @@ -1259,7 +1260,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { unsigned char tag[16]; if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { - if (!memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M)) + if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M)) rv = len; } } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c index 3f8a5ae39..d1f5928f6 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c @@ -503,7 +503,12 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; - unsigned int len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; + unsigned int len; + + if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) + return -1; + + len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (ctx->encrypt) { key->payload_length = len; @@ -520,8 +525,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - len); } else { - if (arg > 13) - arg = 13; memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg); key->payload_length = arg; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c index 80735d345..2da111782 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) +# include <openssl/crypto.h> # include <openssl/evp.h> # include <openssl/objects.h> # include <openssl/rc4.h> @@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, MD5_Update(&key->md, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD5_Final(mac, &key->md); - if (memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return 0; } else { MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, len - md5_off); @@ -258,7 +259,12 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; - unsigned int len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; + unsigned int len; + + if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) + return -1; + + len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (!ctx->encrypt) { len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c index d1d8a07c1..5c5988fc4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned int total = 0; *outl = 0; - if (inl == 0) + if (inl <= 0) return; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h index b00997b14..6cf98acc0 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h @@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ # define EVP_PKS_RSA 0x0100 # define EVP_PKS_DSA 0x0200 # define EVP_PKS_EC 0x0400 -# define EVP_PKT_EXP 0x1000 /* <= 512 bit key */ # define EVP_PKEY_NONE NID_undef # define EVP_PKEY_RSA NID_rsaEncryption @@ -409,6 +408,9 @@ struct evp_cipher_st { /* Set the GCM invocation field, decrypt only */ # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV 0x18 +/* RFC 5246 defines additional data to be 13 bytes in length */ +# define EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN 13 + /* GCM TLS constants */ /* Length of fixed part of IV derived from PRF */ # define EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN 4 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c index caabbf406..ba9dfff21 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c @@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, return 1; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0) return 0; - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) - RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + && RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) <= 0) + return 0; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) return 0; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile index 0e91709f6..52e39e586 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c index 547781655..33d88be11 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c @@ -87,12 +87,18 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, return FIPS_hmac_init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL); } #endif + /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */ + if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0)) + return 0; if (md != NULL) { reset = 1; ctx->md = md; - } else + } else if (ctx->md) { md = ctx->md; + } else { + return 0; + } if (key != NULL) { reset = 1; @@ -107,7 +113,8 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, &ctx->key_length)) goto err; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(len >= 0 && len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key)); + if (len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key)) + return 0; memcpy(ctx->key, key, len); ctx->key_length = len; } @@ -151,6 +158,9 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine) return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len); #endif + if (!ctx->md) + return 0; + return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len); } @@ -163,6 +173,9 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len); #endif + if (!ctx->md) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx)) @@ -181,6 +194,7 @@ void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx); + ctx->md = NULL; } int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx) @@ -232,6 +246,7 @@ unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c); return md; err: + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c); return NULL; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c index 3d130a03e..271d0ebf2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static struct test_st { unsigned char data[64]; int data_len; unsigned char *digest; -} test[4] = { +} test[8] = { { "", 0, "More text test vectors to stuff up EBCDIC machines :-)", 54, (unsigned char *)"e9139d1e6ee064ef8cf514fc7dc83e86", @@ -113,10 +113,27 @@ static struct test_st { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd }, 50, (unsigned char *)"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6", }, + { + "", 0, "My test data", 12, + (unsigned char *)"61afdecb95429ef494d61fdee15990cabf0826fc" + }, + { + "", 0, "My test data", 12, + (unsigned char *)"2274b195d90ce8e03406f4b526a47e0787a88a65479938f1a5baa3ce0f079776" + }, + { + "123456", 6, "My test data", 12, + (unsigned char *)"bab53058ae861a7f191abe2d0145cbb123776a6369ee3f9d79ce455667e411dd" + }, + { + "12345", 5, "My test data again", 12, + (unsigned char *)"7dbe8c764c068e3bcd6e6b0fbcd5e6fc197b15bb" + } }; # endif -static char *pt(unsigned char *md); +static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len); + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 @@ -124,6 +141,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) char *p; # endif int err = 0; + HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx2; + unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int len; # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 printf("test skipped: MD5 disabled\n"); @@ -139,27 +159,172 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { p = pt(HMAC(EVP_md5(), test[i].key, test[i].key_len, - test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL)); + test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL), + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[i].digest) != 0) { - printf("error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i); + printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[i].digest); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */ + +/* test4 */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) { + printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n"); + err++; + goto test5; + } + if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { + printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n"); + err++; + goto test5; + } + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { + printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n"); + err++; + goto test5; + } + if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { + printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n"); + err++; + goto test5; + } + printf("test 4 ok\n"); +test5: + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) { + printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { + printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { + printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { + printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { + printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) { + printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + p = pt(buf, len); + if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) { + printf("Error calculating interim HMAC on test 5\n"); + printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) { + printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) { + printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + p = pt(buf, len); + if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[5].digest) != 0) { + printf("Error calculating 2nd interim HMAC on test 5\n"); + printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[5].digest); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) { + printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) { + printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) { + printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n"); + err++; + goto test6; + } + p = pt(buf, len); + if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[6].digest) != 0) { + printf("error calculating HMAC on test 5\n"); + printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[6].digest); + err++; + } else { + printf("test 5 ok\n"); + } +test6: + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { + printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n"); + err++; + goto end; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) { + printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n"); + err++; + goto end; + } + if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&ctx2, &ctx)) { + printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n"); + err++; + goto end; + } + if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx2, buf, &len)) { + printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n"); + err++; + goto end; + } + p = pt(buf, len); + if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[7].digest) != 0) { + printf("Error calculating HMAC on test 6\n"); + printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[7].digest); + err++; + } else { + printf("test 6 ok\n"); + } +end: EXIT(err); return (0); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 -static char *pt(unsigned char *md) +static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len) { - int i; + unsigned int i; static char buf[80]; - for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile index 8af0acdad..3dc23e48d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile index 110c49ce0..5193fd983 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ install: chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile index 14077390d..8b9a01a29 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile index 82bddac47..c7f4365f0 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile index 17f878aeb..b63011085 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h b/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h index c1efb45f1..182383341 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/md32_common.h @@ -142,8 +142,10 @@ */ #undef ROTATE #ifndef PEDANTIC -# if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__ICC) +# if defined(_MSC_VER) # define ROTATE(a,n) _lrotl(a,n) +# elif defined(__ICC) +# define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl(a,n) # elif defined(__MWERKS__) # if defined(__POWERPC__) # define ROTATE(a,n) __rlwinm(a,n,0,31) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile index e6f1e4478..3ee436176 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile index b9e2ce9a3..0f87dbd54 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile @@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile index 141553149..c2d0c5b7c 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/mem.c b/openssl/crypto/mem.c index 2ce3e8948..fdad49b76 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/mem.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/mem.c @@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line) { char *ret = CRYPTO_malloc(strlen(str) + 1, file, line); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + strcpy(ret, str); return ret; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile index 3d8bafd57..e278fa6a2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c index f69f2c9db..0ee569fb7 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c @@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= ctx->EK0.u[1]; if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi)) - return memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len); + return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len); else return -1; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile index a8aedbd42..f93d2f9d2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: obj_dat.h obj_mac.h obj_xref.h depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c index c6774f457..24859926a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type, d.names = OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names); /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */ - if(d.names) { + if (d.names) { d.n = 0; OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c index e42a1c147..aca382a6e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static unsigned long added_obj_hash(const ADDED_OBJ *ca) return 0; } ret &= 0x3fffffffL; - ret |= ca->type << 30L; + ret |= ((unsigned long)ca->type) << 30L; return (ret); } @@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp) j = (a->length - b->length); if (j) return (j); + if (a->length == 0) + return 0; return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length)); } @@ -415,6 +417,9 @@ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a) if (a->nid != 0) return (a->nid); + if (a->length == 0) + return NID_undef; + if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_DATA; ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README index 4d745508d..cb1d216ce 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ The basic syntax for adding an object is as follows: 1 2 3 4 : shortName : Long Name - If the long name doesn't contain spaces, or no short name - exists, the long name is used as basis for the base name - in C. Otherwise, the short name is used. + If Long Name contains only word characters and hyphen-minus + (0x2D) or full stop (0x2E) then Long Name is used as basis + for the base name in C. Otherwise, the shortName is used. The base name (let's call it 'base') will then be used to create the C macros SN_base, LN_base, NID_base and OBJ_base. @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Then there are some extra commands: !Alias foo 1 2 3 4 - This juts makes a name foo for an OID. The C macro + This just makes a name foo for an OID. The C macro OBJ_foo will be created as a result. !Cname foo diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl index d0ed459d3..389dc3483 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while (<IN>) $myoid = &process_oid($myoid); } - if ($Cname eq "" && !($myln =~ / /)) + if ($Cname eq "" && ($myln =~ /^[_A-Za-z][\w.-]*$/ )) { $Cname = $myln; $Cname =~ s/\./_/g; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile index 60c414cf4..96a1b156b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c index 849cb2f76..c19648c73 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c @@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts, ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); if (val) memcpy(tmpval, val, len); - else - RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len); + else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0) + goto err; if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)) goto err; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index 6c0ccb565..d4a257c33 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, { X509 *signer, *x; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX ctx; int i, ret = 0; ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags); @@ -107,10 +108,20 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { int init_res; - if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL); - else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs); + if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) { + untrusted = NULL; + } else if (bs->certs && certs) { + untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs); + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { + if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto end; + } + } + } else { + untrusted = bs->certs; + } + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted); if (!init_res) { ret = -1; OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); @@ -161,6 +172,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, end: if (chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + if (bs->certs && certs) + sk_X509_free(untrusted); return ret; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index daf3905df..84d0bf9d1 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" { * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100010dfL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100010ffL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1m-fips 19 Mar 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1o-fips 12 Jun 2015" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1m 19 Mar 2015" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile index 2cc780152..7a930eeae 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c index febb53ed0..55071616e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { - int i, j, o, klen; + int i = 0, j, o, klen; long len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c index b98c76c4a..5747c7366 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, if (kstr == buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); + if (p8 == NULL) + return 0; if (isder) ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8); else diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile index 3a7498fe7..be5f8c5d2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index 256b210cc..5ab4bf290 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC # include <stdio.h> # include "cryptlib.h" +# include <openssl/crypto.h> # include <openssl/hmac.h> # include <openssl/rand.h> # include <openssl/pkcs12.h> @@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen) return 0; } if ((maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length) - || memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen)) + || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen)) return 0; return 1; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile index effe05fc0..decf5e020 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index 31a1b983f..c8d7db01b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -445,6 +445,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: + /* + * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType + * field and optional content. + * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content + * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data"). + */ data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, @@ -456,6 +462,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; + /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */ data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); @@ -468,6 +475,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; + /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */ data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { @@ -481,6 +489,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) goto err; } + /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */ + if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); + goto err; + } + /* We will be checking the signature */ if (md_sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) { @@ -623,7 +637,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) etmp = NULL; } #if 1 - if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL)) { + if (in_bio != NULL) { bio = in_bio; } else { # if 0 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile index fb36a0c87..a59b5a939 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile index 27694aa66..df44369a0 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c index 02148d5bf..706ab1e81 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (DosQuerySysState) { char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024); - if(!buffer) + if (!buffer) return 0; if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile index 8a9d49ab5..b3727a4a6 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile index 1614d4796..f3d6e0dc0 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile index 8a8b00eb8..6ca0037c6 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile index 25140b2a7..1c3f094bb 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile index e8121a496..79c7c421b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index d61d6e8b6..6a7c67cdb 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -228,8 +228,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, return ret; ret = sltmp; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) + if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } + if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; + } memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, diff --git a/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile index 4bc55e491..70d3d45a2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile index 2eb2b7af9..ceb8094b0 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile index 41859d46f..763953384 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ srptest: top srptest.c $(LIB) lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c index 701b5cd01..50f75d7e4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -497,7 +497,8 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) goto err; - RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) + goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key)); @@ -549,7 +550,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, } if (*salt == NULL) { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto err; s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); } else { @@ -609,7 +611,8 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, srp_bn_print(g); if (*salt == NULL) { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto err; *salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile index 5327692ac..b069c9323 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile index 0dcfd7857..5bc7ca71f 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c index 28884c2d4..cc8cf2581 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) int i; lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE)); - if(!lock_cs) { + if (!lock_cs) { /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ return; } @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) # else lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(rwlock_t)); # endif - if(!lock_cs) { + if (!lock_cs) { /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ return; } @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) char filename[20]; lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *)); - if(!lock_cs) { + if (!lock_cs) { /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ return; } @@ -328,11 +328,11 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void) lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t)); lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long)); - if(!lock_cs || !lock_count) { + if (!lock_cs || !lock_count) { /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */ - if(lock_cs) + if (lock_cs) OPENSSL_free(lock_cs); - if(lock_count) + if (lock_count) OPENSSL_free(lock_count); return; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile index c18234555..cf991efe4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tags: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile index e6f30331d..4f70b199a 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile index a685659fb..b28fcca6d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile index f4d46e4d1..befd6d6f3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile index 72c82278f..af3c25514 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c index a910636f8..8415d1d8b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c @@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void) static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a) { + if (!a) + return; if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) { X509_free(a->data.x509); } else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 136bfbda6..16db4c025 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -151,11 +151,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { - X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL; + X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; int bad_chain = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; int depth, i, ok = 0; - int num; + int num, j, retry; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { @@ -224,85 +224,118 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) break; } + /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ + j = num; /* * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we * complain. */ - /* - * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. - */ - - i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { - /* we have a self signed certificate */ - if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { - /* - * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find - * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible - * impersonation. - */ - ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); - if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; - ctx->current_cert = x; - ctx->error_depth = i - 1; - if (ok == 1) - X509_free(xtmp); - bad_chain = 1; - ok = cb(0, ctx); - if (!ok) - goto end; + do { + /* + * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. + */ + i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); + x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); + if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { + /* we have a self signed certificate */ + if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { + /* + * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can + * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid + * possible impersonation. + */ + ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); + if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; + ctx->current_cert = x; + ctx->error_depth = i - 1; + if (ok == 1) + X509_free(xtmp); + bad_chain = 1; + ok = cb(0, ctx); + if (!ok) + goto end; + } else { + /* + * We have a match: replace certificate with store + * version so we get any trust settings. + */ + X509_free(x); + x = xtmp; + (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); + ctx->last_untrusted = 0; + } } else { /* - * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so - * we get any trust settings. + * extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ - X509_free(x); - x = xtmp; - (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); - ctx->last_untrusted = 0; + chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); + ctx->last_untrusted--; + num--; + j--; + x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); } - } else { - /* - * extract and save self signed certificate for later use - */ - chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); - ctx->last_untrusted--; - num--; - x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); } - } - - /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ - for (;;) { - /* If we have enough, we break */ - if (depth < num) - break; - - /* If we are self signed, we break */ - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) - break; - - ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); + /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ + for (;;) { + /* If we have enough, we break */ + if (depth < num) + break; + /* If we are self signed, we break */ + if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) + break; + ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); + if (ok < 0) + return ok; + if (ok == 0) + break; + x = xtmp; + if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { + X509_free(xtmp); + X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + num++; + } - if (ok < 0) - return ok; - if (ok == 0) - break; + /* + * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check + * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this + * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking + */ + retry = 0; + if (j == ctx->last_untrusted && + !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { + while (j-- > 1) { + xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); + ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); + if (ok < 0) + goto end; + /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ + if (ok > 0) { + /* + * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later + */ + X509_free(xtmp); - x = xtmp; - if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { - X509_free(xtmp); - X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; + /* + * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an + * alternate chain + */ + while (num > j) { + xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); + X509_free(xtmp); + num--; + ctx->last_untrusted--; + } + retry = 1; + break; + } + } } - num++; - } - - /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ + } while (retry); /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { @@ -1604,47 +1637,84 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) ASN1_TIME atm; long offset; char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; - int i, j; + int i, j, remaining; p = buff1; - i = ctm->length; + remaining = ctm->length; str = (char *)ctm->data; + /* + * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the + * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: + * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ + * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ + */ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { - if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) + /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ + int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; + int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; + if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 10); p += 10; str += 10; + remaining -= 10; } else { - if (i < 13) + /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ + int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; + int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; + if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 12); p += 12; str += 12; + remaining -= 12; } if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { *(p++) = '0'; *(p++) = '0'; } else { + /* SS (seconds) */ + if (remaining < 2) + return 0; *(p++) = *(str++); *(p++) = *(str++); - /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ - if (*str == '.') { + remaining -= 2; + /* + * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... + * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. + * Can we just kill them altogether? + */ + if (remaining && *str == '.') { str++; - while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) - str++; + remaining--; + for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { + if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') + break; + } } } *(p++) = 'Z'; *(p++) = '\0'; - if (*str == 'Z') + /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ + if (!remaining) + return 0; + if (*str == 'Z') { + if (remaining != 1) + return 0; offset = 0; - else { + } else { + /* (+-)HHMM */ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) return 0; + /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ + if (remaining != 5) + return 0; + if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || + str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') + return 0; offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); if (*str == '-') @@ -1921,6 +1991,8 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { + if (!ctx) + return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h index 1f8c0eccb..aacdf55aa 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h @@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); # define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS 0x2000 /* Check selfsigned CA signature */ # define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000 +/* + * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative + * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting + * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions. + */ +# define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000 # define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1 # define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c index d0543662c..6b0bf8a6e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void) void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { + if (param == NULL) + return; x509_verify_param_zero(param); OPENSSL_free(param); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c index 033175257..9219f753b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c @@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ int X509_certificate_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) } } - /* /8 because it's 1024 bits we look for, not bytes */ - if (EVP_PKEY_size(pk) <= 1024 / 8) - ret |= EVP_PKT_EXP; if (pkey == NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return (ret); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile index 556ef351b..05125aba2 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff +update: depend + depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c index 807867b91..22ec20284 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c @@ -584,24 +584,26 @@ static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx) static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx) { - int ret; - STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk; - X509_NAME *nm; + int ret = 0; + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; + X509_NAME *nm = NULL; if (!(nm = X509_NAME_new())) - return 0; + goto err; sk = X509V3_get_section(ctx, value); if (!sk) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", value); - X509_NAME_free(nm); - return 0; + goto err; } /* FIXME: should allow other character types... */ ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, sk, MBSTRING_ASC); if (!ret) - X509_NAME_free(nm); + goto err; gen->d.dirn = nm; - X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk); +err: + if (ret == 0) + X509_NAME_free(nm); + X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk); return ret; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c index dca6ab2ec..0febc1b3e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c @@ -230,11 +230,11 @@ static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, goto merr; if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual)) goto merr; - if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) { + if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if(!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new())) + if (!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new())) goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, POLICYQUALINFO *qual; if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new())) goto merr; - if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) { + if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i); if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) { - if(!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new())) + if (!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new())) goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index 65dd1e2fb..94aaebba3 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c @@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line) int state; /* We are going to modify the line so copy it first */ linebuf = BUF_strdup(line); + if (linebuf == NULL) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } state = HDR_NAME; ntmp = NULL; /* Go through all characters */ diff --git a/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c b/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c index acc688aaf..5682e91a4 100644 --- a/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c +++ b/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c @@ -761,7 +761,8 @@ SSL_CTX *tls_create_ctx(struct tls_create_ctx_args a, void *apparg) if (tls_dhe1024 == NULL) { int i; - RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i); + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i) <= 0) + goto err_return; /* * make sure that i is non-negative -- pick one of the provided * seeds diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod index 75b698834..9a24082ba 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms> [B<-print>] [B<-CAfile file>] [B<-CApath dir>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-md digest>] [B<-[cipher]>] [B<-nointern>] @@ -406,7 +407,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email address matches that specified in the From: address. -=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig> +=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains> Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details. @@ -614,4 +615,6 @@ The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod index d5cce54f4..e12591528 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod @@ -277,6 +277,59 @@ priority and B</tmp> used if neither is defined: # The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename +Simple OpenSSL library configuration example to enter FIPS mode: + + # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any) + # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al. + openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section + + [openssl_conf_section] + # Configuration module list + alg_section = evp_sect + + [evp_sect] + # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode if supported + fips_mode = yes + +Note: in the above example you will get an error in non FIPS capable versions +of OpenSSL. + +More complex OpenSSL library configuration. Add OID and don't enter FIPS mode: + + # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any) + # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al. + openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section + + [openssl_conf_section] + # Configuration module list + alg_section = evp_sect + oid_section = new_oids + + [evp_sect] + # This will have no effect as FIPS mode is off by default. + # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode, if supported + fips_mode = no + + [new_oids] + # New OID, just short name + newoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1 + # New OID shortname and long name + newoid2 = New OID 2 long name, 1.2.3.4.2 + +The above examples can be used with with any application supporting library +configuration if "openssl_conf" is modified to match the appropriate "appname". + +For example if the second sample file above is saved to "example.cnf" then +the command line: + + OPENSSL_CONF=example.cnf openssl asn1parse -genstr OID:1.2.3.4.1 + +will output: + + 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 4 prim: OBJECT :newoid1 + +showing that the OID "newoid1" has been added as "1.2.3.4.1". + =head1 BUGS Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal B<\nnn> diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod index 6e27cf5c1..1cd4c7666 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod @@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ check if the parameters are valid primes and generator. =item B<-2>, B<-5> -The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the -input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. +The generator to use, either 2 or 5. If present then the +input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If not +present but B<numbits> is present, parameters are generated with the +default generator 2. =item B<-rand> I<file(s)> @@ -85,9 +87,10 @@ all others. =item I<numbits> this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size -I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512 -is used. If this option is present then the input file is ignored and -parameters are generated instead. +I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is present then +the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If +this option is not present but a generator (B<-2> or B<-5>) is +present, parameters are generated with a default length of 2048 bits. =item B<-noout> diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod index 2372b373c..fdb900c3c 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp> [B<-path>] [B<-CApath dir>] [B<-CAfile file>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>]] [B<-VAfile file>] [B<-validity_period n>] [B<-status_age n>] @@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify the signature on the OCSP response. +=item B<-no_alt_chains> + +See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details. + =item B<-verify_other file> file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate @@ -379,3 +384,9 @@ second file. openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem -reqin req.der -respout resp.der + +=head1 HISTORY + +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + +=cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod index b021c730c..d92ec9367 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client> [B<-pass arg>] [B<-CApath directory>] [B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-reconnect>] [B<-pause>] [B<-showcerts>] @@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ also used when building the client certificate chain. A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain. -=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig> +=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains> Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details. @@ -347,4 +348,8 @@ information whenever a session is renegotiated. L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> +=head1 HISTORY + +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod index 2105b603b..491038eca 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server> [B<-state>] [B<-CApath directory>] [B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-nocert>] [B<-cipher cipherlist>] [B<-serverpref>] @@ -178,6 +179,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the server certificate chain. The list is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when a certificate is requested. +=item B<-no_alt_chains> + +See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details. + =item B<-state> prints out the SSL session states. @@ -398,4 +403,8 @@ unknown cipher suites a client says it supports. L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> +=head1 HISTORY + +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod index d39a59a90..94a882385 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime> [B<-pk7out>] [B<-[cipher]>] [B<-in file>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-certfile file>] [B<-signer file>] [B<-recip file>] @@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email address matches that specified in the From: address. -=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig> +=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains> Set various options of certificate chain verification. See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details. @@ -441,5 +442,6 @@ structures may cause parsing errors. The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod index 0c8e4926c..18eeee04b 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify> [B<-extended_crl>] [B<-use_deltas>] [B<-policy_print>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-untrusted file>] [B<-help>] [B<-issuer_checks>] @@ -108,6 +109,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280). Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280). +=item B<-no_alt_chains> + +When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not +trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can +be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that +only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the +behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions. + =item B<-policy_print> Print out diagnostics related to policy processing. @@ -409,4 +418,8 @@ B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes. L<x509(1)|x509(1)> +=head1 HISTORY + +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod index 81f93c2eb..3b2796c5d 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0, it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length. If B<bottom> is true, the -number will be odd. +number will be odd. The value of B<bits> must be zero or greater. If B<bits> is +1 then B<top> cannot also be 1. BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod index b7c47b9b0..a32cca2ce 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod @@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ BN_mask_bits() truncates B<a> to an B<n> bit number shorter than B<n> bits. BN_lshift() shifts B<a> left by B<n> bits and places the result in -B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). BN_lshift1() shifts B<a> left by one and places -the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>). +B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_lshift1() shifts +B<a> left by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>). BN_rshift() shifts B<a> right by B<n> bits and places the result in -B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). BN_rshift1() shifts B<a> right by one and places -the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>). +B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_rshift1() shifts +B<a> right by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>). For the shift functions, B<r> and B<a> may be the same variable. diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod index 46cac2bea..9d86d4642 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod @@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases without assuming they are hard errors. +The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative +chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate +chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an +alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour +will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b. + =head1 NOTES The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters @@ -166,6 +172,6 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)> =head1 HISTORY -TBA +The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b =cut diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod index 21e9fe3b9..763eb6f53 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod @@ -2,7 +2,29 @@ =head1 NAME -PEM, PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_write_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAparams, PEM_read_DSAparams, PEM_write_bio_DSAparams, PEM_write_DSAparams, PEM_read_bio_DHparams, PEM_read_DHparams, PEM_write_bio_DHparams, PEM_write_DHparams, PEM_read_bio_X509, PEM_read_X509, PEM_write_bio_X509, PEM_write_X509, PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_read_X509_AUX, PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_write_X509_AUX, PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_read_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_write_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_read_X509_CRL, PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_write_X509_CRL, PEM_read_bio_PKCS7, PEM_read_PKCS7, PEM_write_bio_PKCS7, PEM_write_PKCS7, PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE - PEM routines +PEM, PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey, +PEM_write_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey, +PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, +PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY, +PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey, +PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey, +PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey, +PEM_write_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY, +PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey, +PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey, +PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, +PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAparams, PEM_read_DSAparams, +PEM_write_bio_DSAparams, PEM_write_DSAparams, PEM_read_bio_DHparams, +PEM_read_DHparams, PEM_write_bio_DHparams, PEM_write_DHparams, +PEM_read_bio_X509, PEM_read_X509, PEM_write_bio_X509, PEM_write_X509, +PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_read_X509_AUX, PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX, +PEM_write_X509_AUX, PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_read_X509_REQ, +PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_write_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW, +PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_read_X509_CRL, +PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_write_X509_CRL, PEM_read_bio_PKCS7, PEM_read_PKCS7, +PEM_write_bio_PKCS7, PEM_write_PKCS7, PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, +PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, +PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE - PEM routines =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -239,7 +261,8 @@ SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public key is not DSA. The B<DSAparams> functions process DSA parameters using a DSA -structure. The parameters are encoded using a foobar structure. +structure. The parameters are encoded using a Dss-Parms structure +as defined in RFC2459. The B<DHparams> functions process DH parameters using a DH structure. The parameters are encoded using a PKCS#3 DHparameter diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod index 7a27eef50..b754c16a8 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod @@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved. If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward -secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially -the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used -in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE -has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not -very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable -this option. +secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used, +SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup +attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the +computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so +application authors/users should consider always enabling this option. +The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS). As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters. @@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the -openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer -time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters -instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE -is mandatory. +openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application +guarantees that "strong" primes are used. -Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem, -dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current +Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters, which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly. These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the -L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. -Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using -L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were -generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore -recommended. +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH +parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an +attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem +and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by +applications. An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or -can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach -has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different -key lengths. +can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. -The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and -the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the -ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher. +Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength> +parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export +cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites +are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with +SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore +B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit +parameters in the callback. =head1 EXAMPLES -Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling +Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling partly left out.) - ... - /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */ - DH *dh_512 = NULL; - DH *dh_1024 = NULL; - FILE *paramfile; + Command-line parameter generation: + $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048 + + Code for setting up parameters during server initialization: ... - /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */ - paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r"); + SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new(); + ... + + /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */ + DH *dh_2048 = NULL; + FILE *paramfile; + paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r"); if (paramfile) { - dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); + dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); fclose(paramfile); + } else { + /* Error. */ } - /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */ - paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r"); - if (paramfile) { - dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); - fclose(paramfile); + if (dh_2048 == NULL) { + /* Error. */ } - ... - - /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */ - DH *get_dh512() { ... } - DH *get_dh1024() { ... } - - DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) - { - DH *dh_tmp=NULL; - - switch (keylength) { - case 512: - if (!dh_512) - dh_512 = get_dh512(); - dh_tmp = dh_512; - break; - case 1024: - if (!dh_1024) - dh_1024 = get_dh1024(); - dh_tmp = dh_1024; - break; - default: - /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */ - setup_dh_parameters_like_above(); - } - return(dh_tmp); + if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) { + /* Error. */ } + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); + ... =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/openssl/e_os2.h b/openssl/e_os2.h index d400ac77c..2b1b78ffe 100644 --- a/openssl/e_os2.h +++ b/openssl/e_os2.h @@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ extern "C" { # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 # endif +# if defined(_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64) +# undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX +# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) +# define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64 +# endif +# endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINNT) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT @@ -121,7 +127,7 @@ extern "C" { # endif /* Anything that tries to look like Microsoft is "Windows" */ -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) +# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS diff --git a/openssl/engines/Makefile b/openssl/engines/Makefile index 2fa953440..23bd2f37f 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/Makefile +++ b/openssl/engines/Makefile @@ -146,12 +146,15 @@ lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff @target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) -depend: - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \ - $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \ - fi - @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) +update: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) + +depend: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) +local_depend: + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile b/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile index d661c1082..4e183a467 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile @@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ links: tests: -depend: - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \ - $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \ - else \ - $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \ - fi +update: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi + +depend: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi +local_depend: + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) files: @@ -262,8 +263,9 @@ gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h -gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h -gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h +gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h +gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c index 3201b648f..80ef58f8c 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* e_gost_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA GOST_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL), "GOST_IMIT_CTRL"}, {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL), "GOST_IMIT_FINAL"}, {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE), "GOST_IMIT_UPDATE"}, + {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN), "GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01), "PARAM_COPY_GOST01"}, {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94), "PARAM_COPY_GOST94"}, {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT), "PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT"}, diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h index 92be55845..a2018ec4d 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void ERR_GOST_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); # define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL 114 # define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL 140 # define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE 115 +# define GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN 142 # define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01 116 # define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94 117 # define GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT 118 diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c index 2b9669482..953629543 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid) BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ok = 0; + if(!ctx) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_CTX_start(ctx); p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -48,6 +53,10 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid) x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if(!p || !a || !b || !x || !y || !q) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } while (params->nid != NID_undef && params->nid != nid) params++; if (params->nid == NID_undef) { @@ -55,18 +64,33 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid) GOST_R_UNSUPPORTED_PARAMETER_SET); goto err; } - BN_hex2bn(&p, params->p); - BN_hex2bn(&a, params->a); - BN_hex2bn(&b, params->b); + if(!BN_hex2bn(&p, params->p) + || !BN_hex2bn(&a, params->a) + || !BN_hex2bn(&b, params->b)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } grp = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx); + if(!grp) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } P = EC_POINT_new(grp); + if(!P) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } - BN_hex2bn(&x, params->x); - BN_hex2bn(&y, params->y); - EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(grp, P, x, y, ctx); - BN_hex2bn(&q, params->q); + if(!BN_hex2bn(&x, params->x) + || !BN_hex2bn(&y, params->y) + || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(grp, P, x, y, ctx) + || !BN_hex2bn(&q, params->q)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef DEBUG_KEYS fprintf(stderr, "Set params index %d oid %s\nq=", (params - R3410_2001_paramset), OBJ_nid2sn(params->nid)); @@ -74,16 +98,23 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif - EC_GROUP_set_generator(grp, P, q, NULL); + if(!EC_GROUP_set_generator(grp, P, q, NULL)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(grp, params->nid); - - EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, grp); + if(!EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, grp)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } ok = 1; err: - EC_POINT_free(P); - EC_GROUP_free(grp); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); + if (P) EC_POINT_free(P); + if (grp) EC_GROUP_free(grp); + if (ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } return ok; } @@ -94,7 +125,7 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid) */ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey) { - DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL; + DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL, *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *md = hashsum2bn(dgst); BIGNUM *order = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; @@ -103,6 +134,10 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey) NULL, *e = NULL; EC_POINT *C = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if(!ctx || !md) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_CTX_start(ctx); OPENSSL_assert(dlen == 32); newsig = DSA_SIG_new(); @@ -111,11 +146,25 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey) goto err; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); + if(!group) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx); + if(!order || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); + if(!priv_key) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx); + if(!e || !BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef DEBUG_SIGN fprintf(stderr, "digest as bignum="); BN_print_fp(stderr, md); @@ -128,55 +177,80 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey) } k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); C = EC_POINT_new(group); + if(!k || !C) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } do { do { if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, GOST_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATOR_FAILED); - DSA_SIG_free(newsig); - newsig = NULL; goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, C, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - DSA_SIG_free(newsig); - newsig = NULL; goto err; } if (!X) X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (!r) + r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (!X || !r) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, C, X, NULL, ctx)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - DSA_SIG_free(newsig); - newsig = NULL; goto err; } - if (!r) - r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx); + + if(!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } } while (BN_is_zero(r)); /* s = (r*priv_key+k*e) mod order */ if (!tmp) tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, r, order, ctx); if (!tmp2) tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, e, order, ctx); if (!s) s = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - BN_mod_add(s, tmp, tmp2, order, ctx); + if (!tmp || !tmp2 || !s) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if(!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, r, order, ctx) + || !BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, e, order, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add(s, tmp, tmp2, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } } while (BN_is_zero(s)); newsig->s = BN_dup(s); newsig->r = BN_dup(r); + if(!newsig->s || !newsig->r) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + ret = newsig; err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - EC_POINT_free(C); - BN_free(md); - return newsig; + if(ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (C) EC_POINT_free(C); + if (md) BN_free(md); + if (!ret && newsig) { + DSA_SIG_free(newsig); + } + return ret; } /* @@ -196,6 +270,11 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; int ok = 0; + if(!ctx || !group) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -205,9 +284,17 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); R = BN_CTX_get(ctx); v = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if(!order || !e || !z1 || !z2 || !tmp || !X || !R || !v) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } - EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx); pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec); + if(!pub_key || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_zero(sig->r) || (BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 1) || (BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 1)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, @@ -217,19 +304,28 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, } md = hashsum2bn(dgst); - BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx); + if(!md || !BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef DEBUG_SIGN fprintf(stderr, "digest as bignum: "); BN_print_fp(stderr, md); fprintf(stderr, "\ndigest mod q: "); BN_print_fp(stderr, e); #endif - if (BN_is_zero(e)) - BN_one(e); + if (BN_is_zero(e) && !BN_one(e)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } v = BN_mod_inverse(v, e, order, ctx); - BN_mod_mul(z1, sig->s, v, order, ctx); - BN_sub(tmp, order, sig->r); - BN_mod_mul(z2, tmp, v, order, ctx); + if(!v + || !BN_mod_mul(z1, sig->s, v, order, ctx) + || !BN_sub(tmp, order, sig->r) + || !BN_mod_mul(z2, tmp, v, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef DEBUG_SIGN fprintf(stderr, "\nInverted digest value: "); BN_print_fp(stderr, v); @@ -239,6 +335,10 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, BN_print_fp(stderr, z2); #endif C = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (!C) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, C, z1, pub_key, z2, ctx)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; @@ -247,7 +347,10 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - BN_mod(R, X, order, ctx); + if(!BN_mod(R, X, order, ctx)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef DEBUG_SIGN fprintf(stderr, "\nX="); BN_print_fp(stderr, X); @@ -261,10 +364,12 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ok = 1; } err: - EC_POINT_free(C); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_free(md); + if (C) EC_POINT_free(C); + if (ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if (md) BN_free(md); return ok; } @@ -287,6 +392,10 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec) return 0; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if(!ctx) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (!(priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec))) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); @@ -294,6 +403,10 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec) } pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group); + if(!pub_key) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; @@ -304,9 +417,11 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec) } ok = 256; err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - EC_POINT_free(pub_key); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); + if (pub_key) EC_POINT_free(pub_key); + if (ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } return ok; } @@ -320,7 +435,13 @@ int gost2001_keygen(EC_KEY *ec) { BIGNUM *order = BN_new(), *d = BN_new(); const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); - EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL); + + if(!group || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + BN_free(d); + BN_free(order); + return 0; + } do { if (!BN_rand_range(d, order)) { @@ -332,7 +453,13 @@ int gost2001_keygen(EC_KEY *ec) } } while (BN_is_zero(d)); - EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d); + + if(!EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + BN_free(d); + BN_free(order); + return 0; + } BN_free(d); BN_free(order); return gost2001_compute_public(ec); diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c index 85f4bc899..ce57f17cb 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); gost_ctx cctx; int key_is_ephemeral = 1; + int tmp_outlen; EVP_PKEY *mykey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(ctx); /* Do not use vizir cipher parameters with cryptopro */ @@ -174,12 +175,13 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, } ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher); gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(param->nid); - *outlen = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt, out ? &out : NULL); - if (*outlen <= 0) { + tmp_outlen = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt, out ? &out : NULL); + if (tmp_outlen <= 0) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST94CP_ENCRYPT, GOST_R_ERROR_PACKING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO); goto err; } + *outlen = tmp_outlen; if (!key_is_ephemeral) { /* Set control "public key from client certificate used" */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 3, NULL) <= diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c index 713a0face..b7c5354c1 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c @@ -115,7 +115,10 @@ static int decode_gost_algor_params(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_ALGOR *palg) } param_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(gkp->key_params); GOST_KEY_PARAMS_free(gkp); - EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, pkey_nid); + if(!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, pkey_nid)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_DECODE_GOST_ALGOR_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } switch (pkey_nid) { case NID_id_GostR3410_94: { @@ -552,9 +555,19 @@ static int param_copy_gost01(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) } if (!eto) { eto = EC_KEY_new(); - EVP_PKEY_assign(to, EVP_PKEY_base_id(from), eto); + if(!eto) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if(!EVP_PKEY_assign(to, EVP_PKEY_base_id(from), eto)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if(!EC_KEY_set_group(eto, EC_KEY_get0_group(efrom))) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - EC_KEY_set_group(eto, EC_KEY_get0_group(efrom)); if (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eto)) { gost2001_compute_public(eto); } @@ -729,8 +742,21 @@ static int pub_encode_gost01(X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk) } X = BN_new(); Y = BN_new(); - EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec), - pub_key, X, Y, NULL); + if(!X || !Y) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_ENCODE_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if(X) BN_free(X); + if(Y) BN_free(Y); + BN_free(order); + return 0; + } + if(!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec), + pub_key, X, Y, NULL)) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_ENCODE_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + BN_free(X); + BN_free(Y); + BN_free(order); + return 0; + } data_len = 2 * BN_num_bytes(order); BN_free(order); databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c index 9af7b06d4..b6275b255 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, long keylen; int ret; unsigned char *keybuf = string_to_hex(value, &keylen); - if (keylen != 32) { + if (!keybuf || keylen != 32) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL_STR, GOST_R_INVALID_MAC_KEY_LENGTH); OPENSSL_free(keybuf); diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c index 0116e4740..07ad921ab 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/dsa.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> #include "gost_params.h" #include "gost_lcl.h" @@ -52,11 +53,16 @@ void dump_dsa_sig(const char *message, DSA_SIG *sig) DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { BIGNUM *k = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL; - DSA_SIG *newsig = DSA_SIG_new(); + DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL, *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *md = hashsum2bn(dgst); /* check if H(M) mod q is zero */ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if(!ctx) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_CTX_start(ctx); + newsig = DSA_SIG_new(); if (!newsig) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, GOST_R_NO_MEMORY); goto err; @@ -64,6 +70,10 @@ DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if(!tmp || !k || !tmp2) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_mod(tmp, md, dsa->q, ctx); if (BN_is_zero(tmp)) { BN_one(md); @@ -76,24 +86,41 @@ DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q); /* generate r = (a^x mod p) mod q */ BN_mod_exp(tmp, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx); - if (!(newsig->r)) + if (!(newsig->r)) { newsig->r = BN_new(); + if(!newsig->r) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } BN_mod(newsig->r, tmp, dsa->q, ctx); } while (BN_is_zero(newsig->r)); /* generate s = (xr + k(Hm)) mod q */ BN_mod_mul(tmp, dsa->priv_key, newsig->r, dsa->q, ctx); BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, md, dsa->q, ctx); - if (!newsig->s) + if (!newsig->s) { newsig->s = BN_new(); + if(!newsig->s) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } BN_mod_add(newsig->s, tmp, tmp2, dsa->q, ctx); } while (BN_is_zero(newsig->s)); + + ret = newsig; err: BN_free(md); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - return newsig; + if(ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + if(!ret && newsig) { + DSA_SIG_free(newsig); + } + return ret; } /* @@ -135,17 +162,21 @@ int pack_sign_cp(DSA_SIG *s, int order, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen) int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { - BIGNUM *md, *tmp = NULL; + BIGNUM *md = NULL, *tmp = NULL; BIGNUM *q2 = NULL; BIGNUM *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *z1 = NULL, *z2 = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL; - int ok; + int ok = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if(!ctx) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (BN_cmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 1 || BN_cmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 1) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, GOST_R_SIGNATURE_PARTS_GREATER_THAN_Q); - return 0; + goto err; } md = hashsum2bn(dgst); @@ -157,6 +188,10 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if(!tmp || !v || !q2 || !z1 || !z2 || !tmp2 || !tmp3 || !u) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } BN_mod(tmp, md, dsa->q, ctx); if (BN_is_zero(tmp)) { @@ -172,15 +207,18 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, BN_mod_exp(tmp2, dsa->pub_key, z2, dsa->p, ctx); BN_mod_mul(tmp3, tmp, tmp2, dsa->p, ctx); BN_mod(u, tmp3, dsa->q, ctx); - ok = BN_cmp(u, sig->r); + ok = (BN_cmp(u, sig->r) == 0); - BN_free(md); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - if (ok != 0) { + if (!ok) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, GOST_R_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH); } - return (ok == 0); +err: + if(md) BN_free(md); + if(ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + } + return ok; } /* @@ -190,13 +228,24 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, int gost94_compute_public(DSA *dsa) { /* Now fill algorithm parameters with correct values */ - BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + BN_CTX *ctx; if (!dsa->g) { GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, GOST_R_KEY_IS_NOT_INITALIZED); return 0; } - /* Compute public key y = a^x mod p */ + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if(!ctx) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + dsa->pub_key = BN_new(); + if(!dsa->pub_key) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return 0; + } + /* Compute public key y = a^x mod p */ BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return 1; @@ -243,6 +292,10 @@ int fill_GOST94_params(DSA *dsa, int nid) int gost_sign_keygen(DSA *dsa) { dsa->priv_key = BN_new(); + if(!dsa->priv_key) { + GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } BN_rand_range(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q); return gost94_compute_public(dsa); } diff --git a/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c index 1005dfc90..8a23763f7 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c +++ b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c @@ -712,10 +712,12 @@ static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, /* set public big nums */ rsatmp->e = BN_new(); rsatmp->n = BN_new(); + if(!rsatmp->e || !rsatmp->n) + goto err; bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); - if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) || - !rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + if (rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) || + rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) goto err; ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el, (unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d, @@ -752,15 +754,16 @@ static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, dsatmp->p = BN_new(); dsatmp->q = BN_new(); dsatmp->g = BN_new(); + if(!dsatmp->pub_key || !dsatmp->p || !dsatmp->q || !dsatmp->g) + goto err; bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); - if (!dsatmp->pub_key - || dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) - || !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) - || !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) - || !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + if (dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) + || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) goto err; ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el, @@ -1038,10 +1041,12 @@ static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, } psign->r = BN_new(); psign->s = BN_new(); + if(!psign->r || !psign->s) + goto err; bn_expand2(psign->r, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_expand2(psign->s, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); - if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) || - !psign->s || psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + if (psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) || + psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) goto err; ret = p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg, flen, from, (unsigned long *)psign->r->d, @@ -1070,9 +1075,9 @@ static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, char msg[64] = "ENGINE_modexp"; if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp) { SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); - } else { + } else if (r) { bn_expand2(r, m->top); - if (r && r->dmax == m->top) { + if (r->dmax == m->top) { /* do it */ ret = p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg, m->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG), diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec index 40ac462c7..3e8f3a9d6 100644 --- a/openssl/openssl.spec +++ b/openssl/openssl.spec @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools Name: openssl #Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel} -Version: 1.0.1m +Version: 1.0.1o Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz License: OpenSSL Group: System Environment/Libraries diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile index 8dd390e67..29d9e4528 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -89,12 +89,13 @@ tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff -depend: - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \ - $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \ - else \ - $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \ - fi +update: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi + +depend: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi +local_depend: + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new @@ -507,26 +508,27 @@ s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_pkt.c s2_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h -s2_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h -s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c ssl_locl.h +s2_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h +s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c +s2_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h s3_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index c18ec03bd..8dd8ea33c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -485,6 +485,12 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) return i; } + if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; @@ -869,6 +875,20 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) /* parse the message fragment header */ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); + len = msg_hdr.msg_len; + frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; + frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; + + /* + * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read. + * Fragments must not span records. + */ + if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) { + al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + /* * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time @@ -879,10 +899,6 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1)) return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); - len = msg_hdr.msg_len; - frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; - frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; - if (frag_len && frag_len < len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok); @@ -913,17 +929,16 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max))) goto f_err; - /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ - s->state = stn; - if (frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0); + /* - * XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets + * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked + * that we have enough data in the record */ if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; @@ -944,6 +959,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) } *ok = 1; + s->state = stn; /* * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in @@ -1540,7 +1556,10 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + return -1; + } r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); @@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret; + int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ @@ -1622,10 +1641,12 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) + goto err; p += 16; /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) + goto err; ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); if (ret >= 0) { @@ -1638,6 +1659,7 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } +err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 1394781c0..377c1e61f 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -221,10 +222,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -233,12 +236,14 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } /* setup buffing BIO */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -417,6 +422,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } break; @@ -548,6 +554,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -555,6 +562,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -735,6 +743,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) goto end; /* break; */ + case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; @@ -945,6 +954,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s) f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 94acb15de..011d7b7cb 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -496,6 +496,9 @@ int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client) { int ret; + /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ + SSL_clear(s); + SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); s->d1->listen = 1; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 7b49a7dd7..d659ed428 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); - goto err; + goto f_err; } /* diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c index c4ec9fe10..41c7dc519 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -224,11 +224,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -236,6 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -257,6 +260,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) #endif if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -470,7 +474,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif - || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) + || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL @@ -665,15 +669,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - /* - * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be - * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need - * to set this here because we don't know if we're - * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -690,11 +685,10 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: /* - * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes. - * In a full handshake, we end up here through - * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was - * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. + * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make + * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the + * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be + * cautious. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. @@ -744,6 +738,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -772,6 +767,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -852,6 +848,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) goto end; /* break; */ + case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; @@ -932,6 +929,7 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c index 614b9a35d..7a6188813 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c @@ -576,6 +576,20 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) s->s2->padding = p; s->s2->mac_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3]); s->s2->wact_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3 + mac_size]); + + /* + * It would be clearer to write this as follows: + * if (mac_size + len + p > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER) + * However |len| is user input that could in theory be very large. We + * know |mac_size| and |p| are small, so to avoid any possibility of + * overflow we write it like this. + * + * In theory this should never fail because the logic above should have + * modified |len| if it is too big. But we are being cautious. + */ + if (len > (SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER - (mac_size + p))) { + return -1; + } /* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */ memcpy(s->s2->wact_data, buf, len); if (p) diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 19bb48c9c..4289272b7 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 +#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" # include <stdio.h> # include <openssl/bio.h> # include <openssl/rand.h> @@ -372,12 +373,15 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s) static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) { int is_export, i, n, keya; - unsigned int ek; + unsigned int num_encrypted_key_bytes, key_length; unsigned long len; unsigned char *p; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; const EVP_CIPHER *c; const EVP_MD *md; + unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char decrypt_good; + size_t j; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) { @@ -465,12 +469,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) return (0); } - if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) { - is_export = 1; - ek = 8; - } else - ek = 5; - /* * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is * 1 byte message type @@ -484,12 +482,27 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) * * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of - * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, - * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length - * must be zero). + * this portion is in |num_encrypted_key_bytes|. If the cipher is not an + * export cipher, then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear + * key length must be zero). */ - if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || - (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + key_length = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + if (key_length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) { + is_export = 1; + num_encrypted_key_bytes = 8; + } else if (is_export) { + num_encrypted_key_bytes = 5; + } else { + num_encrypted_key_bytes = key_length; + } + + if (s->s2->tmp.clear + num_encrypted_key_bytes != key_length) { ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; @@ -499,64 +512,49 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. */ - if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || - (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { + if (s->s2->tmp.enc < num_encrypted_key_bytes) { ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return -1; } + /* + * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of + * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, + * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and + * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt + * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 + */ + + /* + * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. + */ + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0) + return 0; + i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - - /* bad decrypt */ -# if 1 + ERR_clear_error(); /* * If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master * secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ - if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) - || (is_export && i != (int)ek))) { - ERR_clear_error(); - if (is_export) - i = ek; - else - i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0) - return 0; - } -# else - if (i < 0) { - error = 1; - SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - } - /* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */ - else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) - || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear + i != - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))) { - error = 1; - SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS); - } - if (error) { - ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); - return (-1); + decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(i, (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes); + for (j = 0; j < num_encrypted_key_bytes; j++) { + p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j] = + constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j], + rand_premaster_secret[j]); } -# endif - if (is_export) - i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + s->session->master_key_length = (int)key_length; + memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, key_length); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, key_length); - if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - s->session->master_key_length = i; - memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, (unsigned int)i); - return (1); + return 1; } static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c index 77374f41e..107b460f2 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); - if (i == 0) + if (i <= 0) return 0; s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 598d27edc..2fb71f277 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) { /* First packet is even in size, so check */ - if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) && + if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) && !(padding_length & 1)) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; } @@ -639,12 +639,22 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, if (k > 0) { if (is_sslv3) { + unsigned overhang; + /* * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header - * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). + * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no + * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and + * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be + * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just + * in case */ - unsigned overhang = header_length - md_block_size; + if (header_length <= md_block_size) { + /* Should never happen */ + return; + } + overhang = header_length - md_block_size; md_transform(md_state.c, header); memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 0e5acecab..0879a0f8b 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ #endif static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) @@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; ret = -1; goto end; } @@ -245,10 +249,12 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -263,6 +269,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) /* setup buffing BIO */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -317,12 +324,24 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */ + ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); + if (ret < 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 1) { + s->hit = 1; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + } +#endif /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */ /* or PSK */ if (! (s->s3->tmp. new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) -&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -358,6 +377,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } break; @@ -381,6 +401,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } } @@ -472,6 +493,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -479,6 +501,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -553,7 +576,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) @@ -612,6 +636,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) goto end; /* break; */ + case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; @@ -658,9 +683,17 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - if ((sess == NULL) || - (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || - !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) { + if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + !sess->session_id_length || +#else + /* + * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared + * "ticket" without a session ID. + */ + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || +#endif + (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } @@ -798,6 +831,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -867,10 +901,19 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* - * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared - * secret + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. + * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST + * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone + * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if + * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the + * server wants to resume. */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && + s->session->tlsext_tick) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, @@ -879,12 +922,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j); - s->hit = 1; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length + if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { @@ -895,12 +941,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } s->hit = 1; - } - /* a miss or crap from the other end */ - if (!s->hit) { + } else { /* - * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so - * we don't stuff up other people + * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server + * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, + * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be + * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { @@ -1045,6 +1092,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -1223,8 +1271,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); @@ -1546,6 +1596,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } + + if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa; rsa = NULL; } @@ -1894,6 +1951,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -2050,7 +2108,10 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) ca_sk = NULL; ret = 1; + goto done; err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + done: if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return (ret); @@ -2085,6 +2146,38 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) } p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + /* + * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new + * one + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { + /* + * Remove the old session from the cache + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) { + if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx, + s->session); + } else { + /* We carry on if this fails */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } + } + + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); n2s(p, ticklen); /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ @@ -2127,6 +2220,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -2187,6 +2281,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } #endif @@ -2208,6 +2303,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } ret = 1; @@ -2506,8 +2602,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n += 2; DH_free(dh_clnt); - - /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */ } #endif @@ -2729,7 +2823,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* Generate session key */ - RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32); + if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + goto err; + } /* * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ @@ -2948,6 +3045,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -3081,6 +3179,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -3149,6 +3248,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) if (!l) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } s->init_num = (int)l; @@ -3165,6 +3265,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) int i, idx; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int pkey_bits; SESS_CERT *sc; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; @@ -3172,6 +3273,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; #endif + int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; @@ -3207,6 +3309,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } #endif pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); + pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); @@ -3224,38 +3327,71 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && - !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } + if (rsa != NULL) { + /* server key exchange is not allowed. */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + } + } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && - !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); + if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; - } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { + } + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); goto f_err; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); goto f_err; } # endif -#endif - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) { + /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { + int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p); + if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768) + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - if (rsa == NULL - || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 > + if (rsa == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; @@ -3263,14 +3399,21 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { - if (dh == NULL - || DH_size(dh) * 8 > + if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { + if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; } else #endif { @@ -3281,12 +3424,62 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } return (1); f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (0); } -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/* + * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from + * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server + * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming. + * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead. + * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external + * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message + * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error. + */ +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb || + !s->session->tlsext_tick) + return 0; + + /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */ + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* + * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead, + * so permit appropriate message length. + * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type + * and not its length. + */ + s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + + if (!ok) + return -1; + + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + return 1; + + /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */ + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) { unsigned int len, padding_len; @@ -3309,8 +3502,8 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && - * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c index 7c9f20c8f..25cf929a5 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -347,11 +347,22 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) if (version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) - && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) + && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + /* + * The record is using an incorrect version number, but + * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't + * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or + * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't + * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end. + */ + goto err; + } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; + } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index b8f91bc94..9aa329260 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; @@ -273,11 +274,13 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -285,6 +288,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -320,6 +325,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } else { /* @@ -379,6 +385,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } } @@ -529,9 +536,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) skip = 1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } + } } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); @@ -629,11 +639,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) */ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } } else { int offset = 0; int dgst_num; @@ -647,9 +660,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next * step */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } + } for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { int dgst_size; @@ -665,6 +681,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); if (dgst_size < 0) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; ret = -1; goto end; } @@ -675,15 +692,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - /* - * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be - * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need - * to set this here because we don't know if we're - * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -703,11 +711,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: /* - * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. - * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through - * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was - * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. + * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make + * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the + * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be + * cautious. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. @@ -726,10 +733,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: /* - * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. - * In a full handshake, we end up here through - * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was - * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make + * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has + * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until @@ -779,6 +784,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -795,6 +801,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } @@ -857,6 +864,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) goto end; /* break; */ + case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; @@ -992,6 +1000,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* + * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte + * for session id length + */ + if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + + /* * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ @@ -1022,6 +1040,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); if (cookie_length == 0) @@ -1035,6 +1059,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) /* get the session-id */ j = *(p++); + if (p + j > d + n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + s->hit = 0; /* * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in @@ -1079,8 +1109,19 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* cookie stuff */ + if (p + 1 > d + n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } cookie_len = *(p++); + if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it @@ -1121,27 +1162,33 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) p += cookie_len; } + if (p + 2 > d + n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } n2s(p, i); - if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { - /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ + + if (i == 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } - if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) { + + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ + if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { /* not enough data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) - == NULL)) { + if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { goto err; } p += i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { + if (s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; @@ -1377,8 +1424,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ciphers = NULL; @@ -1450,8 +1497,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + } + if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return (ret); @@ -1468,8 +1517,10 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT p = s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } #endif /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = &(buf[4]); @@ -1504,6 +1555,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } *(p++) = sl; @@ -1526,6 +1578,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } if ((p = @@ -1533,6 +1586,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } #endif @@ -2016,6 +2070,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -2113,6 +2168,7 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -2367,6 +2423,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) int padl, outl; krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; krb5_ticket_times ttimes; + int kerr = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); @@ -2470,23 +2527,27 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; + kerr = 1; + goto kclean; } if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; + kerr = 1; + goto kclean; } if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; + kerr = 1; + goto kclean; } outl += padl; if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; + kerr = 1; + goto kclean; } if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { @@ -2503,7 +2564,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; + kerr = 1; + goto kclean; } } @@ -2529,6 +2591,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ + + kclean: + OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); + if (kerr) + goto err; } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ @@ -2847,6 +2914,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) s-> session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); + OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) @@ -2879,6 +2947,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } @@ -2894,39 +2963,31 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + /* + * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received + * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non + * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even + * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static + * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the + * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. + */ + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, - -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); + SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); - if (s->session->peer != NULL) { - peer = s->session->peer; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); - type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); - } else { - peer = NULL; - pkey = NULL; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - if (peer != NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } - - if (peer == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); + type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, @@ -2935,12 +2996,6 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) goto f_err; } - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ @@ -3093,6 +3148,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; } end: if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { @@ -3251,8 +3307,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + } + if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (sk != NULL) @@ -3273,6 +3331,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (0); } } @@ -3280,6 +3339,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); if (!l) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; @@ -3315,11 +3375,15 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ - if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) + if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); - if (!senc) + if (!senc) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); @@ -3442,6 +3506,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } @@ -3455,8 +3520,10 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; + } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; @@ -3499,6 +3566,7 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } @@ -3518,11 +3586,14 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } - if (n < 2) + if (n < 2) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ + } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; @@ -3534,15 +3605,20 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ proto_len = p[0]; - if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) + if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; + } padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; - if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) + if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; + } s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index b93b67b14..d2ab0c074 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -1544,6 +1544,7 @@ extern "C" { # define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000 # define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT) +# define SSL_ST_ERR 0x05 # define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 # define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 @@ -2303,6 +2304,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304 +# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 @@ -2408,6 +2410,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 +# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312 @@ -2522,6 +2525,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 +# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334 diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index ac7312e31..88621b725 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"}, @@ -298,6 +299,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT), @@ -440,6 +442,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC), "decryption failed or bad record mac"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG), "dh public value length is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"}, diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index dead12618..e11746a69 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1440,9 +1440,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return (NULL); } - if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) + if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ - else { + if(sk == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } else { sk = *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h index aff3b65d1..a7f3f8dad 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -865,6 +865,7 @@ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type); int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len, const unsigned char *limit); +SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c index fb4e8c525..1ad9dc794 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -227,6 +227,130 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) return (ss); } +/* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) +{ + SSL_SESSION *dest; + + dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src)); + if (dest == NULL) { + goto err; + } + memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest)); + + /* + * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in + * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + dest->psk_identity = NULL; +#endif + dest->ciphers = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; + dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; +# endif +#endif + dest->tlsext_tick = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + dest->srp_username = NULL; +#endif + memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data)); + + /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */ + dest->prev = NULL; + dest->next = NULL; + + dest->references = 1; + + if (src->sess_cert != NULL) + CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT); + + if (src->peer != NULL) + CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (src->psk_identity_hint) { + dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); + if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + if (src->psk_identity) { + dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity); + if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + if(src->ciphers != NULL) { + dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers); + if (dest->ciphers == NULL) + goto err; + } + + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, + &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (src->tlsext_hostname) { + dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname); + if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { + dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = + BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); + if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { + dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = + BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, + src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); + if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) + goto err; + } +# endif +#endif + + if (ticket != 0) { + dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); + if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL) + goto err; + } else { + dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; + dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (src->srp_username) { + dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username); + if (dest->srp_username == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + return dest; +err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSL_SESSION_free(dest); + return NULL; +} + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { @@ -478,9 +602,14 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, int r; #endif - if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) + if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) goto err; + if (session_id + len > limit) { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + if (len == 0) try_session_cache = 0; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c index d725d7834..1b9069f97 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s) case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str = "ok/accept SSL initialization"; break; + case SSL_ST_ERR: + str = "error"; + break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION: str = "SSLv2 client start encryption"; @@ -496,6 +499,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s) case SSL_ST_OK: str = "SSLOK "; break; + case SSL_ST_ERR: + str = "SSLERR"; + break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION: str = "2CSENC"; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c index 8efbff738..6a0c293aa 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -336,7 +336,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void) " -bytes <val> - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH fprintf(stderr, - " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE\n"); + " -dhe512 - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe - disable DHE\n"); @@ -531,7 +533,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) long bytes = 256L; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; - int dhe1024 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0; + int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; @@ -611,19 +613,19 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) debug = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0) reuse = 1; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024") == 0) { + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dhe1024 = 1; + dhe512 = 1; #else fprintf(stderr, - "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); + "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); #endif } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dhe1024dsa = 1; #else fprintf(stderr, - "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); + "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); #endif } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) no_dhe = 1; @@ -905,10 +907,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) */ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); dh = get_dh1024dsa(); - } else if (dhe1024) - dh = get_dh1024(); - else + } else if (dhe512) dh = get_dh512(); + else + dh = get_dh1024(); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh); DH_free(dh); } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 4e2845fa6..8f45294e5 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; } - if(!count) { + if (!count) { /* Should never happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { - unsigned char buf[13], *seq; + unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq; seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence; @@ -809,7 +809,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; - pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); + pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, + EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf); + if (pad <= 0) + return -1; if (send) { l += pad; rec->length += pad; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 243a70f7a..d70b93fea 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1016,19 +1016,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, s->srtp_profile = NULL; - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + if (data == d + n) goto ri_check; + + if (data > (d + n - 2)) + goto err; + n2s(data, len); if (data > (d + n - len)) - goto ri_check; + goto err; while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (data + size > (d + n)) - goto ri_check; + goto err; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); # endif @@ -1064,16 +1068,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int servname_type; int dsize; - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (size < 2) + goto err; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize > size) + goto err; sdata = data; while (dsize > 3) { @@ -1081,18 +1081,16 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, n2s(sdata, len); dsize -= 3; - if (len > dsize) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (len > dsize) + goto err; + if (s->servername_done == 0) switch (servname_type) { case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) + goto err; + if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; @@ -1126,31 +1124,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, dsize -= len; } - if (dsize != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize != 0) + goto err; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) + goto err; + if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) + goto err; if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) + goto err; } # endif @@ -1159,10 +1149,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) + goto err; if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); @@ -1196,15 +1184,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ - ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) + goto err; + if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) + goto err; + s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { @@ -1273,28 +1259,20 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { int dsize; - if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) + goto err; sigalg_seen = 1; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) + goto err; + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) + goto err; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - if (size < 5) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (size < 5) + goto err; s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; size--; @@ -1304,35 +1282,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, /* Read in responder_id_list */ n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize > size) + goto err; while (dsize > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize < 4) + goto err; n2s(data, idsize); dsize -= 2 + idsize; size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize < 0) + goto err; sdata = data; data += idsize; id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (!id) + goto err; if (data != sdata) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; + goto err; } if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = @@ -1349,16 +1318,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, } /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (size < 2) + goto err; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (dsize != size) + goto err; sdata = data; if (dsize > 0) { if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { @@ -1368,10 +1333,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) + goto err; } } /* @@ -1432,6 +1395,10 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, data += size; } + /* Spurious data on the end */ + if (data != d + n) + goto err; + *p = data; ri_check: @@ -1447,6 +1414,9 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, } return 1; +err: + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -2612,7 +2582,10 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + return -1; + } r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); @@ -2647,7 +2620,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret; + int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ @@ -2695,10 +2668,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } p += 16; /* Random padding */ - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); if (ret >= 0) { @@ -2710,6 +2689,7 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } +err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c index d36cfa0a5..bb719ba4c 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c @@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) { unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0) + return -1; s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a); OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); diff --git a/openssl/test/Makefile b/openssl/test/Makefile index 9aa920de1..0ee4ec285 100644 --- a/openssl/test/Makefile +++ b/openssl/test/Makefile @@ -337,12 +337,13 @@ test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff -depend: - @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \ - $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \ - else \ - $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \ - fi +update: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi + +depend: local_depend + @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi +local_depend: + @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new @@ -354,10 +355,10 @@ clean: rm -f .rnd tmp.bntest tmp.bctest *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE) *.ss *.srl log dummytest $(DLIBSSL): - (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all) + (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl) $(DLIBCRYPTO): - (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all) + (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto) BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \ diff --git a/openssl/test/testssl b/openssl/test/testssl index 9fb89a3dd..b9b86b3b6 100644 --- a/openssl/test/testssl +++ b/openssl/test/testssl @@ -119,10 +119,9 @@ $ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1 echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify $ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth -app_verify $CA $extra || exit 1 -echo "Testing ciphersuites" -for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do - echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol" - for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do +test_cipher() { + local cipher=$1 + local protocol=$2 echo "Testing $cipher" prot="" if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then @@ -133,7 +132,38 @@ for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do echo "Failed $cipher" exit 1 fi +} + +echo "Testing ciphersuites" +for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do + echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol" + for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do + test_cipher $cipher $protocol done + if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then + echo "skipping RSA+DHE tests" + else + for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do + test_cipher $cipher $protocol + done + echo "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure" + if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then + $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512 -ssl3 + else + $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512 + fi + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "FAIL: connection with weak DH succeeded" + exit 1 + fi + fi + if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-ec; then + echo "skipping RSA+ECDHE tests" + else + for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EECDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do + test_cipher $cipher $protocol + done + fi done ############################################################################# diff --git a/openssl/tools/Makefile b/openssl/tools/Makefile index bb6fb71f3..c1a2f6bcc 100644 --- a/openssl/tools/Makefile +++ b/openssl/tools/Makefile @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ tags: errors: +update: depend + depend: dclean: diff --git a/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl b/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl index 83334a253..6733d1bed 100644 --- a/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl +++ b/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ open(IN,"<$infile") || die "unable to open $infile:$!\n"; $_=<IN>; for (;;) { - chop; + s/\s*$//; # was chop, didn't work in mixture of perls for Windows... ($key,$val)=/^([^=]+)=(.*)/; if ($key eq "RELATIVE_DIRECTORY") diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl index 8d2fdbc7e..d87c4fd22 100644 --- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl +++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl @@ -534,14 +534,21 @@ EOF # First, read any existing reason string definitions: my %err_reason_strings; if (open(IN,"<$cfile")) { + my $line = ""; while (<IN>) { - if (/\b(${lib}_R_\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) { - $err_reason_strings{$1} = $2; - } - if (/\b${lib}_F_(\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) { - if (!exists $ftrans{$1} && ($1 ne $2)) { - print STDERR "WARNING: Mismatched function string $2\n"; - $ftrans{$1} = $2; + chomp; + $_ = $line . $_; + $line = ""; + if (/{ERR_(FUNC|REASON)\(/) { + if (/\b(${lib}_R_\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) { + $err_reason_strings{$1} = $2; + } elsif (/\b${lib}_F_(\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) { + if (!exists $ftrans{$1} && ($1 ne $2)) { + print STDERR "WARNING: Mismatched function string $2\n"; + $ftrans{$1} = $2; + } + } else { + $line = $_; } } } diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl index b41bb45e8..6d036644d 100644 --- a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl +++ b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ sub do_link_rule local($ret,$_); $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/'; - $n=&bname($targer); + $n=&bname($target); $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n"; $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n"; return($ret); diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl index e95dcbca5..3b64a5a89 100755 --- a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl +++ b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ sub do_link_rule my($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs,$standalone)=@_; local($ret,$_); $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/'; - $n=&bname($targer); + $n=&bname($target); $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n"; if ($standalone == 1) { |